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Abstract 
   
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine two ―large‖ and somewhat diffuse questions: the 
first is the question of why the novel reader reads; the second, the question of what the 
meaning of life is. The former is not often asked by contemporary literary theorists, 
although it does still have a ―quiet‖ presence amongst critical and theoretical works. 
The latter question, despite its  somewhat  anachronistic  and ―unfashionable‖  nature, 
remains a cause of anxiety in the secularised post/modern world, where God is often 
defined as ―dead‖ and the answers to the question of meaning are no longer given. It 
will be argued that the answers to both questions are very much related: the novel 
reader is what Walter Benjamin somewhat offhandedly calls a ―shivering reader‖—an 
existentially anxious reader—and his or her motive for reading is to better understand 
the  meaning  of  life.  The  shivering  reader  searches  for  answers  to  the  question  of 
meaning by looking to the novel‘s fictional characters from which the reader derives the 
warmth  of  wisdom  and  insight  into  the  creation  and  revelation  of  meaning.  These 
insights are derived from the characters either explicitly—from their direct, authoritative, 
dying revelations—or implicitly—from the reader‘s evaluation of the characters‘ choices 
of meaningful projects and their actions. These insights enable the reader to better 
inform his or her own meaningful choices. Moreover, as Benjamin claims, the reader 
looks primarily to fiction because of the modern world‘s privatisation of death—a world 
in which death and the dying‘s revelations are no longer omnipresent. This thesis will 
argue that Benjamin‘s claims regarding the shivering reader are still very relevant for 
the  contemporary  reader,  and  have  continued  scholarly  relevance  in  contemporary 
literary criticism. However, despite these claims of contemporary relevance, it will also 
be  argued  that  the  novel  form  does  have  its  limitations,  such  that  not  all  novels, 
particularly postmodern novels, can be regarded as ―valuable‖ for the shivering reader: 
it is the possibilities of the realist novel which are of most value because realist fiction   iv 
best  reflects  how  the  individual  ordinarily  understands  his  or  her  own  life  and  its 
meaning—an understanding which is often purposefully disrupted by the postmodern 
novel. Although the reader can look to real people and non-fictional representations of 
real  people  (such  as  auto/biography),  the  realist  novel‘s  representations  of  fictional 
characters is more valuable to the shivering reader, primarily because of the manner in 
which these characters are represented and because of the freedom the novelist has in 
his or her representation of their characters. Finally, this thesis examines the rhetoric of 
the novel and discusses  the ways  in  which the novelist influences and shapes the 
reader‘s evaluation of a character‘s life by his or her choice to either exclude or include 
certain events from the character‘s story—choices which promote the meaningfulness 
of some events whilst deflects others.  
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Introduction:  
The Death of God and the 
Shivering Reader 
 
You will never be happy if you continue to search for what happiness consists of. 
You will never live if you are looking for the meaning of life. 
                    —Albert Camus  
 
 
If God did not exist, everything would be permitted. 
                    —Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 
 
 
I must choose.  
           —Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea  
 
 
his  thesis  begins  with  a  question—in  itself  not  immediately  or  eminently 
profound—which has been both asked and answered many times. The question 
is: What is the value of the novel to its reader? The same question may be posed more 
simply: Why does a novel reader read? Of course, since the latter half of the twentieth 
century, questions such as these have often been avoided by literary theorists; indeed, 
questions of motives for reading are rarely raised by contemporary literary scholars. 
These questions are also problematised by the continued practice of questioning the 
concept and criteria of evaluation  itself. And yet, as Rita Felski suggests,  they  still 
retain a ―shadowy presence among the footnotes and fortifications of academic prose.‖
1 
This would imply that questions relating to why a reader reads still do have scholarly 
relevance and answers can still be proposed. To begin such an investigation, we can 
look to two literary theorists—Q. D. Leavis and Felski—for their proposed answers. In 
                                                 
1 Felski, Uses of Literature, 14. 
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Fiction  and  the  Reading  Public—a  book  published  almost  eighty  years  ago—Q.  D. 
Leavis proposed four general reasons why people read.
2 The first two are ―to pass time 
not unpleasantly,‖ and ―to obtain vicarious satisfaction or compensation for life.‖
3 Both 
answers  are  very  common  and  need  little  explanation;  suffice  it  to  say  reading  for 
aesthetic pleasure is a universal pastime, and reading to obtain vicarious satisfaction is 
a  well-documented  phenomenon,  evidenced  by  characters  such  as  Don  Quixote, 
Catherine Morland, and Madame Bovary. 
  Arguably more interesting, however, are Leavis‘s third and fourth reasons for 
why a reader reads. The third is that readers had a desire to ―obtain assistance in the 
business  of  living‖
4—assistance  which  was  ―formerly  the  function  of  religion.‖
5  This 
reason can be understood as the consequence of the ever-increasing secularisation of 
modern society, bringing with it the further consequence that readers no longer know 
the answers to the various questions of ―life.‖ Leavis claims that readers of all strata of 
literature  
 
are  alike  in  very  little  but  a  genuine  sense  of  something  wrong  with  the  world.  They 
expect the novelist to answer real questions (in the form of What should I . . . ? and How 
should I . . . ? and Is it right to . . . ?)—in effect, to help them manage their lives by 
dramatising their problems and so offering a solution, by lending his support to their code 
of feeling and generally by expressing their own half-conscious or perplexed ―feelings 
about‖ Life.
6 
 
This is to say that readers read to answer the questions and the problems of everyday 
situations encountered in their everyday lives; questions which may relate to moral or 
ethical problems, but which may also relate to how they are to understand their own 
emotions and feelings.    
                                                 
2 Q. D. Leavis derived her answers from a survey sent to sixty novelists of which twenty-five 
replied. 
3 Q. D. Leavis, Fiction and the Reading Public, 48. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 69. 
6 Ibid., 69–70. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
  3 
  The fourth and final reason described by Leavis is that readers read ―to enrich 
the quality of living by extending, deepening, refining, coordinating experience‖
7:  
 
The best that the novel can do, it may be suggested, is not to offer a refuge from actual 
life but to help the reader to deal less inadequately with it; the novel can deepen, extend, 
and  refine  experience  by  allowing  the  reader  to  live  at  the  expense  of  an  unusually 
intelligent and sensitive mind, by giving him access to a finer code than his own.
8  
 
This description can be understood in at least two ways. Firstly, Leavis implies that the 
novelist—the  skilled  and  revered  novelist—sees  both  the  world  and  other  human 
beings  through  an  ―unusually  intelligent  and  sensitive‖  lens—a  lens  to  which  novel 
readers  do  not  have  access  except  when  they  are  reading  the  novelist‘s  novels. 
Indeed, it is often assumed that the skilled and revered novelist reads and understands 
human beings‘ idiosyncrasies and nuances better than most.
9 In this way, the novel 
can be seen as a means to a new insight for the reader into a perplexing world but also 
helps formulate sustained and coherent images of others in the world and understand 
how they too ―experience‖ the world. The second way of understanding how the novel 
extends,  deepens,  refines,  and  coordinates  experience  relates  to  the  common 
assumption that the novelist has had many experiences—life-experiences—which he 
or she in turn conveys to their readers through their novels and their characters. In 
other words, the ―intelligent and sensitive mind‖ of the novelist is also a fount of life-
experience from which readers can draw upon and enrich their own life-experience. 
One example (amongst innumerable examples) of a ―novelist of experience‖ is Polish-
born novelist Joseph Conrad who, as a sailor and master-mariner, was privy to a wide 
range of experiences throughout the world. Many of these experiences were in some 
way or other represented in his novels
10 such as his earlier  work The Nigger of the 
Narcissus (1898) which was based on his own voyage from Madras to Dunkirk, and his 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 48. 
8 Ibid., 73–74. 
9 Hochman, Character in Literature, 63. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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novella Heart of Darkness (1902) which was based on his own Congo expedition.
11 
Through  his  novels,  Conrad  ―gives‖  the  reader  his  experiences;  he  extends  and 
deepens  the  reader‘s  experience  with  a  worldly-wisdom  gained  only  through  life-
experience.  
  These  reasons  described  by  Q.  D.  Leavis  provide  a  sound  cornerstone  for 
answers to the question of why a reader reads. However, in her book The Uses of 
Literature (2008) Rita Felski—our second theorist—examines the question of why a 
reader reads from a more contemporary and critical perspective; more specifically, she 
examines the question from the theoretical shadows of the ―high theory‖ of the mid 
1960s, 70s, and early 1980s. Felski also proposes four reasons—some of which can 
be likened to Leavis‘s descriptions—but goes much further in her analysis by justifying 
the importance of each of the given reasons for reading, or ―uses‖ of literature, in light 
of high theory. 
  The first use described by Felski is recognition. Recognition takes place when 
we recognise ourselves in the lives and actions of the characters we read about. It is in 
recognition  that  likeness  and  difference  come  together,  such  that  we  recognise 
ourselves by looking to others. Felski suggests that claims such as this have come 
under scrutiny from critics who argue that the endeavour to know others in order to 
better  know  ourselves  is  a  form  of  an  unethical  objectification.
12  Another criticism 
stemming from Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is that any form of recognition is 
essentially a mirrored  (mis)representation which begins in our infancy  at the mirror-
stage of our development.
13 However, Felski argues that recognition is a very useful 
element of literature as we can recognise ourselves in a  very new and  different way 
and can attain a ―less flawed perception‖ of ourselves.
14 As Felski states:  
 
                                                                                                                                           
10 Berthoud, Joseph Conrad: The Major Phase, 4. 
11 Ibid., 25. 
12 Such as Levinas, Docherty, and Althusser, 
13 See Jacques Lacan‘s Écrits (1966). 
14 Felski, Uses of Literature, 28. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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Recognition is not repetition; it denotes not just the previously known, but the becoming 
known. Something that may have been sensed in a vague, diffuse, or semi-conscious 
way now takes on a distinct shape, is amplified, heightened, or made newly visible. In a 
mobile interplay of exteriority and interiority, something that exists outside of me inspires 
a revised or altered sense of who I am.
15   
 
In recognising ourselves we may also feel a sense of affiliation stemming from the 
solace and relief of knowing that there are others in the (fictional) world who think or 
feel like me.
16 
  The second use of literature is enchantment which is characterised by ―a state 
of intense involvement, a sense of being so entirely caught up in an aesthetic object 
that  nothing  else  seems  to  matter.‖
17  This  description  is  very  similar  to  Leavis‘s 
description  of  vicarious  reading;  however,  as  Felski  states,  Leavis‘s  description  of 
being ―enchanted‖ is, in contemporary criticism, to be ―rendered impervious to critical 
thought, to lose one‘s head and one‘s wits, to be seduced by what one sees rather than 
subjecting  it  to  sober  and  level-headed  scrutiny.‖
18  But  as  Felski  suggests, 
enchantment is not bewitchment, leading to the confusion of fiction and reality; instead, 
it can be a very rich and sensuous aesthetic experience. Enchantment is also a very 
―real‖ reason for reading and is a desire that we cannot necessarily control or explain: 
―enchantment matters because . . . people turn to works of art . . . to be taken out of 
themselves,  to  be  pulled  into  an  altered  state  of  consciousness.‖
19  Enchantment  is 
significant because it is something that most readers ―do.‖ 
  Felski‘s third reason relates to gaining knowledge of the world beyond the self; 
it is knowledge about ―people and things, mores and manners, symbolic meanings and 
social stratification.‖
20 Again, this ―use‖ has been somewhat undermined throughout the 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 25. 
16 Ibid., 33. 
17 Ibid., 54. 
18 Ibid., 56. 
19 Ibid., 76. 
20 Ibid., 83. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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history of fiction and art in that the work of art‘s ―capacity‖ for knowledge of reality is 
illusory, and counterfeit. However, Felski offers a counter-claim: 
  
One motive for reading is the hope of gaining a deeper sense of everyday experiences 
and  the  shape  of  social  life.  Literature‘s  relationship  to  worldly  knowledge  is  not  only 
negative or adversarial; it can also expand, enlarge, or reorder our sense of how things 
are.
21 
 
This understanding is very similar to that of Q. D. Leavis‘s description of the novelist‘s 
ability to  deepen,  extend,  and refine  our  experience of the world. But it is Tzvetan 
Todorov who explains this reason most eloquently: 
 
If someone asks me why I love literature, the answer that I immediately think of is that 
literature helps me live. I no longer seek in literature, as I did in adolescence, to avoid 
wounds  that  real  people  could  inflict  upon  me;  literature  does  not  replace  lived 
experiences but forms a continuum with them and helps me understand them. Denser 
than daily life but not radically different from it, literature expands our universe, prompts 
us to see other ways to conceive and organize it. We are all formed from what other 
people give us: first our parents and then the other people near us. Literature opens to 
the  infinite  this  possibility  of  interaction  and  thus  enriches  us  infinitely.  It  brings  us 
irreplaceable  sensations  through  which  the  real  world  becomes  more  furnished  with 
meaning  and  more  beautiful.  Far  from  being  a  simple  distraction,  an  entertainment 
reserved for educated people, literature lets each one of us fulfil our human potential.
22 
   
  The final use described by Felski is literature‘s ability to ―shock.‖ Shock does 
not simply mean to horrify or instil fear, nor does it refer to the (still) shocking sexual 
explicitness of Marquis de Sade‘s Philosophy in the Boudoir (1795), or the violence and 
sexual explicitness we find in Bret Easton Ellis‘s American Psycho (1991), or the drug-
                                                 
21 Ibid., 83. 
22 Todorov, ―What Is Literature For?‖, 17. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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use in Irvine Welsh‘s Trainspotting (1993). Shock is there to destabilise and unnerve 
the reader and, as such, is very much in antithesis to enchantment:  
 
Instead of being rocked and cradled, we find ourselves ambushed and under assault; 
shock invades consciousness and broaches the reader‘s or viewer‘s defences. Smashing 
into the psyche like a blunt instrument, it can wreak havoc on our usual ways of ordering 
and understanding the world. Our sense of equilibrium is destroyed; we are left at sea, 
dazed and confused, fumbling for words, unable to piece together a coherent response.
23 
 
Shock can also be seen as the ability of  literature to awaken our senses from  the 
(false) tranquillity of our understanding of the world, our beliefs, and truths—some long-
held  and  ossified;  only  the  ―blunt  instrument‖  of  shock  can  break  them,  all  for  the 
benefit and enlightenment of the reader. 
   
Comprehensive in themselves as Leavis‘s and Felski‘s answers are to the question of 
why a reader reads, a more insightful answer may be found in an essay written not too 
long after Leavis‘s work. In his essay, ―The Storyteller‖ (1936), Marxist literary critic 
Walter Benjamin
24 made the following suggestion: ―What draws the reader to the novel 
is the hope of warming his shivering life with a death he reads about.‖
25 In Benjamin‘s 
reading,  it  is  the  unknown  nature  of  death  which  is  the  cause  of  concern  to  the 
reader—is  cause  for  the  reader  to  ―shiver‖—it  is  a  Mysterium  tremendum,  or  as 
Jonathon  Strauss  eloquently  puts  it:  ―Part  of  the  horror  of  death  [is]  its  terrible 
intellectual poverty.‖
26 The reader, therefore, looks to a novel‘s written representations 
of  a  character‘s  death-scene  for  the  ―warmth‖  of  some  understanding  of  the 
phenomenon of death. However, for Benjamin it is more than just the unknown nature 
                                                 
23 Felski, The Uses of Literature, 113. 
24 Describing Walter Benjamin merely as a Marxist literary critic somewhat undermines his 
―plurality.‖ Indeed, as Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osbourne claim in their introduction to Walter 
Benjamin’s Philosophy, ―There are [many] Benjamins: Benjamin the Critic, Benjamin the 
Marxist, Benjamin the Modernist, Benjamin the Jew. . . . Behind each of them, however, in one 
way or another, stands Benjamin the philosopher.‖ A. Benjamin and Osbourne, eds., Walter 
Benjamin’s Philosophy, x.  
25 W. Benjamin, ―The Storyteller,‖ 101. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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of death that draws the shivering reader to the novel: for Benjamin, the death of the 
Other—other  people—and  the  death  of  what  I  will  call  a  ―fictional  Other‖—fictional 
characters—is also the foundation for some understanding of the ―meaning of life.‖ As 
Benjamin somewhat offhandedly states: ―The ‗meaning of life‘ is really the centre about 
which the novel moves.‖
27 . . . ―The nature of the character in a novel [is that] the 
‗meaning‘ of his life is revealed only in his death.‖
28 Benjamin claims that the novel 
reader—specifically,  the  modern  reader—is  shivering  or  ―anxious‖
29  because  of  an 
absence of understanding of the meaning of life, and is therefore drawn to the novel in 
the hope of warming his or her shivering lives with wisdom and understanding which is 
revealed by the dying character. Thus, the value of the novel is that it alleviates the 
anxiety that the shivering reader may feel towards the unanswered question: What is 
the  ―meaning  of  life‖?  In  many  ways  this  one  reason  permeates  and,  indeed, 
transcends most, if not all, of both Leavis‘s and Felski‘s claims about reading.  
  However, unlike Leavis and Felski, Benjamin‘s emphasis is specifically on the 
importance of a novel‘s characters; more specifically again, his emphasis is on the 
importance of representing the lives and deaths of individual characters—the embodied 
ethos  of  (isolating)  modern  society.  Of  course,  any  emphasis  on  character  would, 
today,  in  contemporary  literature  and  criticism,  be  seen  as  somewhat  contentious 
considering the tendency of novelists, literary critics and theorists to marginalise the 
role of character in fiction. As Hochman states (writing in 1985):  
 
Character has not fared well in our [twentieth] century. . . . Over the past fifty years the 
characters  of  literature  have,  in  the  works  of  our  most  innovative  writers,  often  been 
reduced  to  schematic  angularity,  vapid  ordinariness,  or  allegorical  inanity.  The  great 
writers of early modernism fulfilled the Romantic program of individualism and created a 
                                                                                                                                           
26 Strauss, ―After Death,‖ 91. 
27 W. Benjamin, ―The Storyteller,‖ 99. 
28 Ibid., 100–101 (emphasis mine). 
29 The OED defines shivering as ―trembling with cold, fear‖ and anxious as being ―troubled or 
uneasy in mind about some uncertain event; being in painful or disturbing suspense; concerned, 
solicitous.‖  Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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gallery  of  unprecedentedly  complex  characters,  but  their  heirs  have  deliberately 
subordinated the role of character in their work. . . . 
   . . . Postmodernist writers not only challenge the cogency of character as a category 
but actively work to dismantle it as an operative element in their stories.
30  
 
Writing in the 1950s, Nathalie Sarraute also describes how today‘s reader lives in an 
―age of suspicion.‖ The reader is suspicious of what a novelist can tell and, as such, the 
reader is unable to ―believe‖ in the novelist‘s characters.
31 One may question the value 
of such fictions to the shivering reader if the reader is both anxious and suspicious—
the reader is anxious of his or her meaninglessness and yet is inconsolable because of 
his  or  her  suspicion  of  the  warmth  the  novel  and  its  characters  may  bring.  The 
continued  mistrust  and  marginalisation  of  character  is  a  consequence  of 
postmodernism‘s  rejection  of  the  notion  of  the  individual  subject  and  of  the  ―I‖ 
philosophy  tradition  of  Descartes,  Kant,  and  Husserl
32—a  rejection  exemplified  in 
Lacan‘s psychoanalytic theory of the mirror-stage, where one‘s personal identity—that 
of a unified and coherent self—is merely an image and only comes to exist in social 
contexts when it is seen and addressed by others. Moreover, since language ―belongs‖ 
to society and thus the child must learn to speak of his or her self from the position of 
the Other—from outside the self.
33  
  Lacan‘s idea of identity as an image—a ―signifier‖—is very much connected to 
the  emergence  of  structuralism  which  also  had  a  profound  effect  on  the  notion  of 
individualism  and  character.  For  structuralists,  the  meanings  of  human  actions  and 
productions are made possible because of an underlying system of distinctions and 
conventions. These meanings come from outside the subject and have meaning only in 
terms of the system in which they appear:  
 
                                                 
30 Hochman, Character in Literature, 13–14. 
31 Sarraute, ―The Age of Suspicion,‖ 57. 
32 Harland, Superstructuralism, 70. 
33 Ibid., 38–39. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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Once the conscious subject is deprived of its role as source of meaning—once meaning 
is  explained  in  terms  of  conventional  systems  which  may  escape  the  grasp  of  the 
conscious  subject—the  self  can  no  longer  be  identified  with  consciousness.  It  is 
―dissolved‖  as  its  functions  are  taken  up  by  a  variety  of  interpersonal  systems  that 
operate through it.
34  
 
Thus,  for  structuralists,  the  notion  that  characters  are  distinguished,  autonomous 
wholes—that characters ―live‖—is a myth and merely reflects a bourgeois ideological 
prejudice.
35  To this myth we may add H élène  Cixous‘s  claim  that  the  concept  of 
character is ―the product of a repression of subjectivity,‖ and acts as a mask for this 
repression.
36   
  Lastly,  but  not  finally ,  there  is  the  emerg ence  of  the  decentred  subject , 
described by  Frederic  Jameson  in  his  Marxist approach  to individuality. Jameson 
suggests that ―the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual‖—
reflects the dissolution of the ―once-existing centred subject, in the period of classical 
capitalism and the nuclear family into a world of organisational bureaucracy.‖
37 The 
autonomous individual belonged to modernism—a period which idealised the spirit of 
individual capitalism and subsequently the concept of the possibility of unique, personal 
style and avant-gardism. The late-capitalist, postmodern ―subject‖ can no longer invent 
a unique, personal style—if indeed there ever was such a thing as a unique, personal 
style—but must imitate styles giving us the practice of pastiche.
38 For Jameson there is 
no individuality in reality or in art or literature and, indeed, in its characters.    
  From  this  brief  description  it  is  evident  that  discussing  the  concept  of 
individuality and the importance of character is somewhat anachronistic and inevitably 
flawed; however,  the line of argument that this thesis will take ,  firstly  with regards 
individualism,  will  be  very  much  an  ―I‖  philosopher‘s  perspective—an  existential 
                                                 
34 Culler, Structuralist Poetics, 28. 
35 Ibid., 230. 
36 Cixous, ―The Character of Character,‖ 384. 
37 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 15. 
38 Ibid. 15–17. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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perspective—similar  to  that  of  Hazel  E.  Barnes—the  Sartrean  theorist  and  English 
translator of Sartre‘s works—and her critical response to the postmodern concept of 
the fragmented and decentred self: 
 
I do not go along with the notion, current today, that no individual subject exists within us, 
that our psychic core is only a set of fragmented structures imposed on us by our social 
environment. . . . I do not hold that what we call the self is the product of discourse, a 
linguistic convention, a reflecting pool of otherness. . . . I think Sartre is right in claiming 
that a free, prepersonal consciousness forms a self (or ego) by imposing a unity on its 
own experiences and reactions to them, past and present.
39 
 
From  an  existential  perspective,  there  is  a  conscious  sense  of  individuality  in  the 
postmodern world—one that we ―feel‖ in its unity and freedom.  
  With regards to the central role of character in this thesis as a valuable, fictional 
representation of the Other for gaining some understanding our own lives, we can look 
firstly to Hochman‘s description of the ―reality of character in literature‖: 
 
What  links  characters  in  literature  to  people  in  life,  as  we  fabricate  them  in  our 
consciousness, is the integral unity of our conception of people and of how they operate. 
I, indeed, want to go further . . . by holding that there is a profound congruity between the 
ways in which we apprehend characters in literature, documented figures in history, and 
people of whom we have what we think of as direct knowledge in life. In my view, even 
the clues that we take in and use to construct an image of a person are virtually identical 
in literature and in life.
40   
 
When we look to others in the real world we construct an image of them in the same 
way as we construct an image of a historical figure documented in an auto/biography or 
a character in literature. It is this image of a meaningful life that the reader uses to 
better understand the meaning of his or her own life. 
                                                 
39 Hazel E. Barnes, The Story I Tell Myself, xvii. Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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  More  recently,  Felski  makes  a  similar  claim  regarding  the  reality  of  the 
importance and use of fiction particularly in light of the dwindling trend of high theory:  
 
There is a dawning sense among literary and cultural critics that a shape of thought has 
grown old. We know only too well the well-oiled machine of ideology critique, the x-ray 
gaze  of  symptomatic  reading,  the  smoothly  rehearsed  moves  that  add  up  to  a 
hermeneutics  of  suspicion.  Ideas  that  seemed  revelatory  thirty  years  ago—the 
decentered  subject!  the  social  construction  of  reality!—have  dwindled  into  shopworn 
slogans; defamiliarising has lapsed into doxa, no less dogged and often as dogmatic as 
the certainties it sought to disrupt. And what virtue remains in the act of unmasking when 
we know full well what lies beneath the mask?
41 
 
The  question  Felski  asks  is  what  are  we  losing  in  this  ―permanent  diagnosis‖  of 
literature? Indeed, what are we losing if we can no longer look to fiction for answers to 
our  questions  of  meaning  simply  because  theoretically  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
individualism, subjective meaning, and characters who reflect these once innate and 
unquestionable characteristics? It may be argued that the questions of the past and the 
value of the past cannot be dismissed as easily as contemporary theory would have us 
believe. As will become clear, this thesis reflects a continual oscillation between the 
present  and  past  (a  postmodern  longing  for  the  past?),  and  a  penchant  for  the 
anachronistic and the nostalgic. It is also a thesis founded on the ―reality‖ of character 
and the consciousness of the self as an individualistic self. In doing so, there is a less 
than subtle endeavour to revitalise some past theories and values such as the primacy 
of  characters  or  ―the  reality  of  character,‖  but  also  the  reality  of  a  sense  of 
individualism, and a sense of endings. This is not a manifesto to end the progression of 
theory,  which,  as  Terry  Eagleton  suggests  in  After  Theory,  cannot  be  done,  but  a 
reflective pause in the aftermath of high theory.
42   
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The Unanswered Question 
 
What, then, is the answer to the unanswered question: What is the meaning of life?—
the meaning that Benjamin suggests the novel reader is anxiously searching for. But 
where to begin, for a question such as this would often leave even the most gab-gifted 
speechless. This is because the question of the meaning of life is one of the biggest 
questions,  if  not  the  biggest  question  that  anyone—anyone  who  has  felt  anxious, 
confused, or unsure of the meaning of their life—may ask of themselves. Indeed, in 
The Myth of Sisyphus Albert Camus claims that the question of meaning is not only the 
biggest question that one could ask oneself, but is also the most urgent. Camus writes: 
 
There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether 
life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. 
All the rest—whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine 
or twelve categories—comes afterwards. These are games; one first must answer. And if 
it is true, as Nietzsche claims, that a philosopher, to deserve our respect, must preach by 
example, you can appreciate the importance of that reply, for it will precede the definitive 
act. These are facts the heart can feel; yet they call for careful study before they become 
clear to the intellect. 
  If I ask myself how to judge that this question is more urgent than that, I reply that 
one judges by the actions it entails. I have never seen anyone die for the ontological 
argument.  Galileo  who  held  a  scientific  truth  of  great  importance  abjured  it  with  the 
greatest ease as soon as it endangered his life. In a certain sense, he did right. That truth 
was not worth the stake. Whether the earth or the sun revolves around the other is a 
matter of profound indifference. To tell the truth, it is a futile question. On the other hand, I 
see  many  people  die  because  they  judge  that  life  is  not  worth  living.  I  see  others 
paradoxically getting killed for the ideas or illusions that give them a reason for living 
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(what  is  called  a  reason  for  living  is  also  an  excellent  reason  for  dying).  I  therefore 
conclude that the meaning of life is the most urgent of questions.
43  
 
For Camus, an answer to the question of the meaning of life is important because it is a 
question  that,  having  been  answered  or,  better,  having  the  possibility  of  being 
answered, gives each of us a reason to live.  
  However, the question that must be asked so urgently is understatedly complex 
as  it  is  not  necessarily  one  specific question  that  one  asks—it  is  to  ask  oneself  a 
number of interrelated questions. The only concession to this complexity is that all 
permutations of the question ―What is the meaning of life?‖ essentially relate to three 
categories of existence: the universe (or the world); the human race; and the individual. 
These  three  categories  give  us  the  manifold  ―questions‖  of  meaning:  What  is  the 
meaning of human life in relation to the universe? Why does the universe exist? Why is 
there  something  rather  than  nothing?  Why  do  I  exist?
44  This  last -mentioned 
permutation of the question of meaning is of special significance as from the   early 
beginnings  of  the  modern  world,  through  to  contemporary  society  and  the 
modern/postmodern  world,  the  question  of  meaning  has  increasingly  become  a 
question  centred  on  the  individual  and  the  individual‘s  particular  meaning. 
Consequently the question of meaning can be further refined to: What is the meaning 
of my life? What is the meaning of my life in relation to the universe? Indeed, if we 
consider Camus‘ claims, the question of meaning is specifically that of our individual 
selves as it is we who ask ourselves the question of meaning. We do not ask the 
question of the meaning of the universe, or of the world, or of human existence—we 
ask  the  question  of  our  own,  individual  existence.  It  is  the  individual  who  decides 
whether life is worth living. It is the individual who chooses suicide in the face of a 
despairing  sense  of  ―meaninglessness.‖  This  can  be  said  to  be  the  foundation  of 
Camus‘ stress on what he claims to be the fundamental problem of philosophy: the 
question of meaning is urgent as it holds the key to a reason for each of us to live.  
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The Death of God and the Absence of Meaning 
 
This sense of urgency—the urgency, but also the necessity—to anxiously question and 
search for our individual meaning has not always been as ―problematic‖ as it has been 
in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries,  and,  indeed,  today,  as  is  somewhat 
evidenced by the renaissance of existential thought and the ―use‖ of existentialism.
45 
The reason for the beginning of this urgency can be essentially pin-pointed to one very 
significant religious, scientific, and philosophical ―event‖: the ―death of God.‖ It is this 
event which best describes the ―culmination‖ of the process of Western secularisation. 
His  death  was  ―officially‖  declared  by  German  existential  philosopher  Friedrich 
Nietzsche in The Gay Science (1882) in his parable of the madman, who, in the bright 
morning hours, ran to the market place, and, jumping in the midst of the crowd, cried: 
―‗Whither is God? . . . I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his 
murderers.  .  .  .  God  is  dead.  God  remains  dead.  And  we  have  killed  him.‘‖
46  The 
reasoning  behind  Nietzsche‘s  declaration,  and  the  significant  consequences  of  this 
event in Western philosophy‘s understanding of the question of the meaning of life, is 
expounded by Julian  Young in  The Death of God and the Meaning of  Life. Young 
claims that before the death of God the meaning of life was understood through the 
theistic grand-narrative of Christianity, which, before modern times, dominated Western 
thinking.
47  As such,  the meaning of life was not talked about or questioned:  the 
meaning of our individual lives was thought to be a  universal meaning such that each 
―individual‖  had  the  same  meaning  of  life  as  every  other  individual.  This  universal 
meaning was also independent of choice, which is to say that the meaning of life was 
objectively  conferred:  it  was  ―simply  given  to  us  as  something  written  into  the 
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metaphysical structure of reality.‖
48 The answer to the question of meaning was also 
―obvious‖  and  ―self-evident,‖  such  that  the  question  of  meaning  was  a  ―non-issue‖; 
there  was  no  need  to  question  one‘s  life‘s  meaning  as  it  was  of  none  of  one‘s 
concern.
49  Therefore, the question of meaning was not a cause for what may be 
deemed ―serious‖ existential anxiety. But, of course, the domination and authority of 
traditional,  medieval  Christianity  began  to  be  challenged,  particularly  by  two  very 
important  historical  figures  and  their  theories:  the  great  Renaissance  thinker 
Copernicus  (1473–1543)  and  his  heliocentric  theory  of  the  Earth‘s  movement;  and 
Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and his theory of evolution and natural selection.
50 It is 
primarily because of these two theories that the modern, secular world began to take 
shape  and  the  Church‘s  universal,  objective  meaning  (which  was  hitherto 
unquestionable  and  self-evident)  began  to  be  questioned,  and  existential  anxiety 
concomitantly began to rise. Indeed, Nietzsche‘s declaration not only signified a new 
sense of meaninglessness in the absence of theistic, objective meaning, but also a 
growing sense of anxiety in the face of meaninglessness—anxiety which is akin to what 
proponents of existential philosophy describe as the anxiety of our ―abandonment‖ in 
the world. As German existential philosopher Martin Heidegger claims, we are anxious 
because we are ―thrown into existence‖
51—we are thrown into the world without choice, 
without instruction, or pre-given direction, and without meaning. Moreover, we are each 
individually ―alone‖ in our ―thrownness.‖ Thus we are anxious not only because of the 
absence of objective meaning but because of the absence of subjective meaning.   
  What this description suggests is that the shivering reader‘s anxiety towards the 
question of the meaning of life and the need to look to fiction for answers to these 
questions is a symptom of an increasingly secular, post-enlightenment, modern world; 
a world that, in its most dramatic sense, is ―abandoned by God‖—where ―God is dead‖ 
and where the grounds of meaning have been torn asunder. Anxiety comes from the 
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reader‘s  confrontation  with  this  ―blank  mystery  of  existence,‖
52  or  what  Søren 
Kierkegaard calls the ―yawning abyss‖
53 where answers were once known. The reader 
is anxious because he or she is yet to ―discover‖ and understand what it is that makes 
their lives meaningful.
54  
  And as Benjamin suggests the meaning of life is discovered, it is revealed, but it 
is revealed only in death. Indeed, Benjamin describes how ―a sequence of images is 
set in motion inside a man as his life comes to an end—unfolding the views of himself 
under which he has encountered himself without being aware of it.
55 Benjamin seems 
to suggest that it is only to the dying or, more specifically, ―the imminently dying‖—the 
moribund—that the ―true,‖ ―definitive,‖ or, possibly ―authentic‖ meaning of their lives is 
revealed. It is a ―revelation‖ of meaning—a disclosure of the meaning of the past which 
the dying were previously unaware, and only ―now,‖ in death, understand with a new 
sense of clarity and with newfound insight and wisdom. Thus, until death, the meaning 
of life remains somewhat of a mystery and is a cause for what is essentially existential 
anxiety—anxiety about what an undisclosed future will hold. 
 
The Creation of Meaning 
 
But this revelation of meaning is not something to be merely waited for as if we were 
rendered somewhat impotent by our perplexity, just as we do not necessarily ―wait‖ for 
death.  Indeed,  the  revelation  of  meaning  can  be  seen  as  a  ―destination,‖  just  as 
Nietzsche‘s ―true world‖ is a destination, reached by a particular path that we must 
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each choose. Which path we should choose to reach this destination is the source of 
perplexity. We must choose one path amongst many with the hope that the end of the 
path will be our envisioned meaningful destination. Here, it can be said that we are 
properly entering the discourse of existential philosophy, where a central principle is 
that, in the absence of theistic, objective meaning, we each have the freedom to create 
our own individual, subjective meaning—any meaning, any path, we so choose—and 
have absolute responsibility for our lives being meaningful. This is to say that we can 
alleviate our anxiety—and the sense of ―nihilistic‖ despair and perplexity—by creating 
something from the supposed nothingness of existence. Young claims that the freedom 
to create our meaning is one of Continental philosophy‘s responses to the death of 
God, and ―to the threat of nihilism—to the appearance that life, in the absence of the 
true world, is meaningless.‖
56 And, as Young suggests, to create meaning is essentially 
to  create  a  story  of  meaning:  ―What  I  need  to  do  to  overcome  my  sense  of 
meaninglessness  is  to  construct  the  story  of  my  life,  to  construct  my  ‗personal 
narrative.‘‖
57 Young claims that in the absence of a ―true world,‖ and the grand narrative 
of Christianity, it is possible for us to each create our own personal narratives, which is 
to say that we have the freedom to create our own meaningful life-story. This is, of 
course,  very  similar  to  Jean-François  Lyotard‘s  understanding  of  the  postmodern 
condition as ―incredulity toward metanarratives‖
58 and the privileging of ―little‖ narratives 
over ―big‖ narratives.
59 In the absence of big, ―meaningful‖ narratives, it is our individual 
responsibility to both create our own little (though not insignificant) narratives—it is our 
responsibility to  make our  lives meaningful. Young believes that a similar  reflection 
occurred to Nietzsche who claimed that we must firstly ―[view] ourselves as heroes‖
60—
we must each of us see and understand that we can become the heroes of our lives; 
see that we are free to become the heroes of our lives, so that we may become the 
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heroes  of  our  lives.  And  we  must  ―like‖  being  the  hero  of  our  story
61—a  claim 
expressed  by  Nietzsche  in  his  aphorism  of  The  greatest  weight  and  the  ―eternal 
recurrence.‖
62 For some, if not many of us, the question as to whether the life we have 
chosen (and created, and are presently living) is worthy of repetition, may perturb or 
disconcert. However, both Nietzsche‘s and Young‘s aim is not to fuel despair, but to 
assert the necessity for ―positive‖ action, such that, in the absence of meaning, be it 
objective meaning, or even subjective meaning as it were, we must take the initiative 
and create a meaningful story in which we desire and esteem the hero of the story: 
ourselves. We should strive to become who we desire to become.
63  
  The existential lineage of Young‘s claims can also be deduced from Jean-Paul 
Sartre‘s description of one of the first principles of existentialism, namely ―existence 
precedes essence‖:  
 
Man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself 
afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin 
with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes 
of  himself.  Thus,  there  is  no  human  nature,  because  there  is  no  God  to  have  a 
conception of it. Man simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself to be, but 
he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself after already existing—as he wills to be 
after that leap towards existence. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. 
That is the first principle of existentialism.
64   
 
This passage effectively summarises one of Sartre‘s objectives for his very important 
work Existentialism and Humanism (1946) which is to ―defend existentialism‖ against 
the reproach that it is ―an invitation to people to dwell in quietism of despair‖ and to 
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―regard  any  action  in  this  world  as  entirely  ineffective.‖
65  Sartre  also  attempts  to 
illustrate that existentialism‘s first principle is very much a humanistic principle which 
implies that there is no universal human nature, essence, or meaning, but also, and 
more importantly, that we are free to actively create our essence or meaning:  
 
If indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one‘s actions by 
reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism—
man is free, man is freedom.
66 
 
Our meaning is not objectively determined by a God, by human nature, or any such 
innate  qualities  that  exist  prior  to  our  existence—we  are  each  subjectively  free  to 
choose and create our meaning. It must be noted that this description is not necessarily 
a political sense of freedom or a call for revolutionary action as is so often assumed; 
nor does existentialism offer answers to the dilemma of both maintaining a sense of 
individual  freedom  and  a  sense  of  responsibility  for  our  actions,  particularly  where 
others  are  concerned.  Indeed,  Sartre  was  a  very  political  writer;  however,  as  Iris 
Murdoch  claims,  the  assumption  that  existentialism  is  a  political  movement—
particularly a Marxist movement—is essentially a myth, a falsehood. One is free and 
one is condemned to choose but this freedom and the choices themselves are not 
necessarily  connected  to  social,  civil,  or  political  freedom;  I  am  free  insofar  as  my 
meaningful choices come from within me—they are egocentric—yet I am responsible.
67      
  However,  Sartre  makes  another  significant  claim  in  relati on  to  the 
―determination‖ of meaning, or, to use Benjamin‘s words, the ―revelation‖ of meaning: 
Sartre states that we define ourselves—our meaning—afterwards. In other words, the 
freedom to create the meaning of our lives does not immediately or necessarily give 
meaning to our lives. This does not suggest that our present lives are meaningless, 
only that the ―definitive‖ meaning of life is revealed only through the future. This claim is 
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elaborated by Sartre in his other important work Being and Nothingness (1943) where 
he makes a comparison between the meaning of our lives and our individual projects 
and achievements. Sartre plays on the term project in several ways: in one sense it is 
used in its specifically ―existential‖ context, as a verb, where we are said to ―project‖ 
ourselves forward, such that we are ―perpetually engaged in [our] own future.‖
68  In 
terms of meaning, we pre-outline the meaning of our lives by choosing the meaning we 
want to be. This choice of meaning is in a sense meaningful; however, only the future 
can ―confirm‖ or ―invalidate‖ this pre-outlined meaning, this envisioned destination, by 
conferring a definitive meaning upon it.
69 The second sense of  projection is that our 
projection into the future is also comprised of actual projects—the noun form of the 
term project which is used to describe our chosen, pre-outlined, meaningful activities, 
and  their  future  outcomes.  This  gives  us  the  seemingly  tautological  claim  that  we 
―project‖ the meaning of our meaningful ―projects.‖ Sartre does not elaborate on the 
nature of these projects in any great detail; however, he does describe what he calls 
our fundamental project—the ―original projection of myself which stands as my choice 
of myself in the world.‖
70 As Young describes, the fundamental project ―is that project 
which gives unity and meaning to all one‘s lesser projects.‖
71  
  Yet, despite the claim that we are free to choose and create the meaning of our 
lives—a freedom which may obviate the nihilistic anxiety of our meaninglessness in the 
absence  of  God—we  are  not  necessarily  ―free‖  from  the  anxiety  of  choosing  and 
creating this meaning, especially because the act  of choosing a meaningful project 
does not give life meaning. Indeed, accompanying this freedom and responsibility to 
create  the  meaning  is  the  existential  anxiety  of  freedom  and  responsibility.  Sartre 
prefers the term anguish
72 to describe this anxious feeling of freedom and responsibility 
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and  claims  that  ―man  is  in  anguish‖
73  because  of  his  ―condemnation‖  to  choose: 
―condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from 
the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does.‖
74 
The  creation  of  the  meaning  of  our  lives  is  both  our  absolute  freedom  and 
responsibility; however, we do not choose to be free—we are condemned to be free.  
Indeed, we must continually choose—we must choose whether to continue the project 
we have chosen, or to choose a new project. Spanish-born philosopher José Ortega y 
Gasset makes a similar claim in History as a System:  
 
Life is a task. And the weightiest aspect of these tasks in which life consists is not the 
necessity of performing them but, in a sense, the opposite: I mean that we find ourselves 
always under compulsion to do something but never, strictly speaking, under compulsion 
to do something in particular, that there is not imposed on us this or that task as there is 
imposed on the star its course or on the stone its gravitation. Each individual before doing 
anything must decide for himself and at his own risk what he is going to do.
75 
   
Life is a task where no meaning or choice is imposed, and anxiety is the face of the risk 
of a choice which is ―unopposed.‖ The anxiety of the condemnation to choose also 
relates  to  the  anxious  realisation  that  only  we,  individually,  are  concerned  for  the 
meaning of our life. We are ―abandoned‖ or ―thrown‖ into the world without instruction—
nothing  tells  us  how  we  are  to  choose  and  nothing  prevents  us  from  making  our 
choices. As Sartre describes, we are ―abandoned‖ which implies ―that we ourselves 
decide our being. And with this abandonment goes anguish.‖
76 And it is anguish of the 
possibility that the choices we make may be considered or revealed, in the future, to be 
wrong choices. We are anxious because there is always the possibility of a disparity 
between the created or intended meaning of our projects and the revealed meaning of 
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these projects in death. In other words, like the revelations described by Benjamin, the 
true meaning of our chosen projects—the true meaning of the life we have created—is 
understood only through an undisclosed future.  
  But we may also be anxious about the freedom of choice insofar as choosing 
one possibility is at the same time a negation of other meaningful possibilities. As John 
Macquarrie states:  ―Decision is never simply self-fulfilment. It is also self-renunciation. 
To decide for one possibility is ipso facto to renounce every other possibility that was 
open in the situation.‖
77 Thus, we may be anxious at the exclusion of one choice over a 
range of other choices in terms of ―what may have been,‖ particularly if the intended 
meaning of our chosen project does not resemble the actual or definitive meaning. 
Anxiety of the freedom to choose is therefore the anxiety of risk—anxiety that can only 
be overcome by a leap of faith. 
 
The Fictional Other 
   
What becomes evident from the above description is that all of our various forms of 
anxiety have one common thread, namely that we are anxious of what the future may 
reveal, or, as Benjamin claims, what our death will reveal. It is anxiety of the possible 
disparity  between  intention  and  revelation,  between  the  actual  and  the  envisioned 
destination of our chosen paths. And, again, we return to Benjamin and his explanation 
for why the shivering novel reader reads: to show the reader something, some insight 
that he or she has not (and cannot have) yet seen. The reader reads to gain some form 
of wisdom and insight into both the creation and revelation of meaning—where what 
was concealed is revealed—and to understand something of the true meaning of the 
reader‘s life before the revelation in dying. This is to say that the shivering reader can 
look  to  the  novel‘s  representation  of  the  fictional  Other‘s  innumerable,  meaningful 
projects, and the outcomes of these projects, from which the reader can interpret and 
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evaluate the meaning of the fictional Other‘s lives and contrast them with his or her 
own choices and projects. Of course, to warm his or her shivering life, the reader can 
look outwardly to society and other people for some understanding, just as we do for 
much  of  our  understanding  of  the  social  world;  however,  the  novel  and  its 
representation  of  fictional  characters  can  be  considered  equally  valuable  to  the 
shivering reader. Indeed, as I will argue, the novel‘s representation of the life of the 
fictional Other is more valuable than the real Other for alleviating the reader‘s anxiety 
towards the meaning of life because of the ironic mode which provides the reader with 
a more intimate (albeit fictional) representation of the Other‘s revelations, as well as the 
Other‘s thoughts and experiences as they choose and create their meaning—thoughts 
and experiences which are for the most part ―inaccessible‖ in real life.  
  These claims will be the primary focus of exploration and discussion of this 
thesis and the following chapters. More specifically, in the first chapter ―Evaluation and 
the  Fictional  Other‖  we  will  examine  the  role  of  other  people  for  our  individual 
understanding and creation of the meaning of life. We will also ask the question of what 
meaningfulness means in terms of achievement, seriousness, and moral value, and we 
will  consider  the  similarities  and  disparities  between  fictional  and  non-fictional 
representations of realistic characters. The argument will also be made that the novel, 
especially the realist novel, is more valuable to the shivering reader than non-fictional 
discourses.  
  This first chapter will act as a preamble to the remaining chapters where a more 
specific focus on the characters‘ stories and the representation of these stories will be 
taken.  The  second  chapter—―The  Explicit  Revelations  of  the  Dying‖—will  be  an 
examination  of  the  representation  of  the  explicit  revelations  of  the  dying  fictional 
Other—the  words,  the  openly-communicated  death-speeches  of  the  imminently 
dying—which as Benjamin claims are of great value to the shivering reader as they 
offer the reader an ―authoritative‖ insight into the meaning of life. Here, we will again 
examine  the  greater  value  of  fiction  over  non-fictional  discourses  such  as 
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autobiography and biography, specifically in terms of the ubiquity of fictional death-
scenes and the greater freedom of the novelist in representing these death-scenes. We 
will also consider questions of the authority of novelists in their representation of the 
death of the Other and what effect this has on the value of a text to its reader.  
  In what will be essentially the second part of this thesis, we will discuss the 
possibility  of  the  reader‘s  implicit  interpretations  of  the  fictional  Other‘s  personal 
narratives. This is to say that the primary concern of the second part of the thesis is 
how,  in  the  absence  of  a  character‘s  explicit  dying  revelations,  does  the  novel 
―obliquely‖  communicate  a  character‘s  meaning,  thereby  implicitly  enabling  and 
influencing the reader‘s interpretation of a character‘s meaning. The nature of implicit 
interpretation  will  be  introduced  in  the  third  chapter—―Implicit  Interpretation  and 
Evaluation‖—where it will be argued that the personal narrative of a character and the 
plot of a novel are very much interdependent insofar as it is the choices and actions of 
the novel‘s characters which creates plot and the plot‘s ―movement.‖ Indeed, it will be 
argued that the personal narrative is the template for the story of the realist novel and 
one cannot be isolated from the other. This conflation of the two ―stories‖ is further 
evidenced  if  we  consider  both  the  personal  narrative  and  the  plot  in  terms  of  an 
Aristotelian  definition  of  a  plot  as  having  a  beginning,  a  middle,  and  an  end.  The 
beginnings, middles, and ends of both the plot and the personal narrative will be more 
closely  discussed  in  chapters  four,  five,  and  six,  respectively.  In  chapter  four—
―Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction‖—it will be argued that the first event of 
the story surrounds a specifically ―existential‖ beginning in the character‘s story and 
properly begins the character‘s personal narrative and the novel‘s story.  
  Chapter five—―The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning‖—will primarily be an 
examination of how the novelist decides which events must be included so as to create 
a whole, meaningful story and make the character‘s life whole and meaningful, whilst 
omitting those events which are less significant or inessential for understanding this 
meaning.  Introduction: The Death of God and the Shivering Reader 
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  Finally, chapter six—―The End as Death and Closure‖—will be an examination 
of the influence that the various ―ends‖ of the novel can have on the evaluation of a 
character—ends in which the character may or may not die within the discourse, or 
novelistic ends which may be considered open-ended. Here we will examine the impact 
of these different possibilities on the shivering reader‘s understanding of the meaning 
of life and on how the reader evaluates these characters.  
  This is an ambitious thesis and, although I have endeavoured to include as 
many novels as possible, its scope must necessarily have some limitations. One of 
these  limitations  is  that  the  central  focus  is Western  European  literature—literature 
arising out of Western and continental philosophy—with a particular emphasis on the 
nineteenth-century realists. This list will include, amongst others: Lazarillo de Tormes; 
Cervantes‘s Don Quixote; Daniel Defoe‘s Moll Flanders; Laurence Sterne‘s Tristram 
Shandy;  Jane  Austen‘s  Emma;  Charlotte  Brontë‘s  Jane  Eyre;  Gustave  Flaubert‘s 
Madame  Bovary;  Herman  Melville‘s  Moby-Dick;  George  Eliot‘s  Middlemarch;  Leo 
Tolstoy‘s  The  Death  of  Ivan  Ilyich  and  Anna  Karenina;  Joseph  Conrad‘s  Heart  of 
Darkness and Nostromo; James Joyce‘s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and 
Ulysses; D. H. Lawrence‘s The Rainbow; Virginia Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse and Mrs 
Dalloway;  Jean-Paul  Sartre‘s  Nausea;  Patrick  White‘s  The  Tree  of  Man;  J.  D. 
Salinger‘s The Catcher in the Rye; Thomas Pynchon‘s The Crying of Lot 49; Salman 
Rushdie‘s  Midnight’s  Children;  Annie  Proulx‘s  The  Shipping  News;  Ian  McEwan‘s 
Atonement; and Don DeLillo‘s White Noise and Falling Man. One must be aware of the 
one-sidedness of such limitations, and, indeed, the inherent bias of West-European 
literature—which Franco Moretti suggests is essentially a ―canonical fraction, which is 
not even one per cent of published literature.‖
78 However, for this thesis, the emphasis 
is on literature that reflects a particular West-European historico-philosophical view.  
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1 
The Evaluation of Meaning and 
the Fictional Other  
 
There has rarely passed a life of which a judicious and faithful narrative would not 
be useful. 
               —Samuel Johnson, The Rambler, no. 60 
 
The reader of a novel actually does look for human beings from whom he derives 
―the meaning of life.‖ 
                     —Walter Benjamin, ―The Storyteller‖ 
 
What it is to be well spoken of! 
                           —Joseph Conrad, Nostromo 
 
Hell is other people. 
                   —Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit 
 
 
ne of the most important claims made by Benjamin in his description of why the 
shivering reader reads is his suggestion that we look to other people to derive 
the meaning of life. This claim may seem contrary to the expressly existential nature of 
our  personal  narratives,  particularly  when  we  consider  existential  philosophy‘s 
emphasis on individualism: our own individual meaning is our own individual concern, 
and is created through our own individual freedom. However, this stress on individuality 
fails  to  acknowledge  much  of  existentialism‘s  focus  on  the  ―essential  sociality  of 
existence,‖
1 and our necessary social relations and interactions with others. Indeed, as 
Heidegger claims, we are each essentially a ―being-with‖ others which in very simple 
terms means we exist with others and cannot choose not to exist with others. As David 
Cooper  writes,  a  person  can  become  a  hermit,  but  even  then  ―the  loner  does  not 
O The Evaluation of Meaning and the Fictional Other 
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dispense with the existence of others, but chooses to live at a distance from them: 
hence it remains a life led in relation to others.‖
2 The primary significance of our being-
with-others relates to how we interpret the world and how we are supposed to act 
within the world. Heidegger claims that our interpretations are dictated primarily by how 
others interpret them—how the ―they‖ interpret them. The Other and the ―they,‖ differ in 
the sense that the Other is a ―collective‖ of Dasein
3—individual beings—whereas the 
―they‖ is a term used to specifically describe the ―collective‖ or ―social‖ interpretation of 
the world and our being. As Heidegger says of the ―they‖: 
 
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and 
judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 
―great mass‖ as they shrink back; we find ―shocking‖ what they find shocking. The ―they,‖ 
which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of 
Being of everydayness.
4 
 
What this means is that we come to interpret the world and ourselves as the ―they‖ 
interpret the world. As a consequence, our interpretations can also be described as a 
levelling down of our possibilities into averageness, which is to say that our possibilities 
do not stray too far from the ―they‘s‖ average possibilities; our possibilities do not stray 
too far from what is considered valid or not, and that which can be ventured or not.
5 
Ortega similarly claims that we derive our understanding of our possibilities from the 
Other; however, Ortega goes further to say that we even go so far as to plagiarise their 
possibilities: 
 
[My possibilities] are not presented to me. I must find them for myself, either on my own 
or through the medium of those of my fellows with whom my life brings me in contact. I 
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4 Ibid., 126–127H. 
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invent projects of being and of doing in the light of circumstance. This alone I come upon, 
this  alone  is  given  me:  circumstance.  It  is  too  often  forgotten  that  man  is  impossible 
without  imagination,  without  the  capacity  to  invent  for  himself  a  conception  of  life,  to 
―ideate‖ the character he is going to be. Whether he be original or a plagiarist, man is the 
novelist of himself.
6 
 
Whether  we  invent  or  plagiarise  our  meaningful  projects,  we  invariably  look  to  the 
Other for direction. But when we say that we look to the Other, we are really saying that 
we are evaluating the Other—we are evaluating the ―meaningfulness‖ of their lives, and 
based on these evaluations we choose and create the meaning of our own lives. We 
derive understanding and insight into what meaning we will create for ourselves, and 
take comfort in knowing that our choices are much ―wiser‖ and insightful for having 
done so. Indeed, Cottingham claims in On the Meaning of Life that ―talk of ‗meaning‘ in 
life is inescapably evaluative talk. To describe an activity, or a life, as meaningful is 
evidently to approve or commend it.‖
7 We choose our projects because we believe they 
are  meaningful—we  believe  they  have  value—which  is  a  belief  derived  from  our 
evaluation of the meaningful projects of others.  This does not mean that the Other 
creates our meaningful lives, nor does it mean, as structuralists would argue, that the 
Other ―unconsciously‖ creates our individual meanings; instead, the Other, for lack of a 
better  word,  ―influences,‖  by  varying  degrees,  our  consciously  intended  creation  of 
meaning. In this way there is also a sense that the meaning of one‘s projects are at the 
same time ―universal,‖ insofar as meaning is derived from other individuals‘ factical 
situations, and relational, insofar as meaning is unique and essential to one‘s individual 
situation. 
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Absurdity and the Dialectic of Meaning 
 
However, what this derivation of meaning from the Other further implies is that our 
understanding of our self and our meaning enters into a crude Hegelian master/slave 
relationship. For Hegel, the master/slave relationship is necessary for the process of 
recognition of self-consciousness as it is both dependent on and independent of the 
Other
8; similarly, for our meaningful choices, the relationship is such that to become the 
―master‖ of our choices we must first become ―slave‖ to the Other‘s choices, which is to 
say  that  to  create  our  own  individual  meaning  we  must  firstly  look  to  the  Other‘s 
meaning and objectively interpret and evaluate these meanings, before subjectively 
creating the meaning of our own lives. The rub, however, is that these meanings will in 
turn  be  evaluated.  As  such,  it  can  be  said  that  there  is  a  spectre  of  absurdity—a 
confrontation  between  our  reasoning  and  reality
9—which  haunts  our  meaningful 
projects and the evaluation of our lives. Jean-Paul Sartre dedicates much time in Being 
and  Nothingness  to  discussing  this  absurd,  dialectical  relationship  between  the 
subjective creation of meaning and the objective conferral of meaning, specifically in 
relation to the ―dead life‖ of the Other—the life of the deceased. Sartre argues that in 
death  our lives are ―all  done‖ and we can no longer change these lives.  Our lives 
become closed objects, specifically in relation to the actions, events, and projects that 
we have achieved or have endeavoured to achieve.
10 However, Sartre further claims 
that the life of the deceased is not necessarily closed in relation to the meanings of his 
or her actions, events and projects, because the meaning, or meanings, of the dead life 
are  derived  from  its  preservation  and  explicit  reconstruction  in  the  memory  of  the 
―living‖ Other.
11 As Sartre states: ―The unique characteristic of a dead life is that it is a 
life of which the Other makes himself the guardian.‖
12 This is to say that the meaning of 
the dead life is derived, or, more simply, is interpreted and then evaluated by the Other 
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such that the dead life is no longer a ―being-with‖ others but a ―being-for-others‖
13 and 
also an object for others.
14 This transformation is both a  form of  dispossession and 
alienation as the meaning that we each have endeavoured to create is taken from our 
own hands and appropriated by the living Other.
15 For Sartre, this dispossession and 
alienation is a haunting
16 factor of death as  in life, one is categorised, judged, by the 
Other—one is prey for others—and yet, in life, one can still defend oneself against 
these judgements:  
 
So long as I live I can escape what I am for the Other by revealing to myself by my freely 
posited ends that I am nothing and that I make myself be what I am; so long as I live, I 
can give the lie to what others discover in me, by projecting myself already toward other 
ends  and  in  every  instance  by  revealing  that  my  dimension  of  being-for-myself  is 
incommensurable with my dimension of being-for-others.
17  
 
In death, however, we are each dispossessed of our freedom to give the lie to what 
others believe. And it is because of this inevitability that there is very much a haunting 
sense of anxiety as to how one will be remembered: one may feel anxiety towards the 
―nature,‖ the attitude, of one‘s dispossession and the objective conferral of meaning. 
This anxiety is illustrated in Sartre‘s philosophical novel Nausea (1938), a story centred 
on a young writer—Antoine Roquentin—who is writing a biography on Monsieur de 
Rollebon—an eighteenth-century diplomat and traveller. The main action of the story is 
Roquentin‘s battle to overcome his feelings of nausea stemming from the disturbing 
relationship between himself and the objects around him, but also the anxiety he feels 
with the realisation that he is free to choose the meaning of his life. But  it is in a 
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their clothing, or the car they drive). As Roland Barthes suggests, objects are signs—they are 
forms of semiotic communication—that we ―read‖ when we encounter them in everyday life; and 
we evaluate the Other from these readings. Barthes, ―The Kitchen of Meaning,‖ 157–58. 
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conversation  between  Roquentin  and  his  friend,  the  Autodidact,  that  we  find  an 
example of the anxiety one may feel towards the attitude and evaluation of the Other. 
The Autodidact confides to Roquentin that he has become a member of the S. F. I. O. 
Socialist Party and explains why he has made this decision: 
 
―Before  taking  that  decision,  I  felt  such  utter  loneliness  that  I  thought  of  committing 
suicide.  What  held  me  back  was  the  idea  that  nobody,  absolutely  nobody  would  be 
moved by my death, that I would be even more alone in death than in life.‖
18 
 
The Autodidact voices a fear that may be common to many—the fear of not being 
remembered for one‘s actions by those who survive one‘s death. More importantly, it is 
the  fear  of  not  being  remembered  at  all  by  those  who  survive  him,  as  to  be 
remembered is to be valued in some way. Of course, many people are remembered for 
their  infamy;  but  the  Autodidact  does  not  necessarily  care  for  what  the  Other  will 
remember him for, only that he is remembered. However, the Autodidact‘s thinking has 
a sense of inauthenticity about it as he is attempting, through his meaningful projects, 
to create the memories and value judgments of the Other. It is inauthentic but also 
absurd as the value we each endeavour to create  through our meaningful projects 
cannot be decided by ourselves: it is the living Other who decides as they not only 
make themselves the guardian of the dead life, but also become the arbiter of the dead 
life. Just as the living Other interprets and confers meaning onto a dead life, so too do 
they confer value. Moreover, when Sartre claims that the Other makes themselves the 
guardian of the dead life, he is also making the claim that it is the Other that ultimately 
decides which persons—which dead lives—it will ―protect‖ and ―preserve‖:  
 
[To make oneself the guardian of a life] does not mean simply that the Other preserves 
the life of the ―deceased‖ by effecting an explicit, cognitive reconstruction of it. Quite the 
contrary, such a reconstruction is only of the possible attitudes of the Other in relation to 
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the dead  life; consequently  the character of a ―reconstructed life‖ (in the midst of the 
family  through  the  memories  of  relatives,  in  the  historic  environment)  is  a  particular 
destiny which is going to mark some lives to the exclusion of others. The necessary result 
is that the opposite quality ―a life fallen into oblivion‖—also represents a specific destiny 
capable of description, one which comes to certain lives again in terms of the Other. To 
be forgotten is to be made the object of an attitude of another, and of an implicit decision 
on the part of the Other. To be forgotten is, in fact, to be resolutely apprehended forever 
as one element dissolved into a mass (the ―great feudal lords of the thirteenth century,‖ 
the ―bourgeois Whigs‖ of the eighteenth century, the ―Soviet officials,‖ etc.); it is in no way 
to be annihilated, but it is to lose one‘s personal existence in order to be constituted with 
others in a collective existence.
19    
 
What Sartre suggests is that some dead lives are considered more valuable to the 
Other insofar as they are explicitly reconstructed by the Other. As such they stand over 
and above many other dead lives—they are valued, in some way or other, for their 
meaningfulness. This  is  the fear  of the  Autodidact:  to  be forgotten  by  the Other  in 
death. 
  The  inherent  ―contingency‖  of  meaning  of  the  dead  life—meaning  which  is 
determined  by  the  Other—can  also  be  understood  in  terms  of  Sartre‘s  distinction 
between a dead historical being and a living ahistorical being: as a living ahistorical 
being, I am not my past, and I am not controlled by my past—my history is not yet 
complete and written; therefore, I can undertake new projects for new ends, such that I 
remain the ―author‖ of my projects and their meanings. As such, I am always ―ahead‖ of 
the  Other  and  able  to  contradict  and  undermine  the  meanings  interpreted  and 
conferred onto my life by the Other. In death, however, I am a historical being-for-
others, and my past is fixed in the minds of the Other, and decided by the Other. This 
difference  between  the  ahistorical  and  the  historical  being  can  be  likened  to  the 
difference  between  the  written  reconstruction  of  a  life  by  an  autobiographer  and  a 
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biographer, respectively: as the autobiographer of my own life, it is evident that my 
complete, meaningful, ahistorical autobiography is not yet written. I am not yet dead 
and  have  not  finished  ―writing.‖  This  is  precisely  the  claim  made  by  Gin￩s  de 
Pasamonte, in Cervantes‘s Don Quixote (1605–15), who is writing a book on his own 
life-history. Don Quixote questions Ginés on his book: 
 
  ―And what is the title of your book?‖ asked Don Quixote. 
  ―The Life of Ginés de Pasamonte,‖ replied the man of that name. 
  ―And have you finished it?‖ asked Don Quixote. 
  ―How can I have finished it,‖ he replied, ―if my life hasn‘t finished yet? What‘s written 
so far is from my birth to when I was sentenced to the galleys this last time.‖
20 
 
Gin￩s de Pasamonte cannot finish his book until he himself is ―finished‖; he is not yet 
ahistorical and he, himself, nor the biographer of his life, can write his life. However, in 
death, the Other—the biographer—remains to categorise the historical dead life—a life 
which  one  can  no  longer  defend.  A  final  analogy  can  be  drawn  between  Sartre‘s 
description of an interpretable, historical death, and Roland Barthes‘ famous concept of 
the ―death  of the author‖
  which is the claim that the author‘s voice  within a text is 
essentially disconnected from the text, such that the author of the text is theoretically 
―dead.‖ The consequence is that the author‘s intended meaning is no more valuable 
than the meaning brought to the text by the reader. Barthes explains this theory by 
analysing one particular sentence from Balzac‘s Sarrasine: ―This was woman herself, 
with  her  sudden  fears,  her  irrational  whims,  her  instinctive  worries,  her  impetuous 
boldness, her fussings, and her delicious sensibility.‖
21 Barthes then asks the question:  
 
Who  is  speaking  thus?  Is  it  the  hero  of  the  story  bent  on  remaining  ignorant  of  the 
castrato hidden beneath the woman? Is it Balzac the individual, furnished by his personal 
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experience with a philosophy of Woman? Is it Balzac the author professing ―literary‖ ideas 
on femininity? Is it universal wisdom? Romantic psychology?
22  
 
Barthes alludes to the absence of an authorial identity by questioning who is speaking 
these claims: Is it Balzac and the multiplicity of his identity, or is it beyond Balzac, to a 
universal  wisdom?  Barthes  responds  with  the  claim  that  we  can  never  know  the 
answers to these questions, the reason being that  
 
writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, 
composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is 
lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.
23  
 
Writing  does  not  act  directly  on  reality—it  is  not  present—and  is,  therefore, 
disconnected from the voice, or the origin, of the writing‘s voice, such that the ―author 
enters into his own death.‖
24 Barthes further claims that it is language that speaks or 
―performs,‖ and not the author or ―me.‖ Language has no content other than the act by 
which it is uttered; therefore, language knows only a ―subject,‖ not a ―person.‖
25 From 
this explication we can find several pertinent similarities to Sartre‘s theory of the dead 
life. Firstly, in both the text and the dead life, the ―author‖ of the text and of the dead life 
is dead—theoretically or biologically. The body writing the text and the individual living 
his or her life has ―slipped way,‖ ―disconnecting‖ them from their text/life. The result is 
that without the primacy or authority of the ―author‘s‖ intended meaning of the text/dead 
life,  the  responsibility  to  confer  meaning  onto  the  text/dead  life  is  placed  on  the 
shoulders of the reader/the Other. As has been stated earlier, this is a haunting factor 
for Sartre—the meaning of one‘s life is in the hands of the Other as a being-for-others. 
What is more, Barthes claims that the alienation of the author from his or her text is 
considered somewhat beneficial for the reader as it gives the reader the freedom of 
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interpretation. In a similar way, Sartre describes an historical dead life as a ―gift‖—an 
act of generosity—for the Other, insofar as our lives are complete, pure objects which 
are ―handed over to others.‖
26 We place ourselves totally at the disposal of others. This 
transformation into ―otherness‖ in death is significant if we consider that the fictional 
Other is similarly a ―gift‖ for the shivering reader as the reader can interpret and then 
evaluate the historical, dead lives of the fictional Other. The fictional Other‘s dead lives 
are a gift because the shivering reader can warm him or herself with wisdom derived 
from their interpretations and evaluations of the dead fictional Other.  
  However, fictional characters are not the only gift ―within‖ fiction; indeed, the 
―real‖ gift of fiction, it must be said, is the ironic mode of fiction, and its emphasis on the 
representation  of  the  disparity  between  appearance  and  reality,  knowledge  and 
ignorance. It is the ironic mode that allows the reader to know more of a character than 
the reader can know of any real individual. Northrop Frye describes the ironic mode as 
a  mode  of  representation  where  the  hero  of  the  novel  is  ―inferior  in  power  or 
intelligence to ourselves, so that we have the sense of looking down on a scene of 
bondage,  frustration,  or  absurdity.‖
27  The  reader  can  look  down  on  the  hero  with 
insights into the explicit and implicit thoughts and actions as he or she undertakes their 
intended meaningful projects. It can be said that the ironic mode thus gives the reader 
the privilege of being the final arbiter of the lives of the fictional Other.  
 
The Criteria of Meaningfulness 
 
But what is that we look for when we evaluate the Other? More specifically, what does 
―meaningfulness‖ imply and what is the criteria for meaningfulness—criteria for how we 
are  to  evaluate  other  people‘s  meanings  which  will  inform  our  own  choices,  or 
meanings  which  we  will  plagiarise?  Cottingham  suggests  that  one  criterion  for  a 
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meaningful life is that our projects have a certain profundity or seriousness to them, 
and that they are not ―trivial‖ or ―silly‖—that we make an earnest investment in our 
pursuits. To illustrate this point, we can use Camus‘ example of the myth of Sisyphus—
the absurd hero, condemned by the gods to ceaselessly roll a rock to the top of a 
mountain, only to have it roll back down to the bottom. Sisyphus may undertake his 
task  in  all  seriousness,  such  that  he  feels  that  his  task  is  subjectively  meaningful; 
however, for the objective gods, Sisyphus‘s task is trivial, for what is it to roll a stone up 
a mountain? Viewed this way, the task is meaningless. A second criterion is that our 
meaningful projects should be achievement orientated.
28 Again Sisyphus would fail in 
satisfying this criterion: subjectively he is achievement orientated—he desires to push 
his stone to the top of the mountain, and it is his sole desire; however, objectively, his 
task is essentially an exercise in meaningless, endless toil. Sisyphus‘s task will never 
be  achieved  and  so  it  must  be  deemed  meaningless.  What  is  more,  for  our  own 
projects to be deemed meaningful there must also be a sense of transparency or self 
awareness.
29 This is to say that we must be able to grasp what it is that we are doing—
we must be of sound mind.  
  However, even when our actions do fulfil these basic criteria, there is still the 
question of aesthetic meaningfulness, which would depend greatly on the evaluator‘s 
beliefs,  attitudes,  and  values.  More  importantly,  there  is  also  the  question  of  the 
meaningfulness of the morality of one‘s actions. For example, Cottingham argues that 
a Nazi torturer may feel that his life is meaningful as he is achievement-orientated and 
conducts his projects in all seriousness; an objective evaluation, however, is that the 
torturer‘s actions are not morally meaningful at all, and thus his life is not meaningful.
30 
Of course, how these judgements are made will again very much depend on the 
evaluator‘s beliefs, attitudes, and values: a fellow Nazi may indeed deem the torturer‘s 
actions as being extremely meaningful, whereas most people would see no meaning in 
these actions at all.  
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The Value of the Fictional Other 
 
It is with these criteria in mind that we look to the Other to understand what it is that 
makes life meaningful—what projects make life meaningful. We derive insights and 
wisdom from the Other for the creation of our own meaningful projects. And it is with 
these criteria in mind that the shivering novel reader can also look to the fictional Other. 
More specifically, the reader can look to fictional characters of the many forms, both 
past and present, of the realist novel which has experienced a strong resurgence of 
late.
31 Realist fiction is of particular value because of its emphasis on the verisimilitude 
of its characters and their stories to those of real people in the real world.  Again, this 
claim is contentious, but it can be argued that t he characters of the  realist novel are 
essentially imitations of real people and that the realist novel  imitates the form of the 
non-fictional, literary genres of auto/biography (which includes diaries, confessions , 
and memoirs) and biography.  This claim is evidenced in the precursors of the realist 
novel—the Spanish picaresque novels—which tried to emulate non-fictional forms of 
writing and to postulate the same truthfulness as these forms.
32 As Ian Watt describes, 
this was  also  the goal of  the early realist novelists, particularly Daniel Defoe , who 
―initiated an important new tendency in fiction: his total subordination of the plot to the 
pattern of the autobiographical memoir.‖
33 Thus, it can be said that fiction arose from 
the early novelists‘ ―desire‖ to produce a verisimilar imitation of non-fictional discourses 
which were a sort of benchmark for their own works. But this claim is also significant if 
we consider that the auto/biography can be considered more valuable than ―physical‖ 
interaction with the real Other insofar as it often discloses more insights into the life of 
the subject—insights which are not always made known ―publicly.‖  
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  However, the question we may ask is whether the fictional imitation of the lives 
of real people is less valuable than non-fictional, literary representations of the lives of 
real people, irrespective of the fact that it is fiction? The answer, it would seem, is no, 
especially when we consider the volume of criticism pertaining to the discrepancies of 
―fact‖ and ―fiction‖ within the genres of auto/biography. Much of this criticism is directed 
to how the stories are crafted and the similarities in technique of the authors of both the 
fictional and non-fictional genres. One such example of the similarities between the two 
genres, specifically between fiction and biography, relates to the role of interpretation in 
the writing of a biography. As A. O. J. Cockshut describes in his analysis of the ―art of 
biography‖: 
 
The biographer plunges down into a mass of documents, testimonies and (sometimes) 
personal memories. He emerges with a view of a man‘s character. He then has to submit 
his interpretation to the pressure of facts. The difficulty of biography as an art lies mainly 
in  this  tension  between  interpretation  and  evidence.  Some  nineteenth-century 
biographers, admittedly, avoided this tension by having no central interpretation. They 
abdicated in the face of a mass of documents, and tried to let the story tell itself. But 
stories will not tell themselves; a batch of letters and dates is not a biography. Books 
written  by  authors  who  were uncertain  of what they really thought  of their subject, or 
afraid to say, are quickly forgotten.
34  
 
Cockshut  suggests  that,  unlike  the  autobiographer‘s  first-hand  experiences,  the 
biographer must collect not only factual evidence relating to the subject, such as dates 
and places, but collect and interpret the ―non-factual‖ evidence of the subject‘s life— 
second-hand or anecdotal evidence relating to the subject‘s character or personality—
before  translating  this  evidence  into  a  complete  work.  Thus,  the  information  and 
evidence of the life of the subject is mediated or filtered by the biographer, such that 
the  evidential  ―truth‖  of  the  subject‘s  life,  outside  of  the  ―indisputable‖  facts,  is 
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predominantly indirect, ―objective‖ truth—evidence which is derived from ―outside‖ of 
the subject.  
  The genre of autobiography can also be categorised as a ―fictional‖ genre or as 
having fictional elements. In his essay ―Theory of Genres‖ Northrop Frye examines how 
the  two  genres  of  the  novel  and  autobiography  merge  because  of  the  similarity 
between  the  novelist‘s  and  the  autobiographer‘s  techniques  insofar  as  the 
autobiographer‘s process of production resembles that of the novel writer:  
 
Most autobiographies are inspired by a creative, and therefore fictional, impulse to select 
only those events and experiences in the writer‘s life that go to build up an integrated 
pattern. This pattern may be something larger than himself with which he has come to 
identify himself, or simply the coherence of his character and attitudes.
35 
 
What Frye suggests is that the autobiographer and, it would imply, the biographer, 
select only those events that construct a story—a causal chain of events—much like 
the novelist constructs the story of the novel.  
  Philippe Lejeune  also examines the similarities  and differences  between the 
autobiography  and  the  (fictional)  autobiographical  novel;  however,  Lejeune  also 
addresses  the  claim  that  works  of  fiction  are  in  many  ways  more  ―truthful,‖  more 
profound, and more authentic than autobiography, thereby making them more valuable 
to  the  shivering  reader.  This  is  particularly  evident  where  comparisons  are  drawn 
between a particular author‘s autobiographical novels—the author‘s fictional works—
and his or her own autobiography. For Lejeune, the distinction between autobiography 
and  the  autobiographical  novel  is  the  ―autobiographical  pact‖  which  implicitly  or 
explicitly exists between the author and the reader. The pact is the understanding that 
the author, the narrator, and the protagonist of the autobiography are all identical,
36 and 
that the author has made a concerned effort to write about, and understand, his or her 
own individual life, and that the life described by the author is an accurate portrayal and 
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bears a resemblance to the events of his or her life. This pact, of course, does not exist 
between the writer of fiction and the reader. But, as Lejeune argues, the writer of fiction 
aspires to attain and access the same ―truth‖ sought by the autobiographer, and that 
fiction discloses the ―personal, individual, intimate truth of the author‖
37; thus, it can be 
said  that  the  author‘s  autobiographical  novels  resemble  the  author‘s  life—they  are 
autobiographical—if only by degrees. This resemblance—a judgement which is made 
by the reader—can be ―anything form a fuzzy ‗family likeness‘ between the protagonist 
and the author, to the quasi-transparency that makes us say that he is ‗the spitting 
image.‘‖
38  This  is  to  say  that  it  is  the  reader  who  is  responsible  for  the  value  and 
authenticity placed on the fictional text as being implicitly true to the author‘s life. Thus, 
the argument can be made that the fictional works of an author can be seen as being 
more  valuable  to  the  shivering  reader  because  the  personal  insights  within  the 
autobiographical novel are in a sense truer, more profound, and more authentic than 
the  author‘s  explicit,  autobiographical  insights.  Authors  of  fiction  give  more  of 
themselves—more of their beliefs, wisdom, and understanding of the world—as they 
need not conceal themselves from the harsher, more critical light of non-fiction. 
  The notion of truth and authenticity brings us to another way of understanding 
the  similarities  of  fiction  and  non-fiction,  specifically  in  terms  of  their  value  to  the 
shivering reader. As Paul Murray Kendall suggests, the value of any text—factual or 
fictional—is founded on how well the texts are written:  
 
The writer of fiction, out of the mating of his own experience and his imagination, creates 
a world, to which he attempts to give the illusion of reality. The biographer, out of the 
mating of an extrinsic experience, imperfectly recorded, and his imagination, recreates a 
world, to which he attempts to give something of the reality of illusion. We demand that a 
novel, however romantic or ―experimental,‖ be in some way true to life; we demand of 
biography that it be true to a life. There is a difference in meaning between the phrases; 
                                                                                                                                           
36 Lejeune, On Autobiography, 5. 
37 Ibid., 27. 
38 Ibid., 13. The Evaluation of Meaning and the Fictional Other 
  42 
they join, however, in signifying not ―factual‖ but ―authentic‖—and authenticity lies not only 
in what we are given but in what we are persuaded to accept.
39 
 
A similar claim is made by Frye in his questioning of the common understanding of the 
distinction between fiction and non-fiction:  
 
In assigning the term fiction to the genre of the written word, in which prose tends to 
become  the  predominating  rhythm,  we  collide  with  the  view  that  the  real  meaning  of 
fiction is falsehood or unreality. Thus an autobiography coming into a library would be 
classified as non-fiction if the librarian believed the author, and as fiction if she thought he 
was lying.
40  
 
If the author is believed (even it the text is a falsehood), then the work is non-fiction; if 
the author is not believed (even if the text is unequivocally true), then it is fiction. From 
Frye‘s and Kendall‘s descriptions, it can, therefore, be argued that fictional narratives 
can be considered somewhat equal in value to the auto/biography in representing the 
life of the Other, or as is the case, a fictional Other, only if it is a representation of a 
―realistic‖ story. The reader of a fictional text must be able to believe that the characters 
of the fictional Other could exist, could choose, act towards, and reveal the meaning of 
their lives, just as the real Other could. It is because of the novel‘s believability, its 
verisimilitude,  and  the  blurring  of  its  boundaries  with  non-fiction,  that  it  may  be 
considered at least as valuable as non-fiction.  
  Based on these descriptions of the similarities between fiction and non-fiction, it 
can be argued that the novel is at least of equal value to the shivering reader as the 
auto/biography. However, this being said, we often find that, more often than not, novel 
readers look to fiction rather than non-fiction for their getting of wisdom and the gaining 
of life-experience. Indeed, Benjamin claims that, for novel readers, fiction is often the 
primary source of their life-experiences and understanding of the world around them—it 
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is the primary source for understanding ―the business of living.‖ Indeed, when Benjamin 
says that the reader of a novel actually does look for human beings from whom the 
reader derives ―the meaning of life,‖ he seems to suggest that readers look to fictional 
characters before they look to real human beings—before they look to the real world, or 
non-fictional representations of the real world. Benjamin says this almost as if it were 
an afterthought, as if he must convince us that readers ―actually do‖ look to human 
beings, not just fictional characters. For Benjamin, the reason for fiction‘s privileged 
position relates to the isolation of the reader. Benjamin talks of the ―isolated reader,‖ 
and how the activity of reading is almost always done alone:  
 
A man listening to a story is in the company of the storyteller; even a man reading one 
shares this companionship. The reader of a novel, however, is isolated, more so than any 
other reader. (For even the reader of a poem is ready to utter the words, for the benefit of 
the listener.) In this solitude of his, the reader of a novel seizes upon his material more 
jealously than anyone else. He is ready to make it completely his own, to devour it, as it 
were.
41 
 
Novel  readers  are  alone  as  reading  is  unmediated:  even  if  others  were  to  read 
alongside the novel reader, they are still very much alone. This description of isolation 
is very much symbolic of how the novel reader, especially the middle-class reader, is 
alone in a social sense, a claim briefly discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, as 
Richard  Wolin  describes  in  his  biography  of  Benjamin,  the  novel  is  very  much 
permeated by isolation: ―The communal aspect of the artistic process—both in terms of 
the conditions of its production and of its reception—has disappeared. . . . The novel is 
produced  by  solitary  individuals  and  read  by  solitary  individuals.‖
42  From  Felski‘s 
descriptions in the previous chapter, a sense of solitude and isolation is still evident 
and, indeed, problematic for the contemporary reader. It is the solitary reader who is 
looking for life-experience, and to understand the world and his or her meaningful place 
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within the world. This need to look to the novel as a primary source of life-experience is 
exemplified by a scene from George Eliot‘s Middlemarch (1872), where Fred Vincy (a 
careless,  debt-ridden  young  man)  and  Mary  Garth  (the  plain  and  practical  young 
woman whom Fred is in love with) are discussing the nature of relationships between 
men and women. Regarding this matter, Fred opines: ―I suppose a woman is never in 
love with anyone she has always known—ever since she can remember; as a man 
often is. It is always some new fellow who strikes a girl.‖
43 Mary replies by drawing on 
the only advice available to her:  
 
  ―Let me see,‖ said Mary, the corners of her mouth curling archly; ―I must go back on 
my  experience.  There  is  Juliet—she  seems  an  example  of  what  you  say.  But  then 
Ophelia had probably known Hamlet a long  while;  and  Brenda Troil—she  had known 
Mordaunt Merton ever since they  were children; but then he seems to have been an 
estimable young man; and Minna was still more deeply in love with Cleveland, who was a 
stranger. Waverley was new to Flora MacIvor; but then she did not fall in love with him. 
And there are Olivia and Sophia Primrose, and Corinne—they may be said to have fallen 
in love with new men. Altogether, my experience is rather mixed.‖
44    
   
These  fictional  characters—Juliet  from  Shakespeare‘s  Romeo  and  Juliet  (1597); 
Ophelia  and  Hamlet  from  Shakespeare‘s  Hamlet  (1603);  Brenda  Troil,  Mordaunt 
Merton,  and  Clement  Cleveland  from  Sir Walter  Scott‘s  The  Pirate  (1822);  Edward 
Waverley and Flora MacIvor from Scott‘s Waverly (1814); Olivia and Sophia Primrose 
from Oliver Goldsmith‘s The Vicar of Wakefield (1766); and Corrinne from Germaine de 
Staël‘s  Corrinne  (1807)
45—are  the  primary  source  of  experience  from  which  Mary 
draws upon—not her own lived experiences, or those that have been told to her by the 
real Other. Eliot‘s possible self-referential style and ironic tone notwithstanding, Mary 
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looks to fiction for her experiences and accepts these fictional texts as ―truthful‖ and 
valuable. 
   
The ―Superiority‖ of Fiction 
 
However, it can also be argued that the novel form is not only as valuable as non-
fiction but in fact shows itself to be more valuable than non-fiction. This claim can be 
made for many reasons of which we will consider three of the most relevant. The first 
two  reasons  centre  on  the  novel‘s  ubiquity,  which  relates  to  both  the  volume  of 
literature that has been produced since the rise of the new novel form, and the types of 
characters represented in the novel form. The former can be understood if we consider 
that historical analyses of the English reading public show that in the late nineteenth 
century (a period which saw the greatest increase in the population and the burgeoning 
of the mass reading public) between sixty-five and ninety percent of books that were 
circulated in most free libraries were classified as fiction.
46 This benefited the shivering 
reader as the novel‘s ever-increasing ubiquity presented him or her with innumerable 
characters,  thereby  enabling  them  to  draw  upon  a  greater  wealth  of  wisdom  and 
insight. Moreover, as was illustrated by the volume of sales, fictional texts were also 
more ubiquitous than the non-fictional forms of auto/biography.
47  
  But the superiority of fiction over non -fiction lies not only in its quantity of 
characters but in the diversity of character types—the second reason for its privileged 
position. The characters of the realist novel were representative of a wide-range of 
socio-economic backgrounds, and therefore offered the reader a broad collection of 
varied, subjective perspectives. W. J. Harvey describes how this wide-ranging diversity 
was very much a result as the connection between the novel‘s development and the 
growth of the bourgeoisie. Harvey states that the bourgeoisie valued ―liberalism‖ and 
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had  a  very  liberal  state  of  mind,  and  acknowledged  the  plenitude,  diversity  and 
individuality of human beings in society and ―[delighted] in the multiplicity of existence 
and  allows  for  a  plurality  of  beliefs  and  values.‖
48  This  ―multiplicity‖  of  existence  of 
characters  assured  that  the  fire  that  warms  the  shivering  reader  was  increasingly 
―fuelled‖ with the representation of the lives of the fictional Other, such that the quantity 
of diverse characters could be said to yield almost the same warmth as the quality of 
the representation. What is more, from the earliest examples of the novel form, there 
has been an abundance of female characters, thereby offering readers the subjective 
perspective  of  both  sexes.  In  contrast,  the  subject  of  the  pre-twentieth  century 
auto/biography was almost exclusively male, and had some form of social status and 
public  importance,  both  of  which  were  necessary  for  the  auto/biography‘s 
―legitimacy.‖
49 Further, ―autobiography proper [was] perceived to be the right of very 
few  individuals:  those  whose  lives  encompassed  an  aspect  or  image  of  the  age 
suitable for transmission to posterity.‖
50 Thus, the writing of an autobiography was the 
entitlement of wealthy, famous men, and who were old enough to warrant esteem and 
conviction  from  their  readers.  Similarly,  biographies  written  prior  to  the  twentieth 
century were concerned only with the most eminent people—men of high action or 
letters.
51 Only in the twentieth century were these precedents called into question, most 
prominently by Virginia Woolf:  
 
The question now inevitably asks itself, whether the lives of great men only should be 
recorded.  Is  not  anyone  who  has  lived  a  life,  and  left  a  record  of  that  life,  worthy  of 
biography—the failures as well as the successes, the humble as well as the illustrious? 
And  what  is  greatness?  And  what  smallness?  He  [the  biographer]  must  revise  our 
standards of merit and set up new heroes for our admiration.
52  
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Woolf  challenges  the  standards  by  which  the  biographer  attributes  the  status  of 
―hero‖—the standards of worthiness for being the subject of a biography. Indeed, one is 
reminded of Nietzsche‘s claim that we must see the hero within ourselves, and, not 
judge ourselves by the standards of those men deemed worthy by the set standards. 
And as Nietzsche states, we can see the everyday hero of our lives in art—in fiction, 
but not necessarily non-fiction:   
 
Only artists, and especially those of the theatre, have given men eyes and ears to see 
and hear with some pleasure what each man  is himself, experiences himself, desires 
himself;  only  they  have  taught  us  to  esteem  the  hero  that  is  concealed  in  everyday 
characters;  only  they  have  taught  us  the  art  of  viewing  ourselves  as  heroes—from  a 
distance and,  as it  were,  simplified and transfigured—the  art of staging and  watching 
ourselves. Only in this way can we deal with some base details in ourselves. Without this 
art we would be nothing but foreground and live entirely in the spell of that perspective 
which makes what is closest at hand and most vulgar appear as if it were vast, and reality 
itself.
53 
 
It  is  in  the  theatre,  and  in  fiction,  that  we  can  see  that  the  everyday  character—
ourselves—can be the hero of our lives, and create a meaningful life. It is in the theatre 
and  in  fiction  that  we  can  recognise  ourselves—the  everyday  individual—as  the 
everyday hero. In contrast, non-fictional works of the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
lack this diversity of everyday subjects from whom readers can look to for answers to 
their questions of meaning. Indeed, the incommensurability of the lives of the men that 
are written about in auto/biography and the common reader would further suggest that 
little of what is communicated in the auto/biography would be applicable to the reader‘s 
own life: their meaningful projects are in no way similar to my meaningful projects, and 
thus hold little value. How can one recognise oneself in a character when there is no 
commonality between oneself and the characters one is reading about? There is an 
insurmountable factical and situational distancing between the lives of the common The Evaluation of Meaning and the Fictional Other 
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reader  and  the  lives  of  great  men.  The  novel,  however,  is  valuable  as  it  has 
represented the diversity of characters sought by campaigners such as Woolf, and thus 
the novel makes it possible to somewhat overcome the distance between the situation 
of fictional characters and the situation of the reader. Indeed, over its relatively short 
history, the novel has represented innumerable heroes and heroines alike, from the 
poorest  to  the  wealthiest,  the  honourable  to  the  dishonourable,  and  from  the  most 
knowledgeable to the utterly perplexed.  
  The question left begging is whether this distancing can ever be truly overcome. 
Is  it  at  all  possible  for  readers  to  recognise  themselves  in  other  people  with  other 
factical  situations,  irrespective  of  the  possible  ―universality‖  of  wisdom?  Indeed, 
distance is not limited to that which exists between the common reader and great and 
wealthy  men:  distance  is  also  apparent  if  we  consider  the  situational  diversity  of 
ethnicity, race, nationality, and social and political beliefs. However, it can be argued 
that  fiction  does  offer  this  ubiquity  and  diversity.  Indeed,  as  Franco  Moretti  makes 
evident in his ―Conjectures‖ essays, despite a certain lack of theoretical study, there 
are  ―hundreds  of  languages  and  hundreds  of  literatures‖  which  comprise  ―world 
literature.‖
54 Thus, the common, ―worldly,‖ reader can draw upon the literary ―wisdom of 
the world‖—be it relational or universal wisdom—to better understand the meaning of 
his or her life.   
  And yet, it must be noted that, whilst both fiction and non-fiction can offer ―real-
life‖ wisdom to the shivering reader, it can also offer no wisdom—a certain absence of 
wisdom and meaning—because the lives of the subjects and characters can bear no 
such resemblance to that of the reader. This is especially the case  when ordinary, 
―common‖ people are thrown into extraordinary and uncommon circumstances. This is 
to say that the distance between reader and character does not only occur because of 
ethnicity,  race,  etc.—there  is  also  the  distancing  of  events—events  that  cannot  be 
utilised as a sounding pole for how one should live one‘s own life. The most obvious 
                                                                                                                                           
53 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §78. 
54 See Moretti, ―Conjectures on World Literature‖ and ―More Conjectures.‖ The Evaluation of Meaning and the Fictional Other 
  49 
example is the Holocaust and the horrors of Auschwitz. We might say: ―The lives of 
those  people  in  Auschwitz  bear  no  resemblance  to  our  own  lives.‖  We  know  this 
through  the  literature  of  the  Holocaust,  the  exemplar  of  which  is  the  semi-
autobiographical short stories of Tadeusz Borowski in This Way for the Gas, Ladies 
and  Gentlemen  (1959).  Borowski  writes  his  stories  without  sentiment  and  with  a 
knowing indifference. Many of the stories which are set in the Auschwitz concentration 
camp serve to illustrate how many of the men and women of Auschwitz necessarily 
created  a  new  grounding  for  a  moral  life,  and  how  reactions  to  extreme  situations 
create  extreme  behaviours  which  are  not  commensurable  with  behaviours  outside 
these  situations.  More  importantly,  the  stories  show  us  how  the  possibilities  of  the 
concentration  camp  victims  are  incommensurable  to  one‘s  own  possibilities.  In 
Auschwitz, the will is not to live well but simply to live, and to ―live at all costs.‖ We see 
this in a scene from the first story ―This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentleman‖ when 
a cattle-car of prisoners is about to be unloaded. 
 
It is impossible to control oneself any longer. Brutally we tear suitcases from their hands, 
impatiently pull off their coats. Go on, go on, vanish! They go, they vanish. Men, women, 
children. Some of them know. 
  Here is a woman—she walks quickly, but tries to appear calm. A small child with a 
pink cherub‘s face runs after her and, unable to keep up, stretches out his little arms and 
cries: ―Mama! Mama!‖ 
  ―Pick up your child, woman!‖ 
  ―It‘s not mine, sir, not mine!‖ she shouts hysterically and runs on, covering her face 
with her hands. She wants to hide, she wants to reach those who will not ride the trucks, 
those who will go on foot, those who will stay alive. She is young, healthy, good-looking, 
she wants to live.
55 
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In this world, there are no longer normal moral divisions between those who act evil 
and those who are its victims,
56 and there is no  ―normal‖ moral compass. Indeed, as 
the title of one of the stories—―Auschwitz, Our Home‖—suggests, the narrator sees 
Auschwitz is ―home‖ and he looks to it with familiarity, just as you would any normal 
home. But it is a home, a world, which the reader cannot know except as separated 
and distanced—it is otherworldly. This distancing is further emphasised by the many 
juxtapositions within the text such as the description of a soccer game being played 
whilst a train arrives. Steadily the people emerge from the cattle-cars:  
 
The people sat down on the grass and gazed in our direction. I returned with the ball and 
kicked it back inside the field. It travelled from one foot to another and, in a wide arc, 
returned to the goal. I kicked it towards a corner. Again it rolled out into the grass. Once 
more I ran to retrieve it. But as I reached down, I stopped in amazement—the ramp was 
empty. Out of the whole colourful procession, not one person remained. . . . 
  Between  two  throw-ins  in  a  soccer  game,  right  behind  my  back,  three  thousand 
people had been put to death.
57 
 
In A Double Dying, Alvin H. Rosenfeld states that ―such events are discordant, even 
obscene in their juxtapositions, but everything at Auschwitz exists in gross disjunction 
with  the  earlier  life;  and,  seeing  things  this  way,  Borowski  is  sternly  correct  in  his 
refusal to attempt a resolution between the two.‖
58 Here one may read ―earlier life‖ as 
being similar to the life of the ―civilian‖—the reader—before Auschwitz, choosing his or 
her own life. One cannot know the conditions of Auschwitz and one cannot know or 
contrast or draw upon the lives of those in the concentration camps. These texts are 
understatedly invaluable for understanding the frightening possibilities of humanity; yet, 
at  the  same  time,  they  are  outside  history  and  are  not  valuable  to  the  common 
reader—the civilian: the situation of those in Auschwitz, and the events that take place 
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within this world, are unknowable and, thankfully, bear little to no resemblance to the 
reader‘s own situation nor to the reader‘s own choices and possibilities.   
  The Holocaust is one of many exceptions to the claim that both fiction and non-
fiction offers the shivering reader the wisdom to draw warmth from. What fiction and 
non-fiction can offer, however, is ubiquity and diversity. Fiction, in particular, offers the 
greater diversity of characters, and can therefore be seen as more valuable to the 
shivering reader than non-fiction. However, fiction can be considered more valuable to 
the shivering reader than non-fiction not only in terms of who is represented, but in 
terms  of  how  the  characters‘  stories  are  represented,  which  is  the  third  reason for 
fiction‘s  privileged  position.  As  was  intimated  above,  readers  of  fiction  enter  into  a 
different relationship with the fictional Other than they do with the real Other: the reader 
of fiction is not merely evaluating the characters of a novel as if they were people he or 
she meet momentarily on the street, limited to hearing their explicit communication, or 
seeing their ―public‖ actions; nor is the reader limited to the imperfect fragments of the 
living‘s memories of the dead life. Instead, the reader has the privilege of evaluating 
fictional characters from a ―superior,‖ omniscient position, such that the reader can 
―hear‖ the characters‘ explicit and implicit thoughts, see their ―unseen‖ actions. What is 
more,  the  reader  can  hear  and  see  the  characters‘  thoughts  and  actions  as  they 
happen, giving the reader what is essentially a ―perfect,‖ documented memory of the 
events of a character‘s life. This is because the story can be told as if it were presently 
happening,  as  if  it  is  happening  ―now‖  and  not  as  a  reconstruction  of  a  life  from 
memory.  This  possibility  of fictional  narration  is  described  by  Seymour  Chatman  in 
Story and Discourse in which he states that all narratives, fictional and non-fictional,  
 
establish a sense of a present moment, narrative NOW, so to speak. If the narrative is 
overt, there are perforce two NOWs, that of the discourse, the moment occupied by the 
narrator in the present tense (―I‘m going to tell you the following story‖), and that of the 
story,  the  moment  that  the  action  began  to  transpire,  usually  in  the  preterite.  If  the 
narrator  is  totally  absent  or  covert,  only  the  story-NOW  emerges  clearly.  The  time  of The Evaluation of Meaning and the Fictional Other 
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narration  is  then  past,  except  for  the  present  of  dialogue  and  external  and  internal 
monologue.
59  
 
The auto/biography can be written in both NOW tenses; however, there is essentially a 
temporal distance between the writing of the event and the experience of the event, 
such that the memories of the event are somewhat fallible, and no guarantee can be 
made of their accuracy and authenticity. Indeed, the past of the non-fictional subject of 
the auto/biography is not present—it does not exist—and is, therefore, questionable in 
its accuracy. In the novel, however, the story can be narrated from either of the two 
NOWs. But if the novel is narrated only in the second NOW—a possibility belonging to 
fiction alone—then there is no temporal distance between the writing of the event and 
the  experience  of  the  event.  It  is  all  present.  Therefore,  unlike  the  narrator  of  the 
auto/biography,  the  novel‘s  (absent)  narrator  can  have  perfect  ―memory‖  of  the 
experience because he or she can describe the action as it happens. As such, the 
novel essentially guarantees truth, accuracy and authenticity in its representation, and 
thus provides the reader with a far more detailed representation of a character‘s life. Of 
course,  even  when  the  narration  is  told  in  the  preterite,  the ―remembered‖  story  is 
described in far more detail than what can be normally remembered. This disparity is 
particularly  evident  when  we  consider  moments  in  a  novel  where  long  pieces  of 
dialogue,  exchanged  between  characters,  are  remembered  perfectly  despite  having 
taken place many years ago. 
  In  more  recent  fiction,  or,  indeed,  metafiction,  the  implied  ―truthfulness‖  of 
omniscience is called into question and becomes a source of self-reflection. Metafiction 
or ―self-conscious fiction‖ ―systematically draws attention to its status as an artefact in 
order to pose questions about the relationship between fiction and reality.‖
60 Examples 
of such texts are Laurence Sterne‘s Tristram Shandy (1759–67) and Salman Rushdie‘s 
Midnight’s Children (1981), where the narrators both regale stories which cannot be 
known first-hand, whilst also drawing attention to these impossibilities and questioning 
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their truth. Tristram‘s first-person story is primarily centred on his birth (of which he can 
have no memory of experiencing and knows only by report); similarly, Saleem Sinai—
the  narrator  of  Midnight’s  Children—recounts,  in  great  detail,  the  many  significant 
events which preceded his very important birth. A more recent example can be found in 
Ian McEwan‘s Atonement (2001). Initially, the NOW-story is told in the third-person by 
an omniscient narrator; however, following an incident where a vase is broken by a 
teenage Cecilia Tallis and her friend Robbie Turner it is revealed that story is in fact the 
autobiographical reflection of a seventy-three-year-old Briony Tallis—Cecilia‘s younger 
sister—who is telling the story—still in the third-person—as if she were outside the 
action. Indeed, she does see the incident at a distance, but before this event, she is 
spoken of only in the third-person by an ―unknown,‖ omniscient narrator. Writing from 
the position of her later self, Briony says: ―Now there was nothing left of the dumb show 
by the fountain beyond what survived in memory, in three separate and overlapping 
memories.  The  truth  had  become  as  ghostly  as  invention.‖
61  The  thirteen-year-old 
Briony‘s memories have not maintained their vibrancy or accuracy, and so the later 
Briony must ―create‖ the event—a poor sketch of the past‘s reality. In the telling of her 
―autobiography,‖ we also see Briony‘s compulsion to ―produce a story line, a plot of her 
development that contained the moment when she became recognisably herself.‖
62 Her 
autobiographical story must become fiction-like to maintain the façade and, thereby, 
the  ―readability‖  of fiction;  non-fiction  is  only  readable  (and  valuable)  if  it  comes  to 
resemble the narrative of fiction. Once again fiction is privileged over non-fiction, even 
with the reader‘s awareness of McEwan‘s ironic underpinnings   
 
Validity and the Interpretation of Meaning 
 
The reader‘s omniscient ability to hear and see a character‘s thoughts and actions as 
they happen is the dividend of how the fictional Other can be represented. However, 
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this omniscient superiority has the secondary benefit of evaluative superiority as the 
reader can (to use Frye‘s words) look ―down‖ on the novel‘s characters. By looking 
down  on  the  characters,  the  reader  can  make  a  ―valid,‖  accurate,  and  authentic 
evaluation  of  the  character—the  reader  can  make  a  superior  judgment  of  the 
character‘s dead life. The accuracy of interpretation is determined by the synthesis of 
our  objective  interpretation  of  the  dead  Other‘s  meaning  with  the  dead  Other‘s 
subjective, intended meaning—we must know what meaningful projects were chosen 
by the deceased to better evaluate their meaning.  
  Of  course,  it  would  be  bold  to  suggest  that  one  could,  for  the  most  part, 
authoritatively know the intended meaning of another‘s life, even bolder to suggest that 
one‘s  understanding  of  another  person‘s  life  is  identical  with  the  other  person‘s 
intended meaning. We cannot certainly know the Other‘s intentions and we cannot 
certainly know the reasons and the feelings behind their intentions, just as we cannot 
certainly know another‘s grief—we can only empathise and sympathise. Indeed, we 
cannot certainly know why Captain Ahab is chasing Moby Dick; we cannot certainly 
know the mad intentions of Don Quixote; and we cannot certainly know the love that 
Anna Karenina feels for Vronsky which makes her negate her past life. Yet we can 
estimate  their  meaningful  intentions  and  we  can  still  make  interpretations  of  their 
intended  meanings.  To  do  this,  we  must  gather  ―memories‖—data—of  the  dead 
Other—our  own  and  those  of  others  who  knew  the  deceased—so  as  to  confer  a 
meaning  that  is  both  accurate  and  comparable  to  their  intended  meaning.  It  is  a 
meaning that is agreed upon by those who are interpreting the life of the deceased. But 
the activity of interpretation of the text/dead life is never really completed and cannot be 
exhausted in the sense that all interpretations must be seen as partial and part of the 
continual  process  of  the  gathering  of  partial  memories,  pieces  of  stories  and 
anecdotes, such that a collage-like representation is formed; a collage which becomes 
more refined as new memories and new ―subjectivities‖ come to light. The objective 
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interpretation  can  never  match  the  subjective  intention,  but  it  can  become  more 
accurate.
63  
  The importance of this fuller understanding and accuracy to the living is that if 
we make the mistake of conferring only a partial, uninformed, and inaccurate meaning 
onto a dead life, then, in a way, we are reinforcing the isolation of our understanding—
the  isolation  that  we  are  endeavouring  to  overcome.  Complete  freedom  of 
interpretation,  and  invalid  interpretation,  somewhat  leads  back  to  isolation  and 
perplexity. It reduces the fullness of a life, and, inevitably, its value to the living.  
    
The Rhetoric of Showing and Telling 
 
Before we begin a closer examination of the fictional Other and their stories in the 
following chapters, we must firstly recognise a significant difference between the nature 
of interpretation and evaluation of the dead life of the real Other and that of the dead 
life of a fictional character: we must recognise that, unlike the interpretation of the real 
Other, the novel reader cannot avoid coming into contact (or even conflict) with the 
authoritative author who has created the intended meaning of a character. The author 
knows with unquestionable accuracy the intended projects of his or her characters. And 
the  author  of  a  fictional  text  can  also  have  a  significant  influence  on  the  reader‘s 
evaluation of the novel‘s characters. As will be described, this influence is apparent 
regardless of whether the author chooses to tell the story or merely show the story, a 
distinction  which  is  discussed  by Wayne  C.  Booth  in  his  very  important  work,  The 
Rhetoric of Fiction. Booth states that the author can tell the story to us as ―direct and 
authoritative rhetoric.‖
64 Here the influence is explicit and there is no hiding the author‘s 
judgements of his or  her  characters. But the author can also  show  us the story, a 
technique where the author has essentially ―effaced himself, renounced the privilege of 
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direct intervention, retreated to the wings and left his characters to work out their own 
fates upon the stage.‖
65 In this way, the author suppresses all explicit judgements of 
the  lives  of  his  or  her  characters,  such  that  his  or  her  influence  over  the  reader‘s 
evaluation of a novel‘s characters is minimal. The author leaves the reader alone to 
evaluate the characters and decide the meaningfulness of a character‘s life. A pertinent 
example of an author who shows her characters, by attempting to represent the pure 
subjectivity of her characters, is Virginia Woolf, specifically Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse 
which is discussed by Erich Auerbach in Mimesis:  
 
The  writer  as  narrator  of  objective  facts  has  almost  completely  vanished;  almost 
everything  stated  appears  by  way  of  reflection  in  the  consciousness  of  the  dramatis 
personae. . . . This goes so far that there actually seems to be no viewpoint at all outside 
the novel from which the people and events within it are observed, any more than there 
seems  to  be  an  objective  reality  apart  from  what  is  in  the  consciousness  of  the 
characters.
66 
 
Auerbach adds that the author has the stylistic possibility of 
 
obscuring and even obliterating the impression of an objective reality completely known 
to the author. . . . The author at times achieves the intended effect by representing herself 
to be someone who doubts, wonders, hesitates, as though the truth about her characters 
were not better known to her than it is to them or to the reader. It is all, then, a matter of 
the author‘s attitude toward the reality of the world he represents. And the attitude differs 
entirely from that of authors who interpret the actions, situations, and characters of their 
personages with objective assurance, as was the general practice in earlier times.
67 
 
One is reminded of Stephan Dedalus‘s definition of the artist, from Joyce‘s A Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man (1916), where he states: ―The artist, like the God of creation, 
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remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of 
existence,  indifferent,  paring  his  fingernails.‖
68  The  reader  is  left  to  interpret  and 
evaluate, uninfluenced, the fictional Other, as if the reader were privy to the fictional 
Other‘s ―pure,‖ subjective consciousness. The characters speak explicitly, subjectively, 
and authoritatively—not the author. 
  However, whilst privileged to see more than what a novel‘s characters can see, 
an omniscient reader sees no more than the authoritative author is willing to ―show.‖ 
Indeed, an author cannot help but influence the reader‘s evaluation, even if the author‘s 
aim is for pure objectivity. As Booth claims, this influence can be seen even if the 
author were to choose to simply ―re-tell‖ a story: 
 
Unless the author contents himself with simply retelling The Three Bears or the story of 
Oedipus in the precise form in which they exist in popular accounts—and even so there 
must be some choice of which popular form to tell—his very choice of what he tells will 
betray him to the reader. He chooses to tell the tale of Odysseus rather than that of Circe 
or Polyphemus. He chooses to tell the cheerful tale of Monna and Federigo rather than a 
pathetic account of Monna‘s husband and son. He chooses to tell the story of Emma 
Bovary rather than the potentially heroic tale of Dr. Larivi￨re. The author‘s voice is as 
passionately revealed in the decision to write the  Odyssey, ―The Falcon,‖ or  Madame 
Bovary as it is in the most obtrusive direct comment of the kind employed by Fielding, 
Dickens, or George Eliot. Everything he shows will serve to tell; the line between showing 
and telling is always to some degree an arbitrary one. 
  In short, the author‘s judgement is always present, always evident to anyone who 
knows how to look for it. . . . [We] must never forget that though the author can to some 
extent choose his disguises, he can never choose to disappear.
69 
 
What  Booth  suggests  is  that  the  authoritative  author  rhetorically  tells  the  reader 
something of his or her values even when they choose not to tell the reader anything. 
However, what is also interesting about Booth‘s claim is that the choice of the novelist 
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to tell or, as it were, re-tell a story has strong analogies to the description above of 
Sartre‘s claims relating to the Other being guardian of the dead life: it is the Other that 
decides which dead lives will be remembered and reconstructed. In a similar vein, the 
characters of the novel, which are created and given a life by an author, stand out as 
having  a  ―valuable‖  meaningful  life  which  is  worth recounting.  If  we  again  consider 
Booth‘s claim, the author‘s choices are unavoidably influential: the author‘s choice to 
write about a character is a form of telling insofar as the author chooses to write about 
one particular character instead of another. When we question why the author chose 
this way, we are also asking what value the author is suggesting this character has for 
our understanding of our own lives. Of course, possible answers to the question of why 
an  author  chose  to  tell  that  particular  story  has  been  discussed  by  proponents  of 
psychoanalytic theory where the focus is on the significant role of the unconscious in 
telling a story. Psychoanalytic theorists argue that the reasons why an author chooses 
to tell a story is always a result of repressed and ―irrational‖ desires and fears which are 
locked away in the unconscious such that the conscious intentions and choices of the 
author to tell a story are subordinate to the ―true‖ unconscious intentions.
70 Here it can 
be argued that the author is telling the reader something ―unconsciously‖; but how this 
―telling‖  is  interpreted  becomes the realm  of  the  reader.  One  cannot  dismiss  these 
claims  easily;  however,  for  the  present  argument  we  will  assume  that  there  is  a 
conscious  intention  and  a  sense  of  telling  behind  the  author‘s  work,  regardless  of 
whether he or she consciously or unconsciously intends to show or tell a story.  
 
Ethics and Responsibility 
 
Before moving on to a more thorough discussion of the value of the fictional Other‘s 
stories and the rhetoric of the novelist in representing these stories, we must firstly 
address the question of the relationship between ethics and literature—a question that, 
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in  the  last  few  decades,  has  become  of  increased  interest  to  literary  theorists  and 
philosophers alike. The question here is not whether literature has ethical value, or, 
indeed,  political  value—a  topic  addressed  by  Marxist  critics;  it  is  a  question  of  the 
author‘s  ethical  responsibilities  to  the  reader  who  is  consciously  or  unconsciously 
―absorbing‖ these stories of meaningful (fictional) lives to better inform the creation of 
his or her own life. Martha C. Nussbaum (writing in 1988) recognised what was, at the 
time, an absence of ethical theory in literary theory. Nussbaum argues that literature 
serves a very important role in how we are to live our lives and for answering the 
original Socratic question: ―How should one live‖; therefore, the question of ethics is 
invariably linked to literature:  
 
One of the things that makes literature something deeper and more central for us than a 
complex  game  .  .  .  is  that  it  speaks  .  .  .  about  us,  about  our  lives  and  choices  and 
emotions,  about  our  social  existence  and  the  totality  of  our  connections.  As  Aristotle 
observed, it is deep, and conducive to our inquiry about how to live, because it does not 
simply (as history does) record that this or that event happened; it searches for patterns 
of  possibility—of  choice,  and  circumstance,  and  the  interaction  between  choice  and 
circumstance—that turn up in human lives  with such a persistence that they  must be 
regarded as our possibilities. And so our interest in literature becomes . . . cognitive: an 
interest in finding out (by seeing and feeling the otherwise perceiving) what possibilities 
(and  tragic  impossibilities)  life  offers  to  us,  what  hopes  and  fears  for  ourselves  it 
underwrites or subverts.
71 
  
It is because literature speaks about us that it should be subject to ethical inquiry. This 
can be understood from at least two standpoints: the responsibility of the author to the 
reader; and the ethics of alterity. The former relates to the author‘s rhetorical influence 
over  the  reader.  To  understand  this  view  we  can  firstly  look  to  Booth  who,  like 
Nussbaum, argues that literature‘s moral influence over its reader is undeniable:  
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No one who has thought about it for long can deny that we are at least partly constructed, 
in  our  most  fundamental  moral  character,  by  the  stories  we  have  heard,  or  read,  or 
viewed, or acted out in amateur theatricals: the stories we have really listened to.
72 
 
For Booth, this construction of our moral character is primarily a consequence of the 
author‘s intentional or unintentional moral judgements within the work: ―I can think of no 
published story that does not exhibit its author‘s implied judgments about how to live 
and what to believe about how to live.‖
73 The author‘s judgements are undoubtedly 
manifest in his or her story; thus, there must be some form of responsibility on the 
author‘s shoulders. Of course, how the author‘s judgements are communicated and the 
extent  of  his  or  her  influence  is  a matter  of  examining the rhetorical  devices  (both 
implicit and explicit) within the text. In The Company We Keep, Booth argues that it 
both the author and the reader are responsible for a text. Ethical responsibility of the 
reader relates to how the reader is to respond to a text, and that to respond to a text is 
also to be responsible to a text.
74 Part of this response is to recognise that what is 
being told is a fiction—that the reader is dwelling in an ―unreal‖ or ―artificial‖ world; it is 
also to recognise that one may be ―taken over‖ by a text and one may begin to think the 
thoughts of  another—to  be enchanted—but one  must return to  one‘s own thoughts 
after reading.
75 The problem of such theories is that  what is suggested is that there is 
an ―ideal reader‖—one who does not need to be protected from fiction by censors and 
the like; a reader who is aware that something is being told to him or her, but how they 
respond to what is being told them is their own responsibility. This is essentially the 
reader Sartre has in mind when he states: ―You are perfectly free to leave that book on 
the table. But if you open it, you assume responsibility for it.‖
76 ―You‖ it can be assumed 
is  every  free  individual—an  ideal  reader.  We  may  also  argue  that  an  ideal  reader 
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should also realise that one novel is not necessarily the unequivocal fount of wisdom 
for a meaningful life. One particular novel may indeed be invaluable to the reader, but 
the reader should endeavour to place it amongst a range of other novels. One may 
suggest that the result of a more wide-ranging survey is a greater wealth of knowledge 
and wisdom which can be collated and utilised, just as the wealth of ―Otherness‖ that 
society offers creates a more consolidated understanding of one‘s own possibilities. Of 
course, this ideal reader does not exist, but it is a model for the kind of reader—the 
isolated, shivering reader—implied by this thesis,  insofar as  the shivering reader is 
looking to the plurality of Otherness to better understand his or her own life. 
  Like Nussbaum  and Booth,  Anthony  Cunningham,  argues that  literature has 
significant  ethical  implications  and  can  play  a  valuable  role  in  the  reader‘s  life  by 
―functioning  as  a  kind  of  ethical  filter  and  powerful  diagnostic  tool.‖
77  Indeed, 
Cunningham suggests that literature is in many ways more valuable than real, lived 
experience  because  it  can  ―provide  us  with  intimate,  detailed  depictions  of  life  and 
character that are difficult to come by in everyday experience.‖
78 However, with regards 
to the morality of literature, Cunningham argues that the novel can only serve as a 
guide for our moral path if it is the ―right‖ novel:  
 
The  right  kind  of  novel—one  with  detailed  character  portraits  of  particular  people 
embroiled  in  complex,  meaningful  situations—can  help  us  refine  our  moral  vision  by 
giving us a studied opportunity to practice seeing and appreciating diverse ethical loves. 
Armed with the right works of literature, we can literally read for life.
79 
 
The question we may well ask is what is the ―wrong‖ kind of novel? Is it the novel that 
reinforces one‘s ―unethical‖ ideas about how to live one‘s life?; or is the wrong kind of 
novel that which portrays an unethical answer to one‘s questions about how to live 
one‘s life? Here we find the difficulties in demarcating what is deemed right and wrong, 
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ethical and unethical, in literature. This definition of ―right‖ may indeed be similar to 
Leavis‘s criteria for the  most important  novels of the  ―great  tradition‖ which ―are all 
distinguished by a vital capacity for experience, a kind of reverent openness before life, 
and a marked moral intensity.‖
80 And yet, the difficulty with this argument relates to how 
this ―right‖ kind of novel ―establishes‖ itself. Again we are within the realm of rhetoric 
and  responsibility  and  again  it  would  seem  that  responsibility  is  placed  on  the 
shoulders of the author to create the right kind of novel. But it could also be suggested, 
as Booth does, that the reader has a responsibility to other individual readers insofar as 
the reader should  
 
make public [his or her] appraisals of the narratives [they] experience, particularly [their] 
ethical appraisals. . . . [The] most important of all critical tasks is to participate in . . . a 
critical cultural, a vigorous conversation, that will nourish in return those who feed us with 
their narratives.
81  
 
It is thus critical participation which establishes the right and wrong kind of novels—a 
consensus of value for the shivering reader. 
  The  second  standpoint  for  the  question  of  ethics  is  the  ethics  of  alterity—a 
concept discussed most prominently in the work of Levinas and his description of the 
irreducibility  of  the  Other  to  the  ―same‖  (or  the  self)  and  the  problem  of  trying  to 
diminish the alterity of the Other by identifying them as objects which exist only  in 
relation  to  me  and  for  me,  and  not  as  Beings-for-themselves.
82  Felski  explains 
Levinas‘s ethics of alterity in her chapter on recognition:  
 
As  an  advocate  of  otherness,  Levinas  warns  against  the  hubris  of  thinking  we  can 
ultimately come to understand that which is different or strange. Ethics means accepting 
the mysteriousness of the other, its resistance to conceptual schemes; it means learning 
to relinquish our own desire to know. Seeking to link a literary work to one‘s own life is a 
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threat to its irreducible singularity. . . . To recognise is not just to trivialise but also to 
colonise; it is a sign of narcissistic self-duplication, a scandalous solipsism, an imperious 
expansion of a subjectivity that seeks to appropriate otherness by turning everything into 
a version of itself.
83 
 
One is reminded here of Ortega y Gasset‘s claim that we each plagiarise the Others‘ 
meanings: we appropriate—colonise—the life of the Other and make their meanings 
our own and for our own purposes. To plagiarise is also to assume that we know the 
Other‘s meanings; it is to evaluate and confer  definitive meaning. So too  does the 
reader  colonise  the  fictional  Other.  However,  in  more  recent  fiction—specifically, 
postmodern literature—attempts are made to undermine such colonisation. As Thomas 
Docherty writes:  
 
Postmodern narrative attacks the possibility of the reader herself or himself becoming a 
fully enlightened and imperialist subject with full epistemological control over the fiction 
and its endlessly different or altered characters.
84 
 
Postmodern characters cannot be pinned down by the reader and colonised as it were. 
Their identities are not fixed, nor are their essences, thus they escape being of value—
a  commodity—for  the  reader.  This  endeavour  is  certainly  important  for  the 
―colonised‖—the  marginalised  Other—but  not  necessarily  for  the  ―coloniser‖—the 
shivering reader.  
 
The question of ethics is of course a difficult one and this brief exegesis is far from 
exhaustive. However, the line of argument for the present thesis is that the reader is 
ultimately  responsible  for  how  he  or  she  interpret  and  ―use‖  literature.  Just  as  the 
reader is ultimately responsible for carefully navigating through political, economic, and 
philosophical rhetoric, so too should the reader be responsible for navigating his or her 
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way through the rhetoric of the novel, especially the particular stories that are told.  The 
reader should also be aware of the ethics of alterity and the hubris of assuming he or 
she  can  know  the  Other.  However,  for  the  shivering  reader,  the  value  of  fiction  is 
subject to his or her own anxious self-interest, freedom, and responsibility; and this 
self-interest necessitates that the shivering reader look to others—both real people and 
fictional  characters—to better  understand the meaning  of  his  or  her own  life.  More 
specifically,  the  shivering  reader  must  look  to  fictional  characters‘  stories—stories 
which  undoubtedly  have  rhetorical  traces  of  the  novelist,  be  they  ―beneficial‖  or 
―detrimental‖ to the reader. This rhetorical influence is especially evident in what events 
of the characters‘ stories are represented, but also in how the characters‘ stories are 
represented.  More  specifically,  the  novelist‘s  influence  is  evidenced  in  how  the 
meaningful projects of characters are represented, including their intended choices but 
also, and more importantly, the outcomes and revelations of these choices. Indeed, it is 
the representation of the outcomes of the characters‘ personal narratives which are of 
the most value to the shivering reader as it is the outcomes which are responsible for 
awakening the sensibilities of the reader‘s understanding of what a meaningful life is. 
And, as we will see in the following chapter, this awakening is no better achieved than 
in  the  often  shocking  representation  of  the  fictional  Other‘s  death-scenes  and  their 
explicit revelations of the meaning of life. How the reader responds to these revelations 
is the responsibility of the reader.  
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2 
 The Explicit Revelations of the 
Dying 
 
But have I now seen Death? Is this the way 
I must return to native dust? O sight 
Of terror, foul and ugly to behold, 
Horrid to think, how horrible to feel! 
            —John Milton, Paradise Lost, xi, 462–65 
 
 
What draws the reader to the novel is the hope of warming his shivering life with a 
death he reads about.                    
               —Walter Benjamin, ―The Storyteller‖ 
 
 
n the previous chapter we described the historical dead life of the Other as being a 
generous gift for the perplexed living. The death of the Other is an act of generosity 
insofar as the deceased ―hand‖ themselves over to the living, to have the meaning of 
their  dead  lives  interpreted  and  evaluated.  From  these  evaluations,  we  derive 
understanding and insight into what meaning we will create for ourselves. However, 
when we interpret the dead life of the Other—the complete meaningful life of the dead 
Other—we are not necessarily looking to the Other to derive meaning, but looking at 
the Other as if they were purely an object for our ―superior‖ gaze. But, a contradiction 
belies this action insofar as the ―superior‖ gaze is that of the ―inferior,‖ perplexed living: 
the  living  have  no  justification  in  evaluating  the  dead  Other  as  it  is  an  evaluation 
essentially founded on ignorance. Indeed, a far greater gift for the living is the more 
―passive‖ action of deriving the meaning of life by looking to the Other—by listening to 
and seeing the Other‘s communication of their wisdom and insight. But, as Benjamin 
I The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
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suggests, we must not look to the living Other—the equally perplexed Other—but to the 
dying  Other,  as  only  the  dying  have  the  authority  to  convey  to  the  perplexed  their 
understanding of the meaning of life. Consider again Benjamin‘s claim that ―a man‘s 
wisdom‖ and understanding of the meaning of life, the meaning of his real life,  
 
first  assumes  transmissible  form  at  the  moment  of  his  death.  Just  as  a  sequence  of 
images is set in motion inside a man as his life comes to an end—unfolding the views of 
himself under which he has encountered himself without being aware of it—suddenly in 
his  expressions  and  looks  the  unforgettable  emerges  and  imparts  to  everything  that 
concerned him that authority which even the poorest wretch in dying possesses for the 
living around him.
1 
 
Only when we are dying, when death is upon us, do we ―suddenly‖ attain the wisdom 
and the clarity of understanding of the meaning of life, specifically, the meaning of our 
own, individual life. For Benjamin, the act of dying is a moment of pure enlightenment; 
it reveals to us an insight into the meaning of our lives which transcends all previous 
knowledge, such that every action and project of our lives—which may have held no 
significance in our ―lived‖ lives—suddenly becomes significant and meaningful. To use 
the language of literary criticism, if we are each creating our personal narratives, then 
the event of death is very much the denouement of the realist plot, where the final 
scene  of  the  plot  is  ―unknotted,‖  the  mystery  is  solved,  and  the  meaning  of  life 
revealed.
2  Again,  t his  claim  seems  contrary  to  postmodern ist  theories  of  the  
decentered self, and that the notion of individual identity is a cultural myth. But what the 
transcendence of the death-scene seems to imply is that there is a final meaning—a 
final recognition of the meaning of a self that unifies ―the many views [identities] of 
oneself.‖ This is to say that the claim that one is culturally created may indeed be 
possible, but there is still a sense of an overriding meaning—a ―true‖ self. Despite the 
many varied meanings one creates or has created, one still becomes who one is to 
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become. This is the foundation of the wisdom of the dying, to the innumerable selves of 
the living. Death brings closure to our projects and the story of our lives; and, with the 
story  of  our  lives  concluded,  meaning  is revealed.  Of  course,  such  a claim  is  also 
contrary to Sartre‘s  belief  that the meaning of life is  revealed  after  death—that the 
meaning is like an unresolved chord insofar as we project beyond our death:  
 
If it is only chance which decides the character of our death and therefore of our life, then 
even the death which most resembles the end of a melody can not be waited for as such; 
luck by determining it for me removes from it any character as an harmonious end. An 
end of a melody in order to confer its meaning on the melody must emanate from the 
melody itself. A death like that of Sophocles will therefore resemble a resolved chord but 
will not be one, just as the group of letters formed by the falling of alphabet blocks will 
perhaps resemble a word but will not be one. Thus this perpetual appearance of chance 
at the heart of my projects can not be apprehended as my possibility but, on the contrary, 
as the nihlation of all my possibilities, a nihlation which itself is no longer a part of my 
possibilities.
3  
 
The idea that death will coincide with the end of my projects is a fallacy as one is 
always looking to the future—one is always projecting beyond an unforeseeable death. 
It is only by chance that death and the end of my project is will coincide. As Strauss 
describes: 
 
This image of closure is only a fantasy of death and rarely corresponds to the events of 
my life or of my death as a whole life or a totalising death. Still, it does not really matter 
that it is a fantasy, since death never appears to me in its reality as my own.
4   
 
But what is implied by the death-scene, described by Benjamin, and realised in Don 
Quixote, Kurtz, and Kane, is the absence of projection. It is a recognition of death: that 
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it is my death and no longer is it somebody else who is dying. It is no longer death that 
is elsewhere but life that is elsewhere. I no longer project my individual possibilities. In 
somewhat of a reversal of Heidegger‘s description of how ―everyone dies‖ and that 
death  is  always  elsewhere,  Maurice  Blanchot  describes  death  as  a  becoming 
―everyone‖ such that it is not that everyone else dies, but that one dies—one becomes 
one of the anonymous ―they‖:  
 
When someone dies, ―when‖ designates not a particular date but no matter what date. 
Likewise there is a level of this experience at which death reveals its nature by appearing 
no longer as the demise of a particular person, or as death in general, but in this neutral 
form: someone or other‘s death. Death is always nondescript.
5  
 
We could interpret such comments as meaning that in death one has no possibility of 
―pushing death away‖ and no possibility of maintaining one‘s distance by attributing 
death  to  everyone  else  who  dies.
6  By removing this distance ,  one can no longer 
maintain  the  possibility  of  an  individualised  projection.  Instead,  o ne  has  become 
everyone—one has become ―other‖; as such there is only a past, individual life, which 
is, in death, seen from the point of otherness. Death can therefore be understood as a 
conclusion and a revelation realised by the dying self who has become ―other.‖ We 
may also say that in death one becomes a contradiction as one gains an ―impartial,‖ 
objective understanding of one‘s partial, subjective life. This objective ―otherness‖ is not 
that of the living, but of the ―enlightened‖ dying. And this, it may be argued, is why the 
wisdom of the dying is the greatest gift for the living, as it is imbibed with a sense of the 
sublime and the profound—the impartial otherness that the living cannot know until 
they too become the ―they‖ in the phrase ―they die.‖ But in order to receive this ―gift‖ we 
must  firstly  witness  the  Other‘s  experience  of  death—witness  the  Other‘s  ―death-
scene‖—what Anny, Roquentin‘s former lover in Jean-Paul Sartre‘s Nausea, describes 
as one of the ―privileged situations‖ that one may experience in life: 
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―They were situations which had a very rare and precious quality, a style if you like. To be 
a king, for example, struck me as a privileged situation when I was eight years old. Or 
else to die. You may laugh, but there were so many people drawn at the moment of their 
death,  and  there  were  so  many  who  uttered  sublime  words  at  that  moment,  that  I 
honestly thought . . . well, I thought that when you started dying you were transported 
yourself. Besides, it was enough just to be in the room of a dying person: death being a 
privileged situation, something emanated from it and communicated itself to everybody 
who was present. A sort of grandeur. When my father died, they took me up to his room 
to see him for the last time. Going upstairs, I was very unhappy, but I was also as it were 
drunk with a sort of religious ecstasy; I was at last going to enter a privileged situation. I 
leaned against the wall, I tried to make the proper gestures. But my aunt and my mother 
were there, kneeling by the bed, and they spoiled everything with their sobs.‖
7 
 
Anny  describes  the  privilege,  the  gift  of  experiencing  the  death  of  the  Other,  as  a 
moment bound with sublimeness and importance. It connects the living with something 
transcendent,  as  if  the  revelation  of  meaning  were  an  unearthly  force.  Indeed, 
Benjamin  implies  that  the  cause  of  this  revelation  is  almost  like  a  ―non-conscious‖ 
force—that  the  images,  memories,  which  are  ―set  in  motion  inside  a  man‖  are  not 
recalled intentionally, but are ―inspired,‖ possibly externally (by a God or higher power), 
or possibly internally by some unconscious force within the mind or the soul. Here we 
see a possible insight into Benjamin‘s self-declared ―Janus face‖ which ―compelled him 
to oscillate between metaphysical concerns and Marxist interests.‖
8 For Benjamin, the 
material  and  the  immaterial  conflict  at  the  moment  of  death,  in  the  form  of  the 
inexplicable phenomenon of the meaningful revelation. 
  Although somewhat fanciful or maybe romantic, Benjamin‘s claims are neither 
unique  nor  recent.  Indeed,  Benjamin‘s  descriptions  are  very  similar  to  innumerable 
accounts of people who have had near-death experiences—people ―who have revived 
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from apparent death as well as those who have only come close to death.‖
9 These 
people often describe how their ―life flashed before their eyes,‖ a phenomenon which is 
commonly  referred  to  as  a  ―life  review,‖  or  ―panoramic memory.‖
10  Moreover,  near-
death  experiences,  and  similar  phenomena  such  as  ―out-of-body  experiences‖  and 
―otherworld journeys,‖ are believed to be a universal phenomenon, spanning various 
religious and cultural backgrounds of both the Western and Eastern worlds.
11    
  More importantly, and especially for the shivering reader, descriptions of death-
scenes, life reviews and meaningful revelations are also found throughout the history of 
great literature. Indeed, as Robert Weir describes in Death in Literature, death-scenes 
of characters are ubiquitous in not only the novel but all genres of literature, having 
appeared throughout the history of literature as far back as the Epic of Gilgamesh from 
c.2300 BCE:  
 
Much  of  the  world‘s  literature  depicts  death  scenes  of  individuals.  Sometimes  the 
individuals  are  real  persons  in  history;  sometimes  they  are  creations  of  an  author‘s 
imaginative mind. Sometimes the dying person is historically important; other times the 
person is historically unimportant or merely fictional. In any case . . . the depiction of an 
individual‘s death is often the focal point or culminating event of a real-life story or of a 
poem, play, short story, or novel.
12  
 
One of the most obvious forms where the death-scene is of particular importance is 
tragedy—a genre which, like existential philosophy, has as its theme the isolation and 
loneliness of man, facing a blind-fate in a silent world.
13 As George Steiner writes: ―The 
human condition is tragic. It is ontologically tragic, which is to say in essence. Fallen 
man is made an unwelcome guest of life or, at best, a threatened stranger on this 
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hostile or indifferent earth.‖
14 The death of the tragic hero can be seen as both the 
culmination of tragedy but also the deliverance from tragic absurdity. However, death in 
tragedy is not so much concentrated on the death of an individual—the irreparable 
destruction  of  the  hero—but  the  end  of  an  action.
15 We  see  this  in  Shakespeare‘s 
Hamlet where Hamlet‘s life ends as does his endeavour to avenge his father‘s death by 
killing his uncle: 
 
Hamlet      O, I die, Horatio. 
  The potent poison quite o‘ercrows my spirit. 
  I cannot live to hear the news from England,  
  But I do prophesy th‘election lights 
  On Fortinbras. He has my dying voice. 
  So tell him, with th‘occurents more and less 
  Which have solicited—the rest is silence.     Dies. 
Horatio  Now cracks a noble heart. Good night, sweet prince, 
  And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest.
16 
 
Hamlet proclaims his own death, but his concerns are only for the state of Denmark. 
More importantly, in his death, Hamlet completes both the action of the play and the 
action of his life. Here we see what may be one of the rare occasions where one‘s 
projects—simplified here into a singular action—coincide with one‘s death. 
  A  novelistic  example  of  a  death-scene—one  more  akin  to  Benjamin‘s 
description—is  Cervantes‘s  Don  Quixote  (1605–15),  and  the  description  of  Don 
Quixote‘s death-scene. As the story goes, Don Quixote‘s many outrageous and often 
disastrous adventures as a knight errant come to an end when he is seized by fever 
and subsequently bed-ridden. For six days Don Quixote alternates between very short 
periods of waking and long periods of sleeping, until on one of his last days on earth, 
he wakes, bellowing: 
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  ―Blessed be Almighty God, who has done me such good! Indeed his mercy knows 
no bounds, and the sins of men do not lessen or obstruct it.‖ 
  The niece paid careful attention to her uncle‘s words, and they seemed more rational 
than usual, during his recent illness at least, and she asked him: 
  ―What are you saying, sir? Has something happened? What‘s this mercy you‘re on 
about, and these sins of men?‖ 
  ―The mercy, niece,‖ Don Quixote replied, ―is that which God has this instant shown 
me, unobstructed, as I said, by my sins. My mind has been restored to me, and it is now 
clear and free, without those gloomy shadows of ignorance cast over me by my wretched, 
obsessive  reading  of  those  detestable  books  of  chivalry.  Now  I  can  recognise  their 
absurdity and their deceitfulness, and my only regret is that this discovery has come so 
late that it leaves me no time to make amends by reading other books that might be a 
light for my soul. It is my belief, niece, that I am at death‘s door; I should like to make 
myself ready to die in such a way as to indicate that my life has not been so very wicked 
as to leave me with a reputation as a madman; for even though this is exactly what I have 
been, I‘d rather not confirm this truth in the way in which I die.‖
17  
 
Don Quixote describes to his niece how he has had what can only be described as a 
―divine‖ revelation—a revelation shown to him by God. God reveals to Don Quixote his 
past life for what it really is; it is a revelation that is clear, sane, unobstructed, and 
truthful. From Benjamin‘s perspective, we can interpret the restoration of Don Quixote‘s 
sanity as the metaphorical revelation of ―wisdom,‖ which is special to the dying: God‘s 
mercy has restored the mind of Don Quixote who was mad and now is sane; but God 
has also metaphorically restored the ―unaware‖ to the ―aware,‖ the perplexed to the 
wise. 
  But, if Don Quixote‘s death acts as a metaphor for the revelation of meaning in 
death, then a second example can be said to represent a more ―materialist‖ revelation, 
more akin to Benjamin‘s description of the ―non-conscious‖ revelation. This example is 
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the death of Mr. Kurtz—the enigmatic agent for ―the Company‖—in Joseph Conrad‘s 
Heart of Darkness. The seaman Marlow tells a story to his companions of the cruising 
ship the Nellie of an experience he once had some years ago in Africa, whilst they wait 
on the river Thames for the tide to turn. Marlow describes how he was given command 
of a steamboat to travel up the River Congo (unnamed in the novel) to transport people 
and goods for an ivory trading company. Throughout his journey, Marlow hears of a 
man—the first-class agent Kurtz—whom Marlow at first admires, but later fears and 
resents. The impudent Kurtz is ill and is to be relieved from his post at the Company‘s 
Inner Station on the river, either by the company or by ―natural causes.‖ Marlow is 
drawn to Kurtz and eventually meets him, only after first being attacked by natives—an 
attack ordered by Kurtz—in which a shipmate of his was killed. Marlow sees that Kurtz 
is by now most certainly dying and clearly insane, and describes how Kurtz‘s life was 
―running swiftly . . . , ebbing, ebbing out of his heart into the sea of inexorable time.‖
18 
Kurtz‘s  death  is  imminent,  and  Marlow  renders  for  the  listeners  of  his  story  (his 
companions on the Nellie, and the reader) the last moments of Kurtz‘s life: 
 
  ―Anything approaching the change that came over his features I have never seen 
before, and hope never to see again. Oh, I wasn‘t touched. I was fascinated. It was as 
though a veil had been rent. I saw on that ivory face the expression of sombre pride, of 
ruthless power, of craven terror—of an intense and hopeless despair. Did he live his life 
again in every detail of desire, temptation, and surrender during that supreme moment of 
complete knowledge? He cried in a whisper at some image, at some vision,—he cried out 
twice, a cry that was no more than a breath— 
  ―‗The horror! The horror!‘‖
19 
 
Kurtz‘s visions reveal to him the meaning of his life and his actions, and, with the clarity 
of  the  dying,  he  now  understands  the  horror  of  his  actions,  which,  until  his  last 
moments, he has vehemently justified. He is, as Benjamin would suggest, imbibed with 
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the authoritative wisdom of the dying. More importantly, he is imbibed with authoritative 
wisdom  for  the  living.  Indeed,  in  his  critical  essay  on  Heart  of  Darkness,  Jacques 
Berthoud argues that Kurtz‘s revelation can be seen as a universal revelation:  
  
The moment of death, it would seem, has a meaning that is relevant to all mankind. So 
that what the dying Kurtz perceives may not only be true of himself as an individual; it 
may also be significant for humanity at large. 
  We have to take the moment of death, then, as Marlow presents it: not as a cause of 
terror, but as a condition for insight. As far as Kurtz is concerned, it is the instant in which, 
for the first and last time, he sees his past for what it has truly been; it is the point at 
which, in a rending flash, his values at last connect with his life and reveal it to be a 
―darkness.‖
20 
 
Like Benjamin‘s description of the wisdom of the dying, Berthoud‘s interpretation of 
Kurtz‘s revelation is one of new-found insight, a new awareness, but it is not only a 
revelation for Kurtz, the individual, but for all humanity—it is at once both universal and 
relational. Kurtz has the authoritative wisdom for not only the shivering reader, but for 
all  the  ―living,‖  which  he  intentionally  or  unintentionally  communicates.  Indeed,  in 
Francis Ford Coppola‘s Apocalypse Now! (1979)—the film which draws upon various 
themes of Heart of Darkness—the ―universal‖ dying words of Kurtz ―echo‖ as a voice-
over, long after he has died, as if his words were haunting both Captain Willard and the 
viewer. 
  This example illustrates the profound significance of the moment of death and 
the  revelation  of  meaning.  And  yet  it  is  an  experience  that  we  cannot  ―know‖  and 
understand until we, ourselves, are dying—until we are each experiencing our own 
individual  death.  Indeed,  it  is  Marlow  who  describes  the  experience  from  his 
understatedly limited point of view—a description which comes from outside of Kurtz‘s 
subjective experience. In Aspects of the Novel (1927), an early work on the theory of 
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the novel, E. M. Forster describes the ―peculiar‖ event of our death as a ―darkness‖—as 
an  unknowable  experience—and  contrasts  it  with  the  experience  of  our  birth.  He 
describes them both as  
 
strange because they are at the same time experiences and not experiences. We only 
know of them by report. We were all born, but we cannot remember what it was like. And 
death is coming even as birth has come, but, similarly, we do not know what it is like. Our 
final experience, like our first, is conjectural. We move between two darknesses.
21  
 
The experience of the events of birth and death are knowable only by report: we have 
some understanding of them as an event in the lives of the Other (the experience of the 
birth of a child, or witnessing the passing of a relative) but our own individual birth (an 
event from our past) and our own individual death (an event which lies somewhere in 
our future) remain unknown to us (even if Tristram Shandy tells us his story based on 
this unknown). However, it is the event of death which is of more of concern to us, 
particularly in terms of how we live our lives in relation to death. Our birth, it can be 
argued, can be ―reconciled‖ in our understanding: we are each of us born—we are 
each thrown into the world—which is a ―fact‖ that we each must ―accept.‖ And of the 
experience itself, we have witnesses to tell us. More importantly, with the exception of 
our facticity—the historical time and place that we are born, our race, colour, gender, 
our body, and social status
22—the event of our birth does not overtly influence the 
remainder of our lives or the creation of meaning in our lives, particularly if we consider 
that we must create the meaning of our lives in terms of our facticity. Indeed, I cannot 
choose  the  meaningful  project  of  becoming  the  first  indigenous  prime-minister  of 
Australia if I am a non-indigenous Australian. 
  In contrast, the event of our death is still outstanding as a factical possibility of 
our future which, as Heidegger states, ―is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and 
                                                 
21 Forster, Aspects of the Novel, 57. 
22 Macquarrie, Existentialism, 190. The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
  76 
which is not to be outstripped.‖
23  Indeed,  as Heidegger further suggests,  Dasein  is 
necessarily a being-towards-death: our death has a necessary sense of imminence as 
from the moment we are born death is impending, or as Heidegger quotes: ―As soon as 
man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.‖
24 As such, death plays a most 
important  role  in  our  personal  narratives,  and  has  a  perpetual  influence  on  our 
meaningful choices. And because we are beings-towards-death, because death is a 
possibility that remains outstanding and cannot be outstripped, we are anxious about 
the  event  of  death  itself  and  as  to  what  meaning  it  may  reveal,  especially  if,  as 
Benjamin suggests, it reveals the definitive meaning of our lives. Thus, to stave off this 
anxiety, to warm our shivering lives, we must endeavour to gain some understanding 
and insight into the experience of death, and some understanding of its significance, 
before our own experience of death. For this understanding we look to the authoritative 
dying Other. As Benjamin claims, death gives the dying the authority of wisdom that the 
anxious living cannot know, until they too are dying. And it is the communication of this 
authoritative wisdom—the sublime words of the dying Other—which is sought by the 
living.   
  Indeed, we can see how the dying‘s last utterances are of utmost importance to 
the living when we consider the intense hype that surrounds the final, dying words of 
Charles  Foster  Kane  in  Orson  Welles‘s  Citizen  Kane  (1941).  ―Rosebud,‖  Kane‘s 
infamous dying word—the utterance accentuated by an extreme close-up of his greying 
moustachioed mouth—sparks an international search by the ―News Digest‖ newspaper 
to find the meaning of the enigmatic word and its relation to the equally enigmatic 
media tycoon.
25 It is a search performed by, and for, the anxious living Other —the 
enigma of Kane‘s words need to be ―cracked‖ by the living. But, despite the News 
Digest‘s reporters‘ trite beliefs that ―Rosebud‖ is possibly the name of ―a racehorse he 
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bet on once‖ or the name of a woman he loved, or (closer to the truth) ―something he 
couldn't get or something he lost,‖ the search is inevitably in vain as Kane‘s childhood 
sleigh, bearing the inscription ―Rosebud,‖ is incinerated, such that, with the exception of 
the privileged movie-goer, the meaning of the word ―Rosebud,‖ and the meaning of 
Kane‘s revelation, is forever lost.
26  
  The significance of the death-scene of Citizen Kane and his final, dying word is 
that it gives viewers, the witnesses of his death, some understanding of the event of 
death and an insight into the revelation of the meaning of li fe. Indeed, if we also 
consider  the  example  of  Mr.  Kurtz  above,  both  Kane‘s  and  Kurtz‘s  revelations  and 
insights become our revelations and insights. But, what is even more significant is that 
the examples of the deaths of both Kane and Kurtz illustrate how only by sharing their 
experience can we construct our own understanding of death and the meaning of life. 
Only if the words of Kane and Kurtz are witnessed could they be of value to the living; 
only  then  could  they  warm  the  shivering  reader.  Indeed,  it  can  be  argued  that 
Benjamin‘s own particular descriptions of the experience of death—of how death ―sets 
in motion‖ the images of one‘s past life—must have come from either his own shared 
experiences of the Other‘s death. Of course, just as possible is that this description is 
of Benjamin‘s own invention, or, less ―flattering,‖ is the possibility that Benjamin simply 
takes the experience of death as a cliché of what we are to expect in death. These 
possibilities  notwithstanding,  Benjamin‘s,  and  innumerable  other  literal  descriptions, 
representations, reported stories, and insights of the experience of the Other‘s death, 
be they fictional or non-fictional, clichéd or not, are valuable to the anxious living as 
they  add  to  their  own  wealth  of  understanding  of the  experience  of  death  and  the 
revelation of the meaning of life.  
  However,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  novel‘s  representations—be  it  realist, 
modernist,  or  postmodernist—of  the  death  of  the  Other  are  more  valuable  to  the 
shivering  reader than non-fictional representations,  particularly if we again compare 
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fiction to the non-fictional literary genres of auto/biography. What is more, the argument 
can also be made that the novel‘s representations of the fictional Other‘s death-scenes 
are even more valuable to the reader than the reader‘s own physical interactions with 
the dying Other. This claim can be made for two reasons: the first relates to Benjamin‘s 
claim that in the modern, industrial world, the reader no longer physically witnesses or 
experiences  the  death  of  the  Other—the  reader  is  no  longer  privy  to  privileged 
situations;  therefore,  the  reader  needs  the  death  of  the  Other  to  be  represented 
literally. This is to say that the novel is valuable, not because it can represent the death 
of the Other, but that it does represent it. The second reason for why the fictional Other 
can  be  considered  more  valuable  than  the  literal  communication  of  the  real  Other, 
specifically the biography, relates to the lack of restrictions placed on the novelist‘s 
narrative technique in his or her representation of a character‘s experience: the novelist 
is privileged with the freedom to narrate both the character‘s subjective and objective 
experience of death—a freedom which is not  bestowed on the biographer. We will 
examine these two reasons in turn. 
 
 
1. The “Existence” of the Fictional Other’s Death  
The ―Publicness‖ of Death 
 
Benjamin claims that since the beginning of the modern, nineteenth-century industrial 
world,  our  physical  interactions  with  the  dying  Other  have  become  less  and  less 
frequent.  Death,  Benjamin  states,  is  no  longer  ―omnipresent‖  to  the  public,  and, 
therefore, it is no longer common to share or witness the experience of the Other‘s 
death; it is no longer common to experience ―privileged situations.‖ Benjamin contrasts 
this absence with the ―publicness‖ of the pre-modern world, by claiming that, in the 
past, 
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dying was once a public process in the life of the individual and a most exemplary one; 
think of the medieval pictures in which the deathbed has turned into  a throne toward 
which the people press through the wide-open doors of the death house.
27  
 
This pre-modern sense of publicness and community was epitomised by the concept of 
a  ―good  death,‖  or  ―tame  death,‖  so-called  because  of  the  dying  individual‘s  self-
awareness of the imminence of death. As Allen Kellehear describes, in A Social History 
of Dying:  
 
On feeling sure that one will die soon, one makes a will, dividing the estate fairly, makes 
some  provision  for  poorer  members  of  the  family,  accepts  visits  from  the  religious 
sections  of  the  community,  says  one‘s  prayers  and  dies  surrounded  by  family  and 
friends.
28  
 
Two examples, the first non-fictional, the second fictional, illustrate what it means to 
have a good death. The former comes from the 1707 memoirs of Duc de Saint-Simon 
and his account of the death of Mme de Montespan, a woman most renowned for 
having  four  bastard  sons  to  King  Louis  XIV  of  France.  Mme  de  Montespan  had  a 
continual  fear  of  death  and  of  dying  alone,  and  went  so  far  as  to  employ  several 
women to watch her at night:  
 
She  slept  with  the  bed-curtains  drawn  back  and  many  lighted  candles,  her  watchers 
round her, and whenever she woke she liked to find them talking, playing cards or eating, 
so that she could be sure that they were not becoming drowsy.
29  
 
However,  at  the  age  of  sixty-seven,  and  despite  being  of  good  health,  Mme  de 
Montespan suddenly awoke one night feeling ill. Believing that she was dying,  
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she made her confession and received the sacraments. All the servants were summoned, 
even the meanest of them, and she made public admission of her sins against the public, 
humbly asking forgiveness for the scandal which she had caused and for her ill-tempers, 
with such true-seeming repentance that nothing could have been more edifying. She then 
received the sacraments with ardent piety. The fear of death, that had so tormented her 
during her life, was suddenly dispelled and she ceased to be troubled.
30  
 
She  died  shortly  after,  in  her  watchers  and  servants‘  presence. What  is  significant 
about this example is that Mme de Montespan‘s good death made it possible for her to 
share  the  experience  of  her  death  and  her  insights  with  those  around  her,  most 
noticeably how her fear of death had,  in death, disappeared—a warming insight, it 
would seem, for the living. Indeed, the value of Mme de Montespan‘s experience of 
death is that it was directly or indirectly conveyed by a witness to Saint-Simon (whom it 
would appear was not present), who in turn conveyed the experience to the readers of 
his memoirs. Mme De Montespan‘s death becomes the shared privilege of many. 
  The second example of the shared experience of a good death is that of Don 
Quixote, briefly described above. Following his divine revelation, Don Quixote asks his 
niece: ―Call my good friends, my dear: the priest, the graduate Sansón Carrasco, and 
Master Nicolás the barber, because I want to confess my sins and make my will.‖
31 Don 
Quixote proceeds to tell his friends and family that he clearly understands that he was 
mad and is now sane, and that he can now die, despite their entreaties that he should 
―live for a long time.‖ But Don Quixote, with the authority of the dying, denies any such 
possibility: he makes his will, receives the sacraments, and expresses his loathing of 
books of chivalry, before dying in a ―calm and Christian manner.‖
32 What we also notice 
about this representation is that Don Quixote‘s death is a clean, sanitised death—it is a 
death that can be easily ―heard,‖ and revealed, unimpeded by the ravages of death—
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the death throes. It is articulate, intelligible, and transparent, making it a most valuable 
representation for the shivering reader.  
  These examples illustrate how a good death enabled the possibility of being 
witnessed  such  that  they  were  essentially  ―public‖  deaths.  However,  some  several 
centuries after the time of Cervantes and his knight errant, the modern, industrial world, 
was beginning to take shape and the good death of the Other became an event that 
was  no  longer  commonly  witnessed.  Benjamin  claims  that  this  change  occurred 
primarily because in the modern world ―dying has been pushed further and further out 
of the perceptual world of the living.‖
33 Benjamin adds that  
 
in the course  of nineteenth century bourgeois society  has,  by means of hygienic and 
social, private and public institutions, realised a secondary effect which may have been 
its subconscious main purpose: to make it possible for people to avoid the sight of the 
dying.  .  .  .  Today,  people  live  in  rooms  that  have  never  been  touched  by  death,  dry 
dwellers of eternity, and when their end approaches they are stowed away in sanatoria or 
hospitals by their heirs.
34 
 
Benjamin‘s claims can be said to allude to what is described as the experience of 
―social death,‖ where the dying Other‘s lives are considered ―complete,‖ not necessarily 
by themselves, but by society, as the dying cannot offer anything to society and can no 
longer take part in the ―sociality‖ of existence. And, as a result of their exclusion from 
society, the dying are often denied a good death. As Kellehear describes:  
 
Dying  is  increasingly  becoming  an  out-of-sight  and  mistimed  experience.  .  .  .  In  the 
industrial world, if we can survive the early threats of accidents and suicides of youth, the 
mid-life cancer scares and heart attacks, most of us will end up with an assortment of 
diseases  that  will  not  provide  us  with  a  clear  death-bed  scene  for  ourselves  or  our 
families. Creeping arthritis, organ failure or dementia, and sudden body system failures 
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such as strokes, pneumonia or accidental falls will deny most of us a good death or even 
a well-managed one. 
  To make matters worse, between 17 and 30 per cent of the elderly (depending on 
who you read) will experience their dying in a nursing home.
35 
 
Deaths such as these are commonly described as ―bad‖ deaths or even ―shameful‖ 
deaths as they are either hidden away form the public or come unexpectedly. Indeed, 
the private act of suicide was considered to be an especially bad death, as suicide was 
not only believed to be a sin, but is such that no confession of sin could be made.
36 The 
significance of the modern phenomenon of the bad or shameful death is that if death is 
no  longer  omnipresent —deaths  are  no  longer  good  deaths,  witnessed  by  those 
persons  at  the  bedside  of  the  dying—then  the  meaning  of  life  can  no  longer  be 
revealed ―publicly.‖ The Other‘s deaths go unwitnessed—the dying die alone—and the 
living  cannot  draw  upon  the  warmth  of  the  dying  Other‘s  wisdom.  However,  as 
Benjamin  suggests,  the  novel,  with  its  ubiquitous  representations  of  the  lives  and 
deaths  of  the  fictional  Other,  can  offer  the  shivering  reader  the  understanding  and 
wisdom that he or she seeks. Fiction represents and shares the experience of death of 
its characters with its readers.  
  What is more, as has been described above, Cervantes‘s Don Quixote—a work 
that  Benjamin  suggests  is  ―the  earliest  perfect  specimen  of  the  novel‖
37—does 
represent  the  death-scene  of  its  hero,  prompting  the  possible  assertion  that  Don 
Quixote somewhat initiates a convention of the death-scene as a fitting end to the story 
of the novel: where the earlier picaresque tales (to which Don Quixote owes its lineage) 
remained  open  and  incomplete,  insofar  as  the  story  could  not  finish  because  the 
author‘s life has not finished, Don Quixote finds its end in a way in which our own 
deaths can be considered an end. Don Quixote as a great precursor of the novelistic 
genre establishes the death-scene as a befitting final event of the novel‘s plot.   
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  Yet, what must be noted is that not all novels—particularly those of the early, 
eighteenth-century realist  novelists,  which  appeared more  than  a  century  after  Don 
Quixote—are  necessarily  valuable  to  the  shivering  reader  in  their  representation  of 
death.  Indeed,  the  decrease  in  omnipresence  of  death  is  reflected  as  a  transitory 
period  in  the  novel  insofar  as the  early  realist novelists  did  not focus on  death  as 
qualitatively as Cervantes or later novelists. A possible reason for this is that the death 
of the Other was not an experience that needed to be represented in any great detail 
by the early realist novelists. Indeed, in Daniel Defoe‘s Moll Flanders (1722), one of the 
first  examples  of  the  emerging  genre,  Moll  Flanders—born  and  soon  orphaned  in 
London‘s  Newgate  prison  in  the  mid-seventeenth  century—describes  the  death  of 
those people (whom we would assume are closest to her) with mild indifference. She 
does not weep or lament their death, or, at least, she does not describe her lament or 
elaborate upon their death-scene. One telling example is the death of Robert, the first 
of her five husbands: 
 
It concerns the Story in hand very little to enter into the farther particulars of the Family, 
or of myself, for the five Years that I liv‘d with this Husband; only to observe that I had two 
Children by him, and that at the end of five Year he Died: He had been really a very good 
Husband to me, and we liv‘d very agreeably together; But as he had not receiv‘d much 
from  them,  and  had  in  the  little  time  he  liv‘d  acquir‘d  no  great  Matters,  so  my 
Circumstances were not great, nor was I much mended by the Match.
38 
 
Moll‘s indifference to her husband‘s death can be seen as primarily symptomatic of her 
unwavering  pursuit  of  money;  however,  it  may  also  be  seen  as  symptomatic  of  a 
historical  period  in  which  the  experience  of  death  was  both  ubiquitous  and 
quantitative—death  was  commonplace,  or,  as  Philippe  Ari￨s  states  ―as  banal  as 
seasonal  holidays‖
39—and,  as  such,  was  not  worthy  of  elaboration.  Moreover,  Moll 
Flanders tells her story from the year 1683, almost two decades after 1665, which was 
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the setting of Defoe‘s A Journal of the Plague Year which was also written in 1722. 
Thus, Moll, at the age of almost seventy, the age at which she narrates her story, has 
―lived‖ through England‘s Great Plague of 1665 and for her and, it may be suggested, 
her contemporary reader, death was a banal, commonplace event and did not need to 
be recounted in any depth.  
  However, from the beginning of the nineteenth century,  death became more 
austere, more individual and subjective—death was now ―my death‖
40—and knowledge 
of unknowable death was sought; at the same time, however, the death of the Other 
became less public and hidden away, such that the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
reader‘s experience of the Other‘s death, and the reader‘s understanding of death, 
needed  to  be  looked  for  elsewhere.  The  reader  needed  to  look  to  the  fictional 
representation  of  death,  specifically,  the  qualitative  representation  of  the  fictional 
Other‘s death, which, it can be argued, was respectively understood by the nineteenth- 
and  twentieth-century  novelists.  Again  we  can  say  that  the  reader  looked to fiction 
instead of non-fiction simply because of its ubiquity. Think of the deaths of such famous 
characters as Shelley‘s Frankenstein, Dickens‘s Magwitch, Flaubert‘s Emma Bovary, 
Tolstoy‘s Ivan Ilyich and Anna Karenina, Conrad‘s Mr. Kurtz and Nostromo, to name 
some of the more well-known examples, many of which will be further discussed in this 
thesis. These and many other qualitative examples of the deaths of the novel‘s fictional 
Other are valuable to the shivering reader purely because they exist for the shivering 
reader and in a greater number than can be found in non-fictional works.  
   
The in/authentic reader and defamiliarisation 
 
However, despite the claim that in modern times the novel has increasingly provided a 
more qualitative representation of the death of the Other for the shivering reader, it 
does not necessarily imply that death is considered any less banal. Indeed, death may 
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have  become  less  ubiquitous  in  the  public  sphere,  but  there  still  remains  what 
Heidegger describes as Dasein’s inauthentic attitude towards death. Heidegger claims 
that  the  basic  mode  of  Dasein’s  being  is  absorption  in  the  inauthentic  mode  of 
everydayness  in  which  we  spend  most  of  our  lives.  Macquarrie  describes  this 
everydayness as our absorption in the ―daily round of tasks and duties, most of them 
performed in routine and habitual ways or according to a schedule. Everyday existence 
is practically oriented and concerned with the satisfaction of ordinary human needs.‖
41 
For  Heidegger,  this  inauthentic  everydayness  also  relates  to  our  general  attitude 
towards the event of death: 
 
In the publicness with which we are with one another in our everyday manner, death is 
―known‖ as a mishap which is constantly occurring—as a ―case of death.‖ Someone or 
other ―dies,‖ be he neighbour or stranger. People who are no acquaintances of ours are 
―dying‖ daily and hourly. ―Death‖ is encountered as a well-known event occurring within-
the-world.  As  such  it  remains  in  the  inconspicuousness  characteristic  of  what  is 
encountered  in  an  everyday  fashion.  The  ―they‖  has  already  stowed  away  an 
interpretation for this event. It talks of it in a ―fugitive‖ manner, either expressly or else in a 
way which is mostly inhibited, as if to say, ―One of these days one will die too, in the end; 
but right now it has nothing to do with us.‖
42  
 
We exist with the knowledge that death is an everyday event, routine and habitual, and 
will unavoidably be an event in our lives. Yet, right now, it is of no concern to us, as we 
are absorbed in our inauthentic mode. Indeed, the inauthenticity of our everyday mode 
and absorption in the ―they‖ has, as Heidegger puts it, a ―tranquilising‖
43 effect, such 
that our everydayness is almost a ―soothing‖ disposition, of flight and avoidance.
44 As 
the narrator of Don DeLillo‘s White Noise, Jack Gladney, states: ―To become a crowd is 
to keep out death. To break off from the crowd is to risk death as an individual, to face 
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dying alone.‖
45 The crowd, the ―they,‖ is ―safe‖ as death is shared, whereas to face 
death  alone—the  possibility  of  death—is  to  authentically  acknowledge  the 
individualising effect that death has on each of us, and to allow fear and anxiety to 
permeate our existence.  
  Heidegger‘s description of our inauthentic treatment of death as an everyday 
event appears to draw parallels to the description above of the pre-modern world‘s 
attitude that death is a banal and commonplace event. Indeed, death is an event which 
occurs  ―daily  and  hourly‖  in  both  pre-modern  and  modern  times;  however,  the 
difference between the two periods can be located in the quantitative experience of the 
Other‘s death: in the pre-modern world the ―real‖ experience of death can be described 
as both quantitative and qualitative, whereas, in the modern world, the experience of 
the Other‘s death is still quantitative, but is no longer qualitative. The significance of 
this disparity is that without the qualitative experience of the Other‘s death, Dasein is 
not roused from its inauthentic absorption in the ―they,‖ and does not acknowledge the 
finitude of its own life—that its individual death is impending and necessarily limits its 
meaningful projects. Only when  Dasein  is wrenched from the ―they,‖ and comes to 
understand the finitude of its own existence, can it see its life as having the possibility 
of becoming whole and meaningful. This is very similar to Nietzsche‘s claims that we 
do  not  distance  ourselves  from  what  is  closest  at  hand—the  foreground,  or  the 
inauthentic everydayness of our lives—and see the larger picture that is the meaning of 
the whole of our individual lives. What is needed by the reader—who is ―proximally and 
for  the most  part‖  inauthentically  existing  in  the  middle  of  his  or  her  own  personal 
narrative—is the qualitative representation of the death of the fictional Other which can 
rouse the reader from his or her inauthenticity and the ―covering-up‖ of the finitude of 
their lives—that death is impending. Thereby, the fictional elaboration of the death-
scene separates itself from the banal, everydayness of the death of the real Other. 
Heidegger himself discusses the role of the work of art and poetry in disclosing truth, or 
                                                                                                                                           
44 Macquarrie, Existentialism, 197. 
45 DeLillo, White Noise, 73. The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
  87 
the  essence  of  being,  what  the  Greeks  called  aletheia—the  ―unconcealedness‖  of 
being.  The  art  work,  Heidegger  argues,  is  ―not  the  reproduction  of  some  particular 
entity  that  happens  to  be  present  at  any  given  time;  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  the 
reproduction of the thing‘s general essence.‖
46  We might say  that the  ―essence‖ of 
death is not a banal, everyday event, but an event that is impending for me and it is my 
death,  and  it  is  the  fictional  representation  of  a  character‘s  death-scene  that 
unconceals  this  essence.  Although  Heidegger  argues  that  poetry  is  the  genre  par 
excellence of authentic revelation, it can be argued that the novel form—be it realist, 
modernist, or postmodernist—does have the potential for unconcealing the finitude of 
the reader‘s life, thereby rousing the inauthentic reader from the everydayness of life. 
  This  description  of  art‘s  disclosure  or  unconcealment  of  death,  and,  more 
importantly, the fluctuation of the in/authenticity of the reader can also be identified as 
similar to that of the reading process itself. The inauthentic reader is in a continual flux 
between  inauthenticity  and  authenticity  when  in  the  act  of  reading:  the  reader  is 
―inauthentically‖ absorbed in the stories of the fictional Other, which is to say that the 
reader is engrossed with the characters of the novel and his or her desire to know what 
is to come next, what is ―in-store‖ for the characters, such that the ―real‖ world falls 
away into the background. Nathalie Sarraute argues that this engagement of the reader 
is one of the foremost tasks of the novelist: the novelist must ―dispossess the reader 
and  entice  him,  at  all  costs,  into  the  author‘s  territory.‖
47  The  reader  must  not  be 
allowed to create characters or character types—creations which are drawn from the 
reader‘s own life and from his or her own experience of other character types. The 
novelist must draw the reader in and keep the reader alert such that he or she does not 
create—only then does the vision of the author become the reader‘s own.
48 In this way 
the reader is truly inauthentic in his or her reading—there is no self-reflection or the 
possibility of the reader being dragged back into his or her own world.
49 Sarraute‘s 
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48 Ibid., 67–72. 
49 We should note that metafictional novels such as Sterne‘s Tristram Shandy and Rushdie‘s 
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reader reads in bad faith; however, this does not make fiction valuable to the shivering 
reader:  from  this  pure  inauthentic,  dispossession,  the  reader  must  be  made  to 
authentically reflect on his or her own life by being drawn back into his or her own life. 
This is very much a claim similar to that of Stanley Fish in ―Literature in the Reader,‖ 
where he argues that reading is very much an ―event, something that happens to, and 
with  the  participation  of,  the  reader.‖
50  It  is  this  event,  this  happening,  that  is  the 
meaning  of  the  text.  This  claim  is  somewhat  contrary  to  Wimsatt  and  Beardsley‘s 
concept of the ―Affective Fallacy,‖ where there is ―a confusion between the poem and 
its results (what it is and what it does). . . . The outcome . . . is that the poem itself, as 
an  object  of  specifically  critical  judgement,  tends  to  disappear.‖
51  For  the  present 
argument, however, the critical judgement of a text, if we understand reading as an 
event,  is  that  it  affects  the  reader  by  rousing  him  or  her  from  their  inauthentic 
engagement with the text.
52  
  It is here that three of F elski‘s  uses  of  literature—enchantment,  shock,  and 
recognition—come  together  almost  as  a  sequence  or  process  of  reading  ―events‖: 
―enchantment‖  (inauthenticity)  is  destroyed  by  ―shock,‖  (the  death-scene)  which 
                                                                                                                                           
inauthentically immersed in the text. Consider the continual disruption of the reading process in 
Tristam Shandy where Tristram, the overt, meddlesome narrator, consistently intrudes on the 
telling of his story with his descriptions of what are essentially meaningless and unnecessary 
events, anecdotes and digressions. The consequence of these interruptions is that the reader is 
continually ―summoned‖ from an inauthentic immersion in the novel. The reader is constantly 
reminded that they are only reading ―about‖ reality—reading a representation of reality which in 
Tristram Shandy is also an ―unexperienced‖ reality. The loss of the self in the reading process 
becomes impossible and any identification of the reader with the character is compromised. 
Similarly, in Midnight’s Children, the fictional author Saleem Sinai is interrupted by his wife 
Padma and her intermittent interruptions. As such, readers of Midnight’s Children are 
consistently reminded that they are reading a text, thereby disrupting the ―flow‖ of reading, and 
also their ability to immerse themselves in the ―reality‖ of the text. Of course, Rushdie‘s 
Midnight’s Children is a special example because it is a parody or, better, a pastiche of the style 
of Sterne‘s Tristram Shandy—in other words, a postmodern pastiche on Sterne‘s proto-
postmodern novel. The postmodern pastiche unsettles the reader in a way that the realist 
novelist does not: it draws attention to itself as an artefact, and, in doing so, also draws the 
attention of the reader to its fictiveness which again disrupts the reader‘s immersion in the text.  
50 Fish, ―Literature in the Reader,‖ 25.. 
51 Wimsatt and Beardsley, ―The Affective Fallacy,‖ as quoted in ibid, 23. 
52 A more extensive argument for reception as a criterion for the ―quality‖ and value of a literary 
work is made by German literary historian and theorist Hans Robert Jauss: ―For the quality and 
rank of a literary work result neither from the biographical or historical conditions of its origin, nor 
from its place in the sequence of the development of a genre alone, but rather from the criteria 
of influence, reception, and posthumous fame, criteria that are more difficult to grasp.‖ Jauss, 
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prompts ―recognition‖ (authenticity). This idea of reflection as a result of being shocked 
is a very important aspect of art and for the reader: 
  
As long as we find ourselves prone to evasion, euphemism, and denial, as long as we 
flinch away from reminders of our material and mortal existence as fragile composites of 
blood, bone, and tissue, shock will continue to find a place in art.
53 
 
Felski suggests that shock is the ―antithesis of the blissful enfolding and voluptuous 
pleasure that we associate with enchantment.‖
54 But it can be argued that enchantment 
and shock represent the oscillating process of reading; moreover, they are very much 
interdependent.  One  must  firstly  be  enchanted  before  shock  can  have  its  greatest 
effect. And after the reader is shocked, comes the experience of recognition:  
 
[Recognition is] at once utterly mundane yet singularly mysterious. While turning a page I 
am  arrested  by  a  compelling  description,  a  constellation  of  events,  a  conversation 
between  characters,  an  interior  monologue.  Suddenly  and  without  warning,  a  flash  of 
connection leaps across the gap between text and reader; an affinity or an attunement is 
brought to light. I may be looking for such a moment, or I may stumble on it haphazardly, 
startled by the prescience of a certain combination of words. In either case, I feel myself 
addressed, summoned, called to account: I cannot help seeing traces of myself in the 
pages I am reading. Indisputably, something has changed; my perspective has shifted; I 
see something that I did not see before.
55 
 
Recognition in this sense is a simplistic form of recognising oneself. This is especially 
the case when the reader reads the qualitative description of a character‘s death, he or 
she may be ―roused‖ from their inauthentic mode of reading and the everydayness of 
the world in which he or she has become absorbed, uncovering their authentic attitude 
towards their real existence, their meaningful projects, and the finitude of their lives. Of 
                                                 
53 Felski, Uses of Literature, 130. 
54 Ibid., 113. 
55 Ibid., 23. The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
  90 
course, this rousing of the reader from inauthenticity may even be as simple as Jack 
Gladney‘s interspersing of White Noise, with the question: ―Who will die first?‖
56 For 
Jack, the question of death is not that it will and must  happen, but of when  it  will 
happen, and to whom: himself, or his wife, Babette.  
  And yet, if the death-scene were to be considered as a convention of the novel, 
it would most certainly lose its impact on the reader (lose its capability of rousing the 
reader from his or her inauthenticity) if it were not for the ability of the novelist to both 
individualise the death of the fictional Other—so as to illustrate the uniqueness of their 
individual death and the subsequent individuality of the fictional Other‘s meaning—but 
also to estrange and defamiliarise the death-scene so as to bring it into a closer, more 
intimate and profound light; in short, to affect. This is the central argument in Russian 
Formalist Victor Shklovsky when he states that our perception in life, and the sensation 
of  life,  continually  becomes  automatic  and  habitual;  the  purpose  of  art  is  to  make 
objects unfamiliar—to make the stone stony.
57 It can be argued that the representation 
of death is in many ways already unfamiliar to the modern reader because it is no 
longer  omnipresent;  however,  as  death-scenes  ―accumulate‖  in  literature—as  the 
convention of the death-scene gains strength—then its impact must inevitably become 
lessened. Indeed, even similar, conventional revelations of meaning may come to the 
fore,  such  that  the  meaning  of  a  character‘s  life  is  no  longer  individualised  or 
individually meaningful. The character‘s death and the meaning of the character‘s life 
are  absorbed  into  the  mass  of  all  other  characters‘  deaths  and  meanings.  It  is, 
therefore,  the  task  of  the  novelist  to  individualise  his  or  her  character‘s  death—
defamiliarise  the  character‘s  death  from  previous  representations,  such  that  the 
character stands above the rest, not in terms of the supposed meaningfulness of the 
character‘s life, but as an individually meaningful life. The critical skill of the novelist is 
the ability to rouse the reader from the mode of inauthenticity—rouse the reader from 
his or her attitude of banality towards death—such that the reader examines his or her 
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individual life and its projected meaning, and, where possible, make new choices, and 
undertake new meaningful projects. Felski also suggests that the argument, made by 
the Russian Formalists,  
 
oversimplifies  and  underestimates  the  impact  of  literary  works  by  yoking  them  too 
emphatically to a single moment. Art, in this view, can only surprise us for an instant, is 
subsequently eviscerated of all power to change consciousness and provoke thought, is 
rendered flat, stale, and humdrum by the passing of time.
58  
 
Here we can agree with Felski in the sense that art should shock and defamiliarise, but 
it  can  and  should  do  so  beyond  its  historical  moment,  and  not  simply  as  a  formal 
feature  of  the  text.  Indeed,  the  accumulation  of  death-scenes  should  shock  and 
continue to shock the reader, not merely for an instant, but upon rereading and re-
presentation. 
 
 
2. Omniscient Narration of the Fictional Other’s 
Death-scene  
 
From the above description, it can be argued that the novel‘s representation of the 
death-scenes of the fictional Other are of value to the shivering reader simply because 
they quantitatively and qualitatively represent the event of the fictional Other‘s death—
an event which is not commonly experienced in modern times. It can also be argued 
that the novel‘s representation is more valuable than non-fictional, auto/biographical 
representations  of  the  death  of  the  Other  purely  because  of  the  novel‘s  ubiquity. 
However,  the  novel  can  also  be  considered  more  valuable  than  non-fictional 
representations of the death of the real Other because of  how  the fictional Other‘s The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
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experience  of  death  can  be  represented.  Such  a  claim  can  be  made  because  the 
novelist has the freedom to transcend the limited possibilities of the auto/biographer. 
Indeed, despite the autobiographer‘s distinct advantage of being able to write with an 
explicit, subjective, and authoritative voice, the autobiography can be considered the 
least valuable literary form to the reader because the autobiographer, like the reader, 
cannot write his or her own death or their dying revelations. The autobiography must 
end  before  the  autobiographer‘s  death  because  death  necessarily  removes  one‘s 
―literary‖  voice.  Consider  again  the  character  of  Gin￩s  de  Pasamonte,  from  Don 
Quixote: Ginés de Pasamonte cannot finish his book until he himself is ―finished.‖ But 
to finish one‘s story in this way is, of course, an impossibility—one cannot write after 
the  fact.  Consider  also  the  fictional  preface  to  Defoe‘s  Moll  Flanders:  the 
autobiographical story is narrated by Moll Flanders, but the complete account of her 
life, and the claim that she ―died a penitent‖—which is stated only on the original title 
page—was  ―published‖  after  her  death.  As  the  unnamed  author  of  the  preface 
describes:  
 
We cannot say, indeed, that this History is carried on quite to the End of the Life of this 
famous Moll Flanders, as she calls her self, for no Body can write their own Life to the full 
End of it, unless they can write it after they are dead; but her Husband‘s Life being written 
by a third Hand, gives a full Account of them both.
59 
 
What  this  description  suggests  is  that  the  autobiographical  representation  of  the 
Other‘s  personal  narrative—be  it  fictional  or  non-fictional—must  remain  incomplete. 
Indeed, the autobiography proper is distinguished from other autobiographical forms, 
such as diaries and memoirs, because it is written retrospectively, or subsequent to the 
autobiographer‘s experiences. The autobiography proper  is a reconstruction of past 
memories, or, better, a reconsideration of the autobiographer‘s life. The event of death, 
however, cannot be reconstructed by the autobiographer. Of course, some attempts 
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have been made to overcome this problem; however, these autobiographers generally 
write about what they predict the date of their death will be, but do not write of the 
actual  experience.
60  Moreover,  many  autobiographies  are  written  well  before  the 
autobiographer‘s death. Consider the example of Saint Augustine‘s Confessions (397–
400CE) which he completed at the age of forty-six, some thirty years before his death 
in 430CE. A more contemporary example is Jean-Paul Sartre‘s Nobel prize-winning 
autobiography, Words, which he began in 1960 and was published three years later, 
some  seventeen  years  before  his  death  on  April  15,  1980.
61  Moreover,  Sartre‘s 
autobiography predominantly focuses on his childhood, not his more prolific and well-
known later life. These ―incomplete‖ autobiographies lose much of their value for the 
shivering  reader  because  they  represent  the  experiences  and  events  of  individuals 
who, like the reader, have not yet completed their lives and have not experienced the 
end  of  their  personal  narratives,  and,  as  such,  like  the  reader,  do  not  have  the 
―authority‖ to convey the insights from these experiences. As Benjamin suggests, only 
the imminently dying have the authority to convey their insights.  
  In contrast, the biography can be considered more valuable to the shivering 
reader  than  the  autobiography  as  the  biographer  can  include  the  subject‘s  death. 
Indeed,  as A. O. J. Cockshut describes, biography  often does focus on the death-
scene of the subject as it ―hurries rapidly over the first fifteen, twenty or twenty-five 
years of life, concentrates on the active middle years, sketches old age, and then gives 
a  special  emphasis  to  death.‖
62  Cockshut  further  suggests  that  biographers  who 
necessarily survive their subjects can and often do write of their subjects‘ deaths from 
their  own  observation  or  more  commonly  by  collecting  witnesses‘  accounts  of  their 
subjects‘ deaths.  
  However, the question that must be asked is can a biographer objectively, and 
without  ―poetic  license,‖  translate  the  moment—the  experience—of  the  subject‘s 
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death? More specifically, can the biographer accurately and completely represent the 
subject‘s revelation of meaning as he or she passes from life into death? The answer, it 
would seem, is a resounding ―no‖: it is an impossible task for an objective observer to 
represent the subject‘s pure, ―subjective‖ point of view. Indeed, not only the ―neutral‖ 
biographer,  but  the  ―creative‖  biographer  can  only  exhaust  themselves  in  any 
endeavour to represent the subject‘s experience of death. Thus, despite its ―factuality,‖ 
or  creativity,  the  biography  is  an  inferior,  mediated  reconstruction  of  the  subject‘s 
experience of death. This description does well to illuminate one aspect of Virginia 
Woolf‘s  discussion  on  the  disparity  between  fiction  and  biography  in  ―The  Art  of 
Biography.‖ Woolf states:  
 
The novelist is free; the biographer is tied.  
  . . . Here is a distinction between biography and fiction—a proof that they differ in the 
very stuff of which they are made. One is made with the help of friends, of facts; the other 
is created without any restrictions save those that the artist, for reasons that seem good 
to him, chooses to obey.
63  
 
Biographers must predominantly limit their representation of the real Other to objective 
facts,  regardless  of  aesthetics  or  form,  and  must  avoid  adopting  the  subjective  or 
autobiographical point of view of their subject; in contrast, novelists are not restricted 
by facts, aesthetics or form, nor are they restricted to a particular point of view. As W. 
J. Harvey claims, the novelist has ―god-like‖ power, such that the novelist has absolute 
freedom  to  represent  and  articulate  the ―complete‖  intrinsic  mental  experience  of  a 
character‘s  life,  but  also,  and  more  importantly,  the  complete  experience  of  a 
character‘s death
64—a freedom that is beyond even the most elusive boundaries of the 
biographer, and which is all to the benefit of the reader. In Harvey‘s words again: 
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However invisible he may make himself, whatever narrative techniques he may use to 
conceal  his  exit  from  his  fiction,  the  novelist  is  and  must  be  both  omnipotent  and 
omniscient. The last word is, both literally and metaphorically, his alone. 
  This being so, the novelist may confer on us his god-like power and privilege; we, 
too, can see the fictional character in his private self, secret, entirely solitary. Life allows 
only  intrinsic  knowledge  of  self,  contextual  knowledge  of  others;  fiction  allows  both 
intrinsic and contextual knowledge of others.
65  
 
Harvey  suggests  that  the  novelist  can  communicate  to  the  shivering  reader  the 
complete  objective  and  subjective  experience  of  a  character‘s  personal  narrative, 
including  his  or  her  ordinarily  uncommunicable  death.  Moreover,  the  omniscient 
narrator can reveal what the dying Other may intentionally or unintentionally conceal, 
and all at a distance—without proximity to the dying and without the need to witness 
their death. This possibility is essentially absent from earlier literary forms, most notably 
the death-scenes of tragedy. The spectator observes from a distance, outside of the 
action, such that the ironic mode is limited. As such, we may hear  Hamlet‘s death 
speech but we cannot absolutely know Hamlet‘s thoughts as he dies.  
  Two examples of fictional characters‘ death-scenes, both of which come from 
Leo Tolstoy, illustrate how omniscient narration is of the utmost value to the reader. 
The first is the death-scene of Ivan Ilyich in The Death of Ivan Ilyich (1886); the second 
is that of Anna from Anna Karenina (1877). 
 
 
Ivan Ilyich 
 
Tolstoy‘s short story The Death of Ivan Ilyich is an invaluable example of a work that 
gives the reader access to the subjective experience of death and the revelations of the 
dying, but also because it broaches some of the existential themes mentioned above, The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
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such as our in/authentic attitude towards death and the concept of social death. The 
story is narrated in the third-person and begins after the death of Ivan Ilyich—a very 
successful judge in Petersburg. Ivan‘s death is announced in a newspaper which is the 
first time that his friends had heard of his death. What is striking is that his so-called 
friends are unmoved by his death, and, as we are told:  
 
On  hearing  of  Ivan  Ilyich‘s  death  the  first  thought  of  each  of  those  present  was  its 
possible effect in the way of transfer or promotion for themselves or their associates.  
  ―I am sure to get Shtabel‘s place, or Vinnikov‘s, now,‖ thought Fiodr Vassilyevich. ―I 
was promised that long ago, and the promotion means another eight hundred roubles a 
year for me, as well as the allowance for office expenses.‖ 
  ―I must apply for my brother-in-law‘s transfer from Kaluga,‖ thought Piotr Ivanovich. 
―My wife will be very pleased. She won‘t be able to say then that I never do anything for 
her relations.‖
66  
 
Upon hearing of Ivan‘s death, all thoughts turn to business and to the process of living. 
Indeed, his friends are disgruntled at now having to ―fulfil the exceedingly tiresome 
demands of propriety by attending the requiem service and paying a visit of condolence 
to  the  widow.‖
67  Nor  do  his  friends  believe  that  Ivan‘s  death  constitutes  ―sufficient 
grounds for interrupting the recognised order of things,‖
68 namely the game of whist 
planned  for  that  evening.  Ivan‘s  friends  consider  his  death  as  a  mishap  and  an 
inconvenience.  Indeed,  on  hearing  of  Ivan‘s  death,  one  of  his  friends  replies 
incredulously: ―No. Really?‖ There is a sense of disbelief that we can actually die. As 
the narrator (clearly Tolstoy) describes: 
 
Besides the reflections upon the transfers and possible changes in the department likely 
to result from Ivan Ilyich‘s decease, the mere fact of the death of an intimate associate 
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aroused, as is usual, in all who heard of it a complacent feeling that ―it is he who is dead, 
and not I.‖ 
  ―Now he had to go and die but I manage things better—I am alive,‖ each of them 
thought or felt.
69 
 
Later, at Ivan‘s requiem service, Piotr Ivanovich winks at his colleague Schwartz as if to 
imply: ―Ivan Ilyich has made a mess of things—not like you and me.‖
70 Ivan‘s friends 
have the common inauthentic attitude that death indeed happens, but right now, as 
Heidegger writes, it is of no concern to them. Indeed, Heidegger himself comments on 
the  story  of  Ivan  Ilyich,  stating  that  to  Ivan‘s  friends  his  death—and  the  dying  of 
Others—is seen as a ―social inconvenience, if not even a downright tactlessness.‖
71 
Further, their attitude is almost one of immortality, as if Ivan did something wrong, erred 
in some way, ―made a mess of things,‖ thereby giving death an opportunity to occur.  
  From these initial rhetorical ―evaluations‖ of Ivan‘s friends, we can discern that 
Ivan‘s life is not highly regarded or valued by the Other: his was a meaningless life, 
passed over with ease. What is more, like Ivan‘s friends, we, the readers, are also 
somewhat inauthentic in our attitude towards the event of death insofar as Ivan‘s death 
and his meaning, at this early stage of the story, is that of merely one, meaningless 
face in a crowd. He is truly Other: Ivan is not yet individualised nor is his life individually 
meaningful. However, the remainder of the story does well to ―wrench‖ both Ivan from 
the Other, and readers from our inauthentic attitude towards death by rendering, in 
greater detail, Ivan‘s particular, individual and meaningful death. This is achieved by 
how Ivan‘s death is represented, as Tolstoy depicts Ivan‘s subjective, and somewhat 
absolute, experience of death and the revelation of his life‘s meaning—a revelation 
which  is  not  unlike  that  described  by  Benjamin.  This  representation  begins  by 
recounting several significant moments in Ivan‘s life, including those of his childhood, 
and of his later life such as when he first became a lawyer, when he married, and when 
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he  was  given  his  various  promotions.  But  it  is  the  period  of  his fatal  illness  which 
provides the main content of the discourse of the story. Ivan‘s life takes a significant 
turn when he begins to have an unknown abdominal problem—either a floating liver or 
appendicitis—brought  on  by  a  seemingly  innocuous  knock  to  his  side.  Despite  the 
opinions of many doctors who continue to tell Ivan that his pain is nothing to concern 
himself about, it is clear that Ivan‘s health is deteriorating. Indeed, it seems only Ivan‘s 
wife‘s brother speaks the truth of Ivan‘s situation, stating plainly to his sister that Ivan is 
―a dead man! Look at his eyes—there‘s no light in them.‖
72 But Ivan‘s wife, Praskovya 
Fiodorovna, claims that her brother is exaggerating: she, like Ivan‘s friends, does not 
believe that death can happen to Ivan. All deny that such a thing as death is looming. 
And they deny that Ivan is dying by avoiding the sight of him, avoiding his death-bed, 
such that their attitude towards him is essentially that he is socially dead. Only Ivan 
concedes that he is physically dying—that death is looming; and yet, like his friends 
and his wife, he cannot grasp the idea of dying. What is more, Ivan desires a feeling of 
inauthenticity towards his death: he seeks relief from the fact that death is coming, 
going so far as to set up ―mental screens‖ to avoid authentic thoughts of death.  
  Another fortnight passes, Ivan‘s illness worsens and he begins to ―reflect how 
steadily he was going downhill, for every possibility of hope to be shattered.‖
73 He feels 
a sense of isolation, loneliness, as he is indeed alone in his dying. No-one, except 
Gerasim, his butler, sympathises. In his loneliness, Ivan dwells only on the memories of 
the past: 
 
One after another pictures of his past presented themselves to him. They always began 
with  what  was nearest  in  time and then  went  back to  what  was most remote—to his 
childhood—and rested there. . . . ―But I mustn‘t think of all that . . . it‘s too painful,‖ and 
Ivan Ilyich brought himself back to the present.
74  
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Ivan considers the chain of memories that stretch back to his childhood, only to find 
that  another  series  of  memories  comes  to  mind—of  how  his  illness  has  steadily 
developed and grown worse: ―This time, too, the farther he looked back the more life 
there had been. There had been more of what was good in life and more of life itself.‖
75 
Ivan sees that his life from the beginning of his childhood to just after becoming a 
lawyer was happiest. This is significant if we consider that having become a lawyer, 
Ivan was faced with the challenge of replacing his own values with those of people of 
high standing:  
 
As a law student he had done things which had before that seemed to him vile and at the 
time  had  made  him  feel  disgusted  with  himself;  but  later  on  when  he  saw  that  such 
conduct was practised by people of high standing and not considered wrong by them, he 
came not exactly to regard those actions of his as all right but simply to forget them 
entirely or not be at all troubled by their recollection.
76  
   
Ivan  sees  that  life  before  his  becoming  a  lawyer  was  meaningful  and  authentic, 
whereas his life as a lawyer and judge was founded on his succumbing to the ―they,‖ 
such that his life was no longer his own, but meaningless and inauthentic. Indeed, Ivan, 
by his own admission realises that  
 
those scarcely detected inclinations of his to fight against what the most highly placed 
people regarded as good, those scarcely noticeable impulses which he had immediately 
suppressed, might have been the real thing and all the rest false. And his professional 
duties, and his ordering of his life, and his family, and all his social and official interests 
might all have been false.
77    
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Ivan‘s revelation is that the appearance of meaningfulness is sometimes exactly this, 
only  an  appearance,  and  only  in  death  is  the  reality  of  what  is  essentially  the 
meaninglessness of his life uncovered.  
  But Ivan continues to defend his past life, and will not accept the conclusion he 
has drawn. Only when another two weeks have passed, at one hour before his death, 
is this earlier revelation affirmed; only then does he see the definitive meaning of his 
past life, as it is revealed to him in death: 
 
Ivan Ilyich had fallen through the hole and caught sight of the light, and it was revealed to 
him that his life had not been what it ought to have been but that it was still possible to 
put it right. He asked himself: ―But what is the right thing?‖ and grew still, listening. Then 
he felt that someone was kissing his hand. He opened his eyes and looked at his son. He 
felt sorry for him. His wife came up to him. He looked at her. She was gazing at him with 
open mouth, the tears wet on her nose and cheeks, and an expression of despair on her 
face. He felt sorry for her. 
  ―Yes, I am misery to them,‖ he thought. ―They are sorry but it will be better for them 
when I die.‖ He wanted to say this but had not strength to speak. ―Besides, why speak, I 
must act,‖ he thought. With a look he indicated his son to his wife and said: 
  ―Take him away . . . sorry for him . . . sorry for you too . . .‖ He tried to add ―Forgive 
me‖ but said ―Forego‖ and, too weak to correct himself, waved his hand, knowing that 
whoever was concerned would understand.  
  And all at once it became clear to him that what had been oppressing him and would 
not go away was suddenly dropping away on one side, on two sides, on ten sides, on all 
sides. He felt full of pity for them, he must do something to make it less painful for them: 
release them and release himself from this suffering. ―How right and how simple,‖ he 
thought.  ―And  the  pain?‖  he  asked  himself.  ―What  has  become  of  it? Where  are  you 
pain?‖ 
  He began to watch for it 
  ―Yes, here it is. Well, what of it? Let the pain be. 
  ―And death? Where is it?‖ The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
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  He searched for his former habitual fear of death and did not find it. ―Where is it? 
What death?‖ There was no fear because there was no death either. 
  In place of death there was light. 
  ―So that‘s what it is!‖ he suddenly exclaimed aloud. ―What joy!‖  
  To him all this happened in a single instant, and the meaning of that instant suffered 
no change thereafter. For those present his agony lasted another two hours. There was a 
rattle in his throat, a twitching of his wasted body. Then the gasping and the rattle came 
at longer and longer intervals. 
  ―It is all over!‖ said someone near him. 
  He caught the  words and repeated them in his soul. ―Death is  over,‖ he said to 
himself. ―It is no more.‖ 
  He drew in a breath, stopped in the midst of a sigh, stretched out and died.
78     
   
To those people around him, Ivan‘s death  is  an unpleasant, visceral  experience of 
sound and movement, yet for Ivan it is peaceful, and a moment of enlightenment, in 
which time ―stands still.‖ Indeed, his ―catching sight of the light‖ possibly symbolises the 
presence of God, immortality, paradise, but also symbolises inner enlightenment, truth, 
revelation, and wisdom. Light also symbolises the uncovering of ―reality,‖ one of the 
central themes of Plato‘s simile of the cave, described in The Republic (ca. 375 BCE), 
in which the prisoners in a cave see only the shadows of reality, such that all is illusion 
and darkness. Only when the prisoners break free of their shackles and turn around do 
they see reality, firstly by looking to the fire responsible for casting the shadows of 
reality, and then by venturing out beyond the fire, towards the sunlight outside of the 
cave, to the intelligible region of truth, intelligence, and the good.
79 In the same way, 
Tolstoy suggests that only when we die do we see the light that is the reality of  our 
lives,  and  see  the  true  meaning  of  our  lives.  Of  course,  Tolstoy‘s  symbolic 
representation of death does not belong to ―real‖ experience. Moreover, the intimate 
details of Ivan‘s revelation could not have been communicated or understood in real 
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life.  Only  as  an  omniscient  narrator  can  Tolstoy  communicate  the  details  of  Ivan‘s 
―falling through  the  hole,‖  and  ―catching  sight  of  the  light.‖ These  descriptions,  and 
others from the passage, represent that which was not communicated by Ivan to the 
witnesses of his death. Indeed, in his final moments, Ivan wants only to relieve his wife 
and child of the torment of his existence and have them forgive him for the past he has 
only now, in death, understood; yet he is unable to convey these thoughts into words—
he does not have the strength to speak—such that he must endeavour to explain his 
thoughts through his gestures, which can only be described as a poor representation of 
what he actually wishes to communicate. The ―omniscient reader,‖ however, has the 
privilege  to  experience  what  Ivan  experiences  in  death,  and  understand  Ivan‘s 
revelatory insights as he passes. For the reader, Ivan‘s experience is clear and concise 
and communicable. And he conveys to the reader a valuable warning: his final words, 
gestures, and looks tell the reader that the way he has lived his life was not the way he 
should have. Ivan tells the reader how not to live his or her own life—how not to have a 
meaningless life or an unwanted, dissatisfying revelatory meaning. It is a warning, and, 
as has been described above, an authentic uncovering. As Henri Troyat describes in 
his biography on Tolstoy: ―We think of ourselves while Ivan Ilyich moans in pain in his 
bed; we pass our own lives in review as he draws up the balance sheet for his.‖
80 
Ivan‘s revelations cause our own re-evaluations. Because of this detailed account of 
Ivan‘s  death,  the  reader  is  forced  to  authentically  reflect  on  his  or  her  own  life—
something that Ivan‘s friends—who do not have the privilege of knowing this story—
avoid.  
 
 
Anna Karenina  
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Through  the  technique  of  third-person  narration,  Tolstoy  communicates  the 
uncommunicable and reveals what is essentially the concealed, subjective experience 
of  Ivan  Ilyich‘s  death.  However,  the  omniscience  of  a  third-person  narrator  is  also 
valuable if we again consider Benjamin‘s claim that the value of the death of the dying 
Other is only so if they share the revelation of meaning with those witnessing their 
death. Of course, not all deaths are good deaths and not all deaths are public or have 
the possibility of being witnessed. More importantly, the unwitnessed death is of no 
value to the living, as the insights and wisdom of the dying cannot be shared. Only if 
the dying Other experiences a ―good death,‖ or the like, is it possible that their thoughts 
and insights can be communicated. However, in fiction, the omniscient narrator can 
assume the role of the ―god-witness‖ to the solitary death or the shameful death—the 
death where there is no, or can be no, ―human‖ witness. This is evidenced by our 
second example from Tolstoy: the suicide of Anna in Anna Karenina. Anna, is a well-
established  woman  of  high  Petersburg  society,  and  is  married  to  her  much  older 
husband,  Alexei  Karenin—an  official  in  the  Imperial  administration.  Her  life  and 
marriage  have  the  appearance  of  happiness:  she  attends  all  her  formal  societal 
functions with elegance and decorum, and is the object of envy for many. However, 
after a chance meeting with Count Vronsky she begins to question the meaningfulness 
of her marriage to Karenin. Vronsky pursues Anna and despite Anna‘s initial resistance 
they begin an affair. However, although Anna at first feels that her life with Vronsky is 
both happy and meaningful, she increasingly becomes disillusioned about her affair 
and questions the faithfulness of Vronsky, which begins a steady, tragic downfall for 
Anna, as she becomes depressed and suicidal. Anna chooses to take her own life, to 
martyr herself, as revenge primarily against Vronsky. It is an act that she undertakes 
alone, and her death is essentially unwitnessed. She chooses her mode of death—to 
throw herself between the carriages of a moving train, which, as she ominously learns 
from an earlier  incident  in the novel,  is ―easiest,‖ and ―instantaneous.‖
81  Anna then 
chooses the place in which to throw herself: 
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  ―There!‖  she  said  to  herself,  staring  into  the  shadow  of  the  carriage  at  the  sand 
mixed with coal poured between the sleepers, ―there, right in the middle, and I‘ll punish 
[Vronsky] and be rid of everybody and of myself.‖  
  She wanted to fall under the first carriage, the midpoint of which had drawn even 
with her. But the red bag, which she started taking off her arm, delayed her, and it was 
too late: the midpoint went by. She had to wait for the next carriage. A feeling seized her, 
similar to what she experienced when preparing to go into the water for a swim, and she 
crossed herself. The habitual gesture of making the sign of the cross called up in her soul 
a whole series of memories from childhood and girlhood, and suddenly the darkness that 
covered everything for her broke and life rose up before momentarily with all its bright 
past joys.  Yet she did not take her eyes from the wheels of the approaching second 
carriage. And just at that moment when the midpoint between the two wheels came even 
with  her,  she  threw  the  red  bag  aside  and,  drawing  her  head  down  between  her 
shoulders,  fell  on  her  hands  under  the  carriage,  and  with  a  light  movement,  as  if 
preparing to get up again at once, sank to her knees. And in that same instant she was 
horrified at what she was doing. ―Where am I? What am I doing? Why?‖ She wanted to 
rise, to throw herself back, but something huge and implacable pushed at her head and 
dragged over her. ―Lord, forgive me for everything!‖ she said, feeling the impossibility of 
any struggle. A little muzhik, muttering to himself, was working over some iron. And the 
candle  by  the  light  of  which  she  had  been  reading  that  book  filled  with  anxieties, 
deceptions, grief and evil, flared up brighter than ever, lit up for her all that had once been 
in darkness, sputtered, grew dim, and went out for ever.
82 
 
Like Ivan Ilyich, some understanding of the experience of death and the revelation of 
meaning is described. Anna‘s subjective experience is revealed to the reader as death 
approaches.  And  we  can  also  draw  comparisons  between  Anna‘s  and  Ivan  Ilyich‘s 
experience  of  death,  in  particular  Tolstoy‘s  use  of  the  symbol  of  light,  made  in 
reference to how Anna‘s candle of light ―flared up brighter than ever, lit up for her all 
that had once been in darkness.‖ This description relates to an earlier incident in the The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
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novel in which Anna lights candles to ward off the shadow of death
83: here Anna‘s 
candle again wards of her feeling of dread in the face of death, and, like Ivan Ilyich, in 
death all is light.
84 It should be noted that Tolstoy‘s description of Anna‘s experience of 
death is much less detailed in contrast to Ivan Ilyich‘s death, a qualitative difference 
which can possibly be attributed to the fact that Ivan Ilyich was written over a decade 
after  Anna  Karenina,  at  a  time  when  Tolstoy  may  have  felt  more  confident  in  his 
abilities  and  reputation  in  representing  the  unknowable  experience  of  death.  This 
possibility  notwithstanding,  and  irrespective  of  its  less  qualitative  description,  the 
example of Anna Karenina‘s death illustrates how an omniscient narrator can enable 
the shivering reader to witness the unwitnessed death of the Other—the unwitnessed 
death becomes a privileged situation, and a gift for the reader.  
 
 
The Authority of the Author 
 
Although the convention of omniscient narration gives the reader a god-like experience 
of  a  character‘s  death,  the  question  must  be  asked  as  to  what  authority  does  the 
novelist have to represent that which cannot be represented? More importantly, what 
authority  does  the  novelist  have  to  reveal  the  meaning  of  life  when  that  authority 
belongs to the dying, alone? What can the novelist know of the Other‘s death if the 
novelist, like the reader, has not experienced death? Indeed, to again quote Nathalie 
Sarraute: ―Today‘s reader is suspicious of what the author‘s imagination has to offer 
him.‖
85  From  this  suspicion  is  born  a  new  predilection  for  true  facts  (here  one  is 
reminded of Lejeune‘s autobiographical pact). The author need not coax the reader by 
                                                                                                                                           
82 Ibid., 768.  
83 Troyat, Tolstoy, 511. 
84 An interesting comparison could be made between the death of Anna Karenina and that of 
Gustave Flaubert‘s Emma Bovary—two characters whose stories are very similar, but whose 
revelations in death are very dissimilar insofar as Anna‘s death is sublime and calm whereas 
Emma‘s is maniacal and violent.  
85 Sarraute, ―The Age of Suspicion,‖ 57. The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
  106 
over-imagination or experimentation: the reader wants to examine with the author the 
everyday experience of reality—the true facts that comprise reality.
86 However, true 
facts are those spoken in the first-person, from the perspective of the ―I‖; but the death-
scene cannot be told by the ―I‖. The reader is surely suspicious if any attempt is made 
to do just that. The question is thus again asked: ―What is the authority of the author if 
they choose to tell a story they cannot truly know?‖ 
  To answer this question we will firstly look to the definitions of the terms author 
and authority. An ―author,‖ as defined by the OED, is ―the person who originates or 
gives existence to anything‖ and ―he who gives rise to or causes an action, event, 
circumstance, state, or condition of things.‖ The novelist as author can be said to be 
the author of his or her characters insofar as they give existence to their characters and 
the  characters‘  stories.  However,  the  term  author  is  also  understood  in  terms  of 
authority: ―he who authorises or instigates; the prompter or mover‖ or ―the person on 
whose authority a statement is made; an authority, an informant; and ―one who has 
authority over others; a director, ruler, commander.‖ We can say that the author has 
―authority‖ over his or her characters and the stories they create. However, the author 
also has authority over his or her reader, as to be ―in authority‖ is to be ―in a position of 
power; in possession of power over others and of power over, or title to influence, the 
opinions of others; authoritative opinion; weight of judgement or opinion, intellectual 
influence‖  but  is  also  to  have  the  ―power  to  inspire  belief,  title  to  be  believed; 
authoritative statement; weight of testimony.‖  
  What these various definitions suggest is that the author of the novel has not 
only the authoritative power  to create and command his or her characters and the 
characters‘ stories, but also has authoritative power over their reader, such that they 
compel their readers to accept and believe the stories they are being told, which may 
also include the author‘s opinions, judgements, and even biases. But is this authority, 
this power of the author, justifiable? Here we may consider Blanchot‘s meditations on 
Kafka and an excerpt from Kafka‘s Diaries (dated December 1914) in which he says 
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that he ―enjoys dying in the character who is dying.‖ Kafka also states that ―the best of 
what I have written is based on this capacity to die content.‖ It is on this latter statement 
that Blanchot comments: 
  
[This] sentence . . . has an attractive aspect stemming from its simplicity; nevertheless, it 
remains  difficult  to  accept.  What  is  this  capacity?  What  is  it  that  gives  Kafka  this 
assurance? Has he already come close enough to death to know how he will bear himself 
when he faces it? He seems to suggest that in the ―good passages‖ of his writings—
where someone is dying, dying an unjust death—he is himself at stake. Is it a matter, 
then, of an approach toward death accomplished under the cover of writing? The text 
does not say exactly that. It probably indicates an intimacy between the unhappy death 
which  occurs  in  the  work  and  the  writer  who  enjoys  this  death.  It  excludes  the  cold, 
distant relation which allows an objective description. A narrator, if he knows the art of 
moving  people,  can  recount  in  a  devastating  manner  devastating  events  which  are 
foreign to him. The problem in that case is one of rhetoric and the right one may or may 
not have to use it. But the mastery of which Kafka speaks is different, and the calculating 
tactic which authorises it is more profound. Yes, one has to die in the dying character, 
truth demands this. But one must be capable of satisfaction in death, capable of finding in 
the supreme dissatisfaction supreme satisfaction, and of maintaining, at the instant of 
dying, the clear-sightedness which comes from such a balance.
87  
 
Authority,  it  can  be  said  in  Kafka‘s  case,  comes  from  a  certain  state  of  mind—a 
particular disposition towards death. Again, dying can be seen as the becoming one of 
the ―they‖—anonymous and objective.    
  But even if the writer is confident in his or her disposition for writing on death, 
we may now ask whether the strength of the author‘s authority and conviction is based 
solely on his or her writing acclaim and skill, or is it the readers‘ belief that authors may 
have a wealth of ―life-experience,‖ from which he or she draws upon and writes about? 
Indeed, the content of life-experience is very similar to the wisdom of the dying, the 
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difference being that life-experience is that of the living and of those who have a living 
voice. But the question can again be asked: What authority can the living have for the 
living?  What  can  the  living  novelist  tell  the  living  reader,  especially  in  this  age  of 
suspicion? Benjamin would argue that the novelist can offer very little, as the novelist of 
the modern, capitalist age is ―inspired‖ only by his or her own solitary, life-experiences; 
therefore,  like  the  isolated,  perplexed  reader,  the  novelist  of  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth centuries is similarly isolated and perplexed: ―The birthplace of the novel is 
the solitary individual, who is no longer able to express himself by giving examples of 
his most important concerns, is himself uncounselled, and cannot counsel others.‖
88 
The novelist theoretically relates only his or her own individual, subjective experiences, 
which contain very little in the way of wisdom, primarily because it is not drawn from the 
wealth of wisdom of others. As was briefly described in the ―Introduction‖ above, for 
Benjamin,  this  isolation  epitomises  the  ―bourgeois‖  novelists‘  ideology  of  modern 
individualism insofar as the modern novelists tell only of their own isolated, individual 
experiences, and what is of their own individual interest. In contrast, the pre-modern 
storytellers had a wealth of experience, primarily because of their more working-class 
backgrounds  in  which  life-experiences  could  be  easily  shared.  They  had  the 
authoritative wisdom that the modern reader seeks. Benjamin identifies two groups of 
storyteller: the seamen/travelling journeymen; and the peasant/master craftsman. The 
seamen and the journeymen travelled the world, gaining life-experience and worldly 
wisdom, and told the stories of their ventures to all those they met along the way, 
whereas  the  peasants  and  master  craftsmen  settled  at  home  on  their  farms  or 
workshops, tilling the soil, or crafting and weaving, respectively, listening, telling, and 
retelling  the  local  tales  and  traditions.
89  The stories were drawn from a wealth of 
wisdom in which no one storyteller was an authority—all the storytellers who pass on 
the stories were an authority, drawing upon the wisdom of these stories, whilst at the 
same time intertwining their own  life-experiences and wisdom. The novelist did not 
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have this wealth of experience. Indeed, because of the novelist‘s supposed isolation, it 
was  common  for  the  novelist  to  draw  on  the  experiences  of  others.  Indeed,  it  is 
because of the novelist‘s isolation and lack of experience that he or she must look to 
other  peoples‘  experiences  from  which  they  derive  their  stories,  particularly  the 
representation  of  characters‘  death-scenes—an  experience  which  had  become 
increasingly absent. Indeed, this absence necessarily gave reason for authors to draw 
upon other peoples‘ stories of the experience of the death of the Other. Two examples 
in  particular  exemplify  this  ―derivation  of  experience,‖  but  each  example  treats  this 
derivation in a different way. The first is the death-scene of the great, tragic hero of 
Nostromo in Joseph Conrad‘s Nostromo (1904); the second is the death of Ivan in 
Tolstoy‘s The Death of Ivan Ilyich, discussed above. 
   
Nostromo 
 
In her notes on the text in Nostromo, Vèronique Pauly draws attention to the fact that 
Conrad ―sourced‖ Nostromo‘s death from French short story writer and novelist, Guy de 
Maupassant and his short story ―Hautot Father and Son,‖ written in 1889. This sourcing 
is  clearly  evidenced  when  the  two  texts  are  contrasted.  To  begin  with  Conrad‘s 
Nostromo, we find Nostromo on his deathbed, having been accidentally shot and fatally 
wounded  by  Old  Giorgio  Viola—the  father  of  Giselle  whom  Nostromo  (Captain 
Fidanza) has been secretly courting. Viola mistakes Nostromo for Ramirez—Giselle‘s 
other suitor and Nostromo's successor as head of the Cargadores. Viola vehemently 
dislikes Ramirez because of the dishonour he is bringing to his home, especially with 
his ―boasting . . . that he will carry [Giselle] off from the island.‖
90 Because of Ramirez‘s 
boasting,  Viola  set  about  patrolling  his  island,  ready  to  shoot  Ramirez.  Nostromo, 
however,  is  shot  instead  and  his  death  is  imminent.  He  is  asked  by  an  unnamed 
photographer if he has any ―dispositions to make‖: 
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Nostromo made no answer. The other did not insist, remaining huddled up on the stool, 
shock-headed,  wildly  hairy,  like  a  hunchbacked  monkey.  Then,  after  a  long  silence—
―Comrade Fidanza,‖ he began solemnly, ―you have refused all aid from that doctor. Is he 
really a dangerous enemy of the people?‖ 
  In the dimply-lit room Nostromo rolled his head slowly on the pillow and opened his 
eyes,  directing  at  the  weird  figure  perched  by  his  bedside  a  glance  of  enigmatic  and 
mocking  scorn.  Then  his  head  rolled  back,  his  eyelids  fell,  and  the  Capataz  of  the 
Cargadores died without a word or moan after an hour of immobility, broken  by short 
shudders testifying to the most atrocious sufferings.
91  
 
This  description  of  Nostromo‘s  death  is  clearly  derived  from  Maupassant  when  we 
contrast it with Maupassant‘s short story: 
 
But the dying man had closed his eyes, and he refused to open them again, refused to 
answer, refused to show, even by a sign, that he understood . . . He received the last 
rites, was purified and absolved, in the midst of his friends and servants on bended knee, 
without  any  movement  of  his  face  indicating  that  he  was  still  alive.  He  died  about 
midnight,  after  four  hours  of  convulsive  movement,  which  showed  that  he  must  have 
suffered dreadfully in his final moments.
92 
 
What this contrast suggests is that whether or not Conrad has witnessed the death of 
the Other, the fact remains that, for the death-scene of Nostromo, he has derived his 
representation from a fictional source. This can be seen as ―atypical‖ of Conrad who 
generally drew upon many of his life-experiences for his novels. Indeed, in Benjamin‘s 
eyes,  Conrad—the  sailor  and  master-mariner—would  be  regarded  with  the  same 
esteem as the early storytellers, because he had a wealth of experience upon which to 
draw. However, Conrad‘s authority could be questioned in terms of his rendering of the 
experience  of  death.  Why  did  he  draw,  if  only  in  part,  upon  Maupassant‘s  story? 
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Indeed,  was  Conrad  somewhat  apprehensive  in  rendering  the  death-scene  of 
Nostromo, despite his very profound rendering of the revelation of Kurtz in Heart of 
Darkness, which appeared several years before Nostromo? Whatever the answers to 
these questions are, there remains some discrepancy of the authority of Conrad in his 
representation  of  the  death  of  the  Other.  And  yet  Conrad  does  not  elaborate  on 
Maupassant‘s story; he does not overstep what he, nor any other author, could know, 
such that his derivation is essentially innocuous and does little to undermine Conrad‘s 
authority as a storyteller. To put it another way, Conrad does not ―add‖ to the reader‘s 
suspicions. 
  However,  this  innocuousness  of  Conrad‘s  Nostromo  differs  greatly  from  our 
second example: Tolstoy‘s Ivan Ilyich in which Tolstoy not only derives his story from 
someone else‘s experience, but also elaborates on the reported story. 
 
Ivan Ilyich 
 
Tolstoy‘s story of the character Ivan Ilyich was based on the life and death of Ivan Ilich 
Mechnikov, a judge at the court of Tula, in 1881. The idea and details of Mechnikov‘s 
death were ―given‖ to Tolstoy by Mechnikov‘s brother.
93 This would suggest that the 
story of the ―original‖ Ivan Ilich was reported to Tolstoy, but Tolstoy himself, did not 
experience or witness Ivan‘s death: he re-tells Mechnikov‘s story and elaborates on it, 
making it his own. However, unlike Conrad, Tolstoy endeavours to not only represent 
the  objective  experience  of  the  death  of  Ivan  Ilyich—the  experience  of  a  witness, 
observing  Mechnikov‘s  death  from  a  distant  and  limited  point  of  view—but  also 
represents Ivan‘s subjective experience of death. Tolstoy ―assumes‖ the authority of 
the imminently dying by representing both the subjective and objective position, and 
invents all or part of Ivan Ilyich‘s experience of death. Indeed, the narrator tells the 
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story as if it were an event of the past, as if the narrator is the absolute authority—a 
God—seeing Ivan‘s objective and subjective experience of death.  
  Of  course,  Tolstoy  has  the  freedom  to  invent  whatever  he  so  chooses—a 
freedom which is particular to the writer of fiction—even if it is of an experience which 
may be considered unknowable, such as death. Indeed, as E. M. Forster says of the 
writer of death: 
 
There is scarcely anything that the novelist cannot borrow from ―daily death‖; scarcely 
anything he may not profitably invent. The doors of that darkness lie open to him and he 
can even follow his characters through it.
94 
     
Tolstoy follows Ivan Ilyich into the darkness. He conveys the ―real‖ experiences which 
have been told to him, but he ventures beyond what was observed. Consider again the 
description of the death of Ivan Ilyich, how Ivan Ilyich had ―fallen through the hole and 
caught sight of the light,‖ and how ―in place of death there was light.‖ This description 
goes beyond what can be witnessed by those sharing the experience of the Other‘s 
death; beyond the few verbal and visual forms of communication. From his third-person 
point  of  view,  Tolstoy  can  be  said  to  ―know  everything‖  about  Ivan  Ilyich,  and 
experience all of his experiences. Indeed, Tolstoy, when formulating the story of Ivan 
Ilyich, used this third-person narration to enhance the impact of the story on his reader. 
As Troyat describes: 
 
[Tolstoy‘s] original idea had been simply to write a diary of a man struggling with and then 
abandoning himself to death. But gradually he saw what the story might gain in tragic 
depth by  being  told  in the third person, particularly  in changes of lighting  effects and 
camera angles. And the diary grew into a novel.
95 
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Tolstoy saw the limitations of representing the story of the death of Ivan Ilyich from an 
autobiographical point of view, and changed his narration to that of the third-person, 
enhancing the reader‘s experience of Ivan‘s death.  
  However, the question we may again ask is, ―What can Tolstoy ‗know‘ of the 
first-hand experience of death, when he, like his reader, has not genuinely experienced 
death—an  experience  reserved  exclusively  for  the  imminently  dying?‖  Indeed,  can 
anyone claim, with authority, to have intimate knowledge of the genuine experience of 
death?  The  answer  would  seemingly  again  be  a  resounding  ―no.‖  Even  those 
individuals that claim to have had a near-death experience and have lived to tell of the 
experience cannot be said to have genuinely experienced death—their experience of 
death, it can be argued, is somewhat incomplete. Indeed, even if the imminently dying 
were able to convey the experience of their death, and their authoritative revelations of 
the meaning of their life, we must question the limitations of their own ability to convey 
their  experience—an  understanding  and  experience  which  could  very  easily  be 
exhausted in its conveyance. Consider Marlow‘s descriptions of the ―rent veil‖ of Kurtz‘s 
face, as he dies. Kurtz‘s face seems to express that which is inexpressible—something 
that cannot  be known  by  those  who  witness  it.  As  has  been stated, death  can  be 
―experienced‖ by those who surround the dying; however, it is the ―diluted,‖ second-
hand experience, of which little can be known or represented.  
  This inability of the ―living‖ author endeavouring to write from the point of view of 
the imminently dying—to see death and express what one sees—is best illustrated in 
Emily Dickinson‘s poem, ―I Heard a Fly Buzz—When I Died‖ (P 465):  
 
I heard a Fly buzz—when I died— 
The Stillness in the Room 
Was like the Stillness in the Air— 
Between the Heaves of Storm— 
 
The Eyes around—had wrung them dry— The Explicit Revelations of the Dying 
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And Breaths were gathering firm 
For the last Onset—when the King 
Be witnessed—in the Room— 
 
I willed my Keepsakes—Signed away 
What portion of me be 
Assignable—and then it was 
There interposed a Fly— 
 
With Blue—uncertain—stumbling Buzz— 
Between the light—and me— 
And then the Windows failed—and then 
I could not see to see— 
 
The  speaker,  assumedly  Dickinson,  narrates  the  poem  from  a  first-person,  ―role-
playing‖ position, telling the reader of her imminent death. The speaker describes her 
typical  ―experience‖  of  dying,  such  as  the  business  of  willing  away  the  speaker‘s 
keepsakes, but also her anticipation of the ―promised‖ revelations beyond death, and 
the  witnessing  of  ―the  King,‖  which  is  presumably  Christ.
96  However,  a  housefly 
interrupts her ―transition‖ such that she ―could not see to see.‖ Dickinson, in her role-
playing, is endeavouring to see what is on the other side of death; however, the real 
world continues to interrupt this revelation. The speaker cannot ―see‖ the images of 
revelation  which  is  what  she  endeavours  to  see.  All  her  knowledge  of  death,  her 
actions, and expectations reflect the unknowability of death. She experiences death as 
the Other has told her to experience death. Indeed, Dickinson, as the voice behind the 
speaker, is only playing the role of the dying and therefore does not have the authority 
of the dying. And Dickinson seems to acknowledge her failure in endeavouring to do 
so. As Jane Donahue Eberwein describes: 
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Not even by playing the role of a dead person, then, could Dickinson achieve perspective 
on  the  mysteries  she  wanted  to  probe.  Imagination—although  fused  in  a  blending  of 
dream and drama—could never fully place her outside the circuit, however she might 
pivot on its brink.
97 
 
Like Tolstoy‘s Ivan Ilyich, the significance of Dickinson‘s poem is that it is written from a 
position which is ―unknowable‖ to both the author and the reader, be it acknowledged 
by the author, as can be interpreted from Dickinson‘s poem, or unacknowledged and 
―authoritative,‖  in  Tolstoy.  This  would  suggest  that  no  author  has  the  authority  to 
narrate the ―genuine‖ experiences of the imminently dying from either a first- or third-
person point of view: the imminently dying cannot narrate their own death, and the 
author cannot write the death of the imminently dying, except from the point of view of 
an objective witness to the death of the Other.  
  However, as was intimated above, the claim that the author does not have the 
authority to convey the unknowable, does not mean that the author cannot freely relate 
their imagined or invented thoughts and ideas from the point of view of the imminently 
dying. This is to say that novelists may not have the authority to represent the Other‘s 
experience of death, but they do have the right to invent the experience of the Other‘s 
death. Indeed, the novelist has the right to represent anything he or she so chooses. 
The question now is whether the ―suspicious‖ reader authentically chooses to believe 
what is invented. As we have seen, Tolstoy ventures beyond knowable experience—he 
invents Ivan Ilyich‘s experience of death, giving the reader an insight into what is an 
unknown. But what Tolstoy is also doing is deceiving the reader. Indeed, as Wayne C. 
Booth describes in The Rhetoric of Fiction, omniscient narration is one of fiction‘s most 
significant devices but also one of the novelist‘s best ―tricks‖:  
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One of the most obviously artificial devices of the storyteller is the trick of going beneath 
the  surface  of  the  action  to  obtain  a  reliable  view  of  a  character‘s  mind  and  heart. 
Whatever our ideas may be about the natural way to tell a story, artifice is unmistakably 
present whenever the author tells us what no one in so-called real life could possibly 
know.
98 
 
That the reader  can know  what  no  one  could possibly  know  is  an  overt deception 
created  by  the  omniscient  narrator.  And  yet  the  reader  somewhat  inauthentically 
accepts that he or she is being deceived. Indeed, as Booth suggests, it is ―strange‖ that 
the reader trusts the novelist even more so than they would the most reliable witness.
99 
This openness for deception when ―experiencing‖ the death of Ivan Ilyich would appear 
to be symptomatic of the fear of death  and the anxiety of meaning insofar  as any 
insight, be it real or fictional, would warm the shivering reader. The omniscient narrator 
gives the shivering reader a gift of unknown experience which the reader willingly and 
inauthentically  accepts.  It  is  a  gift  that  seemingly  surpasses  the  value  of  the  real 
revelations of the real dying Other‘s, despite the inherent authority and sublimity  of 
these real revelations. Of course, as will be described in the following chapter, this gift 
is  not  always  explicitly  given  through  the  dying‘s  revelations  but  comes  from  the 
reader‘s implicit interpretations and evaluations of the novel‘s narrative discourse. 
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3 
Implicit Interpretation and 
Evaluation  
 
The ―meaning of life‖ is really the centre about which the novel moves. 
               —Walter Benjamin, ―The Storyteller‖ 
 
 
―Well . . . er . . . Seventy years in a man‘s life . . . That‘s a lot to try and get into a 
newsreel.‖ 
      —Citizen Kane 
 
 
e  have  seen  how  death-scenes  in  fiction  are,  for  the  shivering  reader, 
privileged situations, giving the reader a warming insight into the experience 
of death and the revelation of the meaning of life. Indeed, the representation of the 
death of a fictional character is the greatest gift that the reader can ―receive‖ because 
fiction makes it possible for the reader to access an experience which is, in reality, 
inaccessible. And we have seen how Leo Tolstoy‘s  The Death of Ivan Ilyich is the 
sublime example of the possibilities of fiction as it represents the absolute, subjective 
experience of Ivan Ilyich‘s death. However, very few death-scenes in fiction give the 
reader this level of access because very few examples represent the dying fictional 
character‘s  complete,  subjective  experience  of  death.  Indeed,  two  of  the  examples 
discussed in the previous chapter, those of Citizen Kane and Mr. Kurtz, are presented 
to the reader from a purely objective point of view—we do not see ―Rosebud‖ when 
Kane is dying, nor do we see the vision which prompts Kurtz to speak his enigmatic 
final words ―the horror, the horror.‖ Indeed, as Thomas Docherty notes, it is not Kurtz 
W Implicit Interpretation and Evaluation 
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but  Marlow  who  speaks  Kurtz‘s  final  words  when  he  tells  his  story.  Marlow  is 
impersonating Kurtz; he is not only interpreting Kurtz‘s words but trying to recreate 
them by speaking as Kurtz.
1 We should also note that in film there is also another level 
of interpretation: the actor must interpret Marlow‘s words—an interpretation which is 
demonstrated in their speech and vocal features such as intonation, stress, emphasis, 
and  timbre.
2  As  Seymour  Chatman  describes,  from  the  three  radio  and  filmic 
adaptations  of  Heart  of  Darkness—Orson  Welles‘s  two  radio  broadcasts  (1938), 
Francis  Ford  Coppola‘s  Apocalypse  Now!  and  Nicholas  Roeg‘s  Heart  of  Darkness 
(1994)—we can have (if we were to include both the directors and actors) up to five 
varied interpretations of the pronunciation of Kurtz‘s final words: 
 
We don‘t know how Welles would have said them in the film, but we do have records of 
the two radio versions . . . in which Welles played both Marlow and Kurtz. After Marlow 
sets the context with the exclamation, ―What are you looking at?‖ Kurtz‘s vaguely Slavic, 
breathy,  guttural  answer  sounds  self-loathing  and  guilt-ridden,  as  if,  like  Macbeth,  he 
were staring hell in the face. The Kurtz of Roeg‘s film, on the other hand, as played by 
John  Malkovich,  intones  ―The  horror!‖  ethereally,  meditatively,  more  a  philosophical 
question  than  a  tormented  plaint.  Marlon  Brando‘s  dying  words  are  whispered,  as  in 
Conrad‘s original description: ―He cried in a whisper . . . a cry that was no more than a 
breath.‖ They might refer to his assassination by Willard as much as to his own moral 
condition or the state of the world.
3 
 
To these verbal interpretations we can add the actor‘s facial gestures which are also 
very  important  as  they  can  communicate  a  great  deal  to  the  viewer.  What  this 
description suggests  is that, from our objective point  of view,  we  must—like Orson 
Welles, Francis Ford Coppola, Marlon Brando, Nicholas Roeg, and John Malkovich—
interpret  these  words  and  make  meaning.  To  do  this—to  understand  both  Charles 
Foster Kane‘s and Kurtz‘s words—we must understand the context of Kane and Kurtz‘s 
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words, which is to say that we must make a connection between their words and their 
past  lives—the  events  that  have  culminated  in  their  death.  We  must  know  of  the 
―unsound‖ actions Kurtz has taken in the Congo, the journey he has taken, and the 
horrors he has experienced. Like Marlow, we must see the ―evidence‖ of horror. We 
must see the ―black, dried, sunken‖ heads on stakes,
4 posted outside Kurtz‘s house; 
we must know of Kurtz‘s isolation and we must journey with Marlow into Kurtz‘s ―heart 
of darkness.‖ Only then can we make a claim of some understanding of what Kurtz 
sees in death. Indeed, we must undertake a similar task as the reporters attempting to 
find  the  meanings  of  Kane‘s  words:  we  must  connect  the  word  Rosebud  to  some 
―thing‖ in Kane‘s past. We must connect it to a horse, or a woman, or any number of 
other  possible  ―things.‖  This  difficulty  does  not  only  exist  in  the  pinning  down  of 
meaning  but  also  has  its  difficulties  because  of  the  nature  of  language.  This  is 
evidenced  if  we  consider  the  special  relationship  between  meaning  and  language, 
specifically the distinction between language and utterance and the role of language in 
expression. To make this connection we can firstly look to Edmund Husserl and his 
phenomenological theory of ―true‖ language where meaning ―is not just meaning in the 
sense  that  words  mean,  but  in  the  sense  that  someone  means  them  to  mean.‖
5 
Meaning is willed and intended by an utterer; thus, in the case of Citizen Kane, the 
―true‖ meaning of the utterance ―Rosebud‖ is Kane‘s thought of his sleigh, which is 
―seen‖ within his individual mind. Moreover, in Husserl‘s understanding, to know the 
meaning of a speaker‘s words is essentially to ―look straight into the speaker‘s mind.‖
6 
To know ―Rosebud‖ is to know Kane. But the reporters do not know the intention of the 
word ―Rosebud.‖ Indeed, even if they were aware that Rosebud is a sleigh, they still 
cannot know the inexhaustible depths of Kane‘s mind. Another connection can also be 
made  here  if  we  were  to  consider  Jacques  Derrida‘s  examination  of  the  role  of 
language in expression. Derrida‘s task is to undermine Husserl‘s theory, by claiming 
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that ―true‖  language  does not belong to the speaker but is a self-sufficient system, 
independent of human beings. For Derrida, ―true‖ language is exemplified by ―writing‖ 
where it ―exists‖ and ―acts‖ without the speaker who can be either absent or even dead. 
As such, the speaker is no longer ―there‖ to support the meaning of the words. They 
are  independent  from  the  speaker  such  that  any  intention  is  lost.
7 With regards to 
Kane, his words are not ―written down‖ but they are maintained independent of him and 
without his support. As a result, Kane is dead but ―Rosebud‖ continues to act because 
the reporters attach meanings to ―Rosebud.‖ 
  In order to attach meanings to a word which is unattached to an individual—for 
example, the utterer‘s death-speech—we must find other signs—other words and other 
evidence—which belong to the individual‘s past. We must collect data. This activity is 
even more important when we consider two other problems of the communication of 
the  dying.  The  first,  which  is  intimated  above,  is  the  ever-present  difficulty  in 
communicating in words what we see with our eyes, especially what we see within the 
mind. Just as we cannot easily see into another individual‘s mind through his or her 
words, neither can we easily communicate what we see in our minds in order to enable 
others  access  to  our  own  minds.  Language  limits  what  we  endeavour  to  express. 
Indeed, a picture, as they say, is worth a thousand words, but even then words cannot 
―represent‖ a picture. The words Kurtz uses to express what he sees—the image or 
vision of horror—are essentially a poor representation of the much more meaningful 
image  or  vision  seen  only  in  Kurtz‘s  mind‘s  eye.  Kurtz‘s  experience  of  ―horror‖  is 
necessarily understated by the word horror. Indeed, Kurtz‘s experience of horror would 
be understated by even a hundred thousand words. The dying Other can only exhaust 
themselves in their efforts to find the words to convey their sublime revelations to their 
perplexed  witnesses.  As Bertrand Russell states in a letter to his close friend,  and 
former  lover,  Ottoline  Morrell  (11th  August,  1918):  ―The  things  one  says  are  all 
unsuccessful  attempts  to  say  something  else—something  that  perhaps  by  its  very 
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nature cannot be said.‖
8 The sublime revelations of the dying are precisely an example 
of something that perhaps, by its very nature, cannot be said. It can also be argued 
that, even when the dying‘s words are communicated and received by the witness, we 
must still recognise that the meanings of words are in many ways plastic, contingent, 
and multifarious, especially because they are no longer attached to the utterer. What 
the word horror means to Marlow would differ from that of Kurtz. Indeed, the word 
Rosebud is essentially meaningless without a context to place it. The reporters connect 
the word Rosebud to their own subjective contexts, giving us the various interpretations 
of Rosebud as a woman, or a racehorse. The word Rosebud may ―sound‖ like a horse 
that a reporter once bet on himself, or may ―sound‖ like a woman a reporter once dated 
himself.
9 Indeed, none of the reporters connect Rosebud to the most obvious definition 
of the word: ―a bud of a rose.‖
10    
  The second reason why we may need to know more of a character‘s past to 
understand  his  or  her  life‘s  meaning  is  the  fact  that  not  all  characters  can  or  do 
communicate their dying revelations. Consider, for example, the death of Captain Ahab 
in Herman Melville‘s Moby-Dick (1851). On what is to be the final day, and his final 
assault, of his monomaniacal chase for the elusive Moby Dick—the whale that has 
scarred him both on the outside and within—Ahab makes what can be described as his 
final ―death-speech‖: 
 
  ―I turn my body from the sun. What ho, Tashtego! let me hear thy hammer. Oh! ye 
three unsurrended spires of mine; thou uncracked keel; and only god-bullied hull; thou 
firm deck, and haughty helm, and Pole-pointed prow,—death-glorious ship! must ye then 
perish, and without me? Am I cut off from the last fond pride of meanest shipwrecked 
captains? Oh, lonely death on lonely life! Oh, now I feel my topmost greatness lies in 
topmost grief. Ho, ho! from all your furthest bounds, pour ye now in, ye bold billows of my 
whole foregone life, and top this one piled comber of my death! Towards thee I roll, thou 
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all-destroying but unconquering whale; to the last I grapple with thee; from hell‘s heart I 
stab at thee; for hate‘s sake I spit my last breath at thee. Sink all coffins and all hearses 
to one common pool! and since neither can be mine, let me then tow to pieces, while still 
chasing thee, though tied to thee, thou damned whale! Thus, I give up the spear!‖
11   
 
Ahab  recognises  that  this  encounter  with  the  whale  could  be  his  last,  and  he  has 
prepared himself for death; however, it is not necessarily an ―authoritative‖ revelation, 
especially when contrasted with the death-scenes of Kane or Kurtz. Moreover, unlike 
Kane‘s and Kurtz‘s final words, Ahab‘s speech is not necessarily a revelation in the 
face of imminent death, especially if we consider the narration of the action that follows: 
 
The harpoon was darted; the stricken whale flew forward; with igniting velocity the line 
ran through the groove;—ran foul. Ahab stooped to clear it; he did clear it; but the flying 
turn caught him round the neck, and voicelessly as Turkish mutes bowstring their victim, 
he was shot out of the boat, ere the crew knew he was gone.
12 
 
Despite Ahab‘s proclamation in his death-speech that his death is imminent, his death 
is very much an ―accident.‖ Ahab‘s actions suggest that he had no knowledge of what 
would become of him as he thrust the harpoon into the White Whale. Indeed, Ahab 
struggles to untangle the line—a desperate attempt to avoid injury or death—but he is 
inevitably caught by the harpoon‘s line, and is suddenly ―gone.‖ He could have avoided 
death, whereas Kane and Kurtz could not. Of course, Ahab does ―experience‖ dying, 
but his death goes unseen as it is veiled by the blackness of the sea from which neither 
sight nor sound can escape. Ahab‘s death is ―voiceless,‖ and no final gestures are 
witnessed or recounted by Ishmael—the narrator of the story. And for this very reason 
the shivering reader can draw no warming insights from Ahab at the moment of his 
death. The reader cannot know of Ahab‘s regrets, his pleasures, his revelations, as his 
life ends.    
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  However,  what  the  death  of  Ahab  does  give  the  reader  is  a  boundary  for 
interpretation  and  evaluation  as  Ahab  becomes  a  dead  life  for  the  reader.  Indeed, 
where we have previously said that we should firstly look to the Other and listen to 
what they tell us, we must now console ourselves by looking at the Other as if they 
were a ―dumb‖ object. It is a lesser gift, but nevertheless valuable as the  shivering 
reader can derive some understanding of Ahab‘s life and his meaning by looking at the 
narration of Ahab‘s story which precedes his death. This is to say that the shivering 
reader has the freedom to implicitly interpret and evaluate Ahab‘s dead life and derive 
some meaning from his life. Thus, Ahab‘s life is still a gift for the shivering reader, albeit 
a lesser gift when compared to examples such as Tolstoy‘s Ivan Ilyich.  
 
Interpretation and Evaluation as ―Wholeness‖  
 
When talking of a character‘s death and its relation to the character‘s past, we must 
also note two claims that are not being made, both of which are especially pertinent 
when interpreting and, more importantly, evaluating the dead life of character. The first 
concerns the relation between the act  of suicide and the meaning of life, and how 
suicide does not necessarily define the meaning of one‘s life, or supersede one‘s past 
actions.  David  Cooper  claims  that  ―a  heroic  martyrdom  [cannot]  turn  an  otherwise 
worthless existence into a triumphant one. . . . A beautiful death is worth a whole life—
or, better, they are equivalent in value.‖
13 This is to say that one‘s final ―glorious‖ act of 
martyrdom does not necessarily permeate one‘s inglorious past life simply because a 
life ―gains‖ its meaning through its completeness—its wholeness. The meanings of our 
projects are a lifetime in the making, and are laden with nuance, contingency, and 
subtlety and, thus, cannot be overturned on a whim or flight of fancy. Thus, to again 
use the example of the character of Anna Karenina, we should not interpret or evaluate 
the life of Anna Karenina just on her final act of suicide—her act of revenge—inasmuch 
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as we know that her life was much more than this. Her final act of revenge, and the 
way she chooses to die, should not colour her whole life.
14    
  The second claim that we must dismiss is the claim that to have a complete and 
meaningful life one must live to a certain age; to have a complete, meaningful life, one 
must ideally die of old age, whereas a life cut  short by sudden death would be 
considered ―incomplete‖ and meaningless, as our outstanding projects would fall into 
the absurd. This is an assertion that will be discussed further in the following chapters; 
however, for the present examination of death, our position will be to the contrary: a life 
cut short by sudden death is just as complete and whole as the lives of those who die 
of  old  age,  insofar  as  both  are  structurally  complete—sudden  death  still  creates  a 
boundary to a life just as death of old age is a boundary to a life. However, what the 
meaning of that life is—a life that is cut short—may be very different in an interpretive 
sense because of the short temporality of the life. As Benjamin claims:  
 
A man . . . who died at thirty-five will appear to remembrance at every point in his life as a 
man who dies at the age of thirty-five. In other words, the statement that makes no sense 
for real life becomes indisputable for remembered life. The nature of the character in the 
novel cannot be presented any better than is done in this statement, which says that the 
―meaning‖ of his life is revealed only in his death.
15  
 
This is to say that we can still interpret the meaning of the deceased‘s life but we will 
contextualise the deceased‘s life in terms of the age at which he or she dies, and in 
terms of the meaningful projects they undertook within that shorter temporal frame. It is 
this temporal ending which continues to influence how the deceased is remembered 
and how the deceased‘s life is interpreted and evaluated. 
   
                                                 
14 Whether we do indeed evaluate a person‘s whole life is of course a different issue. 
―Celebrities‖ particularly are not often evaluated by their whole lives and, indeed, it is often their 
less significant, sometimes tragic later lives which colour the successes of their past lives. 
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Evaluation as Correspondence of Intention and Revelation of Meaning 
 
But what does it really mean to say that we interpret and evaluate the dead life of the 
Other? The first qualification would be that the interpretation of the fictional Other‘s life 
comes before evaluation as the shivering reader must firstly ―collate‖ the ―data‖—the 
signs—of a character‘s life before evaluating the collation. More specifically, the reader 
must firstly understand what the character‘s intended meaningful project is and decide 
whether the character has achieved this intended meaning, before then evaluating this 
meaning. This process of evaluation is comparable to E. D. Hirsch‘s claim that, for a 
reader  to  evaluate  a  text,  the  reader  must  firstly  understand  what  the  author‘s 
subjective intention for the text was, and only then can the reader objectively evaluate 
the  accomplishment  of  this  intention.  Hirsch  goes  on  to  say  that:  ―Evaluation  is 
constantly distinguishing between intention and accomplishment.‖
16 Similarly, in order 
to  begin  to  evaluate  the  lives  of  the  fictional  Other,  it  is  necessary  to  have  some 
understanding of their subjective intentions, before objectively evaluating the success 
of these intentions.  
  The ―success‖ of these intentions is what is ―revealed‖ in death. To use the 
example of Ivan Ilyich,  Ivan chooses his  intended project  of becoming a judge,  an 
occupation which, in very simple terms, would make him happy and his life meaningful; 
however, in death, it is revealed to Ivan that his intended project was not meaningful. 
Ivan‘s intention does not correspond with his revelation and is, therefore, unsuccessful. 
Here we see the most fundamental relationship for making meaning of our personal 
narratives, but also the fundamental cause for anxiety: intention is an expectation of an 
intended revelation, but in death this expectation may be frustrated. Interpretation is an 
understanding of what was intended and what is revealed—what was accomplished—
and, put simply, evaluation decides whether this intention was accomplished and, if 
accomplished, whether it was a meaningful intention.    
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  The  necessity  for  an  understanding  of  both  a  character‘s  intention  and 
revelation  of  meaning  for  the  process  of  interpretation  and  evaluation  can  also  be 
illustrated by Frank Kermode‘s analogy in  The Sense of  an Ending  of the  tick-tock 
sounds that a clock makes, which Kermode takes as the model for a plot: ―Tick is our 
word for a physical beginning, tock our word for an end. We say they differ. What 
enables them to be different is a special kind of middle.‖
17 This analogy also loosely 
corresponds  to  our  personal  narratives:  the  tock  of  tick-tock  corresponds  to  the 
revelation of meaning; the tick corresponds to the choice of an intended meaning; and 
the middle corresponds to the creation of this intended meaning. This is also to say that 
tock is only meaningful when we ―hear‖ the tick which precedes it. For example, ―The 
horror‖ and ―Rosebud‖ are the ―tocks‖ of the lives of Kurtz and Kane, respectively; but 
they are meaningless when isolated from their past life—they are meaningless without 
the  tick.  These  characters  are  only  valuable  to  the  shivering  reader  if  they  have 
complete personal narratives—the tick and the tock of tick-tock—and are only valuable 
if  their  intended  choices,  actions,  and  revelations  of  their  personal  narratives  are 
communicated  and  represented,  or,  at  the  very  least,  implied  within  the  novel‘s 
discourse. Indeed, as Kermode suggests, the plot of tick-tock creates an ―expectation‖ 
of the reader:  
 
[Novelists] have to defeat the tendency of the interval between tick and tock to empty 
itself;  to  maintain  within  that  interval  following  tick  a  lively  expectation  of  tock,  and  a 
sense  that  however  remote  tock  may  be,  all  that  happens  happens  as  if  tock  were 
certainly following. All such plotting presupposes and requires that an end will bestow 
upon the whole duration and meaning.
18  
 
The shivering reader does not derive warmth only from the choices (the ticks) made by 
a character, isolated from what came before and after the character‘s choice: the value 
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of a character lies in the representation of the character‘s complete personal narrative 
(the tick and tock).  
  But  as  has  been  described  above,  not  all  characters  explicitly  reveal  the 
meaning of their lives in death. The reader may hear the tick but may not hear an 
explicit  tock.  However,  because  death  provides  a  boundary  for  interpretation  of  a 
character‘s dead life, it can be said that a character‘s death implicitly ―reveals‖ the 
meaning  of  the  character‘s  life—the  reader  hears  the  tock  as  part  of  his  or  her 
interpretation. This is to say that the tock is implicit at the ending of the character‘s life 
just as the tock is implied by the ending of the plot; therefore, it is still possible for the 
reader to interpret and evaluate a character‘s life.   
  It must be noted that Kermode‘s analogy of tick-tock has faced some criticism 
because, although it accurately describes the teleology of the realist novel, it cannot 
necessarily be applied to the modern or postmodern novel. Kermode does discuss the 
possibility of the tock-tick plot as a reflection of the modern novel‘s plot, but, as Thomas 
Docherty argues, Kermode  
   
still insists upon placing emphasis on the same kind of ―end‖ as in the simple plot. His 
tock-tick is seen to be working within a larger but unarticulated framework of (tick)tock-
tick(tock), and the reader transforms chronos into kairos by articulating a meaningful plot. 
This is unsatisfactory for dealing with some recent fiction.
19   
 
Docherty claims that there are essentially three types of plot which are dependent on 
three views of time,  history, and personal continuity. The first is the ―tick-tock‖ plot 
which is like that described by Kermode, where history is seen as being progressive 
and  evolutionary.  This  is  essentially  the  realist  plot  and  supports  the  ―idea  of  an 
individual linear continuity of character.‖
20 The second type of plot, which is essentially 
that of modernist texts, such as Finnegans Wake and The Search of Lost Time, is 
circular and takes the form of ―tick-tock-tick.‖ In this view, history is seen as cyclic and 
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therefore  static  and  ―artificially  attains  to  a  spatial  consistency  and  continuity  of 
character, seen in terms of repetition, duplication of character in time.‖
21 The third type 
of plot is essentially that of the postmodern text and takes the form of ―tock-tick‖: ―This 
kind will acknowledge ‗gaps‘ in time, and views history as being discontinuous, radically 
revolutionary, and as happening now, in the present‖
22 and ―often dispense entirely with 
the continuity of the discrete individual.‖
23   
  Ursula K. Heise makes a similar claim regarding Kermode‘s narrative theory. 
However, Heise disputes the viability of this model because of its implicit emphasis on 
the contextual understanding of our lives in relation to death and endings:  
 
What make this type of narrative theory so seductive is that it bases itself on the universal 
human fact of death, as did the time philosophies of Freud, Heidegger and Sartre. But 
this universality is problematic in so far as it leads to the assumption that narrative as a 
genre is fundamentally invariant across cultures and historical periods; although its forms 
of  appearance  might  change,  its  function  for  human  temporal  experience  remains 
constant,  and  therefore  narrative  always  retains  an  underlying  temporal  structure  that 
defines  the  genre.  None  of  these  theories  allows  for  the  possibility  that  the  human 
experience of time depends on cultural contexts that are themselves subject to change. 
Recent  cultural  theory  has  made  us  acutely  aware  that  biological  fact  only  becomes 
―natural‖ or ―universal‖ through the operation of culture; in light of this insight, a theory of 
narrative  that  is  based  on  an  allegedly  transhistorical  experience  of  time  appears 
questionable: the fact that mortality is a physical necessity for the individual by no means 
proves its universal cultural relevance.
24  
 
Heise‘s claims are important as both Kermode‘s and Benjamin‘s theories can indeed 
be viewed as problematic when historically or culturally universalised. However, the 
argument of this thesis is that the relation of death and narrative is indeed historically 
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and culturally contextual: the shivering reader is a product of the modern world in which 
God is dead. This is also why existential philosophy is important as it is the philosophy 
of  the  isolated  individual,  thrown  into  the  godless  world  without  instruction.  The 
shivering reader is authentically disposed towards death and endings. This is also why 
it can be argued that, of the three plot types described by Docherty, the most valuable 
to the shivering reader is that of the realist novel as it most resembles the organisation 
of our ―real‖ personal narratives, or at least how we perceive them to be organised. 
This  is  only  understood  if  we  take  the  event  of  death  as  a  retrospective  unifying 
principle  of  our  contingent  ―identities‖  which,  in  life,  may  not  have  appeared  to  be 
continuous  or  historical.  Indeed,  it  can  be  argued  that  postmodern  fiction  does 
represent, through its characters, what is essentially the ―reality‖ of everyday life as 
being contingent and contextual, is ahistorical and lived only in the present; but this is 
to  understate  the  reality  of  our  projection  and  invention  of  a  meaningful  future—
projection which is also related to an awareness of our past. Here we are not wholly 
dispensing with the reality of the representations of characters of postmodern fiction, 
but are considering the value of such characters to the shivering reader who is creating 
a meaningful life through his or her projects and is also looking to fictional characters—
characters of realist fiction—for wisdom in choosing these projects.  
 
The Personal Narrative as a Template for the Realist Novel 
 
The  argument, therefore,  is  that the  structure of  our  personal  narratives  somewhat 
resembles the structure of a realist fictional plot, insofar as Kermode‘s description of 
the function of the events of a plot (the tick-tock of a plot) resemble the basic functions 
of  our  personal  narratives:  tick  is  an  intention—a  choice  of  project—which  is  only 
meaningful through the future expectation of tock—a revelation. However, it can be 
argued that the narrative of  realist fiction—specifically the narrative structure of the 
realist novel—not only resembles our personal narratives but imitates the structure of Implicit Interpretation and Evaluation 
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our personal narratives. This is to say that the template of fiction is derived from the 
template of our lives. This may appear to be a self-evident statement insofar as human 
beings  generally  write  stories  about  human  beings‘  stories.  Indeed,  in  more 
contemporary theory, it is pointed out that ―narrative‖ is not confined to literature but is 
―central to the representation of identity, in personal memory and self-representation‖
25; 
further, as Paul Ricoeur describes in his analysis on the correlation between the activity 
of narrating a story and the temporal character of human experience, ―time becomes 
human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains 
its  full  meaning  when  it  becomes  a  condition  of  temporal  existence.‖
26  Similar  to 
Ricoeur, the argument here is not that our lives are personal narratives which resemble 
those of fiction, but that, if we examine the function and themes of the narrative events 
of a novel‘s plot, we begin to see that the events of the plot and the mode of narration 
correlate to specifically  existential events which imitate the existential events of our 
personal narratives. But, more importantly, what we also see is that there is no plot 
without a personal narrative. Indeed, where Benjamin suggests that the meaning of life 
is  the  centre  about  which  the  novel  moves,  we  could  really  say  that  a  character’s 
meaningful  projects—the  events  of  a  character‘s  personal  narrative—is  the  centre 
about which the novel moves. This further suggests that character is interdependent 
with the novel‘s story: the character cannot be independent of plot, nor can plot be 
independent of character. The plot is the character‘s created meaningful project. This is 
not  necessarily  a  profound  argument;  indeed,  questions  on  the  independence  and 
interdependence of story and character have been discussed since Aristotle‘s Poetics, 
written between 347 and 322 BCE. And from this early beginning, a variety of positions 
have been maintained, which Chatman summarises and comments on in Story and 
Discourse:   
 
Aristotle and the Formalists and some structuralists subordinate character to plot, make it 
a function of plot, a necessary but derivative consequence of the chrono-logic of story. 
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One  could  equally  argue  that  character  is  supreme  and  plot  derivative,  to  justify  the 
modernist narrative in which ―nothing happens,‖ that is, the events themselves do not 
form an independent source of interest, for example, a puzzle or the like. But to me the 
question  of  ―priority‖  or  ―dominance‖  is  not  meaningful.  Stories  only  exist  where  both 
events and existents occur. There cannot be events without existents. And though it is 
true that a text can have existents without events (a portrait, a descriptive essay), no one 
would think of calling it a narrative.
27 
 
As Chatman states, story and characters have an interdependent relationship; as such, 
it can be argued that most, if not all, realist fiction and, indeed, modern fiction, primarily 
centres on the representation of characters‘ personal narratives. The novel‘s story is 
derived from the action of the character‘s life—action which is driven by the presence 
of possibilities and choice and the making of the choice itself. Indeed, the reality of the 
world ―outside‖ of our selves has no plot—it is pure chronology; the reality outside our 
subjectivity is chronos, the simple passing of time. It is an indefatigable series of ―and 
thens‖ and meaningless causal chains. As such, there is no ―meaningful‖ story.    
  But, as Kermode states, ―human intervention‖ creates story by filling time with 
significance.  Time  becomes  kairos  and  the  moments  of  time  are  ―charged  with  a 
meaning derived from its relation to the end.‖
28 These moments are our meaningful 
choices. We create story by choosing beginnings (intentions) and ends (revelations) 
and by finding meaning in these inventions. For Kermode, this ―humanisation‖ of time 
also relates to the ―special kind of middle‖ of tick-tock:  
 
We can perceive  a duration only  when it is  organised. . . . The fact that  we  call  the 
second of the two related sounds tock is evidence that we use fictions to enable the end 
to confer organisation and form on the temporal structure. The interval between the two 
sounds, between tick and tock is now charged with significant duration. The clock‘s tick-
tock I take to be a model of what we call a plot, an organisation that humanises time by 
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giving  it  form;  and  the  interval  between  tock  and  tick  represents  purely  successive, 
disorganised time of the sort that we need to humanise.
29 
 
Thus, plotting is a humanising of time by human choice and action, and all plotting in 
fiction is interdependent with character. And human beings plot stories for themselves 
and for their fictional stories; but it is the plotting of the former  which provides the 
template for the latter. 
  But a second implication of the interdependence of character and story is that 
this relationship is also essential for the individualisation of fictional characters and for 
the individual freedom of characters. This is evident if we consider how the concept of 
the freedom of a character conflicts with Aristotle‘s claim that, in a story, character is 
added after action:  
 
In  literature,  or  at  least  in  literature  as  understood  by  Aristotle,  the  poet  begins  with 
action. Action involves agents, and the key traits of the agents are determined before 
―character‖ is added. For example, the most essential trait of Macbeth is determined by 
the fact that he murders Duncan. He can approach the murder timidly; he can be eager to 
perform  it;  he  can  be  merciful;  or  he  can  sadistically  prolong  his  victim‘s  agonies. 
Regardless of the chosen alternative, he must be capable of committing murder, and the 
murder is determined by the action.
30 
 
Macbeth has the freedom to choose how he will murder Duncan; however, he is not 
―free‖  to  choose  whether  or  not  he  will  murder  Duncan.  What  Macbeth  does  is 
determined before he chooses how he will do it. And, so, he is not ―existentially‖ free 
and, as a fictional character, is not an accurate representation of how we choose in 
reality. This may seem to be an unnecessary distinction to make, but it must be said 
that if characters are to be considered to be realistic, and of value to the  shivering 
reader, then their actions must not be ―predetermined‖ in any way; they must have the 
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semblance of freedom, which is to say that they must appear to be free to choose what 
actions they will take. The semblance of freedom is essential for a character to be 
considered as a realistic equal—as being verisimilar to a human being. This is the 
value of the realist novel to the shivering reader: the reader‘s life is not predetermined, 
and is thus cause for the reader‘s anxiety towards the question of the meaning he or 
she will choose; to allay this anxiety, the reader looks to characters who are faced with 
a  similar  situation—whose  destinies  are  not  predetermined  and  whose  choices  are 
made with the same vertiginous anxiety as the reader. Warmth is drawn only from 
those characters that face the same anxiety from their condemnation to choose as the 
shivering reader.  
   
Events as Actions and Happenings 
 
However, as was intimated above, one of the most significant and (for the shivering 
reader) the most important justification for maintaining the interdependence of story 
and character can be made on a functional level. This is evidenced when we contrast 
the similarities of the functional events of our personal narratives with those in fiction. 
To understand the nature of these functions we will begin with Chatman‘s description of 
the two types of functional events of a narrative:  
 
Events are either actions (acts) or happenings. Both are changes of state. An action is a 
change of state brought about by an agent or one that affects a patient. If the action is 
plot-significant,  the  agent  or  patient  is  called  a  character.  Thus  the  character  is 
narrative—though not necessarily grammatical—subject of the narrative predicate. . . . 
  A happening entails a predication of which the character or other focused existent is 
narrative object: for example, The storm cast Peter adrift. . . . Thus in ―Peter tried to pull 
down the sails, but felt the mast give way and the boat caught up by an enormous wave,‖ Implicit Interpretation and Evaluation 
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Peter is the subject of a series of actions at the surface, manifestational level. At the 
deeper story level he is narrative object, the affected not the effector.
31 
 
As Chatman‘s example illustrates, if the event is a happening, then a character makes 
choices only on a superficial level: Peter makes superficial choices, but, in reality, his 
choices and his actions are determined by an exterior force—the storm—such that on a 
deeper level Peter is an object being acted upon.
32 But it can be argued that the storm 
is merely a ―limiting factor‖ to his possibilities, similar to that of one‘s existential facticity. 
Peter cannot choose to not be in the storm, as much as he cannot choose not to be 
born male, or choose not to be thrown into existence. He can only choose how he will 
act in the storm, as he would choose to ―act‖ as a male. What this suggests is that 
happenings, choices, and actions are interdependent with our meaningful projects. And 
yet  happenings,  like  the  limiting  factors  of  facticity—like  the  happening  that  is  our 
―thrownness‖ into the world—do not give us meaning or even create meaning: it is our 
choices,  our  responses  to  happenings  (such  as  our  facticity  or  thrownness),  which 
create meaning.   
  This is best illustrated by another example from Melville‘s Moby-Dick. Ishmael 
has ―taken to the ship‖—the Pequod—on a whaling voyage as a ―substitute for pistol 
and ball‖—a choice against  suicide. His choice to take to the ship is a meaningful 
project  against  meaninglessness.  Of  course,  unbeknownst  to  Ishmael  and  the 
Pequod’s crew, Captain Ahab‘s intention for them is not merely to hunt whales for oil, 
but to hunt and kill one particular whale—Moby Dick. It is not a hunt for oil, but for 
Ahab‘s  vengeance.  Only  when  the  Pequod  has  set  sail  does  Ahab  announce  his 
monomaniacal project:  
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―. . . this is what ye have shipped for, men! to chase that white whale on both sides of 
land, and over all sides of earth, till he spouts black blood and rolls fin out. What say ye, 
men, will ye splice hands on it, now? I think ye do look brave.‖  
  ―Aye, aye!‖ shouted the harpooners and seamen, running closer to the excited old 
man: ―A sharp eye for the White Whale; a sharp lance for Moby Dick!‖
33 
 
All  the  crew  agree  to  pursue  the  whale  with  Ahab  such  is  his  ―irresistible 
dictatorship,‖
34—all except the chief mate, Mr Starbuck, who plainly states to Ahab: ―I 
came here to hunt whales, not my commander‘s vengeance.‖
35 But it is the initially 
acquiescent  Ishmael  who  also  finds  himself  increasingly  disconcerted  with  the 
situation: 
 
Such a crew, so officered, seemed specially picked and packed by some infernal fatality 
to help him to his monomaniac revenge. How it was that they so aboundingly responded 
to the old man‘s ire—by what evil magic their souls were possessed, that at times his 
hate seemed almost theirs; the White Whale as much their insufferable foe as his; how all 
this  came  to  be—what  the  White  Whale  was  to  them,  or  how  to  their  unconscious 
understandings, also, in some dim, unsuspected way, he might have seemed the gliding 
great demon of the seas of life,—all this to explain, would be to dive deeper than Ishmael 
can go. The subterranean miner that works in us all, how can one tell whither leads his 
shaft by the ever shifting, muffled sound of his pick? Who does not feel the irresistible 
arm drag? What skiff in tow of a seventy-four can stand still? For one, I gave myself up to 
the  abandonment  of  the  time  and  the  place;  but  while  yet  all  arush  to  encounter  the 
whale, could see naught in the brute but the deadliest ill.
36 
 
In crude terms, Ahab is to Ishmael, what the storm is to Peter: Ishmael and Peter are 
both equally free to act in the face of the happenings—the effectors—of Ahab and the 
storm, respectively. But where Peter‘s choices are seemingly determined, Ishmael‘s 
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choices seem less determined, as, despite the overwhelming force of direction of Ahab 
and  his  loyal  crew,  Ishmael  can  make  choices  such  as  choosing  to  lead  a  mutiny 
against  Ahab,  or  choosing  to  leave  the  Pequod  as  it  encounters  some  eight  other 
whaling ships on its hunt for Moby Dick. These possibilities may not be characteristic of 
Ishmael‘s  past  actions  as  he  does  not  have  the  tendencies  of  being  a  traitor  or  a 
deserter (as is understood by the reader‘s limited knowledge of Ishmael‘s past), but 
Ishmael, like Peter, still remains a free individual and is free to choose how he is to act 
in the face of this happening. Thus, Ahab does not determine Ishmael‘s actions, in the 
same way that the storm determines Peter‘s perfunctory actions. In a sense, Ahab‘s 
project is a happening to Ishmael, but Ishmael must choose to accept or deny the 
happening. The external happening causes internal choice and action.  
  But  what  of  sudden  happenings,  sudden  contingencies,  where  no  choice 
appears to be possible. To answer this question we must consider that death is the 
only  happening  where  no  choice  is  possible—it  is  the  possibility  which  ends  all 
possibilities. Death is a dispossession of our life and a dispossession of our freedom to 
choose, and so our created stories must end. Similarly, if a fictional character dies—
death ―happens‖ to a character—then the events and actions that follow must, if the 
story is to continue, become those of another character, a character that lives on. The 
story must necessarily shift its focus to the actions of other characters. Indeed, when 
Anna  Karenina  dies,  story-time—―the  duration  of  the  purported  events  of  the 
narrative‖
37—continues and the action shifts to the choices and actions of Konstantin 
Levin. It is his story which moves the novel‘s story.  
  And yet it can be argued that the sudden death of a central character—the true 
protagonist—is often handled in such a way that its suddenness is not really sudden at 
all, but an ending befitting of the character‘s actions and the reader‘s expectations. 
Indeed,  endings  are  expected  by  the  reader  of  fiction,  and  a  ―proper‖  ending  is 
expected for the novel and for its protagonist. Consider, for example, the scene from 
                                                 
37 Chatman, Story and Discourse, 62. Implicit Interpretation and Evaluation 
  137 
Conrad‘s Heart of Darkness, when, by the order of Kurtz, Marlow‘s ship is attacked. As 
Marlow describes:  
 
  ―I was looking down at the sounding-pole, and feeling much annoyed to see at each 
try a little more of it stick out of that river, when I saw my poleman give up the business 
suddenly, and stretch himself flat on the deck, without even taking the trouble to haul his 
pole  in.  He  kept  hold  on  it  though,  and  it  trailed  in  the  water.  At  the  same  time  the 
fireman,  whom I could also see  below me, sat  down abruptly  before his furnace and 
ducked his head. I was amazed. Then I had to look at the river mighty quick, because 
there was a snag in the fairway. Sticks, little sticks, were flying about—thick: they were 
whizzing before my nose, dropping below me, striking behind me against my pilot-house. 
All this time the river, the shore, the woods, were very quiet—perfectly quiet. I could only 
hear the heavy splashing thump of the stern-wheel and the patter of these things. We 
cleared the snag clumsily. Arrows, by Jove! We were being shot at!‖
38 
 
Arrows are suddenly being fired, and Marlow, the narrator is not killed, but a shipmate—
the  fireman—is.  Of  course,  Marlow,  the  major,  central  character  and  narrator  must 
survive as there would be no story to tell; however, even if the story were narrated in 
the third-person, it could be argued that the reader‘s expectations of the meeting of 
Marlow and Kurtz (what is essentially the tock of tick-tock)—an expectation created by 
the preceding discourse (tick)—would be frustrated. It would not make for a ―good‖ 
story, or a ―structurally‖ sound story, which is expected by the reader of realist fiction. 
The reader‘s expectations would be similarly frustrated if Ahab were accidentally killed 
before the Pequod’s ―climactic‖ encounter with Moby Dick. As was intimated above, 
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these expectations of the reader may differ for the reader of modern and postmodern 
fictions, but for the realist novel reader the expectation and desire is of a satisfactory 
closure, which does not frustrate the mode of intention and revelation, or the structure 
of tick-tock. Thus, the only real possible happening is death, but it is a happening that 
occurs  at  an  appropriate  time,  at  the  end  of  a  character‘s  completed  story.  This 
structure, it can be argued, is not dissimilar to our own personal narratives insofar as 
we cannot predict our futures, but we do invent and expect a certain future. We could 
argue that no one necessarily expects, or can expect, a sudden death: we expect that 
death  and  closure  will  occur  at  the  appropriate  time  just  as  the  plot  of  tick-tock  is 
expected in realist fiction. Indeed, as will be discussed below, modern and postmodern 
fiction  often  foregrounds  the  ―reality‖  of  the  absurdity  of  such  human  expectations; 
however,  this  does  not  dismiss  our  ―real‖  desire  to  invent  and  expect  appropriate 
endings. 
 
From these descriptions of actions and happenings, we can begin to examine in much 
closer detail the specifically existential functional events of our personal narratives and 
fictional characters‘ personal narratives, utilising the language used to describe fictional 
narratives, which, as I have argued, imitates our personal narratives. This examination 
will be the objective of the following three chapters, each of which will correspond to 
three basic ―narrative blocks,‖
39—the beginning, the middle, and an end, respectively—
a structure derived from Aristotle‘s Poetics. This basic skeleton will be extended by 
drawing upon a variety of narrative terminologies, particularly those of Kermode and 
Chatman (whom we have already discussed). Based on this framework we will see 
how these narrative blocks correspond to the events of our personal narratives, and to 
the personal narratives of the characters of fiction, from which the  shivering reader 
interprets and evaluates the meaning of the fictional Other‘s lives. We will also see how 
these events are not only functional but thematic, insofar as they are permeated by 
existential  themes  such  as  in/authenticity,  finitude,  anxiety,  freedom  of  choice, Implicit Interpretation and Evaluation 
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absurdity,  and  the  predominance  of  the  Other.  Finally,  we  will  see  how  it  is  not 
necessarily  the  reader  who  interprets  the  dead  life  of  a  character  by  actively 
reconstructing  the  character‘s  past,  but  the  novelist  who  actively  creates  the 
character‘s  ―interpretable‖  past,  from  which  the  reader  ―passively‖  interprets  and 
evaluates. This is to say that the rhetoric of the novel tells the reader which events are 
necessary for creating the meaning of a character‘s life. 
                                                                                                                                           
39 See Chatman, Story and Discourse, 55. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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4 
Beginnings in Personal Narratives 
and Fiction 
 
A beginning is that which is not itself necessarily after anything else, and which 
naturally has something else after it. 
                        —Aristotle, Poetics 
 
 
n his preface to Beginnings, Edward W. Said asks: 
 
What  is  a  beginning?  What  must  one  do  in  order  to  begin?  What  is  special  about 
beginning as an activity or a moment or a place? Can one begin whenever one pleases? 
What kind of attitude, or frame of mind is necessary for beginning? Historically, is there 
one  sort  of  moment  most  propitious  for  beginning,  one  sort  of  individual  for  whom 
beginning is the most important of activities? For the work of literature, how important is 
the beginning? Are such questions about beginning worth raising? And if so, can they be 
treated or answered concretely, intelligibly, informatively?
1 
 
Said  asks  these  questions  of  both  our  understanding  of  our  own  lives—our  own 
beginnings—and  of  the  nature  of  beginnings  in  literature.  Similarly,  we  can  ask 
questions of what a beginning is in our meaningful, personal narratives, but, also, if we 
are to look to fiction to understand our personal narratives then we may ask what a 
beginning is in fiction. We may also ask what the importance of beginnings in fiction is 
for  the  interpretation  and  evaluation  of  the  fictional  Other‘s  personal  narratives, 
I Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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specifically in terms of both the beginnings of the personal narratives of the characters, 
and discursive beginnings—where the story of the character is ―taken up.‖ And we can 
ask questions of the rhetoric of these beginnings: what is the novelist telling us when 
he or she chooses a particular beginning?  
   
Aristotle and the Tragic Plot   
 
To begin to answer these questions, we can look to Aristotle‘s description of the tragic 
plot in Poetics. Aristotle describes the beginning and ending of the tragic plot as the 
first and last ―incidents‖ of the plot, respectively:  
 
By a ―beginning‖ I mean that which is itself not, by necessity, after anything else but after 
which something naturally is or develops. By an ―end‖ I mean exactly the opposite: that 
which is naturally after something else, either necessarily or customarily, but after which 
there is nothing else. By a ―middle‖ I mean that which is itself after something else and 
which has something else after it.
2  
 
This definition does not suggest that a plot has any specific beginning or ending, only 
that a plot is chronologically ordered. As O. B. Hardison, Jr., states in his exegesis of 
Poetics,  it  is  because  of  this  extremely  abstract  description  that  a  variety  of 
interpretations  have  been  made  to  explain  the  types  of  incidents  that  relate  to  the 
beginning and ending of a plot. One such example is that of Christian religious drama 
which took the beginning of a plot to be the beginning of time and the ending as the 
destruction  of  the  world.  But  as  Hardison  states,  ―more  self-conscious  drama  often 
solves  the  problem  of  beginning  and  ending  by  the  human  life  span,  or  by  social 
convention.  Birth  and  death  are  obvious  and  natural  points  for  the  beginning  and 
                                                                                                                                           
1 Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method, xi.  
2 Aristotle, Poetics, VII. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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ending of a narrative.‖
3 However, this ―cradle-to-grave‖ form of biographical narration 
was not preferable for Aristotle who complained that it produced a ―false kind of unity‖
4 
as ―for in some of the many and infinitely varied things that happen to any one person, 
there is no unity. Thus, we must assert, there are many actions in the life of a single 
person from which no over-all unity of action emerges.‖
5 Aristotle adds that between 
some events in an individual‘s life there is ―no necessary or probable relation.‖
6 Thus, 
for Aristotle, the dramatist should omit from the narration of a character‘s story his or 
her inauthentic, everyday activities, such as the daily routine of tasks and duties, as 
they bear no relation to the greater action  of the plot or to the character‘s actions. 
Indeed,  Leopold  Bloom‘s  detailed  excursion  to  the  ―cuckstool‖  in  James  Joyce‘s 
Ulysses (1922) would, in all likelihood, be omitted from the Aristotelian plot, as would 
Mrs. Ramsay‘s task of knitting a brown stocking for the lighthouse-keeper‘s son, in 
Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse. Moreover, Aristotle claims that the dramatist should omit a 
character‘s birth and death if they similarly bear no relation to the action. However, as 
has been described above, for our own personal narratives, the concepts of ―unity‖ and 
―wholeness‖ are very much an existential necessity, and constitute the special kind of 
existence of human beings. Indeed, for Heidegger the existence of Dasein is marked 
by  the  wholeness  that  death  brings,  unifying  birth  and  death,  and  one‘s  existence. 
Moreover, if meaningfulness is said to come from one‘s whole life, not just one action 
or the last action (such as redemption of meaninglessness by suicide), then wholeness 
and unity are necessary for meaningfulness. As such, the humble biological event of 
our birth can be identified as the beginning of our personal narratives. Moreover, it can 
be seen as our proper ―ontological‖ beginning insofar as it marks the beginning of our 
thrownness into existence. 
 
                                                 
3 Hardison, Aristotle’s Poetics, 139. 
4 Ibid., 140. 
5 Aristotle, Poetics, VIII. 
6 Ibid. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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The Existential Beginning 
 
However,  for  our  individual  personal  narratives  we  can  also  identify  a  ―second‖ 
beginning—a  specifically  ―existential‖  beginning—of  our  personal  narratives,  which 
follows the initial beginning of our birth and can be said to begin our personal narratives 
proper.  This  beginning—this  meaningful,  self-determined  future—is  essentially  the 
choice of our intentional, meaningful projects and also the beginning of the creation of 
the  meaning  of  these  projects.  To  again  use  Kermode‘s  analogy,  this  existential 
beginning is the tick that creates the anxious expectation of tock; it is the intention of a 
meaningful project of which the definitive meaning will be revealed in our future death. 
  But the designation of the humble-sounding tick to the meaningful choice of our 
existential beginning does not really reflect the significance of the existential beginning, 
nor does it reflect why there is a need to make such a significant choice in the first 
place. And, indeed, the making of the choice of a meaningful project is significant as it 
is marked by a significant change in the way we see ourselves and the way we view 
both our past and future selves. This change takes place before the need to choose 
which is to say that the actual making of the choice comes about only after the change. 
The moment of change can be described as a ―decisive moment‖ in one‘s life, or, to use 
the German word, the change can be described an Augenblick, which is translated as 
the ―blink‖ or ―twinkling of an eye,‖ or simply ―moment.‖ In her book on the concept of 
the Augenblick, Koral Ward suggests that:  
 
In its most basic interpretation the Augenblick describes an experience of a fleeting but 
momentous event, an occurrence usually accompanied by an altered perception of time, 
either as condensed and swiftly passing or slow and drawn out. At its extreme, we might 
experience something like an arresting of time itself; an experience seems to stand out 
from time, though in actuality time moves on taking these moments with it. This itself is 
necessary to the moment: that it must pass.
7 
                                                 
7 Ward, Augenblick, xi. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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For Heidegger, the Augenblick is also a ―moment of vision,‖ a ―decisive moment,‖ which 
is  
 
more  than  an  experience  of  a  sudden  event,  the  moment  holds  a  change  more  far 
reaching than the next ―now‖ moment of time, rather a radical turnabout from one ―world‖ 
or view to another becomes possible.
8  
 
The existential beginning is indeed a moment of vision and a decisive moment insofar 
as it is the moment in which we begin to see ourselves and our lives from  a new 
vantage point—a new perspective. This is also very similar to Aristotle‘s definition of 
anagnorisis which is translated as ―recognition‖ or sometimes ―discovery‖
9 and which is 
the middle incident in a complex tragic plot. Put simply, a recognition is a ―change‖ in a 
character ―from ignorance to knowledge.‖
10   
  The Augenblick, as a moment of recognition, is the first ―step‖ of our existential 
beginnings—a step which can be understood in a number of ways. The first is that it is 
the recognition that we are indeed ―abandoned by God‖ and that there is no meaning to 
life in a world where ―God is dead.‖ Because of the recognition of our abandonment, we 
may  also  ―recognise‖  our  anxiety  stemming  from  our  confrontation  with  the  blank 
mystery of existence. We anxiously recognise that there is no answer to the question of 
the meaning of life. However, more positively, it is also the recognition of our freedom 
to create the subjective meaning of our lives, such that the first step of our existential 
beginning  is  very  much  a  Nietzschean  ―heroic‖  beginning,  described  in  the 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 103. 
9 Hardison, Aristotle’s Poetics, n165. 
10 Ibid., 168. Hardison further suggests that recognition can be interpreted in a number of ways 
but denies that ―self-knowledge‖ is a form of recognition. However, Hardison also claims that, 
―theoretically,‖ self-knowledge, as a form of change from ignorance to knowledge, could be a 
form of recognition, though not in Aristotle‘s definition of a complex plot: ―If ‗self-knowledge‘ or 
‗perception‘ were the only requirement, a recognition scene could form the final incident in a 
simple plot. But . . . the presence of a recognition scene makes a plot, by definition, complex. 
This is only possible if the recognition occurs in the ‗middle‘ section of the play as the result of 
one sequence of incidents and is followed by at least one other incident defining a new 
sequence. After the recognition, the plot must ‗veer off in a new direction.‘‖ Hardison, Aristotle’s 
Poetics, 169. This understanding of recognition will also be discussed in the following chapter. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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―Introduction‖ above. This is to say that our personal narratives begin when we each 
begin to view ourselves as heroes and see that we are free to create our own individual 
meaning.  Accompanying  this  is  the  recognition  that  only  we,  ourselves,  are 
―concerned‖ for the meaning of our own life; that our individual life‘s meaning is of 
concern as it specifically relates to us individually. This form of recognition is significant 
particularly in terms of  the relation between Heidegger‘s descriptions of  authenticity 
and  the  ―they.‖  Put  simply,  we  existentially  ―begin‖  when  we  authentically  wrench 
ourselves from the inauthenticity of the ―they.‖ In saying this, what must be noted is 
that, unlike the inauthenticity of Dasein’s attitude towards death (discussed in chapter 
two above), here we are talking about the ―inauthenticity of choice.‖ John Macquarrie 
proffers a general summary of the relationship between authenticity and choice: 
 
Existence is authentic to the extent that the existent has taken possession of himself and, 
shall we say, has moulded himself in his own image. Inauthentic existence, on the other 
hand, is moulded by external influences, whether these be circumstances, moral codes, 
political or ecclesiastical authorities, or whatever.
11  
 
What  Macquarrie‘s  description  suggests  is  that  we  are  inauthentic  when  we  are 
―moulded by the ‗they,‘‖ and moulded by their interpretations of the self and the world; 
we are inauthentic when we allow the ―they‖ to influence or sway our decision-making. 
Contrastingly, Heidegger states that we are authentic when the ―conscience summons 
Dasein‘s Self from its lostness in the ‗they.‘‖
12 Heidegger adds: 
 
The Self of everyday Dasein  is the  they-self,  which we distinguish from the authentic 
Self—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As they-self, the 
particular Dasein has been dispersed into the ―they,‖ and must first find itself.
13  
 
                                                 
11 Macquarrie, Existentialism, 206. 
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, 274H. 
13 Ibid., 129H. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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Thus, we can say that the first step of the beginning of our personal narrative is also 
our individual conscience summoning us from our inauthenticity to authenticity, such 
that  we  determine  our  own  individual  possibilities  of  meaning  and  not  the  ―they‘s‖ 
determination. Put this way, we find that our authentic summoning of the conscience is 
somewhat similar to Nietzsche‘s claim that we need to remove our selves from the 
foreground of our lives and see ourselves from a distance. In terms of the creation of 
the meaning of our lives, the ―foreground‖ is our state of inauthenticity from which we 
need to summon ourselves, see the bigger picture, and authentically see the heroes 
that we must become. This change is very much reflective of the culmination of our 
formative years where, as an adult, we begin to make own meaningful choices. But 
there is also a change in our agency; a change which can be further explained if we 
again look at Chatman‘s description of actions and happenings. In his example of Peter 
being caught in a storm, Chatman describes how the storm happens to Peter such that 
Peter is the affected not the effector. The storm is an external force affecting Peter as if 
he were merely an object. As I have argued, Peter is still free to choose how he will act 
in the face of the storm, even if it seems that he is not free. A similar situation can be 
said of our formative years as we lack a certain sense of individual freedom because of 
the predominance of the Other (such as our parents). As such, we are the affected and 
it is the Other that is the effector. Like Peter, we are free but we do not necessarily act 
freely. In adulthood, however, we become the effectors. This change in agency of the 
child, and the nature of ―choice,‖ is also discussed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. Aristotle claims that children do not make choices at all, let alone a choice with 
the weight of an existential choice: ―For both children and the lower animals share in 
voluntary  action,  but  not  in  choice,  and  acts  done  on  the  spur  of  the  moment  we 
describe  as  voluntary, but  not  as  chosen.‖
14  For  Aristotle,  children‘s  characters  are 
―only  just  forming  and  their  deliberations  are  usually,  or  often,  not  their  own,  but 
somebody  else‘s.  As  they  grow  up,  so,  more  and  more,  they  make  choices  for 
                                                 
14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. III, ch. 2. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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themselves—true choices.‖
15 Thus, in Aristotle‘s terms, an existential beginning is the 
adult‘s making of a true choice: the ―true‖ beginning of our personal narratives is the 
shift from being merely the central character of our lives to its true, Nietzschean hero, 
where we choose our meaningful personal narratives with a new-found sense of adult, 
existential freedom. This, I believe, answers another of the questions posed by Said on 
the problem of describing what a ―beginning‖ is: ―Is the beginning of a given work its 
real beginning, or is there some other, secret point that more authentically starts the 
work off?‖
16 I would argue that the real beginning of our stories is an ―adult‖ existential 
beginning, and an ―authentic‖ beginning in both senses of the word.  
  From this description we can thus summarise the first step of our ―existential‖ 
beginning as an authentic, anxious realisation of our freedom to choose and create our 
meaningful personal narratives. The second step, however, is the making of the choice 
of our meaningful projects—the tick of our personal narrative—and the recognition of 
the  range  of  choices.  A  description  of  the  nature  of  choice  can  be  derived  from 
Chatman‘s description of a kernel event of a narrative, which he states is one of two 
hierarchal types of narrative event, the other being a satellite event:  
 
Kernels are narrative moments that give rise to cruxes in the direction taken by events. 
They are nodes or hinges in the structure, branching points which force a movement into 
one of two (or more) possible paths. Achilles can give up his girl or refuse; Huck Finn can 
remain at home or set off down the river; Lambert Strether can advise Chad to remain in 
Paris or to return; Miss Emily can pay the taxes or send the collector packing; and so on. 
Kernels cannot be deleted without destroying the narrative logic. In the classical narrative 
text, proper interpretation of events at any given point is a function of the ability to follow 
these ongoing selections, to see later kernels as consequences of earlier. 
  A minor plot event—a satellite—is not crucial in this sense. It can be deleted without 
disturbing  the  logic  of  the  plot,  though  its  omission  will,  of  course,  impoverish  the 
narrative aesthetically. Satellites entail no choice, but are solely the workings-out of the 
                                                 
15 Warnock, ―The Nature of Choice,‖ 224.  
16 Said, Beginnings, 3. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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choices made at the kernels. They necessarily imply the existence of kernels, but not 
vice-versa. Their function is that of filling in, elaborating, completing the kernel; they form 
the flesh on the skeleton.
17 
 
Although Chatman does not say that kernel events are choices, his examples indicate 
that a crux in a story is an event which is determined by choice. Therefore, we can say 
that  kernel  events  encompass  the  range  of  movements  and  possible  paths—our 
choices and projects—of our personal narratives. They are the major choices of our 
personal narratives and are essential to the narrative structure. In contrast, Chatman 
argues that satellite events are not crucial to the narrative structure, and involve no 
choice—they are the workings out of the choices of the kernels. However, as  was 
argued in the previous chapter, our choices essentially constitute all the events of our 
personal  narratives;  therefore,  the  argument  could  be  made  that  both  kernels  and 
satellites are choices: the kernel events represent major choices for major projects, 
whereas satellite events represent minor choices for minor projects which are essential 
for the ―workings-out‖ of the major projects.   
  Of course, our existential beginnings are not defined by the possibility that we 
see that we are free to choose, and that we see that there are choices, but that we do 
choose and, most importantly, do begin to act upon our intended choices—the third 
step of our existential beginnings. Indeed, choice without action is essentially empty 
and  meaningless  as  it  does  not  ―begin‖  the  creation  of  meaning—it  is  merely  a 
possibility which fades just as quickly as the utterance of our choice ceases to echo. 
Indeed, the act of creating meaning can also be described as the ―movement‖ that 
follows our intended choices. As Said describes:  
                                                 
17 Chatman, Story and Discourse, 53–54. This description is of course very similar to Roland 
Barthes‘ earlier description of cardinal functions (kernels) and catalysts (satellites). Barthes uses 
the example of a telephone ringing to explain: ―It is equally possible to answer or not answer, 
two acts which will unfailingly carry the narrative along different paths. Between two cardinal 
functions however, it is always possible to set out subsidiary notations which cluster around one 
or other nucleus without modifying its alternative nature: the space separating the telephone 
rang from Bond answered can be saturated with a host of trivial incidents or descriptions—Bond 
moved towards the desk, picked up one of the receivers, put down his cigarette, etc. These 
catalysers are still functional, insofar as they enter into correlation with a nucleus, but their Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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To identify a beginning—particularly that of a historical movement or a realm of thought—
with an individual is of course an act of historical understanding. More than that, however, 
it is what may be called an intentional act—that is, an act in which designating individual 
X  as  founder  of  continuity  Y  (a  movement,  say)  implies  that  X  has  value  in  having 
intended Y.
18 
 
To use Said‘s terms, an individual or, indeed, a character in a novel has ―value‖—he or 
she has a meaningful life—only insofar as they intend their project and act in such a 
way that the project ―moves‖  and becomes realised.  Moreover, only  when this first 
kernel  event  is ―settled‖  can the  beginning  come to  an  ―end‖  and  the  creation  and 
shaping of the meaning—―the middle‖—of our stories begin.  
  From this description we can draw a basic functional model of the beginnings of 
our  personal  narratives,  illustrated  in  figure  1,  below.  The  horizontal  line  is  a 
chronological  time-line  of  our  existence,  moving  left  to  right  from  the  vertical  line 
representing the boundary of our birth (B), to the vertical line representing the boundary 
of death (D). The dashed vertical line (E) is a pseudo-boundary representing the kernel 
event  of  our  lives—the  existential  beginning  of  our  personal  narratives  (the  less 
essential  satellite  events  have  been  omitted). The  oblique  lines  stemming from  the 
horizontal  line  at  E  represent  several  possible  choices  which  are  not  chosen.  The 
horizontal line is the chosen choice. 
 
           B                           E                                                                  D 
Figure  1:  Basic  personal  narrative  picture.  This  figure  has  been  adapted  from  Chatman‘s 
narrative diagram in Story and Discourse, 54. 
                                                                                                                                           
functionality is attenuated, unilateral, parasitic.‖ Barthes, ―Introduction to the Structural Analysis 
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Beginnings and Fiction  
 
From this summary of the beginnings of our own personal narratives, we can now 
turn to the beginnings of fictional characters. In doing so it becomes immediately 
apparent that there is a significant disparity between the world of fiction and the 
world of reality: unlike our own individual personal narratives, a character in a novel 
can be shown to have three beginnings: a biological beginning, or the event of the 
character‘s  birth  (B);  an  existential  beginning,  where  the  heroic  beginning  of  a 
character  is  represented  within  the  story  of  the  novel‘s  discourse  (E);  and  a 
discursive  beginning  (a),  where  the  narration  of  a  character‘s  story  begins—the 
moment in time, which, for most realist fiction, is essentially when the linear NOW-
story  (the  story  that  begins  at the  story-NOW—the moment the  action  began  to 
transpire) is taken-up by the narrator. These three beginnings provide for at least 
three broad narrative combinations: the first is that the NOW-story begins before an 
identifiable  existential  beginning;  the  second  combination  is  that  the  NOW-story 
begins at the character‘s existential beginning; and the third combination is that the 
NOW-story begins after the character‘s first existential beginning, and often focuses 
on  a  second  (or  third  etc.)  existential  beginning.  We  will  examine  a  number  of 
examples which exemplify these combinations, but in doing so we will also consider 
the broad historical trends of these combinations, the rhetoric of these beginnings, 
and how these beginnings influence the interpretation and evaluation of a character. 
Moreover, we will examine the various ways in which the characters are introduced 
into the text and how, when, and by whom the characters are named. As will be 
illustrated in several of the examples below, the process of naming a character (be it 
by an autobiographical narrator or a third-person narrator) has a significant effect on 
how the character is evaluated.   
                                                                                                                                           
18 Said, Beginnings, 32. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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1. Biological and Discursive Beginnings 
 
Although  Aristotle  did  not  prefer  the  events  of  birth  and  death  as  the  respective 
beginnings and endings of a narrative,  it was very much a convention of the early 
realist novelists who modelled the novel form on the autobiographical memoir such that 
the  character‘s  biological  beginning  (B)  or,  more  specifically,  the  character‘s  early, 
―formative years‖ coincided with the novel‘s discursive beginning (a)—the beginning of 
the story-NOW—or the moment when the autobiographical narrator begins to recount 
his or her preterite story after the ―darkness‖ of birth (illustrated in figure 2 below where 
the discursive beginning (a) is the bold-set vertical line).  
 
 
      a and B                     E              
 
Figure 2: Coinciding of character‘s biological beginning and beginning of novel‘s story. 
 
The coinciding of a character‘s biological beginning with the discursive beginning of the 
story provides a simple and pragmatic start for both the autobiographical narrator and 
the  novelist  behind  the  fictional  narrator:  it  gives  the  narrator  a  firm  boundary,  a 
cornerstone,  from  which  he  or  she  can  tell  their  story;  similarly,  for  novelists,  a 
biological beginning serves the dual purpose of bringing their characters into existence 
as discourse (a pragmatic time to start the character‘s story), and existence as ―real‖ 
human beings.  Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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  What is more, by beginning the story of a novel with a character‘s biological 
beginning,  it  enables  the  novelist  to  detail  the  formative  years  of  the  character‘s 
existence—his or her childhood—which is often considered to be the most important 
period  of  a  ―real‖  autobiographer‘s  life.  It  shows  the  evolution  of  a  character  from 
childhood to adulthood. This beginning is essentially the more encompassing focus of 
the Bildungsroman—variously described as the ―novel of formation,‖ ―of initiation,‖ ―of 
education.‖
19  In  The  Way  of  the  World,  Franco  Moretti  describes  how  the 
Bildungsroman  centres  on  the  movement  away  from  youth  to  maturity  and  to  the 
formation of the ego.
20 It is also symbolic of the essence and meaning of life in the 
modern world: 
 
Youth,  or  rather  the  European  novel‘s  numerous  versions  of  youth,  becomes  for  our 
modern culture the age which holds the ―meaning of life‖ . . . . 
  . . .  Youth is, so to speak, modernity‘s ―essence,‖ the sign of a world that seeks its 
meaning in the future rather than in the past.
21 
 
From  this  description  we  can  thus  understand  ―youth‖  as  the  beginning  of  self-
determination and the creation of meaning—a meaning which can be found only by 
looking  and  projecting  forwards.  The  inclusion  of  a  character‘s  formative  years  is 
especially  significant  if  we  consider  that  it  does  well  to  illuminate  the  character‘s 
existential beginning, the moment of change when the character begins to take hold of 
his  or  her  own  adult  life,  and  where  the  character  first  chooses  his  or  her  own 
meaningful project. In narrative terms, the existential beginning is the first proper kernel 
event  of  the  story  which  follows  the  discursive  and  biological  beginning  and  the 
character‘s formative years. 
                                                 
19 Moretti, The Way of the World, 15. 
20 Moretti describes how he believes that there are no Freudian interpretations of the novel and 
no solid Freudian analysis of youth. The reason for this is that ―the raison d’être of 
psychoanalysis lies in breaking up the psyche into its opposing ‗forces‘—whereas youth and the 
novel have the opposite task of fusing, or at least bringing together, the conflicting features of 
individual personality.‖ Moretti, The Way of the World, 10–11.  
21 Moretti, The Way of the World, 4–5. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
  153 
    
Jane Eyre 
 
The  story  of  Jane  in  Charlotte  Bronte‘s  Jane  Eyre  (1847)  exemplifies  this  first 
combination of beginnings. Jane is an orphan, having both her mother and father die of 
typhus  fever.  She  was  subsequently  taken  in  by  her  Aunt  Reed  whose  deceased 
husband was the brother of Jane‘s mother. Jane‘s childhood is spent initially at the 
Reeds‘ home of Gateshead, in which she is treated very cruelly by her inherited family, 
before, at the age of ten, being sent to the Lowood charity school, where Jane lives 
under the dominance of Mr. Brocklehurst. It is this event—her moving to Lowood—
which is the locus for the beginning of the narration of her autobiographical story—the 
beginning of the NOW-story. More specifically, the first four chapters (the first narrative 
block) of the discourse are concerned with only a few months of her life at Gateshead, 
and the following five chapters (the second narrative block) are concerned with her first 
few months at Lowood. It is because of this focus on her move to Lowood that we can 
interpret it as being a significant event in Jane‘s life. It can also be described as a 
kernel event insofar as it appears as a crux in her story and separates the two narrative 
blocks symbolised by the two places in which she has lived. However, what must be 
noted is that the event of Jane going to Lowood is an event that happens to Jane: she 
does not choose to go to Lowood—she is forced to go there by her Aunt Reed, and the 
then ten-year-old Jane has no say in the matter. Indeed, her being sent to Lowood may 
even be interpreted as not being a kernel event of her story as it is not an event where 
a choice is made by Jane—the character that ―moves‖ the story. This is to say that the 
events of her first ten years of life happen to Jane and her move to Lowood is almost 
indistinguishable from the ―mode‖ of existence—her affected existence—at Gateshead. 
Her move to Lowood is not a crux in her life but an undisturbed trajectory. And this 
trajectory remains undisturbed for the following eight years at Lowood, as is explicitly Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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indicated by Jane herself when, at the beginning of the tenth chapter, she tells the 
reader: 
 
Hitherto I have recorded in detail the events of my insignificant existence: to the first ten 
years of my life, I have given almost as many chapters. But this is not to be a regular 
autobiography:  I  am  only  bound  to  invoke  memory  where  I  know  her  responses  will 
possess some degree of interest; therefore I now pass a space of eight years almost in 
silence: a few lines only are necessary to keep up the links of connection.
22 
 
What we notice in this passage is that Jane explicitly acknowledges the insignificance 
and, it can be said, the meaninglessness of her first ten years at Gateshead, but also 
the meaninglessness of the following eight years she spends at Lowood. It can be 
inferred that Jane believes that this period at Lowood is of no interest to the reader but 
also  that  this  period  bears  little  significance  on  the  unfolding  of  her  story,  for 
understanding the meaning of her story, or, indeed, for evaluating the meaning of her 
life. In this combined period of eighteen years, Jane asks no questions of her life or its 
meaning, and her life appears to be very much an inauthentic existence. It is only when 
her teacher, Miss Temple, marries and decides to move on with her husband, that Jane 
has an awakening of sorts, and has what would appear to be an authentic, existential 
beginning: 
 
I walked about the chamber most of the time. I imagined myself only to be regretting my 
loss, and thinking how to repair it; but when my reflections were concluded, and I looked 
up and found that the afternoon was gone, and evening far advanced, another discovery 
dawned on me: namely, that in the interval I had undergone a transforming process; that 
my mind had put off all it had borrowed of Miss Temple—or rather that she had taken with 
her the serene atmosphere I had been breathing in her vicinity—and that now I was left in 
my natural element; and beginning to feel the stirring of old emotions. It did not seem as if 
a prop were withdrawn, but rather as if a motive were gone: it was not the power to be 
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tranquil which had failed me, but the reason for tranquillity was no more. My world had for 
some years been in Lowood: my experience had been of its rules and systems; now I 
remembered that the real world was wide, and that a varied field of hopes and fears, of 
sensations and excitements, awaited those who had courage to go forth into its expanse 
to seek real knowledge of life amidst its perils.
23 
 
Miss Temple can be said to have provided Jane with a safe ground beneath her feet—
a tranquilising everydayness—which (whilst not abject in any way) also suppressed 
any need for her to choose a life—a meaningful project—for herself. Miss Temple‘s 
leaving thrusts the eighteen-year-old Jane into the role of an adult. And as an adult she 
must choose for herself and must look towards a new future for herself: 
 
And now I felt that it was not enough: I tired of the routine of eight years in one afternoon. 
I desired liberty; for liberty I gasped; for liberty I uttered a prayer; it seemed scattered on 
the  wind  then  faintly  blowing.  I  abandoned  it  and  framed  a  humbler  supplication;  for 
change, stimulus: that petition, too, seemed swept off into vague space; ―Then,‖ I cried, 
half desperate, ―grant me at least a new servitude!‖
24  
 
Jane sees that her past is, in hindsight, meaningless—it is a meaningless chapter of 
her personal narrative, preceding its true existential beginning, as is evidenced by her 
―tiring‖  of  eights  years  in  one  afternoon.  For  the first time,  Jane  chooses  a  life for 
herself as a free adult: her formative years have ended and her new adult life begins. 
But what is also interesting is that when Jane chooses a meaning for herself, she also 
chooses a meaning within the confines of her facticity reflecting Moretti‘s description of 
the Bildungsroman as the novel of modern self-determination and individuality but also 
of  socialisation—the  cultural  tendency  towards  normality  and  to  adhere  to  social 
norms.
25 Indeed, Jane‘s facticity has thus far held her back—she is an orphan of low 
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socio-economic status, and, therefore, cannot aspire for much more. But, here, she 
chooses a meaning within her facticity. As Jane declares:  
 
―But Servitude! That must be matter of fact. Any one may serve: I have served here eight 
years; now all I want is to serve elsewhere. Can I not get so much of my own will? Is not 
the  thing  feasible?  Yes—yes—the  end  is  not  so  difficult;  if  I  had  only  a  brain  active 
enough to ferret out the means of attaining it.‖
26 
 
And so Jane chooses ―a new servitude.‖ She is still bound to serve, but at least it is a 
servitude of her own choice. More importantly for her meaningful story is that Jane 
does choose and does act, firstly with her advertising of her services as a teacher, and 
secondly by accepting the offer of the position of governess at Thornfield—the home of 
Mr. Rochester. And it is because of Jane‘s acceptance of this position that her life truly 
begins,  a  new  beginning  acknowledged  by  Jane  herself:  ―A  phase  of  my  life  was 
closing to-night, a new one opening to-morrow‖
27; and ―I mounted the vehicle which 
was to bear me to new duties and a new life in the unknown environs of Millcote.‖
28 
Jane recognises that her new beginning is to play a significant part in the shaping of 
her  life.  What  must  also  be  noted  is  that  Jane‘s  choice  of  a  new  servitude  as  a 
governess, instils her with a new sense of heroic freedom and individualism. Indeed, 
the freedom and individualism continues throughout her story as is evidenced when, in 
the novel‘s concluding chapter, she famously states: ―Reader, I married him.‖
29 Jane 
does not say that ―he married me,‖ or that ―we were married,‖ but that she married him. 
From this choice of words, Jane suggests that she chose to marry Rochester as a free 
individual, such that she is not his servant, and that she is, and has always been, free 
to  choose  what  will  become  of  her  life,  and  free  to  create  her  life‘s  meaning.  Her 
existential beginning is thus a beginning which influences the remainder of her life, 
creating a proper boundary to her personal narrative.  
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  The  story  of  Jane  Eyre  is  a  pertinent  example  of  an  existential  beginning; 
however, it is also a pertinent example in terms of the historical development of both 
the  novel  and  its  characters,  as  it  both  connects  and  separates  itself  from  the 
picaresque novels and the early realist novels from which it owes its lineage. More 
specifically, whilst sharing such formal similarities as autobiographical narration and 
similarities in character with these earlier novels, the character of Jane Eyre has a far 
more significant and identifiable existential beginning than earlier characters, and there 
is also a stronger sense of agency in her character. This claim can be best illustrated 
by contrasting the character of Jane Eyre with two earlier characters: Lázaro from the 
anonymous  picaresque  novel  Lazarillo  De  Tormes  (1554)  and  Moll  Flanders  from 
Defoe‘s Moll Flanders (1722). The three characters of these respective novels do share 
several commonalities such as having been orphaned at a very young age and having 
been  born  into  servitude;  however,  the  two  characters  of  the  earlier  novels  differ 
markedly from the character of Jane Eyre insofar as there is almost no change in the 
agency  of  the  earlier  characters,  and  there  is  almost  no  identifiable  existential 
beginning. 
 
Lázaro 
 
Lazarillo De Tormes provides the starkest contrast with Jane Eyre, specifically in terms 
of the agency of the two novels‘ respective characters and in terms of an identifiable 
existential beginning. Lazarillo is the autobiographical story of a young boy, Lázaro, 
who comes to live with, and be the servant of, various masters, to which each chapter 
of Lazarillo De Tormes is dedicated. Commonly, picaro characters lack the freedom to 
choose what their lives will be; as such the events of their lives, and the events of their 
discoursed stories, are happenings in which they are the patient. The  picaro is the 
affected, not the effector in his or her own story, just as Jane Eyre, for the first eighteen 
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years of her life, is the affected. And, like the story of Jane Eyre, the discourse and the 
NOW-story  of  Lazarillo  de  Tormes  begins  with  the  hero‘s  biological  beginning  and 
proceeds to detail the often horrific events of his story.  
  Lázaro begins his story with his recollections of the first significant event of his 
young life, when, at the age of eight years old, his mother allows a blind man to take 
Lázaro so that he may act as a servant and guide to his new master: 
   
Round about then a blind man came to stay at the inn. Now he thought I would be the 
right kind of lad to set his feet straight on the road, and so he asked my mother to let him 
take me. She said that she would put me in his charge.
30  
 
Despite his mother‘s entreaties to the blind man that he treat the young, orphaned 
Lázaro with care, the blind man instead treats Lázaro very cruelly and, consequently, 
Lázaro chooses to leave. Here Lázaro‘s choice is not so much an act of free will, like 
Jane Eyre‘s choice to leave Lowood, or as a choice of a meaningful project, but an act 
of necessity. Indeed, his leaving of the blind man leads to him meeting his next master, 
a priest, such that his servitude is maintained. This chance meeting with the priest not 
only signifies the beginning of the second chapter of the novel, but is also identifiable 
as the second narrative event of Lázaro‘s story:  
 
When I went up to him to beg for a few coppers he asked me if I knew how to serve at 
Mass. I said I did, which was true because the blind man had taught me hundreds of 
things, even though he did treat me badly, and this was one of them. So the priest took 
me on as his servant.
31  
 
These first two chapters of Lazarillo De Tormes illustrate how life happens to the young 
Lázaro, a theme which is continued over the next four chapters/episodes. He serves 
others not by choice but by force. But, of course, Lázaro is essentially a child and 
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therefore can be forgiven for not making his own true choices. He is recounting his 
formative years in which his sense of agency and freedom is assumedly being fostered 
such  that  he  would  eventually  take  control  of  his  own  life  and  become  its  hero. 
However, this change does not come to pass: in the seventh and final chapter of his 
story, Lázaro is of adult age, and yet his agency does not really differ from that of the 
previous chapters when he was a youth; indeed, even as an adult, Lázaro is still the 
servant of others and is the patient of happenings. This is evidenced when Lázaro 
describes his ―arranged‖ marriage:  
 
Soon after I got the job, the Archpriest of St Salvador‘s heard about me and saw how 
sharp and ready-witted I was, because I used to announce that his wines were for sale. 
So he arranged a marriage for me with a maid of his. I saw that only advantages and 
good could come from being associated with the reverend gentleman, my lord, and Your 
Honour‘s servant and friend, so I decided to marry the girl.
32 
 
Lázaro‘s final and only choice is whether or not to marry the girl; but his decision is an 
empty and meaningless one as it has effectively been decided for him. Lázaro does not 
have what can be described as an existential beginning: he may be telling his story but 
he is not its hero in a Nietzschean sense. He is not the hero of his story in the way that 
Jane Eyre is the hero of her story. And unlike Jane Eyre‘s story, Lázaro‘s lacks any 
form of a personal narrative: it is a meaningless series of ―and thens‖
33 which generally 
focuses on the acquisition of food. To again use Kermode‘s terms, the story of Lázaro 
does not distinguish between chronos—―the passing of time‖—and kairos—where a 
point in time is ―charged with past and future‖; ―charged with a meaning derived from its 
relation to an end.‖
34    
                                                 
32 Ibid., 77–78. 
33 This is a phrase derived from Julian Young in his description of what a meaningless life may 
feel like: ―Perhaps . . . when one complains that one‘s life is meaningless, what one is 
complaining about is the lack of a story. If I look back on my past, all I see is a series of 
episodes connected by nothing more than ‗and then‘s‘ (sic)—I was born, and then I went to 
school, and then I became a loving wife and mother, and then the kids left home, and then . . .‖ 
Young, The Death of God, 85–86. 
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Moll Flanders  
 
The story of Lázaro is very similar to our second example—the story of Moll Flanders in 
Defoe‘s Moll Flanders. Indeed, the story of Moll Flanders can be said to be more like 
the story of Lázaro than that of Jane Eyre despite Jane Eyre and Moll Flanders being 
generally grouped within the genre of the realist novel. The reason for this is that the 
earliest examples of the new genre of the realist novel were still very much picaresque 
in the sense that the kind of narrative events that constitute the character‘s story were 
predominantly  influenced  by  exterior  forces.  Indeed,  Moll  Flanders  shares  many 
characteristics with the picaro character as Moll is a character of low birth and her 
deceitful  actions,  similar  to  those  of  the  picaro.  However,  as  Ian Watt  claims,  Moll 
Flanders differentiates herself from the picaro insofar as ―the feeling evoked by [her 
actions] is of a much more complete sympathy and identification: author and reader 
alike cannot but take her and her problems much more seriously.‖
35 This description 
would place Moll Flanders in the same category as Jane Eyre as Jane similarly evokes 
sympathy and identification; however, this claim notwithstanding, it can be argued that 
Moll is still very much a picaresque character insofar as she does not illustrate a causal 
or active development, which would seemingly stem from an existential beginning. Moll 
Flanders does not choose to act with her own sense of freedom in the way that Jane 
Eyre acts. There is, however, an event within her autobiographical story which has the 
appearance of an existential beginning and the intention of a meaningful project. This 
event occurs when Moll is still very much a child, when at the age of eight years old 
she is crying to her mistress about the prospect of ―going into service‖—of going to be 
a  servant—claiming  that  she  ―can‘t  work  house-work.‖  The  mistress  endeavours  to 
calm  her  by  saying  that  she  need  not go  yet. But  this  does  not calm  Moll,  which, 
consequently, angers the mistress: 
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When she saw that I was not pacify‘d yet, she began to be angry with me; and what 
wou‘d you have? says she, don‘t I tell you that you shall not go to Service till you are 
bigger? Ay, says I, but then I must go at last; why, what? said she, is the Girl mad? what, 
would you be a Gentlewoman? Yes says I, and cry‘d heartily, till I roar‘d out again.
36 
 
Moll  wants  to  become a  Gentlewoman,  which  can  be  described  as  Moll‘s  wish  ―to 
become self-sufficient, to be her own ‗economic‘ system as it were.‖
37 However, what 
must  be  noted  in  this  description  is  that  Moll  does  not  say  that  becoming  a 
Gentlewoman  is  her  individual  meaningful  project,  her  goal:  it  is  her  mistress  who 
proposes it, to which Moll innocently agrees. It is only an implied choice. Indeed, no 
such mention of becoming a Gentlewoman is made by Moll in the discourse prior to 
this  particular  incident—her  choice  is  simply  not  to  do  house  work.  However,  Moll 
maintains the desire of becoming a Gentlewoman for several years, until, at the age of 
fourteen, she encounters several ―misfortunes,‖ and consequently, on the ―spur of the 
moment,‖ changes her mind:  
 
The fright of my Condition had made such an Impression upon me, that I did not want 
now to be a Gentlewoman, but was very willing to be a Servant, and that any kind of 
Servant they thought fit to have me be.
38  
 
Moll‘s new ―project‖ is to become ―a servant to many masters,‖ much like the lot of 
Lázaro.  Again,  it  would  seem  that  this  choice  is  representative  of  an  existential 
beginning as Moll chooses for herself; however, the narrative does not develop this 
possibility with any conviction in the same way that Jane Eyre‘s existential beginning is 
developed. It is not projected as a future possibility, such that the reader can see that 
Moll is becoming who she is. Thus, it is an empty and meaningless choice. However, it 
can be said that Moll does have another meaningful project, namely the pursuit of 
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money  and  wealth.  As  Watt  describes,  this  kind  of  ―project‖  was  typical  of  the 
characters of early realist novels: 
 
All  Defoe‘s  heroes  pursue  money,  which  he  characteristically  called  ―the  general 
dominating article in the world‖; and they pursue it very methodically according to the 
profit and loss book-keeping which Max Weber considered to be the distinctive technical 
feature of modern capitalism. Defoe‘s heroes, we observe, have no need to learn this 
technique; whatever the circumstances of their birth and education, they have it in their 
blood, and keep us more fully informed of their present stocks of money and commodities 
than any other characters in fiction.
39 
 
Watt claims that this was a common goal for all of Defoe‘s heroes who each pursued 
money, embodying the rise of economic individualism in the modern capitalist world.
40 
But if ―pursuing money‖ were a project of any substance, it fails only insofar as it a 
project that is completed over and over again: Moll Flanders lives her life in a hand-to-
mouth fashion, where little to no thought of a future beyond the next acquisition of 
money is considered. Thus, Moll‘s life, like Lázaro‘s life and his endless quest for food, 
is reduced to a series of meaningless ―and thens.‖ Indeed, like the picaresque tales, 
Moll  Flanders  is  an  episodic  plot  which,  as  Watt  describes,  ―[denies]  Defoe  the 
advantages  of  a  structure  which  will  give  coherence  and  larger  implication  to  the 
thoughts and acts of his characters.‖
41 This implication is that of a posited future based 
on an individual, authentic choice and action, stemming from an existential beginning. 
Of course, it can be argued that Moll Flanders does achieve her goal of gaining wealth 
when she eventually inherits a plantation from her mother, and, as the subtitle of the 
novel reads, finally ―grew rich‖; however, this goal is achieved not by Moll‘s own hands 
or  from  her  own  choices—Moll,  herself,  attributes  this  acquisition  to  the  ―Hand  of 
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Providence.‖
42  As  such,  this  event  can  only  be  described  as  another  ―happening,‖ 
where Moll is the patient and not the agent of the event. Indeed, owing to the fact that 
only a few pages remain before the end of the novel, Moll‘s good fortune appears to be 
more of a functional and satisfactory conclusion to a novel on behalf of its author than a 
satisfactory conclusion to a more-or-less meaningless life.  
 
 
2. Existential and Discursive Beginnings  
 
Jane Eyre, Lazarillo De Tormes, and Moll Flanders are all examples of novels which 
employ  the  first  combination  of  beginnings  in  fiction:  the  coinciding  of  the  novel‘s 
discursive beginning and the novel‘s character‘s biological beginning. This combination 
enables the narrator/novelist to detail the formative years of a character and ideally 
contrast these formative years with the character‘s existential beginning. However, a 
second possible combination of the three beginnings in fiction is the coinciding of an 
existential  and  discursive  beginning  where  the  NOW-story  (a)  essentially  omits  the 
character‘s biological beginning and formative years (B) and begins at the character‘s 
―first‖ existential beginning (E)—the crux of when the character‘s formative years are 
concluding and his or her adulthood (and their ability to make ―true‖ choices) begins (as 
illustrated in figure 3, below). 
 
 
           B                      a and E   
                                         
Figure 3: Coinciding of character‘s existential beginning and beginning of novel‘s story. 
                                                 
42 Defoe, Moll Flanders, 420. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
  164 
 
To begin at a character‘s existential beginning or, as will be discussed below, after an 
existential beginning is a significant choice to make on behalf of the novelist because it 
suggests that the character‘s past—the character‘s formative years—is less important, 
if at all important, to the meaningful story. The character in the novel does have a 
―past,‖  which  began  with  his  or  her  biological  beginning,  but  this  past  can  be 
represented  as  a  stasis  statement  which  rhetorically  states  that  the  past  is  not 
altogether  meaningless,  but  can  be  summarised  without  disrupting  or  affecting  the 
story.
43 Chatman claims that the stasis statement is one of two kinds of statements in 
the novel‘s discourse, the other being a process statement:  
 
The discourse is said to ―state‖ the story, and these statements are of two kinds—process 
and stasis—according to whether someone did something or something happened; or 
whether something simply existed in the story. Process statements are in the mode of DO 
or  HAPPEN,  not  as  actual  words  in  English  or  any  natural  language  (these  form  the 
substance of the expression), but as more abstract expressional categories. . . . Stasis 
statements are in the mode of IS.
44  
 
Chatman  suggests  that  a  stasis statement may  communicate  either  or  both  of two 
aspects:  a  character‘s  identity  or  the  character‘s  qualities,  such  as  the  character‘s 
traits.
45  However, it can be argued that the stasis statement can also represent a 
summary  of  the  character‘s  past  choices  (or  lack  thereof)  and  past  actions.  More 
specifically,  the  stasis  statement  enables  the  novelist  to  summarise  the  overall 
                                                 
43 This description of the stasis statement is very much related to Aristotle‘s definition of the 
beginning of a plot as ―the incident that initiates the process of change.‖ Hardison suggests that 
this change is the disruption of a ―stable situation‖: ―Although life is never stable, societies and 
individuals tend to seek stability. It often happens that after a period of relative equilibrium 
something happens to upset the balance, and that later, after the disrupting factor has worked 
itself out, a new stability, more or less satisfactory than the former one, is achieved.
‖ Hardison, 
Aristotle’s Poetics, 140. This stable situation or period of equilibrium happens before the plot 
begins, such that the first incident begins the disruption of this stability. 
44 Chatman, Story and Discourse, 31–32. 
45 Ibid., 32. Of course, not all traits necessarily change, and those that do may not change 
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meaningfulness or meaninglessness of a character‘s past choices and past actions. 
Hochman elaborates on this concept:  
 
The embodied  presence  of the characters as  glimpsed even at their first appearance 
implicitly contains—as a first glimpse of a person in life may do, though perhaps less 
vividly—the whole process of their development. We are ordinarily impelled to intuit this 
development, without much specification of detail, on the basis of the experiences we see 
the  characters  undergo  in  the  course  of  the  work.  We  assume  that  the  experiences, 
responses, and conflicts that they have in the present action epitomise their characteristic 
modes  of  experience  at  all  times  and  that  the  structure  of  values  and  choices  which 
makes them what they are in the present reflects what they were in the past.
46  
 
This  choice  to  omit  a  character‘s  past  by  summarising  his  or  her  past  as  a  stasis 
statement is exemplified by the coinciding of the beginning of the discourse of the novel 
with the existential beginning of its character: this choice enables the novelist to omit 
the character‘s formative years, such that the meaningful segment of the character‘s 
life—his or her adult life—becomes the main, ―meaningful‖ action and the beginning of 
their meaningful personal narrative.
47 This very much relates to Said‘s claim that the 
beginning ―is the first step in the intentional production of meaning.‖
48 Similarly, the 
production of meaning is reflected in the coinciding of the character‘s NOW-story with 
the intention of the character‘s meaningful project. Of course, this does not necessarily 
mean  that  the  character‘s  past  is  meaningless;  however,  the  choice  to  omit  the 
character‘s past rhetorically implies that the character‘s past is unnecessary for making 
sense of the story or the character‘s meaning. This is also significant if, for example, 
                                                                                                                                           
first described as ―static,‖ and may continue to be static until some unforseen incident disrupts 
this stasis. 
46 Hochman, Character in Literature, 148. 
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we  consider  that  the  novelist‘s  choice  to  omit  the  formative  years  of  his  or  her 
characters is rhetorically telling us that this past should not influence how the character 
is interpreted and evaluated. Indeed, if a child makes no ―true‖ choices, then the child 
cannot be judged on the choices he or she does make.   
 
Stan Parker  
 
This  description  of  the  implied  meaninglessness  of  a  character‘s  past  life  by  its 
omission  from  the  discourse  is  exemplified  by  the  story  of  Stan  Parker  in  Patrick 
White‘s The Tree of Man (1955). The Tree of Man is a significant example not only 
because of where the NOW-story begins but because of how Stan Parker‘s existential 
beginning is represented: White uses strong symbolic language to emphasise Stan‘s 
beginning. Stan‘s existential beginning—his Augenblick—is the first narrative block of 
the story and represents a crux in Stan‘s life: his formative years have ended and his 
adulthood is beginning. What is significant about beginning at this crux is that where 
Jane Eyre dedicates a hundred-odd pages to the narration of her formative years—
before the true choice of her existential beginning—the third-person narrator of The 
Tree of Man summarises Stan‘s formative years and his existential beginning within the 
minimal space of some fifteen pages. As such, the main discourse of The Tree of Man 
is centred on the adulthood of Stan‘s life—his life after his formative years. 
  The beginning of the discourse of The Tree of Man, and the narrative block of 
the existential beginning, begins the NOW-story. The narrator begins by telling us of a 
young  man,  Stan,  and  his  dog  arriving  at  an  untended  piece  of  land  in  the  early 
twentieth-century Australian outback, which Stan has inherited from his mother and 
father.  Stan  is  at  first  unnamed,  which  can  be  recognised  as  external  focalisation, 
which G￩rard Genette describes as a narrative technique where ―the hero is described 
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and followed for a long time as an unknown person whose identity is problematic.‖
49 
The ―problem‖ of Stan‘s identity is gradually unfolded and we see that it is essentially 
the problem of making meaning of his own, individual life. At first, the young man‘s 
actions are mechanical, voiceless, and impersonal, until he takes his axe to a tree: 
 
The man took an axe and struck at the side of a hairy tree, more to hear the sound than 
for any other reason. And the sound was cold and loud. The man struck at the tree, and 
struck, till several white chips had fallen. He looked at the scar in the side of the tree. The 
silence was immense. It was the first time anything like this had happened in that part of 
the bush.
50 
 
The  striking  of  the  axe  upon  the  tree  breaks  the  silence  of  the  bush;  but  it  also 
symbolises the breaking of the silence of his indistinguishable identity, and, as we later 
discover, the breaking of the silence of the man‘s somewhat inauthentic life. The sound 
of the axe striking the tree is new and unlike anything that had been heard before in 
this part of the bush, but also new and unlike anything that had been heard from the 
young man himself. The man is tentatively testing his freedom and is finding voice. 
There  is  a  sense  of  ―becoming‖  in  the  man;  indeed,  as  the  third-person  narrator 
explicitly states: ―The man was a young man. Life had not yet operated on his face.‖
51 
The man‘s face, and the piece of land on which he has found himself, have not been 
worked upon by life or humankind, respectively. The land has not been fashioned into, 
or imbibed with, a sense of place, just as the young man has not found himself, and 
given character or individuality to his face, his identity, or his meaningful life.  
  The narrator proceeds to describe more sounds produced by the man which 
intermingle with the surrounding bush: ―There was the sound of tin plate, tea on tin, the 
dead thump of flour. Somewhere water ran. Birds babbled, settling themselves on a 
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roost.‖
52 Only at this moment is the young man given a name: Stan Parker. And it is at 
this moment that the narrator recalls, through a flashback sequence, the beginning of 
Stan‘s story, telling the reader of how Stan got his name,  and some details of his 
mother and father. The narrator also tells the reader of the desires that Stan‘s mother 
has for him:  
 
  ―Stan,‖ said his mother once, ―you must promise to love God, and never to touch a 
drop.‖ 
  ―Yes,‖ said the boy, for he had had experience of neither, and the sun was in his 
eyes.
53  
  
Stan‘s mother‘s aspirations were that he become a preacher or a teacher: ―He will 
teach the words of the poets and God. With her respect for these, she suspected, in all 
twilight and good faith, that they might be interpreted.‖
54 But the narrator tells us that 
Stan  was  none  of  these:  ―He  was  no  interpreter.  He  shifted  beside  his  fire  at  the 
suggestion  that  he  might  have  been.  He  was  nothing  much.  He  was  a  man.‖
55 
Intentionally or not, these opinions seem to alternate from being those of Stan and 
those of the third-person narrator: Stan is ―uncomfortable‖ at the suggestion that he 
might be an interpreter, and it can be said that the narrator is merely voicing Stan‘s 
thoughts; at the same time, however, it appears that the authoritative narrator—the 
authoritative Other—is telling the reader that Stan is nothing much. He is none of the 
things that Stan‘s mother desires, but he is also nothing else. Stan is, at this moment of 
the story, a meaningless individual, but he also has the semblance of the ―nothingness‖ 
of  a  tabula  rasa:  he  can  create  something  from  this  nothingness.  But  that  Stan  is 
nothing and desires nothing is not entirely accurate: the narrator tells us that Stan‘s 
only desire was for ―permanence.‖ However, it is a desire that came and went: he 
longed for permanence, but where it was to take place he did not yet know. Without the 
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action of seeking permanence, Stan‘s life remains in a limbo of meaningless stasis. He 
does not act and, therefore, does not create meaning. This stasis is broken, however, 
when we are told of another event of Stan‘s past—the death of his mother—and how 
his dying mother told Stan of a piece of land he was to inherit. Stan is initially unsure as 
to what the property means to him: 
 
The young man‘s breath thickened, his heart tolled against his ribs—was it for a liberation 
or imprisonment? He did not know. Only that this scrubby, anonymous land was about to 
become his, and that his life was taking shape for the first time.
56 
 
Stan, it would seem, had no choice in possessing his inheritance—the property is his. 
Yet he is faced with a choice as to how he will act towards this inheritance: Is it to be a 
liberation or an imprisonment? Is it to be the permanence he both desires and dreads? 
Stan must choose how he will live in relation to this inheritance. Indeed, the inheritance 
of this land can be seen as the catalyst for Stan‘s existential freedom, but also the 
catalyst for the anxiety of this freedom, made visceral as his heart tolls against his ribs. 
But, because of this new freedom which has been thrust upon him, Stan also sees that 
his  life  is  taking  shape  insofar  as  it  is  up  to  him  to  do  what  he  will,  such  is  the 
significance of his new freedom.   
  Following  his  mother‘s  death,  Stan  buys  a  cart  and  sets  off  to  his  newly 
inherited land, and new beginnings, and the story returns to the NOW-story when Stan 
and his dog arrive on the land: 
 
They reached their destination, and ate, and slept, and in the morning of frost, beside the 
ashes of a fire, were faced with the prospect of leading some kind of life. Of making that 
life purposeful. Of opposing silence and rock and tree. . . .  
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  . . . And the young man, after sighing a good deal, and turning in his bags, in which 
the crumbs of chaff still tickled and a flea or two kept him company, flung himself into the 
morning. There was no other way. 
  But to scrape the ash, but to hew with the whole body as well as axe the grey hunks 
of fallen wood, but to stamp the blood to life, and the ground thawing took life too, the 
long ribbons of grass bending and moving as the sun released, the rocks settling into 
peace  of  recovered  sun,  the  glug  and  tumble  of  water  slowly  at  first,  heard  again 
somewhere, the sun climbing ever, with towards it smoke thin but certain that the man 
made. 
  A little bird with straight-up tail flickered and took the crumb that lay at the man‘s 
feet. 
  The man‘s jaws took shape upon the crusts of stale bread. His jaws that were well 
shaped, strong, with a bristling of sun about the chin. This was gold. 
  Down through him wound the long ribbon of warm tea. He felt glad.  
  As the day increased, Stan Parker emerged and, after going here and there, simply 
looking at what was his, began to tear the bush apart.
57  
 
Stan flings himself into the morning, and into the abyss of the nothingness that is his 
indeterminable future. He is the mythical figure of the phoenix, waking near his ashes 
on a new morning, free. And from his freedom the meaningful individual is born and 
emerges. He sets out to make life purposeful, opposing silence and rock and tree; 
opposing the inauthentic, meaningless stasis which dominated his previous life.  He 
begins to violently clear the land, a symbolic clearing of the past and the beginning of 
an  ahistorical  future;  the  cleaning  of  the  slate,  making  way  for  a  new  existential 
beginning.  
  The rhetorical significance of this beginning is that Stan‘s pre-existential life is 
summarised as a flashback in the relatively short first chapter. The past is dwelt on only 
briefly,  sparsely,  before  the  story  moves  forwards.  It  signifies  the  insignificance  of 
Stan‘s  life  before  the  inheritance  of  the  land,  and  the  meaningfulness  that  the 
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inheritance has enabled him to create in his life. Rhetorically, the narrator is as much 
as saying that from this moment on, from the moment Stan first wields his axe into the 
tree, his life is becoming meaningful—Stan has the possibility of creating a personal 
narrative with an intended meaning, the tick of tick-tock, and nothing that has come 
before that moment need be given detail within the discourse. Stan‘s past is nothing 
but a memory in the NOW-story and can be described in the same scarce and faded 
detail of a memory. This is also significant if we consider that the discursive boundary 
of The Tree of Man also creates a ―corporeal‖ boundary as it is the beginning of a 
book—a physical object which, as Roland Barthes says of the literary work, ―can be 
held in the hand.‖
58 This gives the NOW-story of the discourse a sense of the ―actual,‖ 
of  existing,  whereas  a  memory—a  flashback—is  immaterial.  But  this  corporeal 
boundary also gives Stan Parker‘s character a sense of becoming as the future in The 
Tree  of  Man—a  future  which  does  not  ―exist‖  but  is  part  of  his  existence,  part  of 
becoming who the character is to become—is somewhat corporeal. In contrast, Stan‘s 
undiscoursed  past,  which  may  only  be  alluded  to,  lies  outside  of  the  corporeal 
discourse, outside of the pages of the book. The reader can see that the character has 
a future, which is primarily the chronological movement of the story from beginning to 
end; but the reader cannot see the character‘s past. It is not NOW. A past that does not 
exist as discourse—as pages in a book—does not have what may be described as 
―corporeal conviction.‖ The character‘s undiscoursed past is, therefore, meaningless, 
firstly  because  of  the  rhetoric  of  the  novelist‘s  choice  not  to  include  the  past  of  a 
character within the material pages of the novel, and because it is a choice to exclude 
or merely hint at a past because it is not significant to understanding the story of the 
character;  because  they  do  not  pertain  to  the  story  proper.  This  also  reflects  the 
attitude of the novelist insofar as the previous choice—the first existential beginning—is 
not important. The third-person narrator implicitly suggests that the choices they make 
within the pages of the novel are the most significant choices—these choices create a 
narrative, not the choices outside of the novel‘s pages. It is from here that there is 
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meaningful intention and from here that Stan‘s personal narrative begins. And it is from 
this beginning onwards that the reader must base his or her evaluation. 
 
Charles and Emma Bovary 
 
White‘s method of introducing Stan and eliding much of Stan‘s past is almost identical 
to that of Flaubert‘s in Madame Bovary when he introduces the characters of Charles 
Bovary and Emma. Charles is very similar to Stan in that it is his mother—the ―original‖ 
Madame Bovary—who decides much of who he is to be:  
 
She dreamed of high office, she already saw him, tall, handsome, talented, established, 
an engineer, or a magistrate. She taught him to read, and even taught him, on an old 
piano that she had, to sing two or three little ballads.
59 
 
With these grand designs in mind, she ―installs‖ him in his studies of medicine, she 
finds a room for him, and she has meals sent to him. Charles does briefly attempt to 
rebel against his mother‘s wishes (Charles becomes a ―tavern-goer‖ which he feels is a 
―precious act of liberty‖ and an ―initiation into the great world,‖
60) but subsequently fails 
in his studies. This rebellion is also a failed attempt at creating his own life—of breaking 
away from his mother—as he soon returns to the control of his mother and begins what 
is to be a more successful attempt at his studies: 
 
He got quite a decent pass. What a great day for his mother! They gave a fine big dinner. 
  Where should he go to practise his art? To Tostes. There was only one old doctor 
there. For ages and ages Madame Bovary had been watching out for his death, and the 
old chap hadn‘t even packed his bags before Charles was installed just across the road, 
as his successor. 
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  But it wasn‘t quite enough to have brought up her son, have him taught medicine 
and discover Tostes for him to practise in: he had to have a wife. She found one for him: 
the widow of a bailiff from Dieppe, forty-five years old with twelve hundred francs a year. 
  Although she was ugly, thin as a rake, and splendidly bepimpled, Madame Dubuc 
had  no  lack  of  suitors  to  choose  from.  To  accomplish  her  plan,  Mère  Bovary  had  to 
trounce  them  all,  and  she  even  thwarted  with  great  skill  the  machinations  of  a  pork-
butcher who had the backing of the priests.
61 
 
This passage clearly shows the dominant influence of Charles‘s mother over his life, 
his choices, and freedom. What we see is that Madame Dubuc becomes the ―new‖ 
Madame Bovary but also becomes the ―new‖ controlling authority of Charles‘s life. And, 
indeed,  not  until  Charles  meets  Emma  does  he  tentatively  begin  to  make  his  own 
choices  and  recognise  his  own  freedom.  However,  the  moment  of their  meeting  is 
significant not only in his change of attitude towards his freedom: there is also a sense 
of significance in the way that both Charles and Emma are respectively introduced into 
the story. Prior to meeting Emma, Charles is given no direct free speech—the narrator 
of  the  story  does  not  allow  Charles  to  speak  in  his  own  words;  instead  he  is 
paraphrased and conversations are implied. The only time Charles does speak is when 
he is first introduced as a boy of fifteen to his new school mates. Having been asked 
his name, Charles can only stutter the word ―Charbovari.‖
62 Soon after this, the anxious 
Charles loses his cap. When he moves to find it he is asked by the teacher what it is he 
is looking for; he replies: ―My ca . . .‖
63 Charles does not speak—and when given the 
opportunity he can only stutter; he makes a mess of it as if he were not the authority of 
his own voice—as if he were coming to terms with his voice. This is a basic symbol for 
his lack of freedom which continues throughout his schooling and his first marriage. 
However,  Charles  is  eventually  given  a  voice,  again  when  he  is  looking  for 
something—this  time  in  the  presence  of  Emma,  the  daughter  of  a  man  Charles  is 
treating:  
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  ―Are you looking for something?‖ she asked. 
  ―My riding-crop, please,‖ he said. 
  And he began to hunt around on the bed, behind the doors, under the chairs; it had 
fallen to the ground, between the sacks and the wall. Mademoiselle Emma noticed it; she 
bent over the sacks of wheat. Charles, gallantly, sprang into action and, as he reached 
down over her, he felt his chest brush against the  back of the girl beneath him. She 
straightened up, red-faced, and looked at him over her shoulder, handing him his riding-
crop.
64 
 
This innocuous meeting with Emma is significant because Emma herself has hitherto 
not  spoken  directly  in  the  novel.  She  too  has  been  without  voice,  and  so  their 
conversation, and their awkward coming together, signifies a new bond and a new 
beginning for the two of them. The significance of their bond and the insignificance of 
Charles‘s bond with his first wife is further emphasised by the sudden death of the 
latter. It is sudden as it takes place in only the second chapter of the thirty-five chapters 
that comprise the novel‘s three parts. On this early departure, the intrusive narrator 
makes the somewhat ironic comment: ―She was dead! How astonishing!‖
65 What the 
death of the ―second‖ Madame Bovary means is that the barrier to Charles‘s freedom 
and the barrier to the proper story—the story of the ―third‖ Madame Bovary which the 
narrator wants to tell—is removed. Of course, after this initial introduction of Charles 
and  Emma,  the  ―meaningful‖  story  essentially  becomes  Emma‘s  (her  increased 
dissatisfaction with married life and her subsequent affairs) and the story of ―the flat as 
pavement‖ Charles is once again relegated to the background. The story of Charles is 
initially the centre—he is the centre of the action, even if they are not really his own 
actions. But, with the introduction of Emma his choices and actions become secondary 
to  Emma‘s.  What  is  more,  his  choices  and  actions  lack  discursive  ―volume‖  and 
corporeality and thus lack meaningfulness.  
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Ishmael 
 
A third example, where a corporeal boundary signifies the meaninglessness that lies in 
the nothingness outside of this boundary, is the first-person narration of the story of 
Ishmael in Melville‘s  Moby-Dick, which, like the story of Stan Parker, begins at the 
precise moment of a crux in Ishmael‘s life and signifies a new existential beginning for 
Ishmael. He is telling a story of his past but he omits all knowledge of his past beyond 
this ―present‖ fragment of his life and offers no context or contrast of his existential 
beginning with his earlier past or what we will from now simply refer to as his ―past.‖ 
Moreover, Ishmael somewhat explicitly tells us of the meaninglessness of his past, as 
is evidenced by Ishmael‘s opening discourse: 
 
Call me Ishmael. Some years ago—never mind how long precisely—having little or no 
money in my purse, and nothing particular to interest me on shore, I thought I would sail 
about a little and see the watery part of the world. It is a way I have of driving off the 
spleen, and regulating the circulation. Whenever I find myself growing grim about the 
mouth;  whenever  it  is  a  damp,  drizzly  November  in  my  soul;  whenever  I  find  myself 
involuntarily pausing before coffin warehouses, and bringing up the rear of every funeral I 
meet; and especially whenever my hypos get such an upper hand of me, that it requires a 
strong  moral  principle  to  prevent  me  from  deliberately  stepping  into  the  street,  and 
methodically knocking people‘s hats off—then, I account it high time to get to sea as soon 
as I can. This is my substitute for pistol and ball. With a philosophical flourish Cato throws 
himself upon his sword; I quietly take to the ship. There is nothing surprising in this. If 
they but knew it, almost all men in their degree, some time or other, cherish very nearly 
the same feelings towards the ocean with me.
66  
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Ishmael‘s  life  has  come  to  a  crux—a  crux,  he  suggests,  that  he  has  experienced 
before. This claim may hint at more of Ishmael‘s past, but it would appear that it is 
somewhat of a repetitive and meaningless cycle: he appears to find meaningfulness in 
life, only to fall back into meaninglessness. And now, once again, Ishmael has come to 
the realisation that his life is meaningless, so much so that he is willing to take his own 
life  in  the  face  of  this  meaninglessness.  These  thoughts  strikingly  resemble  Albert 
Camus‘ discussion on the problem of suicide and his claim that without meaning there 
is no reason to live. Ishmael is facing this exact same problem and has drawn the 
same  conclusion.  However,  Ishmael  substitutes  this  morbid  possibility  with  a  new 
meaningful beginning: he substitutes the pistol and ball by choosing to ―take to the 
ship.‖ This choice can be interpreted in two ways: it is a choice of a new existential 
beginning, to negate the meaninglessness of the past, and put an end to the stasis of 
meaninglessness;  or  it  is  a  choice  to  avoid  or  escape  his  anxious  and  authentic 
feelings of meaninglessness by immersing himself in the ―inauthenticity‖ of the ship. In 
any case, Ishmael chooses for himself: he chooses to negate his past and embrace his 
new sense of freedom.   
  Ishmael‘s attitude towards the past is reflected in his choosing to summarise his 
past with two statements, namely, that he has little to no money in his purse, and 
nothing particular to interest him on shore. They are stasis statements which represent 
the culmination of Ishmael‘s past—a past that ―was‖—and now ―is‖—now exists as the 
NOW-story begins. All that has come before the moment that the story begins can be 
essentially described and summarised by these stasis statements. To begin this story 
in  this  manner  is  a  purposeful  choice  made  by  Ishmael—the  autobiographical 
narrator—and Melville—the real author behind Ishmael—which alerts the reader to the 
insignificance of Ishmael‘s past which he does not recount in any great detail. It is as 
much an emphasis on what is to come as it is a lack of emphasis on what has come 
before.  Because  of  this  ―boundary,‖  the  reader  discerns  the  significance  of  this 
beginning, over and above other possible beginnings, and can assume that what the 
narrator will communicate from this beginning is of value and interest to the reader. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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  But there is also one other, more subtle indication of the lack of significance that 
Ishmael places on his past, namely the symbolic meaning behind the opening line: 
―Call me Ishmael.‖ From this sentence it can be inferred that Ishmael does not say that 
his name is Ishmael. It is an instruction to his reader and is as much as saying: ―You, 
reader, are to call me Ishmael—the name I have given to the narrator and hero of the 
story I am about to tell—whereas others in my past—the past which existed before my 
story  begins—have  called  me  otherwise.‖  This  is  in  keeping  with  the  common 
association of the name Ishmael with the figure of the exile
67: Ishmael is in exile from 
his past, and he has identified himself as an exile by calling himself Ishmael. However, 
there are at least two other possible implications which can be derived from this 
statement. Firstly, Ishmael‘s past, which can be defined by his actions, are the actions 
of an individual who is ―not-Ishmael‖ but someone else. It is an Ishmael-of-the-past, 
which precedes the NOW-story. It is an ―other‘s‖ existence which belongs to the past, 
and when the reader calls him by his new name it signifies a negation of the other self, 
and  the  birth  of  a  new.  Here  the  nothingness  outside  of  the  corporeal  boundary 
symbolises the nothingness of death, just as the nothingness outside of the discourse 
of Stan Parker‘s life symbolises the ―death‖ of his childhood and the birth of adulthood. 
  A second implication of Ishmael‘s desire for a new identity through a new name 
can also be read as an affirmation of the Other‘s role in forging and understanding his 
individual identity. Those who knew Ishmael-of-the-past also knew of his actions; as 
such, the name given to him by the Other-of-the-past is the name that appropriately 
belongs to his past actions. Just as a gambler is known to his friends and family as a 
gambler by way of his actions, so too is the Ishmael-of-the-past known and named by 
the  Other  of  his  past.  The  reader,  however,  does  not  belong  to  the  Other  which 
precedes  his  story,  and  so  Ishmael  gives  the  reader  an  ―appellation‖  which 
corresponds and reflects the narrator and hero of his ―present‖ and future story. For 
Ishmael to instruct the reader to call him thus, is as much as saying that he negates the 
name and the past which lie beyond the beginning (and the boundary) of his story, and 
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the name Ishmael symbolises a new beginning, and a name deserving of the story he 
is going to tell. This is significant if we consider that the reader can only evaluate the 
meaning of Ishmael‘s life by the segment of life that he reveals—the segment of life 
that represents the meaning of Ishmael. 
  However, we may also understand the name Ishmael as an empty space, an 
empty sign, to be filled by the future discourse. This claim can be understood if we 
consider  Docherty‘s  description  of  how  the  first  mention  of  a  character,  be  it  the 
character‘s name or the pronominal ―I,‖ 
 
creates a gap, a blanc sémantique in the sense of the novels; they create the gap in our 
understanding which requires plenitude, a gap therefore which prompts us to read on and 
―fill‖ with meaningful significance the empty space in the name as it occurs in the fictional 
world.
68 
 
When Ishmael instructs the reader to call him Ishmael, he is creating an empty space 
which is to be filled with his telling of the ensuing story. Moreover, this empty space 
represents the nihlation of his filled (meaningful/less) past. Ishmael fills the present 
emptiness with the meaningful significance of his future story.  
 
Quoyle 
 
A final, more contemporary example of a character‘s story in which the existential and 
discursive  beginnings  coincide  and  effectively  omit  much  of  the  character‘s  past 
including  his  or  her  biological  beginning  and  formative  years  is  Quoyle  in  Annie 
Proulx‘s The Shipping News (1993). Once again the story begins at a crux in the hero‘s 
life; however, Quoyle‘s existential beginning is much subtler than previous examples, 
reflecting his far more reserved disposition; and unlike the previous examples such as 
those characters of the Bildungsroman, Quoyle‘s formative years appear to end when Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
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he  is  almost  middle-aged.  In  the  second  paragraph  of  the  first  page  the  narrator 
summarises the first thirty-odd years of Quoyle‘s life with several stasis statements: 
 
Hive-spangled,  gut  roaring  with  gas  and  cramp,  he  survived  childhood;  at  the  state 
university, hand clapped over his chin, he camouflaged torment with smiles and silence. 
Stumbled through his twenties and into his thirties learning to separate his feelings from 
his life, counting on nothing. He ate prodigiously, liked a ham knuckle, buttered spuds.
69 
 
This  summary  of  Quoyle‘s  life  is  understatedly  economical,  and,  like  the  story  of 
Charles  in  Madame  Bovary,  rhetorically  implies  that  these  years  are  essentially 
meaningless and must be understood as being of little significance when interpreting 
and evaluating the whole of Quoyle‘s life—what is to become the NOW-story and the 
greater volume of the novel‘s discourse. In this period it is also implied that he makes 
no explicit choices,  and,  like a  picaro  character, seems to be the affected, not the 
effector,  of  his  own  story.  Indeed,  he  merely  ―survives  childhood‖  and  ―stumbles 
through his twenties into his thirties.‖ This evaluation is soon made more explicit: ―His 
earliest sense of self was as a distant figure: there in the foreground was his family; 
here, at the limit of the far view, was he.‖
70 Moreover, in his thirties, Quoyle ―falls‖ into a 
job as a newspaper reporter for The Mockingbird Record—a job acquired for him by his 
new friend Partridge. Indeed, Quoyle is ―given‖ both a job and an identity of sorts which 
he seems to accept merely because it is suggested from an ―authoritative‖ friend. But it 
is not really ―him‖ as is evidenced at the end of the first chapter: 
 
He abstracted his life from the times. He believed he was a newspaper reporter, yet read 
no  paper  except  The  Mockingbird  Record,  and  so  managed  to  ignore  terrorism, 
climatological change, collapsing governments, chemical spills, plagues, recession and 
failing banks, floating debris, the disintegrating ozone layer. Volcanoes, earthquakes and 
hurricanes, religious frauds, defective vehicles and scientific charlatans, mass murderers 
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and serial killers, tidal waves of cancer, AIDS, deforestation and exploding aircraft were 
as remote to him as braid catches, canions and rosette-embroidered garters. Scientific 
journals spewed reports of mutant viruses, of machines pumping life through the near-
dead,  of  the  discovery  that  the  galaxies  were  streaming  apocalyptically  toward  an 
invisible Great Attractor like flies into a  vacuum cleaner nozzle. That was the  stuff of 
others‘ lives. He was waiting for his to begin. 
  He got in the habit of walking around the trailer and asking aloud, ―Who knows?‖ He 
said, ―Who knows?‖ For no one knew. He meant, anything could happen. 
  A spinning coin, still balanced on its rim, may fall in either direction.
71     
 
Quoyle recognises that he does not know where to begin his life; what choices he will 
make. He has not begun to live his life because he has not yet chosen a life. From 
here, the story again moves quickly: within the next six pages (some six years of story-
time)  Quoyle  meets  and  marries  Petal—a  controlling  woman  who  makes  him  her 
cuckold and to whom he has two children. Within the next ten pages (only several days 
of story-time) Quoyle‘s parents commit suicide, he loses his job at a local paper, and 
his  children  are  abducted  by  Petal  who  proceeds  to  sell  them  to  a  paedophile. 
Fortunately, the children are soon found and are returned to Quoyle unharmed. Again 
because of the economy of the discourse, it appears that none of these events were of 
Quoyle‘s own choosing; however, the abduction and return of the children does seem 
to act as a mini-catalyst as it throws into relief his love for his children and makes him 
recognise his desire to be a good father, which in his eyes, is a serious and meaningful 
project. And it is here that his aunt, whom he has become acquainted with after his 
parent‘s funeral, suggests he start a new life in Newfoundland, a place where he once 
had relatives:  
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―You can look at it this way,‖ she said. ―You‘ve got a chance to start out all over again. A 
new place, new people, new sights. A clean slate. See, you can be anything you want 
with a fresh start. In a way, that‘s what I am doing myself.‖
72 
 
Quoyle agrees to the suggestion, but for Quoyle it is not a new start but a start, albeit a 
humble  one.  Indeed,  Quoyle  gradually  emerges  as  a  much  stronger,  purposeful 
character:  he  endeavours  to  become  a  loving  father,  he  gets  a  job  at  the  local 
newspaper, he rebuilds an old house he has inherited, and, despite not being able to 
swim, he finds a boat (a necessity in Newfoundland). Most significantly, he finds a new 
partner to share his life with. All of these choices and actions are given a much fuller 
description and occupy the greater fraction of the novel‘s discourse (the story-time is 
only a few years with just over three-hundred pages or almost ninety-five percent of the 
total pages dedicated to their explication). They are the meaningful events which are 
chosen and caused by Quoyle after his humble existential beginning and they come to 
form the proper NOW-story to which the greater volume of the discourse is dedicated.  
 
 
3.  Secondary  Existential  Beginnings  and 
Discursive Beginnings 
 
The discursive beginning of the story of Ishmael can be said to differ from that of Stan 
Parker and, to some extent, Quoyle‘s insofar as their beginnings are most certainly 
their first existential beginnings, whereas Ishmael‘s existential beginning could be his 
second (or third or fourth etc.). It is because of this that Ishmael could also be an 
example  of  the  third  combination  of  beginnings  in  fiction  where  the  first  existential 
beginning (E) of a character begins before the NOW-story (a) begins—the tick of tick-
tock occurs before the beginning of the discourse. We can say that these stories begin 
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in  medias  res  of  the  creation  of  the  characters‘  meanings,  which  is  essentially  the 
middle  of  the  characters‘  personal  narratives.  This  form  of  story  differs  from  the 
previous  examples  as  the  past  of  the  character,  including  some  kind  of  existential 
beginning, is not discoursed, and yet must still be considered somewhat significant and 
meaningful (or meaningless), especially as a distinctive contrast for the second (or third 
or fourth etc.) existential beginning. These secondary  Augenblicke  become the first 
kernel events of the story, thereby omitting all of the character‘s childhood and his or 
her ―first‖ existential beginning. What we often find is that these undiscoursed, first 
existential beginnings have begun to ―lose meaningfulness‖ which is to say that the 
meaningful choices made by the characters, begin, or have begun, to depreciate in 
value such that creation moves towards a form of ―destruction.‖ When the destruction 
ends  and  is  complete  there  is  some  form  of  Augenblick,  such  that  the  end  of 
destruction is reversed and becomes the beginning of a new creation: the main action 
of the novel changes direction with a new kernel event and with it a ―new‖ existential 
beginning (E2 in figure 4 below).
73  
 
 
           B                           E            a       E2                      
 
Figure 4: Beginning of the discourse in medias res of character‘s creation of meaning. 
 
What  we  also  notice  in  these  novels  is  a  much  narrower  span  of  time  which,  as 
Hochman describes,  
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is  the  common  medium  of  dramatically  perceptible  dynamism  in  character.  The  most 
dynamic  and  conflict-ridden  characters,  those  subject  to  the  most  highly  dramatised 
sense of process, tend to be those who, like Anna Karenina, Raskolnikov, and Othello, 
figure  in  works  that  focus  largely  on  present  actions  and  therefore  possess  relatively 
shallow time dimensions. Such characters tend to be  engaged with events that follow 
from their choices in the present action.
74  
 
These beginnings in medias res are centred on characters that have come to a conflict 
in their lives—a conflict which has come after their formative choices which may, in the 
present action, have been retrospectively deemed false or inauthentic, which is to say 
they were choices that were not their own. It is a conflict in medius res of adulthood. 
 
Anna Karenina 
   
Beginnings in medias res can of course be found in many novels including those of 
Jane  Austen,  George  Eliot,  Fyodor  Dostoyevsky,  and  Virginia  Woolf.  But  it  is  the 
description of the change in meaningful project of the character of Anna Karenina in 
Tolstoy‘s Anna Karenina that we find its epitome. The story of the life of Anna begins 
when Anna is of a more mature age: she is no longer a young lady, but a married 
woman, with an eight-year-old son. We can assume that Anna has chosen some kind 
of meaningful project for her life before the NOW-story begins, such that the action to 
follow is set after this ―undiscoursed‖ existential beginning. The impact and importance 
or, indeed, lack of importance, of this initial choice is only disclosed later in the novel. 
However, like the examples of Stan Parker and Ishmael, the insignificance of her past 
and her past choices is rhetorically implied by the lack of detailing in the discourse, but 
also by the lack of corporeal conviction: Anna‘s first meaningful choice is not detailed 
within the discourse and it does not exist within the NOW-story; therefore, we may 
assume that it is not a lasting choice.  
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  Anna is first introduced in the second chapter of the first part of Anna Karenina 
by her brother, Stepan Arkadyich in his discussion with Matvei the valet:  
 
  ―Matvei, my sister Anna Arkadyevna is coming tomorrow,‖ he said, stopping for a 
moment the glossy, plump little hand of the barber, who was clearing a pink path between 
his long, curly side-whiskers. 
  ―Thank  God,‖  said  Matvei,  showing  by  this  answer  that  he  understood  the 
significance of this arrival in the same way as his master, that is, that Anna Arkadyevna, 
Stepan Arkadyich‘s beloved sister, might contribute to the reconciliation of husband and 
wife.
75  
 
The reconciliation is that of Stepan and his wife Dolly, following Stepan‘s affair with 
their children‘s former French teacher. His first action is to call on Anna to talk to Dolly 
in  the  hope  that  she  will  somehow  help  in  the  reconciliation.  What  is  significant, 
however, is that the reader is told that Anna is ―beloved‖ which does much to establish 
her amicable character and demeanour—a characterisation which is initially echoed 
innumerable times by many other characters in the novel. Indeed, when Dolly hears 
that  Anna  is  coming,  she  remonstrates  that  she  ―can‘t  receive  her,‖
76  but  is 
nevertheless pleased that Anna is indeed coming, stating: ―I know nothing but the very 
best about her, and with regard to myself, I‘ve seen only kindness and friendship from 
her.‖
77 And when Anna does come, Countess Vronsky (whom Anna travels with from 
Petersburg to Moscow, in order to aid the reconciliation) also praises Anna: ―I could go 
around the world with you and not be bored. You‘re one of those sweet women with 
whom it‘s pleasant both to talk and to be silent.‖
78 From these more or less explicit 
comments, it is implied that Anna is a sincere, happy, and thoughtful individual, and 
that her actions to this culminating moment of the NOW-story have contributed to a 
meaningful and happy existence. She has a meaningful life and her project is valued by 
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herself and by others. What is more, it would seem that the tick of her life will move 
naturally towards the expected tock. But, the plot of Anna Karenina is not a simple or a 
static plot (nor is it a singular plot insofar as there are two stories being told, namely 
Anna‘s and Levin‘s); indeed, the stasis of both Anna‘s life and, necessarily, the plot of 
Anna Karenina are inevitably met with a complication which comes in the form of Count 
Vronsky, who falls in love with Anna, but he is also the ―unwitting‖ catalyst for Anna‘s 
tragic downfall.  
  Vronsky plays a very significant part in Anna‘s life, not only by his actions, but 
also  symbolically.  This  can  be  understood  if  we  consider  how  Anna  is  properly 
―introduced‖ in the novel, which is to say the moment in which she first appears and 
speaks. Vronsky is at the train station to meet his mother who has travelled with Anna 
from Petersburg. An unnamed Anna exits the carriage and Vronsky excuses himself to 
allow her to pass. He is himself about to enter the carriage to meet his mother, but is 
compelled to look at her again: 
 
[He] felt a need to glance at her once more—not because she was very beautiful, not 
because of the elegance and modest grace that could be seen in her whole figure, but 
because  there  was  something  especially  gentle  and  tender  in  the  expression  of  her 
sweet-looking face as she stepped past him. As he looked back, she also turned  her 
head. Her shining grey eyes, which seemed dark because of their thick lashes, rested 
amiably and attentively on his face, as if she recognised him, and at once wandered over 
the approaching crowd as though looking for someone. In that brief glance Vronsky had 
time to notice the restrained animation that played over her face and fluttered between 
her shining eyes and the barely noticeable smile that curved her red lips. It was as if a 
surplus of something so overflowed her being that it expressed itself beyond her will, now 
in the brightness of her glance, now in her smile. She deliberately extinguished the light in 
her eyes, but it shone against her will in a barely noticeable smile.
79  
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It  can  be  inferred  that  this  lady  is  Anna  Karenina;  however,  this  inference  is  only 
confirmed when Vronsky recognises who the lady is, and gives Anna her name. This 
recognition takes place after Vronsky partly overhears a conversation Anna is having 
with an unknown Ivan Petrovich
80 (a conversation which draws attention to the strength 
and conviction of Anna‘s character), but also the conversation that immediately follows 
between Anna and Vronsky‘s mother:  
 
  ―I still don‘t agree with you,‖ the lady‘s voice said. 
  ―A Petersburg point of view, madam.‖ 
  ―Not Petersburg, merely a woman‘s,‖ she answered. 
  ―Well, allow me to kiss your hand.‖ 
  ―Good-bye, Ivan Petrovich. Do see if my brother is here, and send him to me,‖ the 
lady said just by the door, and entered the compartment again. 
  ―Have you found your brother?‖ asked Countess Vronsky, addressing the lady. 
  Vronsky remembered now that this was Mme Karenina.
81 
   
Anna is given a name by Vronsky: he tells us who this ―lady‖ is. But his naming of Anna 
differs  from  Stepan‘s  earlier  mention  of  her  name:  Stepan  names  Anna  as  an 
incorporeal thing, a name belonging to a memory, a memory of the past and which is 
also  somewhat  historical.  Contrastingly,  Vronsky  gives  a  name  to  the  Anna  of  the 
―present-tense‖;  his  doing  so  signifies  a  new,  ahistorical  existence  for  Anna  with 
Vronsky.  His  naming  her  brings  her  into  ―present,  corporeal  existence‖  just  as  the 
narrator of The Tree of Man brings Stan Parker into existence. Vronsky‘s naming of 
Anna can also be said to signify the beginnings of a new meaningful existence between 
the  two.  However,  for  Anna,  her  new  beginning  is  only  recognised  after  the  fact, 
specifically when she meets Vronsky for a second time (a meeting cunningly devised 
by Vronsky) and finds that she  has feelings for him: ―Anna,  looking down,  at  once 
recognised Vronsky, and a strange feeling of pleasure suddenly stirred in her heart, 
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together with a fear of something.‖
82 Anna feels a sense of pleasure, a new awakening 
of pleasant, ―meaningful‖ feelings. But  she also seems to feel anxious towards the 
possible repercussions of this new beginning; a feeling of anxiety towards what actions 
she may choose in the face of this new feeling. At first, Anna denies this pleasure, this 
happiness, deciding to return to Petersburg such that her ―good and usual life will go on 
as before.‖
83 However, this is very much an inauthentic choice, as when Anna returns 
home it is not ―good or usual,‖ especially when she meets her husband, Alexei Karenin:  
 
Some unpleasant feeling  gnawed at her  heart  as she met his unwavering and  weary 
gaze,  as if she had  expected him to look different. She  was especially struck by the 
feeling of dissatisfaction with herself that she experienced on meeting him. This was an 
old, familiar feeling, similar to the state of pretence she experienced in her relations with 
her  husband;  but  previously  she  had  not  noticed  it,  while  now  she  was  clearly  and 
painfully aware of it. 
  ―Yes, as you see, your tender husband, tender as in the second year of marriage, is 
burning with desire to see you,‖ he said in his slow, high voice and in the tone he almost 
always used with her, a tone in mockery of someone who might actually mean what he 
said.
84  
 
Anna is struck by her  new feelings toward Karenin;  he is changed in her eyes,  or 
changed from the image she expected. But even Anna‘s son, Seryozha, has become 
somewhat of a disappointment to her:  
 
She had imagined him better than he was in reality. She had to descend into reality to 
enjoy him as he was. But he was charming even as he was, with his blond curls, blue 
eyes and full, shapely legs in tight-fitting stockings.
85  
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Anna has a revelation, albeit an unwanted revelation, an Augenblick—a moment of 
recognition. Her past has taken on a new, retrospective meaning; it has taken the form 
of inauthentic meaninglessness, and her love for Vronsky signifies a new desire—a 
new authentic beginning. This new beginning follows her first undiscoursed existential 
beginning,  which  is  initially  understood  by  the  various  stasis  statements  used  to 
describe  Anna‘s  life—statements  which  imply  a  sense  of meaningful  happiness,  an 
implication echoed by the opinion of the other characters. This meaningful project is, 
however, destroyed, and the creation of a new meaningful project begins.  
  But if this new beginning is in a sense authentic, does this mean that Anna‘s life 
before her rebirth has been inauthentic? Has she been living in bad faith, ignoring her 
true feelings? It would seem that there has indeed been some ―authentic‖ doubt in 
Anna‘s  mind  about  the  meaningfulness  of  her  previous  life  with  Karenin.  This  is 
evidenced by the disclosure of how Karenin and Anna were first bound. It is Anna‘s 
brother, Stepan, who offers an account of the ―mistake‖ of their marriage:  
 
―I‘ll begin from the beginning: you married a man twenty years older than yourself. You 
married without love or not knowing what love is. That was a mistake, let‘s assume.‖  
  ―A terrible mistake!‖ said Anna.
86 
 
Later we are also told by the narrator of the story of Karenin‘s and Anna‘s courtship:  
 
During his governorship, Anna‘s aunt, a rich provincial lady, had brought the already not-
so-young man but young governor together with her niece and put him in such a position 
that he had either to declare himself or to leave town. Alexei Alexandrovich had hesitated 
for a long time. There were then as many reasons for this step as against it, and there 
was no decisive reason that could make him abandon his rule: when in doubt, don‘t. But 
Anna‘s aunt insinuated through an acquaintance that he had already compromised the 
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girl and that he was honour-bound to propose. He proposed and gave his fiancée and 
wife all the feeling he was capable of.
87 
  
Both  Anna  and  Karenin  are  bound  together  against  their  will,  and,  as  such,  their 
marriage, and the happiness that seemingly existed between them, was essentially 
lived in bad faith and is therefore meaningless.  
  What must be noted, however, is that before the falseness of the Karenins‘ 
marriage is disclosed, there is a strong rhetorical influence of the overt narrator (again 
clearly voicing the opinions of Tolstoy) on the reader‘s evaluation of Anna‘s choice to 
have  an  affair  with  Vronsky.  The  narrator  describes  Karenin  as  having  a  ―habitual 
mocking  smile‖  and  ―big  weary  eyes,‖  such  that  not  only  is  the  hint  of  a  loveless 
marriage made, but Karenin is portrayed as incapable of being loved. What this further 
implies  is  that  instead  of  Anna‘s  choice  to  have  an  affair  being  considered  abject, 
without  value,  and  therefore  meaningless,  it  is  easily  forgiven  and  becomes 
meaningful.  
  The  overt  rhetorical  influence  of  Tolstoy  on  the  reader‘s  evaluation  of  Anna 
becomes even more evident if we consider that Tolstoy initially portrayed Karenin ―as a 
warm, sensitive soul, cultivated and kind. His main fault is sentimentality,‖
88 but, in the 
final version, is represented as ―a dried-up, self-centred, narrow-minded man, a pure 
product  of Petersburg bureaucracy. . . . He paralyses and disfigures everything he 
touches; for him, his wife is simply one item of his establishment.‖
89 It is because of this 
unflattering portrayal of Karenin that the reader can forgive Anna when, following her 
revelation, she authentically chooses to begin a relationship with Vronsky; when she 
acts upon her proper existential beginning, having previously, inauthentically refused 
Vronsky. And Tolstoy did indeed endeavour to portray Anna as a tragic figure, capable 
of  sympathy  from  the  reader.  This  is  despite  Tolstoy  initially  disliking  his  original 
construction of Anna, condemning her in the name of morality and seeing her as an 
                                                 
87 Ibid., 507. 
88 Troyat, Tolstoy, 499. 
89 Ibid., 500. Beginnings in Personal Narratives and Fiction 
  190 
―incarnation of lechery.‖ But Tolstoy began to change his attitude and gradually began 
to ―fall in love‖ with Anna and because of this, Tolstoy began to re-write Anna. He 
endeavoured to ―elevate and justify Anna‖ through her looks and actions, to the point 
that ―Anna‘s appeal owes nothing to the artifices of coquetry. A charm she is unaware 
of radiates from her body.‖
90   
  What is interesting, however, is that the reader is also told of how the other 
characters of the novel feel about this illicit relationship between Vronsky and Anna:  
 
The majority of young women, envious of Anna and long since weary of her being called 
righteous, were glad of what they surmised and only waited for the turnabout of public 
opinion to be confirmed before they fell upon her with the full weight of their scorn. They 
were already preparing the lumps of mud they would fling at her when the time came. 
The majority of older and more highly placed people were displeased by this impending 
social scandal.
91 
 
Karenin himself also elicits scorn from the Other: ―It was a very pleasant conversation. 
They were denouncing the Karenins, wife and husband.‖
92 This opinion of the other 
characters  in  the  novel  is  of  great  concern  for  Karenin  in  his  want  for  keeping  up 
appearances:  
 
  ―I  want  to  warn  you,‖  he  said  in  a  low  voice,  ―that  by  indiscretion  and  light-
mindedness you may give society occasion to talk about you. Your much too animated 
conversation tonight with Count Vronsky‖ (he articulated this name firmly and with calm 
measuredness) ―attracted attention.‖
93  
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From this statement Anna surmises to herself: ―‗He doesn‘t care,‘ she thought. ‗But 
society noticed and that troubles him.‘‖
94 Anna alludes to the inauthentic influence of 
the Other over Karenin‘s feelings towards her relationship with Vronsky and towards 
their own relationship. Anna authentically embraces her meaningful choice, whereas 
Karenin‘s concern is of his reputation and not of the unhappiness and absurdity of their 
new situation. And indeed this is very much a new situation and new life:  
 
From that evening a new life began for Alexei Alexandrovich and his wife. Nothing special 
happened. Anna went into society as always, visited Princess Betsy especially often, and 
met Vronsky everywhere. Alexei Alexandrovich saw it but could do nothing.
95 
 
A new narrative block begins and the middle of Anna‘s life ―begins‖ again, but, also, the 
story proper begins. However, what also begins is a shift from the initial one-sided, 
authoritative  evaluation  of  Anna  by  the  Other—the  Other‘s  ―filling  in‖  of  the  empty 
space  that  was  the  name  Anna—to  a  contrast  between  the  increasingly  negative 
evaluation of the objective Other, and the evaluation of the reader, who is able to know 
more of Anna‘s subjective life. Indeed, it is from here that the reader is able to interpret 
and evaluate Anna‘s life with more accuracy and equanimity than the other characters 
of Anna Karenina, as Anna is concomitantly and subjectively ―filling in‖ the empty space 
that is her name. The reader no longer judges Anna through the opinion of the Other 
but can begin to interpret and evaluate Anna‘s life from an omniscient and superior 
position. By giving Anna a subjective voice, Tolstoy gives Anna life, and gives her the 
ability to decry and, indeed, invalidate the opinion of the Other.
96 She is not a Sartrean 
―dead life‖—an object for the Other—and she is not objectively given meaning by the 
Other: she is subjectively creating meaning. Only the reader is privileged to see this 
subjectivity, and, therefore, only the reader can produce an authoritative and accurate 
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evaluation of Anna‘s life—an evaluation enabled and constructed by Tolstoy. It is this 
aspect of Tolstoy‘s methods that properly reflects John Bayley‘s description of how the 
success of an author‘s approach to the theme of love is ―closely linked with his attitude 
towards his own characters—that [an] author, in fact, is best on love who best loves his 
own  creations‖  and  who  has  ―an  attitude  towards  them  which  is  analogous  to  our 
feelings towards  those we love in life;  and an intense  interest  in their personalities 
combined with a sort of detached solicitude, a respect for their freedom.‖
97 Tolstoy, in 
his love for Anna, gives her the freedom to defend herself against her accusers. But, at 
the  same  time,  what  Tolstoy  also  effectively  does  is  give  the  reader  courage  to 
authentically evaluate Anna‘s life without being swayed by the ―they.‖ This is to say that 
instead of allowing the Other to dictate the evaluation of the meaning of Anna‘s life, 
Tolstoy enables the reader to authentically evaluate Anna‘s life and enables the reader 
to make his or her own decision as to the meaningfulness of Anna‘s choices. Anna‘s 
life with Vronsky is not meaningless because the other characters of the novel tell the 
reader that it is meaningless; the meaning of Anna‘s life is contingent on what the 
reader considers to be meaningful.      
 
Nostromo 
 
In Anna Karenina we see how the ironic mode enables the reader to evaluate Anna 
with greater accuracy and equanimity, such that the reader can separate Anna from the 
opinions of the ―they.‖ However, a second example, which similarly begins the NOW-
story after an initial, existential beginning, can be said to ―undermine‖ the subjective 
creation of meaning, and emphasise the dominance of the Other in the conferral of 
meaning. This example is the story of Nostromo (who is also known as Gian‘ Battista, 
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the  Capataz  de  Cargadores  (the  Captain  of  the  Stevedores),  and,  later,  Captain 
Fidanza) in Joseph Conrad‘s Nostromo.  
  Like Tolstoy‘s Anna Karenina, the discoursed story of Nostromo begins when 
Nostromo is of a mature age and we can assume that he has chosen a meaningful 
project for his life. Moreover, like Anna Karenina, Nostromo is very much concerned 
with questions of what makes life meaningful. As F. R. Leavis describes in The Great 
Tradition the main characters of Nostromo each  
 
[enact] a particular answer to the question that we feel working in the matter of the novel 
as a kind of informing or organising principle: what do men find to live for—what kinds of 
motive force or radical attitude can give life meaning, direction, coherence?
98  
 
In very simple terms, Nostromo‘s meaning of life centres on prestige and a desire to 
―be well spoken of.‖ This is his intended, meaningful project—a project which appears 
to have been imbedded in Nostromo‘s mind by Old Giorgio Viola (the father-figure of 
Nostromo),  who  once  told  the  then  young  Nostromo  that  ―a  good  name  .  .  .  is  a 
treasure.‖
99 It is, however, the journalist Martin Decoud who, in a letter to his sister, 
best surmises the desires of Nostromo:  
 
―The only thing [Nostromo] seems to care for, as far as I have been able to discover, is to 
be  well  spoken  of.  An  ambition  fit  for  noble  souls,  but  also  a  profitable  one  for  an 
exceptionally intelligent scoundrel. Yes. His very words, ‗To be well spoken of. Sí, señor.‘ 
He does not seem to make any difference between speaking and thinking. It is sheer 
naïveness  or  the  practical  point  of  view,  I  wonder?  Exceptional  individualities  always 
interest me, because they are true to the general formula expressing the moral state of 
humanity.‖
100 
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Nostromo‘s desires are not initially disclosed to the reader; all that is disclosed is the 
opinion of the overt third-person narrator and the other characters in the novel. The 
narrator  and  the  other  characters  of  Nostromo  serve  to  summarise  the  meaningful 
culmination of Nostromo‘s past which, as Jacques Berthoud describes, is very much 
representative of the narrative style of Nostromo, as it ―[brings] to the foreground not a 
single  protagonist  doubled  by  a  single  narrator  but  a  number  of  equally  prominent 
individuals, each of whom is repeatedly called upon to comment on his fellows.‖
101 The 
narrator describes Nostromo as an ―invaluable fellow,‖ ―a fellow in a thousand‖ (a claim 
the  narrator  uses  twice),  and  as  ―the  indispensable  man,  the  tried  and  trusty 
Nostromo.‖
102 However, these claims are not merely the sentiments of the narrator but 
all the people of the fictional town of Sulaco in which the story takes place. Indeed, 
Nostromo‘s reputation is known and avowed by many, none more so than Captain 
Mitchell (the commander of the O. S. N. Company‘s ships) who describes Nostromo as 
―a  man  absolutely  above  reproach.‖
103  The  prestigious  reputation  of  Nostromo  is 
disclosed  by  the  narrator  almost  as  if  it  were  historical  fact.  Indeed,  the  way  the 
narrator  describes  Nostromo‘s  past  is  almost  indistinguishable  from  the  way  the 
narrator  describes  Sulaco‘s  past.
104  The  implication  of  this  assimilation  is  that 
Nostromo‘s past and reputation is fixed, unquestionable, such that his reputation is 
essentially a stasis statement of what appears to be a meaningful past. 
  However, despite the appearance of the meaningfulness of Nostromo‘s past, 
there is at the heart of his project an ominous sense of absurdity. More specifically, 
there is a conspicuous disparity between Nostromo‘s meaningful intentions and the 
reality  of  the  meaninglessness  of  such  intentions.  This  absurdity  and  disparity  of 
Nostromo‘s reality is emphasised by the ironic mode of  Nostromo, which,  as F.  R. 
Leavis states, permeates all the characters of Nostromo:  
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On the whole we see the characters from the outside, and only as they belong to the 
ironic pattern—figures in the futilities of a public drama, against a dwarfing background of 
mountain and gulf.
105 
 
Nostromo desires that his life be thought of as historical, which is to say that he desires 
that his life be conferred with meaning by the Other as if it were a dead life.
106 Indeed, 
Nostromo does not necessarily act ahistorically as he chooses only to perpetuate what 
the Other thinks of him. He chooses not to alter his past. The absurdity of living in this 
manner is that he embraces exactly what ―haunts‖ existentialists such as Jean-Paul 
Sartre.  Nostromo  embraces  the  dispossession  and  alienation  of  meaning  in  death, 
believing that prestige and his being spoken well of is a ―reward‖ for his service. He 
again tells this to Decoud: 
 
  ―‗I suppose, Don Martin,‘ he began, in a thoughtful, speculative tone, ‗that the Se￱or 
Administrator of San Tom￩ will reward me some day if I save his silver?‘ 
  ―I said that it could not be otherwise, surely. He walked on, muttering to himself. ‗Sí, 
sí, without doubt, without doubt; and, look you, Señor Martin, what it is to be well spoken 
of! There is not another man that could have been even thought of for such a thing. I shall 
get something great for it some day. And let it come soon,‘ he mumbled. ‗Time passes in 
this country as quick as anywhere else.‘‖
107  
 
Nostromo believes that being ―spoken well of‖ is a reward for his good deeds; however, 
in reality, the contrary is true: he himself will inevitably become a ―gift‖ for the Other as 
in death the Other confers meaning onto life. And Nostromo does indeed embrace his 
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death,  he  desires  death,  as  is  understood  by  the  emphasis  he  places  on  what  he 
believes will be his last great act: saving the silver of the San Tomé mine from the 
insurgent Sotillo. To save the silver he must transport it on a lighter to the Isabels and 
bury it in the foothills, a most fatal venture. Nostromo says of this act: ―I am going to 
make it the most famous and desperate affair of my life. . . . It shall be talked about 
when the little children are grown up and the grown men are old.‖
108 But, again it is 
Decoud who best summarises Nostromo‘s desires: ―Here was a man . . . that seemed 
as though he would have preferred to die rather than deface the perfect form of his 
egoism.‖
109 Nostromo‘s mission to save the silver is to be the culminating event of his 
life of prestige and remembrance; and it is to be the finale of a life lived in favour of 
others. This is the tragic absurdity of Nostromo‘s project.  
  And it is this tragedy which is also emphasised by the ironic mode of Nostromo. 
This emphasis is evidenced in the discursive beginning of Nostromo when, in one of 
the first incidents of the NOW-story, the first ―contrary‖ voice to Nostromo‘s reputation 
is heard—a voice which, like that of the narrator, is heard before the voice of Nostromo 
is first heard. It is here that the reader first hears a conflicting opinion of Nostromo‘s 
intentions to those of the narrator—the ―authoritative‖ spokesperson for the people of 
Sulaco. This event takes place during of one of the frequent revolutions of Sulaco, at 
the casa Viola, home to Old Giorgio, his wife, Signora Teresa, and their two daughters, 
Linda and Giselle. Barricaded in their home, and sensing the imminent danger of their 
predicament, Signora Teresa begins to moan: ―Oh! Gian‘ Battista, why art thou not 
here? Oh! why art thou not here?‖
110 Her husband reprimands his wife: 
 
  ―Peace, woman! Where‘s the sense of it? There‘s his duty,‖ he murmured in the 
dark; and she would retort, panting— 
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  ―Eh! I have no patience. Duty! What of the woman who has been like a mother to 
him? I bent my knee to him this morning; don‘t you go out, Gian‘ Battista—stop in the 
house, Battistino—look at those two little innocent children!‖
111 
   
And yet Nostromo (whom the Viola‘s believe, because of his reputation, will save them) 
does not come, prompting Signora Teresa to declare: ―I know him. He thinks of nobody 
but  himself.‖
112  Signora  Teresa  makes  the  first  disparaging  remarks  against  the 
reputation  of  Nostromo  (seemingly  a  singular  opinion
113),  casting  doubt  on  the 
―success‖  of  his  intentions.  However,  contrary  to  Signora  Teresa‘s  claims,  the 
omniscient narrator tells the reader: ―All the morning Nostromo had kept his eye from 
afar on the Casa Viola, even in the thick of the hottest scrimmage near the Custom 
House.‖
114 When chance permits, Nostromo arrives with a shout and a shot from his 
revolver: 
 
His  voice  had  penetrated  to  them,  sounding  breathlessly  hurried,  ―Hola!  Vecchio!  O, 
Vecchio! Is it all well with you in there?‖ 
  ―You see—‖ murmured old Viola to his wife. 
  Signora Teresa was silent now. Outside Nostromo laughed. 
  ―I can hear the padrona is not dead.‖ 
  ―You have done your best to kill me with fear,‖ cried Signora Teresa. She wanted to 
say something more, but her voice failed her. 
  Linda  raised  her  eyes  to  her  face  for  a  moment,  but  old  Giorgio  shouted 
apologetically— 
  ―She is a little upset.‖ 
  Outside Nostromo shouted back with another laugh—  
  ―She cannot upset me.‖ 
  Signora Teresa found her voice. 
  ―It is what I say. You have no heart—and you have no conscience, Gian‘ Battista—‖ 
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  They heard him wheel his horse away from the shutters. The party he led  were 
babbling excitedly in Italian and Spanish, inciting each other to the pursuit. He put himself 
at their head, crying, ―Avanti!‖ 
  ―He has not stopped very long with us. There is no praise from strangers to be got 
here,‖ Signora Teresa said tragically. ―Avanti! Yes! That is all he cares for. To be first 
somewhere—somehow—to  be  first  with  these  English.  They  will  be  showing  him  to 
everybody. ‗This is our Nostromo!‘‖ She laughed ominously. ―What a name! What is that? 
Nostromo? He would take a name that is properly no word from them.‖
115  
 
The  omniscient  narrator  maintains  Nostromo‘s  reputation;  and  yet,  in this  passage, 
Signora Teresa‘s disparaging voice is again heard. This is significant as it enables her 
to illuminate two important aspects of Nostromo‘s character: the first is that Nostromo is 
not altruistic as his brave actions are done not to aid those in trouble but to earn him 
praise; and secondly, that the name Nostromo was given to him by Captain Mitchell. 
The latter is significant if we consider that the name Nostromo is a corruption of the two 
Italian phrases, nostro uomo, which means ―our man,‖ and il nostromo, which in galley 
terminology refers to a ―boatswain.‖
116 For Captain Mitchell and the English/Europeans, 
who have come to mine the silver of the San Tom￩ mine, Nostromo is ―their man‖—
Nostromo belongs to them such that he is no longer a ―being-with‖ others but a ―being-
for-others.‖ Indeed, he is well spoken of in the sense that one speaks well of a fine 
piece of machinery, which is to say that his value is the same as that which is attributed 
to material things; and so too is Nostromo a commodity. He is an invaluable fellow, but 
invaluable  for  others.  Indeed,  Captain  Mitchell  even  boasts  of  his  discovery  of 
Nostromo  and  also  states:  ―The  fellow  is  devoted  to  me,  body  and  soul!‖
117  Here, 
Nostromo‘s value rests on his unquestioned loyalty to Captain Mitchell. What is more, 
Captain  Mitchell  ―lends‖  Nostromo  to  others  including  the  Engineer  who  similarly 
describes Nostromo as ―a most useful fellow, lent me by Captain Mitchell of the O. S. 
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N. Company. It was very good of Mitchell. Charles Gould told me I couldn‘t do better 
than take advantage of the offer.‖
118 Nostromo does not exist as a being for-itself but 
exists as a being in-itself. His life is a meaningless life, lived in bad-faith. But, again, 
Nostromo seemingly embraces becoming an object for others and embraces a loss of 
individuality and subjectivity of meaning.    
  Unlike the story of Anna Karenina, Nostromo does not have an ―immediate,‖ 
secondary existential beginning which effects a change in his understanding of the 
meaning of his past. Indeed, what can be interpreted by the reader as being the ―static‖ 
meaninglessness of Nostromo‘s past life is maintained for a great part of the novel‘s 
discourse. Nostromo accumulates the events of his life—he is almost monomaniacal as 
he does not change the direction of the action of his story or the novel‘s story. More 
importantly the events of his life seemingly involve no real choice—his choices are 
predetermined by his reputation. This is evidenced by the event following Nostromo‘s 
being asked to undertake the mission to save the silver of the mine, when Signora 
Teresa (who has become very ill and whose death is imminent) begs Nostromo to fetch 
her a priest. Here, Nostromo is faced with a choice which, in itself, can be seen as a 
significant kernel event of Nostromo‘s story, particularly because he is confronted with 
a  choice  to  either  maintain  his  chosen  project  (his  reputation)  or  fetch  a  priest  for 
Teresa. For Nostromo, however, the choice is no choice at all: he refuses to fetch a 
priest  readily  and  without  question  or  deliberation—his  mind  is  already  made  up, 
thereby  diffusing  the  event  as  a  kernel  or  as  a  branch  of  possibilities  and  new 
beginnings. Indeed, it is because of his reputation that Nostromo must undertake this 
project: his reputation determines his choice, such that the mission of saving the silver 
of the mine was inevitable. Moreover, his act of saving the silver will assumedly be 
praised by many; in contrast, the choice to help a dying woman, whose singular, lonely 
voice of praise will soon be silenced by her death, would not elicit the same wealth of 
praise. Indeed, to invert the proverb ―Of the dead, speak no ill,‖ it is in Nostromo‘s 
interest  that  ―the  dead  speak  no  ill.‖  The  implication  of  maintaining  the  stasis  of 
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Nostromo‘s past by accumulating these events within the NOW-story is that, unlike 
Anna Karenina‘s past choices, Nostromo‘s past choices have corporeal conviction as 
we hear and see the present events of the NOW-story as they occur within the pages. 
This is to say that unlike Anna‘s past choices, Nostromo‘s undiscoursed past choices 
become more credible and believable. Only after Nostromo saves the silver does he 
experience what can be described as an existential beginning, an Augenblick, which, 
as will be described in the following chapter, is analogous to the ―middle‖ event of the 
Aristotelian plot.  
    
Seriousness and Secondary Existential Beginnings 
 
It would be difficult to make any definitive generalisations from the examples discussed 
above of the meaning of the different combinations of beginnings; however, one broad 
generalisation which can be tentatively made is that there is a historical trend of a 
movement away from the coinciding of the discursive beginning of the story with the 
biological  beginning  of  character,  to  discursive  beginnings  which  begin  after  a 
character‘s  formative  years  or  after  a  character‘s  first  existential  beginning.  This  is 
particularly  evident  in  the  late-Victorian  novels  and  the  modernist  novel  where  the 
secondary  Augenblicke  of a character‘s life  is often the primary event/action of the 
story.  Indeed,  the  stories  of  the  novels  of  the  late  Victorians  often  begin  in  the 
characters‘ adulthood and concerned itself with adulthood. This can also be said to 
represent an increase in the ―seriousness‖ of the late Victorian novel, particularly in 
terms of its themes and questions, and its examination of the more serious problems of 
―adult‖  life.  In  The  English  Novel  Walter  Allen  claims  that  English  writers  such  as 
George Eliot and European writers such as Flaubert, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy wrote 
with far greater intent and seriousness.
119 Allen argues that Dostoyevsky especially 
reflected this seriousness:  
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Dostoyevsky,  with  his tremendous subject-matter of man in relation to God, is plainly 
using the novel with a depth of seriousness quite beyond anything the early Victorians 
proposed for it. 
  The seriousness of these European writers was both moral and aesthetic; it is not 
always a simple matter to distinguish one from the other.
120 
 
One  need  only  look  to  Dostoyevsky‘s  The  Brothers  Karamazov  and  Crime  and 
Punishment to understand the seriousness alluded to by Allen. Indeed, in the latter, the 
reader  is  immediately  thrown  into  a  dire  situation,  when,  in  the  first  few  pages, 
Raskolnikoff, who is contemplating murdering Alena Ivanovna (the woman he is in debt 
to),  asks  himself:  ―Can  I  really  be  capable  of  that?‖
121  Raskolnikoff  recognises  the 
severity of his possible actions but also the implications of his choices. In contrast, 
some  of  the  novels  of  writers  such  as  Charles  Dickens  often  lack  this  depth  of 
existential seriousness. As F. R. Leavis says of Dickens in The Great Tradition:  
 
That Dickens was a great genius and is permanently among the classics is certain. But 
the genius was that of a great entertainer, and he had for the most part no profounder 
responsibility  as  a  creative  artist  than  this  description  suggests.  Praising  him 
magnificently  in  Soliloquies  in  England,  Santayana,  in  concluding,  says:  ―In  every 
English-speaking home, in the four quarters of the globe, parents and children would do 
well to read Dickens aloud of a winter‘s evening.‖ This note is right and significant. The 
adult mind doesn‘t as a rule find in Dickens a challenge to an unusual and sustained 
seriousness.
122   
 
Leavis‘s  (clearly  biased)  opinion  is  that  the  shivering  reader  is  looking  to  adult 
characters to help understand the problems and questions of the meaning of life. Only 
characters  that  have  experienced  ―true‖  beginnings,  whose  lives  have  become 
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problematic, and who reflect the same questions and anxieties of the shivering reader 
are valuable to the shivering reader.
123 From the examples discussed above, we find a 
particular lack of seriousness in the trivial stories of  Lazarillo  De  Tormes  and  Moll 
Flanders.  Indeed,  the  Augenblick  of  Jane  Eyre  also  lacks  a  sense  of  seriousness. 
Franco Moretti goes so far as to question whether Jane Eyre and Great Expectations 
are  essentially  fairy  tales,  citing  Bruno  Bettleheim‘s  definition  of  the  fairy  tale  as 
―[beginning] with the hero at the mercy of those who think little of him and his abilities, 
who mistreat him and even threaten his life . . .‖ Moretti claims that ―this is the basic 
predicament  (if  not  always  the  starting  point)  of  every  protagonist  of  the  English 
Bildungsroman.‖
124 Jane Eyre is the exemplar Bildungsroman protagonist as she is, 
from the very beginning, at the mercy of her Aunt Reed and her cousins. Indeed, this 
same starting point is essentially repeated over and over in the picaresque novel, such 
that each episode begins at a terrible starting point. What is more, Jane Eyre and Great 
Expectations are characterised by extreme paradigmatic oppositions such as good and 
evil—characteristics which dominate a child‘s mind and which are also particular to the 
fairy tale:  
 
Childlike, and fairy-tale-like, is the belief that such a judgment [of right and wrong] can be 
made always and everywhere; that it is, in the end, the only meaningful type of judgment. 
When this happens—as it does in these fairy-tale novels [such as Jane Eyre and Great 
Expectations]—the standards of common morality invade every page and every action: 
the world has meaning only if it is relentlessly divided into good and evil.
125  
 
Whether or not these novels can be regarded as fairy tales, it can be said that their 
stories  and  characters  lack  a  certain  ―depth‖—a  certain  seriousness  and  intensity 
desired by the ―adult,‖ shivering reader, particularly in terms of the choices that the 
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characters  make  as  they  do  not  carry  the  weight  of  consequence  of  action  or  the 
weight of consciousness of the facticity of death. Compare the existential beginnings of 
Stan  Parker  who  is  anxiously  facing  an  unknown  future;  consider  the  suicidal 
tendencies of Ishmael prompting him towards an existential beginning; consider the 
repercussions of Anna Karenina‘s existential beginning, such as her exclusion from 
society and her tragic death; and consider the fatalistic nature of Nostromo‘s ―most 
desperate affair.‖ These examples are valuable to the shivering reader purely because, 
for the shivering reader, the question of the meaning of life is a serious matter and 
should be treated as such. Indeed, for Albert Camus, understanding the question of the 
meaning of life is a matter of life and death—the existentially anxious reader is, for 
Camus, essentially a ―suicidal‖ reader.     
  But an even more poignant reason why the youth of fictional characters in the 
modernist novel is elided, and the Augneblicke of adult life becomes a more prominent 
focus of the story, is the aftermath of the Great War. As Moretti describes: 
 
If one wonders about the disappearance of the novel of youth, then, the youth of 1919—
maimed, shocked, speechless, decimated—provide quite a clear answer. We tend to see 
social and political history as a creative influence on literary evolution, yet its destructive 
role may be just as relevant. If history can make cultural forms necessary, it can make 
them impossible as well, and this is what the war did to the Bildungsroman.
126 
 
The Great War changed all and instead of creating a possibility of new beginnings—
new  individual  experiences  and  existence—it  shattered  them;  the  becoming  of 
individuality—of maturity and adulthood—felt tainted and unfulfilled and could no longer 
be written.  
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Beginnings and the Postmodern Novel 
 
The novels examined thus far have all exhibited Kermode‘s plot structure of tick-tock 
inasmuch as the beginning (the tick) creates the expectation of an ending (the tock). 
These novels are essentially realist in their structure and thus conform to this simple 
model. However, as was described above, Docherty and Heise both argue that this is 
not applicable to modern or postmodern fiction, and, indeed, the narrative blocks of 
beginnings, middles, and ends are very difficult to isolate or embed in a ―geometric‖ 
structure. As Docherty writes, this is especially the case for postmodern fictions: 
 
Instead of the ―open-ended‖ fiction which begs for its completion or closure by the reader, 
we  have  an  ―open-beginning‖  fiction,  which  demands  not  closure,  but  rather  a 
discontinuous series of re-beginnings on the part of the reader. As such, the reader is not 
allowed to rest in one single completed interpretation of the fiction; instead, the reading 
subject is placed in a position of subjectivity from which to inaugurate new beginnings. In 
terms  of  ―character,‖  the  reader  may  not  rest  in  one  meaningful  description  of  the 
―characters‖ of the text, but must intersubjectively inaugurate with them new beginnings 
of his or her own subjectivity. Here, the complementary ―tock‖ to Kermode‘s ―tick‖ never 
appears. . . . There is no ―sense of an ending,‖ for there is no ending, only beginnings.
127  
 
To illustrate Docherty‘s claims we can look to the ―postmodern‖ literature of the absurd 
which has its foundations in Samuel Beckett and the French Theatre of the Absurd, 
and  in  other  post-World  War  II  American  writers,  such  as  Thomas  Pynchon,  Kurt 
Vonnegut, and John Barth.
128 Absurdist fiction is especially pertinent for the present 
argument as both existentialists and absurdists share the same understanding of the 
principles  of  the  absurdity  of  the  human  situation ;  they  differ,  however,  in  their 
approach to the ―aftermath‖ of the recognition of this absurdity, specifically in relation to 
the freedom and possibilities of the individual: where the existentialists strive ―against‖ 
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absurdity  by  choosing  meaningful  projects  (which  have  existential  beginnings)  and 
endeavour  to  make  their  lives  meaningful  in  the  face  of  meaninglessness,  the 
absurdists‘ task is to dramatise the absurdity of life and emphasise the fact that our 
existence is doomed to failure. Further, absurdists dramatise the limits of our freedom, 
and, particularly through the use of black humour, reflect the grim and pathetic way in 
which we hold on to our sense of freedom.
129 Indeed, this contrast of existential and 
absurdist thinking is also useful to illustrate the value of realist fiction (what we may call 
existential fiction)  to the shivering reader   as opposed to   some  early  postmodern 
(absurd) fiction.  
  The  absurdist‘s  understanding  of  beginnings  is  exemplified  in  the  novels  of 
Thomas  Pynchon,  particularly  The  Crying  of  Lot  49  (1965)  and  Gravity’s  Rainbow 
(1973). Pynchon‘s novels do not exhibit the realist novel‘s geometric structure; instead, 
they are structured such that there are only ―beginnings‖ (a sequence of ticks) with no 
real endings, such that they purposefully frustrate the expectations of the reader. We 
see this in the story of Oedipa Maas—the unwitting executrix of the estate of Pierce 
Inverarity—in Pynchon‘s The Crying of Lot 49. What proceeds is a very mysterious 
journey, which may or may not have been invented by Oedipa‘s paranoia. As Tony 
Thwaites explains, Oedipa‘s story is based on false starts and flawed beginnings: 
 
At the very beginning of the text, there is a suspension, the enigma of the title: The Crying 
of Lot 49. Follow the course of the plot, or at least the regular process of a line of type 
through the volume, and  at the very  end of the text the enigma is repeated: ―Oedipa 
settled  back,  to  await  the  crying  of  lot  49.‖  Not  resolved,  but  repeated,  and  even 
complicated in this repetition. . . . Instead of being a passage between a question and its 
answer—endpoints of a single trajectory, which is the parabola of the Same‘s gravity—
the  plot  is  an  eddy  where  every  point  sinks,  is  lost,  returns  newly  problematised  in 
difference at every turn. . . . There are no answers, only multiplications of the problem in 
a resonating network of repetitions, each affirming all the others, and all affirming that plot 
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which separates them and yet binds them as that increasingly impossible and desperate 
hypothesis,  the  Tristero.  Here  everything  is  all  false  starts  and  false  endings  which 
bottom out.
130 
 
What the reader finds in Oedipa is paranoia and delusion and flawed plotting. This is 
not to say that Oedipa‘s paranoia is not justified,
131 and it not to say that she does not 
have a meaningful project of sorts: she is trying to solve the mystery of the Tristero , 
and  she  undertakes  th is  project  relentlessly,  seriously.  But  the  mystery  remains 
unsolved—undetermined, open. And, thus, the reader finds in Oedipa an emptiness—
an absence of wisdom. This is not to say that Oedipa is not ―wise‖—it is to say that she 
does  not  ―experience‖  the  revelation  of  closure  and  endings,  and  therefore  cannot 
impart these revelations to the reader. This is similar to many characters of the absurd; 
and it is because of this, it can be argued that the literature of the absurd in a sense 
takes  to  the  extreme  a  lack  of  counsel  for  the  shivering  reader—counsel  which 
Benjamin claims was once offered by the pre-modern storyteller, and sought by the 
modern reader. The texts may be considered aesthetically ―valuable,‖ and they are 
unquestionably  very  important  literary  works,  but  they  lack  the  value  of  revelatory 
wisdom  expected  and  yielded  from  novels  such  as  those  of  the  realist  tradition. 
Pynchon‘s Gravity’s Rainbow similarly denies the reader wisdom, and serves only to 
reinforce  the  sense  of  the  unknown  and  unknowable.  This  stems  from  the  lack  of 
closure, or, as Heise comments, from the ―indeterminacy‖ of Gravity’s Rainbow: 
 
As  the  narrative  progresses,  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  for  both  characters  and 
readers to construct any plot pattern or underlying meaning for the phenomena they are 
confronted with. This indeterminacy is not settled or clarified even by the ending of the 
novel:  quite  literally,  Gravity’s  Rainbow  is  a  novel  whose  plot  gradually  vanishes, 
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disintegrating  into  a  multitude  of  episodes  and  characters  that  might  or  might  not  be 
connected with each other.
132 
 
In Gravity’s Rainbow  personal narratives are void of endings and closure and thus 
deny the reader meaningful revelations, which, again, are expected by the shivering 
reader.  
  The denial of endings and closure is also a major theme in Laurence Sterne‘s 
The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy and Salman Rushdie‘s Midnight’s Children—
two novels which exhibit many of the hallmarks of postmodern fiction. The desires and 
expectations of the shivering reader are constantly frustrated by the disruptions and 
interruptions within the two texts. Indeed, like The Crying of Lot 49, Tristram Shandy 
does  not  really  have  a  beginning,  but  many  beginnings,  none  of  which  are  really 
―existential,‖ and none of which ever  really  begins in the first place. Instead, these 
beginnings are continually interrupted and frustrated, such that the writing strategy of 
Tristam Shandy can be described as ―retardation through incompletion‖: 
 
At all levels of Tristram Shandy, nothing is completed. Walter‘s encyclopaedia is never 
written. The novel begins with a description of the coitus interruptus which brings Tristram 
into the world. The central narrative is never finished because it is continually punctuated 
by descriptions of events whose relevance to the main story is apparent only to Tristram 
himself.
133 
 
The consequence of the incompletion of the many beginnings of Tristram Shandy is 
that it also frustrates the reader‘s sense of closure in the novel for there is no tock to 
complete tick of tick-tock. The novel cannot provide the shivering reader with warmth 
through closure.  
  We find a similar method of frustration of expectation in Midnight’s Children: the 
fictional author Saleem Sinai intersperses his story with discussions on the physical 
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process of writing his story—discussions which are comically illuminated by his first 
respondent  Padma  and  her  intermittent  interruptions.  The  shivering  reader  of 
Midnight’s Children is reflected in Padma: she wants a simple, autobiographical story, 
which is both linear and causal—a story from ―the universe of what-happened-next.‖
134 
And  she  also  wants  a  singular,  identifiable,  personal  narrative,  structured  by  its 
meaningful events—the choices of meaningful projects, and actions which create the 
intended meaning of these projects. But despite Padma‘s cajoling of Saleem to ―get a 
move  on,‖  he  cannot  satisfy  this  desire:  he  must  write  multiple  plots,  multiple 
histories.
135 Indeed, as Saleem explicitly states: ―I have been a swallower of lives; and 
to know me, just the one of me, you‘ll have to swallow the lot as well.‖
136 There is 
always more to his story as all his and others stories ―leak‖ into  each other. They 
cannot be separated, but are interwoven and intertextual, creating no coherence or 
unity.  And  so  the  shivering  reader‘s  and  Padma‘s  desires  and  expectations  must 
remain incomplete and frustrated.  
  Another important recurring theme of postmodern literature, which undermines 
its value to the shivering reader relates to the narrator‘s method of introducing and 
naming characters, which, as has been discussed, is very important for beginning the 
character‘s  existence:  the  giving  of  a  proper  name  to  a  character  instantiates  the 
existential beginning of the character and initiates the beginning of meaning. Further, 
the character‘s name, once instantiated, is expected to be maintained throughout the 
text,  thereby  uniting  the  identity  and  the  wholeness  of  the  character.  However,  in 
postmodern fiction, this is not necessarily the case. As was described above in the 
discussion on the ethics of alterity, postmodern fiction endeavours to undermine the 
unity and fixed identity of its characters. The identity of characters purposefully shifts— 
an effect which is achieved through various narrative techniques such as the repetition 
of  names  for  different  characters,  or  by  giving  a  single  character  a  number  of 
pseudonyms. As such, the shivering reader cannot pin down and derive meaning from 
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the manifold identities of the ―individual‖ character. A similar problem occurs for the 
reader  of  Nathalie  Sarraute‘s  fiction,  notably  in  Tropisms  (1939)—a  book  which  is 
made up of a ―series of moments‖
137 and in which no proper names are given to the 
characters. As Docherty writes: ―[Sarraute] sees only the name‘s quality as a label, and 
therefore thinks of it as in some way fixative upon her characters and their freedom, 
and by implication their life, or lifelikeness.‖
138 Here we are reminded of Sartre‘s claim 
that ―so long as I live, I can give the lie to what others discover in me.‖ If you cannot 
name a character then you cannot give that character a fixed meaning. However, what 
Sarraute‘s technique does by avoiding the pinning down of a character‘s identity is 
undermine the shivering reader‘s expectations as he or she cannot assume that the 
unity of a character‘s identity exists. More importantly, it disrupts the connection of the 
existential beginning of a meaningful life to the revelatory ending of that life. This is an 
unwelcome disruption for the shivering reader as he or she is looking to characters for 
wisdom and instruction; the shivering reader is looking to complete and meaningful 
characters for warmth, which is made possible by the realists‘ representation of their 
characters‘ meaningful projections and revelations which are united by the characters‘ 
singular identities.  
  It  is  also  in  a  more  recent  postmodern  novel—Don  DeLillo‘s  Falling  Man 
(2007)—that we find an alternative purpose for the technique of external focalisation 
where a character is unnamed for a period and his or her identity is problematic—a 
technique  used  to  great  effect  in  White‘s  The  Tree  of  Man  for  emphasising  Stan 
Parker‘s  existential  beginning.  DeLillo‘s  novel  begins  with  the  story  of  Keith 
Neudecker—a  lawyer  who  was  working  in  the  northern  tower  of  the  World  Trade 
Center when the 9/11 attacks happened. In the first chapter, Keith is not named: we 
are only introduced to an anonymous man emerging from the rubble of the fallen Twin 
Towers: 
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It was not a street anymore but a world, a time and space of falling ash and near night. 
He  was  walking  north  through  rubble  and  mud  and  there  were  people  running  past 
holding towels to their faces or jackets over their heads. They had handkerchiefs pressed 
to their mouths. They had shoes in their hands, a woman with a shoe in each hand, 
running past him. . . .  
  He  wore  a  suit  and  carried  a  briefcase.  There  was  glass  in  his  hair  and  face, 
marbled bolls of blood and light. He walked past a Breakfast Special sign and they went 
running by, city cops and security guards running, hands pressed down on gun butts to 
keep the weapons steady.
139 
 
The man remains unnamed throughout the first chapter and only in the second chapter 
does his identity begin to emerge (even then indirectly) through the dialogue of other 
characters, notably his estranged wife Lianne and her mother. What is significant about 
this  example  is  it  appears  to  be  the  reverse  of  an  existential  beginning:  it  is  a 
disintegration of identity. Indeed, Keith has children, is divorced, has a job, and he has 
character traits—he has a ―meaningful‖ life that we can assume he has created. But as 
he walks away from the rubble, the shell-shocked Keith is drawn towards his estranged 
wife‘s  apartment—he  ―regresses‖  to  his  past  life  and  past  identity.  Here,  however, 
Keith‘s  loss  of  identity  symbolises  much  more  than  one  individual‘s  existence,  one 
man‘s story: it symbolises a loss of ―identity‖ for America—the ―disconnect between 
America‘s self-image and its image in the eyes of the world.‖
140 It is a novel in which all 
the characters‘ identities begin to disintegrate:  
 
Falling Man describes numerous psychic projections and identifications. But in the novel, 
everyone is falling. All identities are either confused (Keith's son thinks bin Laden's name 
is Bill Lawton) or double (Martin Ridnour is Ernst Hechinger) or merging (Hammad with 
Atta) or failing (the Alzheimer's patients; Lianne's father and mother).
141  
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The  9/11  attacks  also  mark  an  end  of  progression,  of  a  future—a  claim  which  is 
somewhat evidenced in a conversation between Lianne and her mother: 
 
  ―What‘s next? Don‘t you ask yourself? Not only next month. Years to come.‖ 
  ―Nothing is next. There is no next. This was next. Eight years ago they planted a 
bomb in one of the towers. Nobody said what‘s next. This was next. The time to be afraid 
is when there‘s no reason to be afraid. Too late now.‖
142  
 
The future has become an unknown and the idea of plot has collapsed. One cannot 
predict what is next as there is no ―next.‖ Moreover, one cannot expect the tock of tick-
tock because both the ticks of the metanarrative of progression (a ―big‖ narrative) and 
the projection of Keith‘s life (a ―little‖ narrative) appear static, deferred, even regressive. 
Again this undermines the shivering reader‘s desire for unity and meaning and merely 
reaffirms the shivering reader‘s anxiety about his or her own meaning.  
 
We have seen how the novels of differing periods of fiction begin in a variety of ways. 
However, with the exception of postmodern novels such as those of Sterne, Pynchon, 
Rushdie, and DeLillo, where beginnings are indeterminate and problematic, what these 
novels  each  have  in  common  is  a  clearly  identifiable  middle—the  part of  the  story 
which  follows  the  ―first‖  beginning  and  which  is  essentially  the  greater  discursive 
―volume‖ of the realist novel. Indeed, we can ask what the future will hold for Jane Eyre 
and Moll Flanders after their respective existential beginnings just as we can ask what 
the future will hold for Nostromo, Anna Karenina, Ishmael, and Stan Parker after their 
respective  existential  beginnings.  Each  character  must  continue  to  choose  and  act 
regardless of their choices—their discursive beginnings. In the following chapter we will 
examine the structure of ―middles‖ in terms of these future choices and actions which 
comprise the middle of the novel and how they inevitably lead to the revealed meaning 
of the characters‘ lives—the end of their personal narratives. We will also examine how 
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these choices and actions create and shape the meaning of the characters‘ lives. And 
we will also consider how the characters‘ choices and actions, and the rhetoric of the 
novelists‘ choice to include or exclude the characters‘ choices and actions, also shape 
the reader‘s evaluation of the characters‘ meanings.  
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5 
 The Middle as the Shaping of 
Meaning  
 
Since freedom is a being-without-support and without-a-springboard, the project in 
order to be must be constantly renewed. 
                  —Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 
 
 
f the incidents of our biological birth and biological death are the first and last events 
of  our  lives—the  beginning  and  the  end  of  our  lives—then  the  greater  temporal 
volume of our lives is the duration between these boundaries—the middle part, the 
period in which we live and exist for the most part. However, as was suggested above, 
the middle of our personal narratives does not begin with our biological birth but begins 
at, or a moment after, our first existential beginning—our ―true‖ beginning—and ends at 
the moment—the event—of our death.
1 The middle begins when the basic path of our 
intended meaningful projects has been chosen and clearly (or vaguely) mapped out 
and the first anxious steps are made to create this intended meaning. But, as has been 
described in the ―Introduction‖ above, the freedom to create our life‘s meaning does not 
necessarily  give  meaning  to  our  lives.  As  Jean-Paul  Sartre  claims,  our  intended 
meaningful projects only attain their meaning through a future end. The first choice of a 
meaningful  project  does  not  create  meaning—it  is  a  projection  and  we  must  move 
towards meaning; to choose is to set a meaningful project in motion towards revelation. 
But  if  we  are  condemned  to  choose,  then  we  are  also  condemned  to  continually 
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choose our meaningful projects. Only by continually choosing our projects and actions 
can we successfully create and achieve the intended meaning of our projects. What 
this further suggests  is that we are not  compelled  to continually choose this initial, 
intended meaning inasmuch as our past choices do not make either our present or 
future  choices  necessary—our  past  projects  do  not  dictate  our  present  or  future 
projects. Indeed, the middle of our lives is not homogenised or uniform—one choice 
does not yield a clear, definitive meaning. The meanings of our choices are uncertain 
until they are revealed. Moreover, our choices are contingent: our chosen projects may 
come  to  an  end  (willingly  or  unwillingly,  successfully  or  not)  and  new  choices  of 
projects,  new  beginnings,  are  necessarily  made.  Once  again,  the  example  of  the 
character of Anna Karenina best illustrates this contingency of choice and intention: 
Anna  negates  her  past,  intended  project  (she  ends  her  marriage  to  Karenin)  and 
begins a new project (her new life with Vronsky). Like Anna, we too have the freedom 
to negate our past, and we too are free to choose new, meaningful projects. Indeed, we 
may ―come up for air‖ in the midst of our projects and pause to survey the direction and 
the meaningfulness of our projects; survey where we have been and where we are 
going. This is also to say that we may find opportunity to summon ourselves from our 
everyday mode of inauthenticity—the everydayness of our lives and our projects—such 
that  we  can  authentically  re-evaluate  our  situation.  Anna  Karenina  dwells  in  the 
inauthentic  everydayness  of  her  loveless  marriage  with  Karenin  and  it  takes  her 
encounter with Vronsky to rouse her from this everydayness such that she begins to 
authentically see the meaninglessness of her past life and consequently choose a new 
beginning. These claims are again very similar to Nietzsche‘s claim that in order to see 
ourselves as heroes we must distance ourselves from what is closest at hand—the 
foreground—and see the larger picture—the meaning of our whole lives and not merely 
the immediate. In the same way we must distance ourselves to see if the hero we are 
becoming is indeed the hero we intend to become. Thus, we can say that the middle of The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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our  personal  narratives  is  an  existence  in  continual  flux  between  authenticity  and 
inauthenticity, between reflection and choice and action.
2   
  But to say that we may choose new, secondary beginnings does not negate or 
diminish  the  claim  that  a  meaningful  life  comes  from  a  whole  life,  nor  does  it 
necessarily  affirm the  postmodern  understanding  of  the  contingency  of  identity  and 
meaning.  Once  again  we  are  reminded  of  David  Cooper‘s  claim  that  ―a  heroic 
martyrdom [cannot] turn an otherwise worthless existence into a triumphant one‖; nor 
does a new meaningful beginning, in its negation or supersession of past beginnings, 
make a whole life meaningful. The middle of our personal narratives is comprised of all 
our new choices and new beginnings, including all of our lesser choices and projects. It 
is the combination of both the major and minor choices and projects—the kernel and 
satellite events of our personal narratives—that comprise the whole of our lives and 
give shape to our whole lives. This is also to say that the middle is comprised of all our 
contingent identities which combine to create a unified, whole and meaningful identity 
which, as Benjamin claims, is revealed only in dying. 
 
Middles and Fiction  
 
How then do we describe the middle of the fictional plot? As we have done in previous 
chapters,  we  can  begin  by  again  looking  at  Aristotle‘s  definition  of  plot,  more 
specifically his definition of the complex plot which ―is symbolised schematically by a 
line that abruptly changes direction.‖
3 This abrupt change is essentially the middle of 
the complex plot and is the result of an incident which is either a reversal (peripeteia), 
or a recognition (anagnorisis). As O. B. Hardison explains:  
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Reversal is a relatively simple concept. It is ―a change of fortune in the action of the play 
to the opposite state of affairs.‖ An action seems to be proceeding toward success and 
suddenly  veers  off  in  the  direction  of  misfortune. We  can  call  this  type  of  plot  ―fatal-
complex.‖  .  .  .  Alternately,  an  action  seems  to  be  proceeding  toward  misfortune  and 
suddenly veers off in the direction of happiness. This type of plot is ―fortunate-complex.‖ . 
. . 
  ―Recognition‖ is a more difficult concept. The introductory definition is fairly broad. It 
is  ―a  change  from  ignorance  to  knowledge‖;  it  results  in  ―friendship  or  .  .  .  hostility‖ 
between agents involved in an action; and it is ―most effective‖ when it is closely related 
to a reversal.
4 
 
The story of the character Nostromo exemplifies the Aristotelian complex plot insofar 
as the ―middle,‖ or, better, the middle narrative block, culminates at an event which is 
both  a  reversal  and  a  discovery  or  self-recognition.  This  event  immediately  follows 
Nostromo‘s successful mission to save the silver  of the mine—his ―most  desperate 
affair.‖ As the story goes, Nostromo and Decoud (who has accompanied Nostromo on 
the mission) succeed in making it to the Isabels alive and manage to hide the silver in 
its foothills; however, the story told to the insurgent Sotillo by Hirsch (a stowaway on 
the lighter) is that Nostromo and Decoud have both drowned in a collision with another 
vessel, and that the silver has been lost to the sea—a story which soon dissipates 
across the wider community. That Nostromo is assumed to be dead is significant for 
several reasons. The first is the confirmation of Nostromo‘s ―value‖ to the Europeans: 
Captain Mitchell‘s first thoughts upon hearing of Nostromo‘s death are that ―now in all 
the future days he would be deprived of the invaluable services of his Capataz.‖
5 In a 
similar fashion, Charles Gould‘s first reaction is that if the Capataz was alive then he 
would  be  the  best  man  to  complete  a  mission  to  save  the  mine.  Even  in  death, 
Nostromo is still thought of as a commodity, as an object, and not as a man capable of 
sympathy. However, it is comments such as these which reveal the second significant 
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implication of Nostromo‘s supposed death, namely that, despite the ―abject‖ nature of 
these  comments,  Nostromo‘s  supposed  death  has  essentially  fulfilled  his  desire  of 
―being  spoken  well  of.‖  He  has  ―succeeded‖  in  creating  his  intended,  meaningful 
project. Ironically, however, when Nostromo returns to Sulaco to enjoy his success he 
quickly discovers that it is not what he had anticipated:   
 
[Nostromo‘s]  vanity  was  infinitely  and  naively  greedy  .  .  .  [He]  led  a  public  life  in  his 
sphere. It became necessary to him. It was the very breath of his nostrils. . . . Without it 
he would have been nothing. . . . The Capataz of the Sulaco Cargadores had lived in 
splendour and publicity up to the very moment, as it were, when he took charge of the 
lighter containing the treasure in silver ingots. The last act he had performed in Sulaco 
was in complete harmony with his vanity, and as such perfectly genuine. He had given 
his last dollar to an old woman moaning with the grief and fatigue of a dismal search 
under the arch of the ancient gate. Performed in obscurity and without witnesses, it had 
still  the  characteristics  of  splendour  and  publicity,  and  was  in  strict  keeping  with  his 
reputation.  But  this  awakening,  in  solitude,  .  .  .  had  no  such  characteristics.  His  first 
confused feeling was exactly this—that it was not in keeping. It was more like the end of 
things.  The  necessity  of  living  concealed  somehow,  for  God  knows  how  long,  which 
assailed him on his return to consciousness, made everything that had gone before for 
years appear vain and foolish, like a flattering dream come to an end. 
  . . . He remained rich in glory and reputation. But since it was no longer possible for 
him to parade the streets of the town, and be hailed with respect in the usual haunts of 
his leisure, this sailor felt destitute indeed.
6  
 
Nostromo‘s reward has come but it is not as he had wished it: he is a fugitive, and must 
avoid being recognised; thus he can no longer enjoy the praise of others, just as he 
would not be able to enjoy their praise in death. He sees that the values of reputation 
and reverence are meaningless without being amongst those whom revere him. And 
for this he feels betrayed: 
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No one waited for him; no one thought of him; no one expected or wished his return. 
―Betrayed!  Betrayed!‖  he  muttered  to  himself.  No  one  cared.  He  might  have  been 
drowned  by  this  time.  No  one  would  have  cared—unless,  perhaps,  the  children,  he 
thought to himself. But they were with the English signora, and not thinking of him at all.
7 
 
Here we see that Nostromo desires not only the prestige of reputation but to also be 
cared for and loved. And Nostromo realises that he has failed in achieving both of 
these desires. Nostromo‘s despair is further compounded when he discovers that his 
most ―desperate‖ affair was not considered desperate at all by the Europeans, as they 
readily gave in to the demands of Sotillo. Indeed, when Nostromo again meets Dr. 
Monygham, the doctor does not even inquire about the ―most desperate undertaking of 
his life.‖
8 In Nostromo‘s mind, the doctor voices the opinion of all the Europeans of 
Sulaco and also illuminates the harsh reality of the absurdity that Nostromo‘s life has 
suddenly  become.  It  is  this  moment  which  is  essentially  the  discovery—the  middle 
part—of Nostromo. As Northrop Frye describes:  
 
The discovery or anagnorisis which comes at the end of the tragic plot is not simply the 
knowledge  by  the  hero  of  what  has  happened  to  him  .  .  .  but  the  recognition  of  the 
determined shape of the life he has created for himself, with an implicit comparison with 
the uncreated potential life he has forsaken.
9 
 
Frye  correctly  states  that  the  discovery  comes  at  the  end  of the  plot;  however,  as 
Hardison suggests, the self-discovery can appear in the middle section of the complex 
plot but only if it is ―followed by at least one other incident defining a new sequence.‖
10 
It is from this definition that we find a distinct similarity to the self-discovery of Nostromo 
as  Nostromo recognises  the meaninglessness of  the  past  he  has  created from  his 
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intended project: he is not rewarded for his good deeds, his menial style of living, or for 
his generosity. Because of this, he must begin a new ―sequence,‖ make a new choice, 
and, indeed, he does choose a new project.  
  This moment in Nostromo‘s life can also be described as both an Augenblick, 
and as a moment much like the interval between tock-tick. The former is illustrated 
when we contrast Nostromo‘s experience of his discovery with Frye‘s description of the 
Augenblick of tragedy: 
 
Tragedy seems to move up to an Augenblick or crucial moment from which point the road 
to what might have been and the road to what will be can be simultaneously seen. Seen 
by the audience, that is: it cannot be seen by the hero if he is in a state of hybris, for in 
that case the crucial moment is for him a moment of dizziness, when the wheel of fortune 
begins its inevitable cyclical movement downward.
11 
 
When Nostromo returns to Sulaco he is in a state of hubris, but his discovery soon 
becomes a vertiginous moment. It is a dizziness which is both confusing and abject; his 
solitude and destitution do not make sense to Nostromo; and the ground beneath his 
feet falls away.  
  This description is also very similar to the interval between tock-tick which, as 
Kermode describes, lacks form, is disorganised, and cannot be properly grasped.
12 
This is not to say that the plot is like that of the postmodern plot, but is more like a tick-
tock-tick-tock plot. From his destitution—the silent, empty interval between tock-tick—
Nostromo must choose a new existential beginning, a new tick, as the choices of his 
past are now determined—the tock of the initial tick–tock has been ―heard.‖ And it is 
here that the first significant kernel event of the novel, and in Nostromo‘s personal 
narrative, occurs: Nostromo realises that his past is meaningless, and that he must 
now choose a new meaningful project. And it is in his choosing of a new meaningful 
project  that the first  evidence  of  a  reversal  in Nostromo  takes  place: his  choice  to 
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undertake  the  dangerous  mission  of  carrying  a  message  to  General  Barrios  (a 
commander  in  the  Sulaco  military)  asking  him  to  return  with  his  troops  and  save 
Sulaco. Nostromo accepts this mission not out of loyalty to the Europeans (as he would 
have done before the reversal), but to save Signora Teresa‘s children, her dying wish 
for Nostromo. He accepts the mission out of guilt for his previous choice to save the 
silver instead of fulfilling her first dying wish—his fetching a priest for her. This decision 
is significant as Nostromo seemingly chooses for himself: he eases his own guilt, his 
moral conscience. He is no longer worried about what the Other thinks of him but about 
what he thinks of himself. But the ―greater‖ reversal is his withholding of the fact that 
the silver is buried safe at the Isabels, despite the common belief that it has been lost 
at  sea.  Indeed,  when  Nostromo  discovers  that  Decoud  has  died  whilst  waiting  for 
Nostromo‘s  return,  Nostromo abandons  all  loyalty  to  the  Europeans  and keeps the 
silver for himself. It is this aspect of the reversal, his materialistic self-interest, which 
begins his downward momentum into misfortune, and eventually leads to his tragic 
death.  
  
The Middle of the Realist Plot 
 
The  plot  of  Nostromo may  appear  to  be  somewhat  ―conventional‖  as  it  adheres to 
Aristotle‘s description of a ―basic‖ complex plot and has only one significant change in 
the direction of the plot. However, most novels, especially modernist and postmodernist 
novels are far less conventional. Indeed, as was intimated in the previous chapter, the 
idea  of  a  ―middle‖  in  the  postmodern  novel  is  somewhat  defunct.  For  example,  in 
Pynchon‘s The Crying of Lot 49 there are only beginnings which do not progress to 
proper middles, let alone determined ends; both middles and ends become casualties 
of  the  progression  of  disintegration.  Indeed,  where  the  middle  of  the  realist  plot  is 
supposed to ―uphold‖ the integrity of the beginning by making possible the intended 
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end,  in  Pynchon  the  flawed  beginnings  immediately  ―hamstring‖  the  middles‘ 
possibilities of upholding possible ends. This follows from Thwaites‘s suggestion that, 
for the reader of The Crying of Lot 49, the success of the search to understand the 
meaning of the novel‘s title is suspended and thus incomplete. The end of the novel 
undermines the reader‘s attempts to make meaning by negating the possibility of a 
―successful‖ revelation. Thus we can say that the novel is structured as a beginning 
followed by a perpetual middle which is only ―completed‖ in a corporeal sense: the last 
page  of  the  novel.  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  the  need  to  rethink  the  tick-tock 
structure  of  the  postmodern  plot  is  essential.  As  Docherty  argues,  the  postmodern 
novel can be seen as tock-tick, but we may also see it merely as ―tick-...‖ where the 
interval between tick-tock is seemingly open and incomplete.       
  However, the realist novel, although much more conventional, still differs from 
Aristotle‘s basic plot as it is common for more than one change of action to take place. 
Indeed, the larger time-frames of the realist novel enable many changes in direction 
over  the  character‘s  lifetime,  such  that  the  novelist  can  focus  on  not  one  isolated 
event—one  change—in  a  character‘s  life—but  essentially  all  of  the  events  and  the 
many changes of the character‘s life. The consequence of this is that the ―middle‖ of 
the realist novel—bound by the first existential beginning of a character and his or her 
end—must  necessarily  have  a  time-frame  which  is  akin  to  the  time-frames  we 
associate with a lifetime. The value of representing these time-frames to the reader is 
that a fuller picture of a character‘s life can be portrayed; and from this fuller picture the 
reader can make far more accurate interpretation and evaluation of the character. The 
reader can better understand the character‘s choices and actions and the chains of 
causes and effects which have contributed to the character‘s whole life. And the reader 
can see how the meaning of a character‘s life was shaped.   
  How, then, is the larger temporal-frame of the middle of a character‘s personal 
narrative represented in fiction? How is the voluminous mass of choices and actions—
which shape the meaning of a character—―compressed‖ into a novel? Moreover, how 
is the voluminous mass of a character‘s subjective, conscious experience—the greater The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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volume  of  the  character‘s  ―inner  life‖—represented  in  the  novel?  It  is  with  these 
questions  that  we  recognise  a  dilemma  in  any  possible  attempt  by  the  novelist  to 
represent  the  whole  of  a  character‘s  life.  It  is  the  dilemma  of  time-scale,  which  is 
essentially the dilemma of being able to represent all the events of a character‘s life in 
both the larger measures of time (years and decades) and the smaller measures of 
time (seconds, minutes, hours, and days). Ian Watt describes how this is one of the 
foremost problems faced by the early realist novelists in their representation of fictional 
characters: 
 
The main problem in portraying the inner life is essentially one of the time-scale. The 
daily experience of the individual is composed of a ceaseless flow of thought, feeling and 
sensation; but most literary forms—biography and even autobiography for instance—tend 
to be of too gross a temporal mesh to retain its actuality; and so, for the most part, is 
memory. Yet it is this minute-by-minute content of consciousness which constitutes what 
the individual‘s personality really is, and dictates his relationship to others: it is only by 
contact with this consciousness that a reader can participate fully in the life of a fictional 
character.
13 
 
Watt  identifies  the  disparity  between  how  we  experience  reality  and  how  reality  is 
represented in fiction. The early realist novelists addressed this problem by beginning 
to explore the daily life of their characters in minute detail, such that they could also 
depict the concerns of everyday life on a much smaller and discriminative time-scale 
than was previously used.
14 Indeed, W. J. Harvey claims that despite there being a 
wide-range of temporal ―realities‖—temporal frames—within the genre of the novel, it 
can be maintained that all novels are ―usually much more concerned with time as a 
day-to-day  continuum,  as  a  small  scale  condition  of  human  experience.‖
15 
Notwithstanding a certain British bias of the history of the novel, Watt suggests that this 
characteristic was first evident in the novels of Daniel Defoe:  
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[Defoe‘s] fiction is the first which presents us with a picture both of the individual life in its 
larger perspective as a historical process, and in its closer view which shows the process 
being acted out against the background of the most ephemeral thoughts and actions.
16 
 
It  is  this  merging  of  the  two  perspectives  which  makes  the  novel  invaluable  to  the 
reader: the novel can practically represent and give detail to both the moment of a 
character‘s  existential  beginning  and  the  moment  of  the  character‘s  revelation  of 
meaning, even if they are separated by many years. Jane Eyre can tell us of her day-
to-day life at the age of ten in minute detail, and then merely glances at the next eight 
years, before describing her day-to-day experiences at the age of eighteen, all without 
any disruption to the story or confusion to the reader.   
 
Interpretation and the Stream of Consciousness 
 
Of course, Virginia Woolf, one the foremost modernist writers, questioned the ―reality‖ 
of the realist novel, and its portrayal of the movement of time, claiming that the realist 
novel  does  not  necessarily  provide  an  accurate  representation  of  the  subjective 
experience of life: 
 
Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad 
impressions—trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From 
all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as they 
shape themselves into the life of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of 
old; the moment of importance came not here but there; so that, if a writer were a free 
man and not a slave, if he could write what he chose, not what he must, if he could base 
his  work  upon  his  own  feeling  and  not  upon  convention,  there  would  be  no  plot,  no 
comedy, no tragedy, no love interest or catastrophe in the accepted style, and perhaps 
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not a single button sewn on as the Bond Street tailors would have it. Life is not a series of 
gig-lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope 
surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end.
17 
 
From this description, and from Woolf‘s own works, it can be said that our subjective, 
conscious experience of the real world is not comprised of clearly demarcated and 
isolated  events,  disconnected  from  each  other.  In  reality,  life  is  a  temporal  flux  of 
consciousness, such that the events of our lives essentially blend into one another as a 
constant stream, giving us the literary style of the stream-of-consciousness novel—a 
style which ―purports to present a direct quotation of what occurs in the individual mind 
under the impact of the temporal flux.‖
18 We can recognise what may be described as 
the  kernels  and  satellites—the  events—of  a  narrative  structure  in  both  fiction  and 
reality; however, these events are not singular entities, temporally separated from one 
another. 
  However,  a  number  of  Woolf‘s  novels,  in  which  she  employs  the  style  of 
stream-of-consciousness, are not necessarily of value to the shivering reader who is 
looking to fictional characters to understand the meaning of life. This is because they 
are  lacking  the  essential  element  of  a  story-time  which  corresponds  with  that  of  a 
―complete‖ lifetime. For example, the story-time of Mrs Dalloway (1925) is less than 
one day in Mrs. Dalloway‘s lifetime, which is a mere fraction of Mrs. Dalloway‘s whole 
lifetime.  Consider,  also,  the  stream-of-consciousness  novels  of  James  Joyce, 
specifically  Ulysses, where one day (the 16th of June, 1904) in the life of Leopold 
Bloom—―Bloomsday‖—is predominantly described from  his subjective point of view. 
The story-time of Ulysses represents only a fraction of Bloom‘s conscious lifetime; it is 
only a fragment of the whole of his meaningful, subjective, conscious experience, and 
thus  lacks  the  fundamental  wholeness  necessary  for  interpretation  and  evaluation. 
Indeed, if we consider that the meaning of a character‘s life must be understood in 
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terms of a hermeneutic circle where ―complete knowledge is always in this apparent 
circle, that each particular can only be understood via the general, of which it is a part, 
and  vice  versa,‖
19  then  neither  Mrs  Dalloway  or  Ulysses  give  the  reader  complete 
knowledge of the respective novel‘s protagonists. (This, of course, was not necessarily 
Woolf or Joyce‘s intention for their respective characters).  
  But it becomes quickly apparent that any attempt to discursively represent a 
character‘s stream-of-consciousness over his or her lifetime would be an absurd and 
impractical exercise, especially if we consider that the style of stream-of-consciousness 
is usually described as the loose correspondence of story-time and discourse-time (or 
reading-time)—the  ―time  it  takes  to  peruse  the  discourse.‖
20  The  absurdity  and 
impracticality of representing such a correspondence is best illustrated if we were to 
consider the loose correspondence of discourse-time and story-time in Ulysses. Joyce 
writes  some  nine-hundred  odd  pages  to  represent  the  best  part  of  one  day,  some 
eighteen hours, in the life of Mr. Bloom. This is a fragment—one ―conscious‖ day—of 
the  whole  of  Bloom‘s  lived  life.  Hypothetically  speaking,  if  one  were  to  ―read‖  the 
complete consciousness of Bloom‘s life, one would need to include Bloom‘s complete 
subjective experience from the time of his birth to the time of his death; and if Bloom 
were to live to an age of the average person, or to the Old Testament age of three 
score and ten, then Joyce‘s onerous task would be to produce a book bursting with 
almost  twenty-three  million  pages,  or,  if  there  were  an  extremely  conservative  one 
hundred words per page, 2.3 billion words. To put this hypothetical claim another way, 
if in Woolf‘s Mrs Dalloway the chimes of Big Ben were to ring out only the hour—story-
time  hours  which  loosely  correspond to reading-time  hours—then  the  reader  would 
―hear‖ its chime six hundred thousand times.  
  Even  these  exhaustive  hypothetical  figures  may  still  be  insufficient  in 
representing the whole of a character‘s lifetime, especially if we again consider Erich 
Auerbach‘s examination of a passage from Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse, in which Mrs. 
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Ramsay is measuring a stocking for the lighthouse keeper‘s son against James‘s (her 
six-year-old  son‘s)  leg.  The  significance  of  this  passage  relates  to  the  disparity  of 
discourse-time  (the  ―time‖  needed  to  represent  the  flux  of  Mrs.  Ramsay‘s 
consciousness  as  she  measures  the  brown  stocking)  and  story-time.  As  Auerbach 
states:  
 
The . . . representation of what goes on in Mrs. Ramsay‘s mind . . . takes a greater 
number of seconds and even minutes than the measuring—the reason being that the 
road taken by consciousness is sometimes traversed far more quickly than language is 
able to render it, if we want to make ourselves intelligible to a third person, and that is the 
intention here. . . . [In] a surprising fashion unknown to earlier periods, a sharp contrast 
results between the brief span of time occupied by the exterior event and the dreamlike 
wealth of a process of consciousness which traverses a whole subjective universe.
21   
 
What Auerbach suggests is that language fails to account for the ―absolute‖ flux of 
consciousness as language moves too ―slow‖ in its representation. This is to say, story-
time  cannot  properly  correspond  with  reading-time  because  the  words  of the  novel 
cannot communicate the wealth and detail of the complete subjective consciousness of 
its  characters.  Only  by  employing  the  narrative  technique  of  stretch,  where  the 
discourse-time  exceeds  that  of  story-time,  could  the  text  even  come  close  to 
representing the necessary detail. What this means is that a hypothetical novel, said to 
represent the complete subjective consciousness of its characters, would necessarily 
increase  the  already  absurd  reading  time  of  seventy  years,  to  an  indeterminable 
temporal  length.  Thus,  hypothetically  speaking,  if  one  were  to  read  the  absolute 
representation  of  a  character‘s  consciousness  with  the  realist  novel‘s  story-time 
dimensions and a modernist‘s style of stream-of-consciousness, then one would no 
longer be living for meaning, but reading for meaning. In short, it is an absurdity.  
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The Rhetoric of the Middle 
 
From the above description, it is patently clear that the novelist cannot represent the 
whole  of  a  character‘s  temporal  life,  or  the  whole  of  the  character‘s  subjective, 
conscious experience of this life, within the pages of his or her novel. The novelist 
necessarily exhausts him or herself in this attempt. This would suggest that the novel 
fails the shivering reader in its representation of the fictional Other as only a whole life 
can be accurately interpreted but also, more importantly, evaluated with equanimity. 
And yet, this disparity can be partly reconciled if we consider that the realist novelist, 
and indeed, the modern or postmodern novelist, does not necessarily allude to the 
―wholeness‖  of  the  representation  of  a  character‘s  reality,  or  intend  to  represent  a 
character‘s complete  subjective life. Instead, as Wolfgang Iser  states in  The Act of 
Reading, the novelist must create the ―illusion‖ of wholeness: 
 
When Arnold Bennett said, ―You can‘t put the whole of a character into a book,‖ he was 
thinking of the discrepancy between a person‘s life and the unavoidably limited form in 
which that life may be represented. From this fact there are two very different conclusions 
to be drawn. First, as Ingarden says, there must be a series of ―schematised aspects‖ by 
which the character is represented, and as each incomplete view is supplemented by the 
next so there gradually arises the illusion of a complete representation. Second, however, 
one can turn one‘s attention to the selective decisions that must be taken if the character 
is to be presented in such a way that we are able to identify him.
22 
 
What  Iser  suggests  is  that  the  ―complete‖  character  of  the  novel  must  inevitably 
become ―less round‖; that there are aspects and actions of the character that are given 
an elevated status by the novelist such that they may be included to the exclusion of 
others. However, this ―hierarchy‖ does not necessarily mean that there is something 
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lacking in the representation of a character. Indeed, it can be argued that those aspects 
of a character which are included in the novel do ―complete‖ the character insofar as 
only  those  aspects  which  are  represented  are  necessary  for  understanding  the 
―essence‖ of a character. This is very much the claim made by E. M. Forster when he 
discusses the nature of the disparate relationship between the novelist and his or her 
characters, and that of the novel‘s characters and its reader:  
 
[A character in a book is real] when the novelist knows everything about it. He may not 
choose to tell us all he knows—many of the facts, even of the kind we call obvious, may 
be  hidden.  But  he  will  give  us  the  feeling  that  though  the  character  has  not  been 
explained, it is explicable, and we get from this a reality of a kind we can never get in 
daily life. 
  For human intercourse, as soon as we look at it for its own sake and not as a social 
adjunct, is seen to be haunted by a spectre. We cannot understand each other, except in 
a rough and ready way; we cannot reveal ourselves, even when we want to; what we call 
intimacy is only a makeshift; perfect knowledge is an illusion. But in the novel we can 
know people perfectly.
23 
 
Forster suggests that the authoritative novelist ultimately chooses which facts, details, 
and, most importantly, choices and actions of a character‘s life must be included in the 
discourse of the novel so as to ―perfectly‖ understand the character and the character‘s 
meaning.  The  novelist  reveals  those  elements  which  are  necessary  for  making 
meaning of both the novel and its characters by deciding whether to include or exclude 
certain events of the character‘s story. This decision is essentially a rhetorical device of 
the novelist and is significant not only because it tells the reader what is necessary for 
understanding (or interpreting) the meaning of a character, but also because it tells the 
reader how to evaluate the meaning of the character‘s life. Indeed, just as Tolstoy hints 
at the insignificance of Anna Karenina‘s past by choosing to omit much of this past 
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from  her  discoursed  story,  so too  can  the  novelist  choose to  omit  events  from the 
middle  of  his  or  her  characters‘  lives—events  which  are  similarly  insignificant  or 
unnecessary  for  understanding  the  meaning  of  the  characters‘  lives.  Thus,  in  very 
general terms, the novelist‘s choice to exclude events in a story rhetorically implies 
their insignificance, but also implies the significance of that which is included; or, put 
another way, the novelist‘s choice to include events in a story implies their significance, 
but also implies the insignificance of those that are excluded.  
    
The Novelist’s Exclusion of Everydayness: the Summary and Ellipse  
 
The exclusion of certain events from a story is effected by the novelist‘s use of two 
specific narrative devices: the summary, where both the discourse- and reading-time 
are shorter than story-time; and the ellipse, which is essentially the same as summary 
except that both the discourse-time and reading-time are zero. As has been described, 
both of these devices are necessary for the ―practicality‖ of the novel as they make the 
larger temporal frames of the realist novel possible. However, how these exclusions 
relate to a character‘s meaningful story depends on the implicitness or explicitness of 
the novelist‘s (or narrator‘s) reasons for the exclusion of certain events. To begin with 
the ellipse, one of the most common literary devices, we can say that in the stories of 
realist novels, such as Jane Eyre or Anna Karenina, the ellipse is generally understood 
as  an  exclusion  of  an  insignificant  part  of  the  story  and  the  insignificance  of  this 
exclusion  is  implicitly  understood  by  the  reader.  As  Chatman  claims,  this  implicit 
understanding is essential to the ―transaction‖ of the text to its audience: 
 
Whether  the  narrative  is  experienced  through  a  performance  or  through  a  text,  the 
members  of  the  audience  must  respond  with  an  interpretation:  they  cannot  avoid The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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participating in the transaction. They must fill in gaps with essential or likely events, traits 
and objects which for various reasons have gone unmentioned.
24 
 
The narrator, therefore, does not explicitly state the insignificance of the ellipse to the 
story: its insignificance is implied. These events may of course be excluded to build 
suspense or add drama; however, at its most basic, functional level, an ellipse can be 
used to exclude events which fall under the category of inauthentic everydayness: the 
events of our daily routine of tasks and duties. It is implied that the characters of a 
novel ―do‖ undertake these activities, but they are not essential to the story. Indeed, 
when we think of the real Other we do not necessarily take into account their everyday 
activities when interpreting and evaluating their lives. And, again, we certainly do not 
need to know of all of Mr. Bloom‘s excursions to the ―cuckstool.‖  
  These ellipses implicitly exclude the insignificant events of a character‘s story; 
however, less common are examples where the insignificance of an ellipse is explicitly 
stated. However, one example can be found in Henry Fielding‘s Tom Jones (1749), in 
the chapter: ―Containing Little or Nothing.‖ The overt, third-person narrator tells the 
reader of the insignificance of the period between the end of the last chapter and the 
beginning of the next: 
 
The reader will be pleased to remember, that, at the beginning of the second book of this 
history, we gave him a hint of our intention to pass over several large periods of time, in 
which nothing happened worthy of being recorded in a chronicle of this kind. 
  In so doing, we do not only consult our own  dignity and ease, but the good and 
advantage of the reader: for besides that by these means we prevent him from throwing 
away his time, in reading without either pleasure or emolument, we give him, at all such 
seasons, an opportunity of employing that wonderful sagacity, of which he is master, by 
filling up these vacant spaces of time with his own conjectures; for which purpose we 
have taken care to qualify him in the preceding pages.   
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  .  .  .  As  we  are  sensible,  that  much  the  greatest  part  of  our  readers  are  very 
eminently possessed of this quality, we have left them a space of twelve years to exert it 
in; and shall now bring forth our heroe, at about fourteen years of age, not questioning 
that many have been long impatient to be introduced to his acquaintance.
25 
 
Twelve years of Tom Jones‘s life passes as an ellipse and the narrator gives no detail 
of events, choices, or actions, only stating that nothing happened and is not of any 
significance. Indeed, the narrator invites the reader to fill in the vacant spaces of this 
period with his or her own conjectures, further emphasising the little effect this period of 
time has on the logic of the story or, it would seem, on the reader‘s interpretation of the 
meaningfulness of Tom Jones‘s life within this period.  
  Like the ellipse, the summary can be employed by the narrator to communicate 
the insignificance of an omitted fragment of the story; however, unlike the ellipse, this 
insignificance  of  the  summary  is  most  commonly  stated  explicitly  by  either  a  first-
person narrator, or even an overt third-person narrator. Indeed, first-person narration 
particularly  lends  itself  to  explicitness  as  is  illustrated  by  the  previously  discussed 
passage from Brontë‘s Jane Eyre in which Jane states: ―I now pass a space of eight 
years  almost  in  silence:  a  few  lines  only  are  necessary  to  keep  up  the  links  of 
connection.‖
26 Jane proceeds with a brief summary of these eight years and explicitly 
tells the reader that what she has omitted from this summary is unimportant and is of 
no  interest  to  the  reader.  More  importantly,  Jane  is  narrating  the  story  with  the 
hindsight of memory, and so she is essentially recalling only the parts of her story 
which can be said to contribute to the reader‘s understanding and interpretation of the 
story. Thus, the reader can trust that the moments Jane has excluded from the story 
are more or less insignificant. The insignificance of a character‘s life is also explicitly 
stated as a summary in V. S. Naipaul‘s A House for Mr Biswas (1961) where the third-
person narrator tells us: ―In all Mr. Biswas lived for six years at The Chase, years so 
squashed  by  their  own  boredom  and  futility  that  at  the  end  they  could  be 
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comprehended in one glance. But he had aged.‖
27 This one glance, representative of 
discourse-time, is the summary of a boring and futile six-year period, which needs little 
discursive elaboration; only Mr. Biswas shows the signs of the passing of story-time. 
  What we must realise is that not all moments of everydayness are ―insignificant‖ 
or meaningless; indeed, even the most banal moments of everydayness can be laden 
with meaning. This is essentially the argument made by Franco Moretti in ―Serious 
Century‖  in  which  he  discusses  the  nineteenth-century  shift  from  the  centrality  of 
kernels, or what Moretti simply calls ―turning points,‖ to the centrality of satellites or 
―fillers‖  (Moretti‘s  term).  Moretti  examines  Austen‘s  Pride  and  Prejudice  (1813)  to 
explain this new emphasis: 
 
Elizabeth and Darcy meet in chapter 3, he acts horribly, she is disgusted: first action with 
―consequences for the development of the story‖: they are set in opposition to each other. 
Thirty-one  chapters  later,  Darcy  proposes  to  Elizabeth;  second  turning  point:  an 
alternative has been opened. Another twenty-seven chapters, and Elizabeth accepts him: 
alternative closed, end of the novel. Three turning points: beginning, middle, and ending; 
very geometric; very Austen-like. But of course, in between these three major scenes, 
Elizabeth and Darcy meet, and talk, and hear, and think about each other, and it‘s not 
easy to quantify this type of thing, but I have done my best, and have found about 110 
episodes of this kind. These are the fillers.
28 
 
Fillers comprise the narration of the everyday which is some ninety-seven percent of 
the  total  episodes  of  Pride  and  Prejudice.  And,  as  Moretti  claims,  this  is  Austen‘s 
greatest achievement: everydayness has come to be the foreground of the novel.
29 
  Another example described by Moretti is Flaubert‘s Madame Bovary which he 
claims marks another significant shift in the nineteenth-century‘s attitude towards the 
everyday. Moretti examines a scene in which Emma and Charles Bovary are having 
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dinner—a scene which had been previously discussed by Auerbach in Mimesis—which 
reads:  
 
But it was above all at mealtimes that she could bear it no longer, in that little room on the 
ground floor, with the smoking stove, the creaking door, the oozing walls, the damp floor-
tiles; all the bitterness of life seemed to be served to her on her plate, and, with the steam 
from the boiled beef, there rose from the depths of her soul other exaltations as it were of 
disgust. Charles was a slow eater; she would nibble a few hazel-nuts, or else, leaning on 
her elbow, would amuse herself making marks on the oilcloth with the point of her table-
knife.
30 
 
Auerbach  describes  the  scene  as  a  ―random  moment,‖  without  quarrel  or  conflict; 
―nothing  happens,  but  that  nothing  has  become  a  heavy  oppressive,  threatening 
something.‖
31 It is on this claim of Auerbach‘s that Moretti comments:  
 
An oppressive everyday . . . Because Emma has married a mediocre man? Yes and no. 
Yes, because Charles is certainly a weight in her life. And no, because even when she is 
most distant from him—in her two adulteries, with Rudolphe and then with Leon—Emma 
finds exactly ―the same platitudes of married life,‖ the same recurring hours when nothing 
noteworthy happens.
32  
 
Moretti  further  describes  this  scene  as  a  ―collapse  of  ‗adventure‘  into  everyday 
banality.‖
33 It is here that Emma realises that her ―dream‖ life is indeed a dream and the 
reality of her mediocrity is clear.  
  The reason for Flaubert‘s (and others) emphasis on fillers in nineteenth-century 
literature, Moretti argues, relates to ―the history of private life,‖
34 more specifically to the 
history of bourgeois private life:  
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[Fillers]  offer  the  kind  of  narrative  pleasure  compatible  with  the  new  regularity  of 
bourgeois life. . . . They are part of what Weber called the ―rationalisation‖ of modern life: 
a process that begins in the economy and in the administration, but eventually pervades 
the sphere of free time, private life, entertainment, feelings . . . . Or in other words: fillers 
are  an  attempt  at  rationalising  the  novelistic  universe:  turning  it  into  a  world  of  few 
surprises, fewer adventures, and no miracles at all.
35  
 
This  is  precisely  the  world  of  Emma  Bovary  where  life  has  become  banal 
everydayness.  But  life,  it  can  be  argued,  is  indeed  like  this:  not  all  is  adventure. 
However, the ―everyday banality‖ of this supposedly random event is important in that it 
is included within the discourse of the novel as an event worth discussing. The reason 
for  this  is  that  it  is  very  much  an  ―authentic‖  moment  for  Emma,  despite  it  being 
articulated by the narrator for the reader. This is evidenced particularly in the sentence: 
―All the bitterness of life seemed to be served to her on her plate, and, with the steam 
from the boiled beef, there rose from the depths of her soul other exaltations as it were 
of disgust.‖ As Auerbach comments:  
 
Here it is not Emma who speaks, but the writer. . . . She doubtless has such a feeling; but 
if she wanted to express it, it would not come out like that; she has neither the intelligence 
nor the cold candour of self-accounting necessary for such a formulation.
36  
   
The narrator, or, as Auerbach implies, Flaubert himself, must say what Emma Bovary 
is thinking. They are ―thinking‖ the same but Flaubert is the voice. More importantly, 
however, is the content of this thought: what Auerbach‘s description of this random 
moment implies is that what was once considered everyday banality or ―everydayness‖ 
is  not  necessarily  ―everyday  inauthenticity.‖  This  is  to  say  that  actions  which  may 
appear inauthentic (such as when we are involved in our daily tasks and duties, or, as 
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Heidegger states, when we are busy, excited, interested, or ready for enjoyment
37) are 
not necessarily so:  meaningful, reflective,  authentic  thoughts  can  take  place  at  the 
most  meaningless  times.  This  also  suggests  that  everydayness  is  not  always 
insignificant to a novel‘s meaningful story. The minute events of life—the fillers which 
are often excluded from a novel‘s discourse by the use of an ellipse or summary—can 
also be very important in the creation and shaping of meaning—they are meaningful in 
themselves  and  they  are  necessary  for  the  creation  of  definitive  meaning.  Indeed, 
Felski similarly suggests that daily life, ―often spurned or ignored in the mainstream 
tradition of Western philosophy,‖ is nevertheless an important aspect of our lives. It is 
for this reason that ―the everyday must be rescued from oblivion by being transformed; 
the all too prosaic must be made to reveal its hidden subversive poetry. The name for 
this form of aesthetic distancing is of course defamiliarisation.‖
38 Flaubert, it can be 
argued, is doing just this; but to defamiliarise is also to recognise how the insignificant 
moments in our lives are sometimes laden with meaning; and it is also to make the 
reader recognise that the insignificant moments of his or her life can take place at the 
most insignificant times.   
 
Exclusions and Corporeal Conviction 
 
What the above description of the exclusory powers of the ellipse and the summary—
be it the exclusion of adventure or everydayness—principally suggests is that there is 
―more‖ to a character than is given to the reader—that there are more experiences of 
the character ―outside‖ of the discourse. However, it can be argued that in actuality 
there is nothing else to the character, no more subjective, conscious experiences of the 
character outside of the novel‘s discourse because these experiences do not ―exist.‖ 
This does not mean that the reader does not interpret and extrapolate on what is not 
written within the pages of the novel, only that what is not written does not ―exist‖ and 
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does  not  have  ―corporeal  conviction.‖  The  reader  does  not  need  to  interpret  and 
extrapolate on these unknowns to understand the experience of the character, and it is 
unnecessary for the reader to believe that there is more outside of the novel‘s pages—
something that the novelist has kept to him or herself. One can liken this approach to a 
phenomenological bracketing of the novel by which ―the real object, the actual historical 
context  of the  literary  work,  its  author,  conditions  of  production  and  readership  are 
ignored; phenomenological criticism aims instead at a wholly ‗immanent‘ reading of the 
text, totally unaffected by anything outside it.‖
39 The reader must assume that what is 
found in the discourse is all the raw story material necessary for an interpretation and 
evaluation of a character‘s life, regardless of what the novelist has chosen to conceal 
from the reader. What should be interpreted is printed on the pages in front of the 
reader, and can only come from these pages. This is the essential material for making 
meaning.  
  This is also very much the argument of Georg Lukács in The Theory of the 
Novel,  when  he  discusses  the  ―immanent‖  meaning  and  wholeness  of  the  novel, 
regardless of what is explicitly or implicitly excluded from its discourse. Lukács claims 
that the novel resorts to the biographical form to overcome life‘s ―heterogenous mass of 
isolated  persons,  non-sensuous  structures  and  meaningless  events.‖
40  This 
overcoming is achieved through what Lukács calls the novel‘s ―bad‖ infinity. Lukács 
states that, on the one hand,  
 
the  scope  of  the  world  [in  the  novel]  is  limited  by  the  scope  of  the  hero‘s  possible 
experiences and  its mass is organised by  the orientation  of his development towards 
finding  the  meaning  of  life  in  self-recognition;  on  the  other  hand,  the  discretely 
heterogeneous  mass  of  isolated  persons,  non-sensuous  structures  and  meaningless 
events  receives  a  unified  articulation  by  the  relating  of  each  separate  element  to  the 
central character and the problem symbolised by the story of his life.  
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  The beginning and the end of the world of a novel, which are determined by the 
beginning and end of the process which supplies the content of the novel, thus become 
significant landmarks along a clearly mapped road. The novel in itself and for itself is by 
no means bound to the natural beginning and end of life—to birth and death; yet by the 
points at which it begins and ends, it indicates the only essential segment of life, that 
segment which is determined by the central problem, and it touches upon whatever lies 
before or after that segment only in perspective and only as it relates to that problem; it 
tends to unfold its full epic totality only within that span of life which is essential to it. 
  When the beginning and the end of this segment of life do not coincide with those of 
a human life, this merely shows that the biographical form is oriented towards ideas: the 
development of a man is still the thread upon which the whole world of the novel is strung 
and along which it unrolls, but now this development acquires significance only because it 
is typical of that system of ideas and experienced ideals which regulatively determines 
the inner and outer world of the novel.
41 
 
Lukács suggests that the novel form‘s totality is limited by the time-frame of the novel 
and the experiences of the hero, yet it is total as all the other elements of the story are 
related to, and unified by, the main character and his or her story. Thus, the exclusions 
in the text are not essential for the interpretation and evaluation of the meaning of the 
novel or the main character; however, the events that are included are essential for the 
interpretation and evaluation of the meaning of the novel and the main character—a 
claim which is very similar to Aristotle‘s description of the unity of the tragic plot. 
  This  brings  us  to  one  final  claim  regarding  the  insignificance  of  the  ―gaps 
between the gig lamps,‖ namely that the reader need not, and should not, ―project‖ 
events into those gaps which are not detailed within the discourse. As the narrator of 
Tom Jones explicitly states, the events that occur within these undiscoursed periods 
are purely conjectural. Similarly, when there is an ellipse in the text, the reader may 
assume that things could have happened, but any attempt to complete these sections, 
and ―bridge the gap,‖ do so only as conjecture. The reader can assume that ―little to 
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nothing‖ happens, or, put another way, the reader can assume that the character has 
not necessarily made any ―significant‖ new choices of action during the undiscoursed 
periods of the novel and is merely maintaining the ―active‖ stasis of his or her actions. 
This is to say that even though the reader of Tom Jones is invited to infer the action 
which  occurs  in  the  period  of  twelve  years,  the  reader  normally  does  not  have  to 
expand on the nature of the undiscoursed events. This is not to say that the time period 
is unimportant, only that no action of any significance takes place. Similarly, when the 
narrator of Mr Biswas tells us that Mr. Biswas‘s life was boring and futile—in-itself a 
stasis statement—the reader needs only to consider that for six years, Mr. Biswas‘s life 
was boring and futile. There is no need to elaborate on this statement—it can simply be 
accepted  as  given.  All  else  falls  into  the  category  of  meaningless  speculation  and 
undesirable loose ends (a claim that will be further addressed in the following chapter 
when we look at the end of the novel).  
 
 
Inclusions  as  Existential  Beginnings  and 
Authentic Moments 
 
This brief description of the narrative devices of summary and ellipse implies that there 
is a basic hierarchy of meaningfulness in life and in the novel when interpreting and 
evaluating the meaning of a life: those events which are excluded are for the most part 
inessential  to meaningfulness  and  (by  default)  those  events  which  are  included  are 
elevated, such that they may be considered essential to meaningfulness. But, as was 
intimated by the discussion on the banal everydayness of Emma Bovary‘s dinner with 
Charles,  this  hierarchy  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  saying  that  those  events  that  are 
included are more meaningful than those that are excluded just because they ―exist‖ or 
contribute to the logic of the story: the moments that are included are more meaningful 
because they are imbued with ―value,‖ a claim which is best explained by Forster: 
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Daily life is . . . full of the time-sense. We think one event occurs after or before another, 
the  thought  is  often  in  our  minds,  and  much  of  our  talk  and  action  proceeds  on  the 
assumption. Much of our talk and action, but not all; there seems something else in life 
besides time, something which may conveniently be called ―value,‖ something which is 
measured not by minutes or hours, but by intensity, so that when we look at our past it 
does not stretch back evenly but piles up into a few notable pinnacles. . . . So daily life, 
whatever it may be really, is practically composed of two lives—the life in time and the life 
by values—and our conduct reveals a double allegiance. ―I only saw her for five minutes, 
but it was worth it.‖ There you have both allegiances in a single sentence. And what the 
story does is to narrate the life in time. And what the entire novel does—if it is a good 
novel—is to include the life by values as well.
42   
 
Forster describes the value of ―notable pinnacles‖ (which appear to be analogous to 
Woolf‘s description of the ―gig lamps‖ of fiction) and how these moments mean more 
than  simply  the  passing  of  time.  These  moments  are  laden  with  significance  and 
meaning, just as the Augenblick means more than a ―blink‖ or ―twinkling of the eye.‖  
  This claim of Forster‘s is also significant if we consider that how we look at the 
past and how we evaluate these pinnacles differs greatly in reality and in fiction. In 
reality, when we look back on the past we do not necessarily ―see‖ our meaningful or 
authentic moments. Think of Citizen Kane when he reflects on his childhood sleigh: his 
reflection on his past is essentially authentic; however, his playing in the snow with his 
childhood sleigh could hardly be described as the same. Thus, meaningful happiness, 
Kane playing in the snow, could be described as inauthentic. In realist fiction, however, 
it would seem that the notable pinnacles of the story essentially revolve around the 
authentic,  often  anxious  moments  of  the  lives  of  the  novel‘s  characters.  These 
pinnacles reflect change and new authentic choices and actions, whereas the ellipses 
and  summaries  of  the  story  reflect  stasis  and  inauthentic  everydayness—the 
inauthentic filler. Moreover, the authentic pinnacles of fiction reflect how a meaningful 
choice can become problematic, and how meaningfulness is essentially in a state of 
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flux, the consequence being that one‘s projects must be continually chosen and re-
evaluated. 
 
Konstantin Levin 
 
The story of Levin in Tolstoy‘s Anna Karenina exemplifies how the events of the novel 
revolve around these significant, authentic moments of the character‘s life. However, 
because Anna Karenina has two main stories, that of Anna and that of Levin, we also 
notice that the ―inauthentic‖ periods between the authentic moments of Levin‘s life are 
essentially ―occupied‖ by the ―authentic‖ moments of Anna‘s concurrent story. This shift 
in point of view emphasises the temporal gap between the authentic moments, but also 
emphasises the meaninglessness of the inauthentic periods which have been omitted 
from  Levin‘s  story.  The  character  of  Levin  is  also  an  especially  pertinent  example 
because Levin is engaged in a number of meaningful projects, each of which continues 
to overlay the others in their meaningfulness, such that his primary projects become 
secondary,  and  his  secondary  projects  become  primary.  Levin  also  illustrates  the 
torment of perplexity of not understanding what it is that makes life meaningful. This 
perplexity is also that of Tolstoy, himself, whom the character of Levin was essentially 
based on:  
 
Tolstoy pours out much of his own experience through the character of Levin—whose 
name echoes his own first name: Lev—including his philosophical and religious doubts, 
his moral crises, and his suicidal despair. . . . He also endows Levin with his own love of 
the country, dislike of society, idealisation of the peasants and of manual work, and with 
ideas  for  better  and  fairer  management  of  the  land.  When  Levin  goes  hunting,  his 
enjoyment  is  Tolstoy‘s.  Even  more  remarkably,  Levin‘s  experience  of  betrothal  and 
marriage are also Tolstoy‘s own.
43 
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Levin‘s philosophical and religious doubts, moral crises, and suicidal despair are very 
much Tolstoy‘s, a claim which is further evidenced in his autobiographical work ―My 
Confession‖ (1882): 
 
Five years ago something very strange began to happen with me: I was overcome by 
minutes at first of perplexity and then of an arrest of life, as though I did not know how to 
live or what to do, and I lost myself and was dejected. But that passed, and I continued to 
live as before. Then those minutes of perplexity were repeated oftener and oftener, and 
always in one and the same form. These arrests of life found their expression in ever the 
same questions: ―Why? Well, and then?‖
44  
    
However, Tolstoy has a revelation, finding an answer to his questions: 
 
No matter how I may put the question, ―How must I live?‖ the answer is, ―According to 
God‘s law.‖ ―What real result  will there be from my life?‖—―Eternal torment or eternal 
bliss.‖ ―What is the meaning which is not destroyed by death?‖—―The union with infinite 
God, paradise.‖
45  
   
Tolstoy‘s philosophical and religious doubts, moral crises, and suicidal despair become 
the significant events of Levin‘s life within the discoursed story of Anna Karenina.  
  To  illustrate  how  the  pinnacles  of  Levin‘s  NOW-story  are  essentially  the 
authentic moments and existential beginnings of his life, we will divide the novel into a 
number of broad narrative blocks and main actions which properly belong to Levin‘s 
story.  This  method  is  by  no  means  exhaustive
46  but it will serve the purpose of 
illustrating  how  the  significant,  authentic moments  (the  duration of which can  be 
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measured  in  days  or  even  hours),  make  up  the  greater  volume  of  the  discourse, 
despite the overall length of the NOW-story being more than two-and-a-half years.
47 
  In the first narrative block (I, 5 –15)
48  of  Levin‘s  story,  the  main  action  (and 
greater volume of the discourse) concentrates on Levin‘s decision to begin a new life 
with Kitty Shcherbatsky (a long time family friend of Levin and youngest sister of Dolly) 
by asking her to marry him. Despite the innocuousness of Levin‘s choice to propose to 
Kitty, it would seem that the impetus behind his proposal is a far more serious matter 
than it would normally occasion, as he was being plagued by ―questions about the 
meaning of life and death which lately had been coming more and more often to his 
mind.‖
49 Levin has been facing an authentic, existential crisis: his past life has become 
somewhat  meaningless,  prompting  him  to  question  what  it  is  that  makes  life 
meaningful. This existential crisis has continued to plague Levin and has been cause 
for his suicidal despair. And to the question of meaning, Levin, it would seem, has 
found an expedient answer—the meaningful happiness of marriage—and so he has set 
himself to asking for Kitty‘s hand. For Levin, Kitty is the source of all his happiness and 
meaning; their union is the primary meaningful project of Levin‘s life and will supersede 
all previous secondary projects. However, because of Kitty‘s expectation of a proposal 
from Vronsky, she refuses Levin, frustrating the success of his intended, meaningful 
project. It is this frustration of his project which ends the first narrative block, ending this 
significant moment in Levin‘s life, the duration of which block is essentially one day—a 
minimal portion of the novel‘s duration despite a significant volume of discourse being 
dedicated to its representation. 
  The  second  narrative  block  of  Levin‘s  story  (I,  24–27)  begins  on  the  day 
following the proposal, when Levin returns to his farm and his project of farming life. 
The duration of this block is also no more than a day and centres on Levin‘s decision to 
begin a new life regardless of the despair borne from Kitty‘s refusal. Indeed, Levin is 
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resolved that his life would be better than before, and ―decided from that day on not to 
hope any more for the extraordinary happiness that marriage was to have given him, 
and as a consequence not to neglect the present so much.‖
50  
  This  second  narrative  block  ends  with  Levin  claiming  that  ―all  is  well,‖
51 
suggesting  that  some  sort  of  stasis  has  been  reattained.  And,  indeed,  the  third 
narrative block (II, 12–17) begins some three months after the end of the second block. 
We  can  infer  that  during  these  three  months  of  Levin‘s  life,  which  have  occurred 
―between‖  the  two  blocks,  Levin  is  immersed  in  the  inauthentic  everydayness  of 
farming  life  and  in  the  writing  of  a  book.  However,  the  main  action  and  discursive 
volume of the third block (the duration of which is several days) relates to Stepan‘s 
(Anna‘s brother) arrival at Levin‘s farm bringing with him the news that Kitty is still 
unmarried  and  has  fallen  ill.  This  news  summons  Levin  from  his  immersion  in  the 
inauthenticity of farming life and he is reminded of his primary project: his love for Kitty 
and the meaningfulness of their union. The happy, inauthentic everydayness of farming 
life is disrupted and Levin once again becomes authentic, which is to say he becomes 
―gloomy‖ and despondent.  
  The main action of the fourth narrative block (III, 1–12) concentrates on Levin‘s 
inauthentic mode of farming life in which he tries to ―make‖ his life meaningful. The 
duration  of  this  period  is  approximately  three  months;  however,  one  of  the  most 
significant  events—the  main  action  of  the  discourse—is  that  Levin  is  once  again 
reminded  of  Kitty  and  reminded  of  his  love  for  her.  Indeed,  all  other  thoughts, 
discussions, actions within this chapter are merely background noise in comparison to 
the meaningful aura that surrounds Kitty. But, again Levin endeavours to cover-up this 
―abject  authenticity‖  with  farming  life,  and  even  goes  so  far  as  to  renounce  all  his 
―former  dreams  about  family  life.‖
52  Following  his  authentic  thoughts  of  Kitty  is  an 
inauthentic period of approximately two-and-a-half months to which very little discourse 
is given. However, this fourth narrative block ends when, having immersed himself in 
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the inauthenticity of farming, Levin ―physically‖ sees Kitty, and he has a new, authentic 
realisation,  namely  that,  regardless  of  the  project,  it  is  her  that  will  make  his  life 
meaningful: ―There was no other being in the world capable of concentrating for him all 
the light and meaning of life,‖
53 and once again his primary, meaningful project comes 
to the forefront of his mind. All else is background when contrasted with Kitty. Indeed, 
the meaninglessness of his farming projects is thrown into greater relief when he thinks 
of the meaningfulness that a life with Kitty would bring.  
  However, out of pride and despite his desire to be with her, Levin does not 
propose  to  Kitty.  Indeed,  the  main  action  of  the  fifth  narrative  block  (III,  24–32)  is 
focused  on  Levin  covering  up  his  desire  for  Kitty  and  his  endeavour  to  make 
meaningful those projects which previously held no meaning. And yet despite these 
efforts, he still cannot forget her and again becomes despondent, a mood which is all 
the more heightened when his dying brother Nikolai comes to visit. Seeing how near 
death his brother is, Levin begins to have authentic thoughts of his own death, which 
have only for the first time come to the forefront of his mind: 
 
Death,  the  inevitable  end  of  everything,  presented  itself  to  him  for  the  first  time  with 
irresistible force. And this death, which here, in his beloved brother, moaning in his sleep 
and calling by habit, without distinction, now on God, now on the devil, was not at all as 
far off as it had seemed to him before. It was in him, too—he felt it. If not now, then 
tomorrow, if not tomorrow, then in thirty years—did it make any difference? And what this 
inevitable death was, he not only did not know, he not only had never thought of it, but he 
could not and dared not think of it. 
  ―I work, I want to do something, and I‘ve forgotten that everything will end, that there 
is—death.‖
54 
 
Levin sees no purpose in his future life. All meaningfulness has come to an end and all 
supposedly meaningful projects shall remain incomplete. And because he cannot have 
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Kitty, who is to make his life meaningful, he has no reason to live. Indeed, Levin‘s 
response to an invitation to Paris from Shcherbatsky, Kitty‘s cousin, is simply: ―No, I‘m 
finished. It‘s time for me to die.‖
55 However, almost immediately after this declaration, 
Levin realises that he must continue to live:  
 
He had to live his life to the end, until death came. Darkness covered everything for him; 
but precisely because of this darkness he felt that his undertaking was the only guiding 
thread in this darkness, and he seized it and held on to it with all his remaining strength.
56 
 
This realisation ends the fifth narrative block, and begins the sixth block (IV, 7, 9, 11, 
13–16), which has the duration of essentially one evening, in which the main action is a 
party to which both Levin and Kitty have been invited. In the months prior to the party, 
Levin has been continuing his ―inauthentic‖ project of writing a book on farming, but he 
has also continued to think of death. However, this despair changes, when Levin sees 
Kitty at the party and he is reminded of his primary project: his desire for a marriage 
with Kitty. He again chooses this project and finally proposes, thereby, beginning a new 
meaningful, authentic life.  
  The main action of the seventh block (V, 1–6) is Kitty and Levin‘s marriage. 
Levin says that he is in a state of ―happy madness,‖ and yet this block is also marked 
by Levin‘s doubt of the existence of God. More importantly, despite the significance of 
the  event  of  a  wedding,  very  little  detail  is  given  to  the  wedding,  which  seemingly 
detracts  from  its  significance  to  Levin‘s  story;  indeed,  as  we  soon  learn  Levin‘s 
marriage to Kitty does not completely overcome Levin‘s existential anxiety.  
  The eighth block (V, 14–20) begins three months after the marriage (after three 
months  of  inauthentic,  ―happy  madness‖)  with  the  main  action  being  the  death  of 
Levin‘s brother, Nikolai. Because of the presence of death, Levin experiences another 
authentic  moment:  he  reflects  on  his  life  and  his  marriage  and  recognises  that  he 
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indeed, has a happy and meaningful life. Finally it would seem that Levin has achieved 
his goal of a happy, meaningful, married life. And yet in the ninth (VI, 1–15) and tenth 
(VII, 1–11, 13–16) narrative blocks, Levin discovers that the happiness of marriage is 
not  constant,  uniform  meaningfulness.  Indeed,  Levin  is  plagued  by  the  continual 
torment of jealousy (both his and Kitty‘s) and by questions of whether his marriage and 
his happiness with Kitty, or, indeed, his secondary project of a farming life, are indeed 
meaningful  projects.  His  ―expedient  answers‖  to  what  is  meaningful  in  life  are  still 
questionable  inasmuch  as  they  are  ―guesses‖  at  answers,  but  are  not  answers  in 
themselves. He is in continual flux in terms of the meaningfulness of his life. More 
importantly, the duration of these thoughts and questions could be measured not by 
months, but by days, or even hours and minutes; they are authentic thoughts which are 
discursively voluminous but not necessarily temporally long. 
  It is in the eleventh and final block (VIII, 1–19)—which takes place almost two 
months  after  Anna‘s  death—that  Levin  has  one  of  his  most  significant,  authentic 
moments,  when,  once  again,  he  questions  the  meaningfulness  of  his  life  and 
understands that death may once again be the answer: 
 
  ―Without knowing what I am and why I‘m here, it is impossible for me to live. And I 
cannot know that, therefore I cannot live,‖ Levin would say to himself. 
  ―In  infinite  time,  in  the  infinity  of  matter,  in  infinite  space,  a  bubble-organism 
separates itself, and that bubble holds out for a while and then bursts, and that bubble 
is—me.‖ 
  This  was  a  tormenting  untruth,  but  it  was  the  sole,  the  latest  result  of  age-long 
labours of human thought in that direction.  
  This was the latest belief on which all researches of the human mind in almost all 
fields were built. This was the reigning conviction, and out of all other explanations it was 
precisely this one that Levin, himself not knowing when or how, had involuntarily adopted 
as being at any rate the most clear. 
  But it was not only untrue, it was the cruel mockery of some evil power, evil and 
offensive, which it was impossible to submit to. The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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  It  was  necessary  to  be  delivered  from  this  power.  And  deliverance  was  within 
everyone‘s reach. It was necessary to stop this dependence on evil. And there was one 
means—death. 
  And, happy in his family life, a healthy man, Levin was several times so close to 
suicide that he hid a rope lest he hang himself with it, and was afraid to go about with a 
rifle lest he shoot himself. 
  But Levin did not shoot himself or hang himself and went on living.
57  
 
Levin goes on living his married life with Kitty, yet is marked by his despair of not 
knowing the true meaning of life. However, stemming from a conversation with the 
muzhik Fyodor, Levin has a revelation and somewhat of a new existential beginning. 
Fyodor  is  telling  Levin  of  the  difference  between  the  characters  of  an  innkeeper, 
Kirillov, and Platon, ―a wealthy and good muzhik,‖ and how they achieve their wealth—
how they ―make it pay.‖ Levin asks: 
 
  ―Then how does Kirillov make it pay?‖ 
  ―Mityukha‖  (so  the  muzhik  scornfully  called  the  innkeeper)  ―makes  it  pay  right 
enough,  Konstantin  Dmitrich!  He  pushes  till  he  gets  his  own.  He  takes  no  pity  on  a 
peasant. But Uncle Fokanych‖ (so he called old Platon), ―he won‘t skin a man. He lends 
to you, he lets you off. So he comes out short. He‘s a man, too.‖ 
  ―But why should he let anyone off?‖ 
  ―Well, that‘s how it is—people are different. One man just lives for his own needs, 
take Mityukha even, just stuffs his belly, but Fokanych—he‘s an upright old man. He lives 
for the soul. He remembers God.‖ 
  ―How‘s that? Remembers God? Lives for the soul?‖ Levin almost shouted. 
  ―Everybody knows how—by the truth, by God‘s way. People are different. Now, take 
you even, you wouldn‘t offend anybody either . . .‖ 
  ―Yes, yes, goodbye!‖ said Levin, breathless with excitement, and, turning, he took 
his stick and quickly walked off towards home. 
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  A new, joyful feeling came over him. At the muzhik‘s words about Fokanych living for 
the soul, by the truth, by God‘s way, it was as if a host of vague but important thoughts 
burst from some locked-up place and, all rushing towards the same goal, whirled through 
his head, blinding him with their light.
58 
 
Levin has his final authentic moment and revelation. Once again he finds some answer 
to  the  question  of  meaningfulness:  meaningfulness  in  religion  and  by  God‘s  will. 
Indeed, the significance of this final, authentic revelation is that Tolstoy again uses the 
term  ―blinding  light‖  which  he  also  uses  in  an  earlier  description  of  how  Kitty 
concentrates  for  Levin  ―all  the  light  and  meaning  of  life.‖  The  symbolism  of  light 
determines  the  meaningfulness  of  this  recognition  and  imbibes  it  with  a  sense  of 
authority. These two projects—his life with Kitty and a life lived in God‘s way—make 
Levin‘s life meaningful.  
  From this far from exhaustive description, we can calculate that if each block 
essentially represents one day, then the greater discursive volume of Levin‘s story is 
comprised of eleven days; eleven days out of the duration of two-and-a-half years of 
the  NOW-story.  But,  despite  this  small  temporal  fraction  of  the  whole  story,  these 
eleven  days  represent  the  essential  part  of  the  story  as  they  are  the  significant, 
authentic  moments  of  Levin‘s  personal  narrative:  they  centre  on  Kitty  and  Levin‘s 
authentic thoughts of the meaningfulness their marriage would bring; and they also 
centre on authentic thoughts of death and meaning, and God and meaning. And it is 
these qualitative moments which are also quantitatively discoursed. Their significance 
lies in the depth of representation and detailing. Of course, we do see this depth of 
detailing elsewhere in the novel, such as Levin and Stepan‘s snipe hunt (a passion of 
Tolstoy); but for the most part it is the significant, authentic moments of Levin‘s life 
which  are  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  detailed,  which  further  elevates  their 
significance in Levin‘s meaningful story.      
 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 794. The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
  249 
Overt Versus Covert Meaningfulness  
 
Where the postmodern novel may confuse the distinction between the meaningfulness 
of events within the plot, the realist novel approaches the meaningful events of the 
novel in a far more overt manner. This is particularly evident in the story of Levin and 
the rhetoric behind the inclusion of the events of Levin‘s life. They represent authentic 
moments which centre on his thoughts of Kitty, death, and the question of the meaning 
of life. They are also moments where change and new direction takes place; where 
new choices and new actions ―move‖ the story. However, as Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan 
states in Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics the meaningfulness of the inclusions 
(and exclusions) of a text, particularly in modernist texts, is not always easy to identify:  
 
Ordinarily,  the  most  important  events  or  conversations  are  given  in  detail  (i.e. 
decelerated), whereas the less important ones are compressed (i.e. accelerated). But this 
is not always the case; sometimes the effect of shock or irony is produced by summing 
up briefly the most central event and rendering trivial events in detail.
 59 
 
An example of this shock or irony can be found in Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse. The 
story-time of both the first and third parts of To the Lighthouse (―The Window‖ and ―To 
the Lighthouse,‖ respectively) is one afternoon or the best part of a day. However, in 
between these two days is a span of some ten years, which is broken by the second 
part, ―Time Passes‖ (the night before the day of the third part). In ―Time Passes,‖ there 
are bracketed statements which relate to events which have occurred over the past ten 
years. These events including the deaths of: Mrs. Ramsay—―[Mr. Ramsay stumbling 
along a passage stretched his arms out one dark morning, but, Mrs. Ramsay having 
died  rather  suddenly  the  night  before,  he  stretched  his  arms  out.  They  remained 
empty.]‖
60; Prue Ramsay—―[Prue Ramsay died that summer in some illness connected 
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with childbirth, which was indeed a tragedy, people said. They said nobody deserved 
happiness more]‖
61; and Andrew Ramsay—―[A shell exploded. Twenty or thirty young 
men were blown up in France, among them Andrew Ramsay, whose death, mercifully, 
was instantaneous.]‖
62 As has been suggested throughout this thesis, the event of a 
character‘s death is a very significant event in a novel; yet Woolf chooses to simply 
state  only  the  bare,  minimal  details  of  her  character‘s  respective  deaths.  Indeed, 
instead of detailing the characters‘ death, Woolf chooses to centre the first part of the 
story primarily on Lily  Briscoe‘s painting of a picture,  Mrs. Ramsay‘s  mending of a 
stocking, and a dinner for the Ramsay family and their guests (all of which occur in an 
afternoon), and centres the third part on the boat-journey to the lighthouse. The theory 
behind Woolf‘s choices to either heighten or lessen the intensity of certain events within 
the  story  is  discussed  by  Hermione  Lee  in  her  introduction  to  Woolf‘s  To  the 
Lighthouse: 
 
Brackets are a way of making more than one thing happen at once. But they also create 
an unsettling ambiguity about the status of events. What is more ―important,‖ the death of 
Mrs. Ramsay, or the fall of a fold of a green shawl in an empty room? If the novel makes 
us think of more than one thing at once, and exists in more than one time, which takes 
precedence? Is the life of the Ramsays in the garden and house enclosed by the outside 
world  as  if  in  parenthesis,  as  the  lighthouse  is  surrounded  by  the  sea?  Or  is  it  the 
Ramsays that are the main text, and everything else is in brackets?
63 
 
Questions such as these suggest that the hierarchy of events in fiction are not always 
clear-cut and identifiable; however, it can be argued that the realist novelists, such as 
Tolstoy, were far more overt and less subversive in their reasons for the inclusion of 
some events to the exclusion of others.    
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Interpretation, Evaluation, and the “Shape” of 
Meaning 
 
It  is  essentially  these  overtly  meaningful  events  which  give  shape  to  the  realist 
character‘s life. As has been intimated above, the middle of the novel, bound by the 
beginning(s) and the end of a character‘s life, is where the shaping of the character 
takes place, such that the character becomes who they intended to become, not by a 
single event in his or her personal narrative, but by all the discoursed and, to some 
extent, the undiscoursed events of the character‘s personal narrative. It is in the middle 
where the character gains his or her ―roundness‖ by representing the actions that make 
them who they  will become. The middle is also the place where interpretation and 
evaluation continues to take place, as new interpretations of a character supersede 
past interpretations. However, the middle is also where the meaning of a character‘s 
life becomes more and more limited because of the finitude of the character‘s life. 
Indeed, because death, as Heidegger suggests, is always ―impending‖ it continually 
limits  our  freedom  and  possibilities  and  increasingly  determines  the  shape  of  the 
meaning of our lives; and it also ―limits‖ evaluation (again, the martyr cannot redeem a 
worthless life). This claim is somewhat analogous to Paul Goodman‘s description of 
―probability‖ within the narrative of a poem: ―In the beginning anything is possible; in the 
middle  things  become  probable;  in  the  end  everything  is  necessary.‖
64  Chatman 
elaborates on this claim stating:  
 
The working out of plot (or at least some plots) is a process of declining or narrowing 
possibility. The choices become more and more limited, and the final choice seems not a 
choice at all, but an inevitably.
65   
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The  same  can  be  said  for  our  meaningful  projects:  when  we  first  choose  our 
meaningful  projects  we  are  absolutely  free  to  choose  whatever  project  we  desire 
(within the limiting factors of our facticity) and almost any project is possible; however, 
because  of  the  finitude  of  life,  and  the  fact  that  time  continues  to  slip  away,  the 
meaning of our lives becomes more and more probable regardless of whether it is the 
intended  meaning  or  not;  and  in  death,  the  ―definitive‖  meaning  of  our  projects, 
intended  or  otherwise,  is  inevitable  because  finitude  determines  it.  Indeed,  this 
movement towards ―inevitability‖ is what makes us anxious because we want to know 
what  becomes  of  our  choices  as  the  limiting  shadows  of  finitude  grow  continually 
longer,  removing  the  freedom  of  possibility.  Further,  the  inevitably  of  definitive 
meanings  comes  irrespective  of  new  existential  beginnings.  This  is  because  new 
existential  beginnings  also  become  more  and more  limited  in  terms  of  their  overall 
influence on the complete meaning of one‘s life, and, to some extent, the range of 
possible  choices.  This  is  very  much  related  to  Heidegger‘s  description  of  authentic 
resoluteness: ―The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of 
what  is  factically  possible  at  the  time.‖
66  The  factical  possibilities  of  one‘s  life  are 
determined  by  its  relation  to  the  time  of  one‘s  life—―time‖  which  is  influenced  and 
―determined‖ by one‘s finitude. This claim is illustrated by figure 5, below, where the 
oblique  lines  stemming  from  the  horizontal  line  at  E,  E2,  and  E3  represent  several 
possible choices which are not chosen, but can also be said to represent the range of 
possible choices as the angle created by the two oblique lines becomes smaller as 
time continues. 
 
         B      E      E2    E3                    D 
   
Figure 5: Limiting factors of facticity. 
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For good or ill, the shape of meaning is determined by temporality: the time-frames of 
meaningfulness dictate the shape of meaning. However, as will now be illustrated, the 
shaping  of  a  character  in  a  novel  is  greatly  influenced  by  the  ―fragmenting‖  of  the 
character‘s  life  and  the  omission  of  events  of  the  character‘s  life  from  the  novel‘s 
discourse, such that it is not necessarily the character‘s whole life that shapes and 
determines the character‘s meaning, but the fragment(s) of the character‘s life which 
are represented by the NOW-story. One may argue that in postmodern fictions—where 
the unification of identity is purposefully undermined, and where reality is ever only 
experienced  in  the  present—this  limiting  of  possibilities  is  meaningless.  Instead  of 
limiting the character‘s life, each segment and each fragment appears to necessitate 
treatment as isolated and outside of the character‘s overall shape. That is to say, a 
character‘s ―past‖ and the name and identity which belong to the character‘s past does 
not necessarily or categorically resemble the character‘s ―present‖ or ―future‖ character, 
or his or her name or identity; nor does the character‘s past necessarily or categorically 
influence or limit the character‘s present or future. Each ―new‖ identity defies unity and 
any sense of facticity; therefore, there is no clear or definable shape to the postmodern 
character.  Of  course,  what  must  be  observed  is  that  this  description  does  in  fact 
resemble  the  existentialist‘s  claim  that  we  are  always  free  to  choose—we  are 
condemned to choose—and in a sense can choose a new identity; however, unlike the 
postmodernist,  the  existentialist  would  also  argue  that  these  new  identities  are 
nevertheless  unified.  Indeed,  one  cannot  dismiss  one‘s  past  so  easily:  even  an 
individual who changes his or her name in real life—tries to literally shake-off their 
identity—is necessarily haunted by his or her past and shaped by their past, if only in 
terms of the limiting factors of facticity and possibilities. This is also the case for the 
character of realist fiction where there is a dependency on the concept of unity and 
shape for its structure, and where a character‘s past, present, and future each play a 
significant role in creating this unity and shape. 
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Anna Karenina 
 
One of the best ways of illustrating how a character of realist fiction is given shape 
through the middle of the novel, and how the temporal frame of the period of the NOW-
story influences interpretation and evaluation, is by again examining the story of Anna 
Karenina. As was described in the previous chapter, Anna‘s NOW-story begins with an 
―unwanted‖ existential beginning when she meets Vronsky and starts a new meaningful 
life with Vronsky. The middle of Anna‘s story begins after this secondary existential 
beginning, and is comprised of all the incidents between this beginning and the end of 
Anna‘s story, her death—the final incident of her personal narrative. Within this period 
is Anna‘s ascending happiness as she enjoys what is essentially her now authentic, 
subjectively meaningful life with Vronsky. The momentum of Anna‘s happy, meaningful 
relationship with Vronsky is essentially maintained; however, following an incident in 
which Vronsky injures himself during a horse-race, Anna and Vronsky‘s ―private‖ affair 
is revealed. Under the scrutiny of Karenin, Anna is compelled to tell of her affair to 
which  Karenin  replies:  ―‗So  be  it!  But  I  demand  that  the  outward  conventions  of 
propriety be observed until‘—his voice trembled—‗until I take measures to secure my 
honour and inform you of them.‘‖
67 Anna is initially pleased with her telling Karenin of 
the  affair  as  the  unspoken  affair  made  her  feel  that  her  situation  was  ―false‖  and 
―dishonest.‖  However,  her  telling  Karenin  has  a  secondary  consequence  in  that  it 
removes  the  ground  from  which  she  was  safe  and  protected,  but  also  begins  her 
downward movement into tragedy. Anna becomes anxious, and suddenly feels that her 
relationship with Vronsky is losing its strength and meaningfulness. This change also 
signals the beginning of her descent into unease and paranoia, causing her to make 
rash decisions for her life:  
 
[Anna] went on sitting in the same position, her head and arms hanging down, and every 
once in a while her whole body shuddered, as if wishing to make some gesture, to say The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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something,  and then  became still again. She kept repeating: ―My  God! My God!‖ But 
neither the ―my‖ nor the ―God‖ had any meaning for her. Though she had never doubted 
the religion in which she had been brought up, the thought of seeking help from religion in 
her situation was as foreign to her as seeking help from Alexei Alexandrovich. She knew 
beforehand that the help of religion was possible only on condition of renouncing all that 
made up the whole meaning of life for her. Not only was it painful for her, but she was 
beginning to feel fear before the new, never experienced state of her soul. She felt that 
everything was beginning to go double in her soul, as an object sometimes goes double 
in tired eyes. Sometimes she did not know what she feared, what she desired: whether 
she feared or desired what had been or what would be, and precisely what she desired, 
she did not know.  
  ―Ah, what am I doing!‖ she said to herself, suddenly feeling pain in both sides of her 
head. When she came to herself, she saw that she was clutching the hair on her temples 
and squeezing them with both hands. She jumped up and began pacing. 
  ―Coffee‘s ready, and Mamzelle and Seryozha are waiting,‖ said Annushka, coming 
back again and finding Anna in the same position. 
  ―Seryozha?  What  about  Seryozha?‖  Anna  asked,  suddenly  becoming  animated, 
remembering her son‘s existence for the first time that whole morning. 
  ―He‘s been naughty, it seems,‖ Annushka answered smiling. 
  ―What has he done?‖ 
  ―You had some peaches on the table in the corner room, and it seems he ate one on 
the sly.‖ 
  The reminder of her son suddenly brought Anna out of that state of hopelessness 
which she had been in. She remembered the partly sincere, though much exaggerated, 
role of the mother who lives for her son, which she had taken upon herself in recent 
years,  and  felt  with  joy  that,  in  the  circumstances  she  was  in,  she  had  her  domain, 
independent of her relations with her husband and Vronsky. That domain was her son. 
Whatever position she was in, she could not abandon her son. . . . She had a goal in life. 
And she had to act, to act in order to safeguard that position with her son, so that he 
would not be taken from her. She even had to act soon, as soon as possible, while he 
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had not yet been taken from her. She had to take her son and leave. Here was the one 
thing she now had to do.
68   
 
This event in Anna‘s life is essentially a third existential beginning: Anna renounces her 
past choices, her past meaningful projects of her life with Karenin, and then Vronsky, 
and chooses a new meaningful project: to be a mother to her son. All of her previous 
projects  haven  fallen  into  meaninglessness,  such  that  her  son  is  now  the  primary 
source of meaningfulness in her life: care of Seryozha is her primary goal, a goal which 
was  earlier  replaced  by  her  love  for  Vronsky.  But,  as  Anna  says  herself,  care  of 
Seryozha is an insincere goal. And it is because of this insincerity that, just as quickly 
as this project is decided, it is superseded by Anna‘s final project—her martyrdom—
which ironically can also be identified as a fourth existential beginning: it is a project of 
revenge against Vronsky, as is implied by the novel‘s epigram: ―Vengeance is mine; I 
will repay.‖ Anna deserts her son, abandoning the half-hearted meaningful project she 
chose earlier, and takes her own life. And it is here that the tragedy of Anna‘s life is 
determined.   
  From this brief summary of Anna‘s story, we can begin to interpret and evaluate 
Anna‘s life and give shape to its meaning by crudely dividing her life into at least two 
meaningful  parts.  To  do  this  we  must  also  include  Anna‘s  undiscoursed  past  (the 
period prior to her meeting Vronsky) such that it is an evaluation of her whole life (with 
the  exclusion  of  her  formative  years).  Anna‘s  undiscoursed  past  is  essentially  the 
period of her life which began when she first married Karenin, and ended when she 
met Vronsky. The temporal length of this part can be approximated to at least nine 
years.
69 This period of Anna‘s life with Karenin had been evaluated kindly by the Other, 
which is to say that, in very simple terms, it was objectively meaningful and valued. But 
upon  meeting  Vronsky,  Anna  retrospectively  finds  this  past  to  be  altogether 
meaningless.  And  it  is  here  that  her  new  subjectively  meaningful  life  with  Vronsky 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 288–89. 
69 This figure is based on the knowledge that Anna‘s eight-year-old son Seryozha was not born 
out of wedlock. The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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begins. The temporal length of this period is approximately two-and-a-half years, with 
the discursive beginning (a in figure 6, below) of her meeting Vronsky and ending some 
short  period  before  her  death.  The  significance  of  this  contrast  relates  to  the  two 
temporally disparate halves of her life: the subjective meaningfulness of Anna‘s life with 
Vronsky—which began with her second existential beginning (E2) and ―ended‖ with her 
third existential beginning (E3)—is a relatively short period when compared to her now 
retrospectively, subjectively meaningless past.  
 
 
           B                                            E                                   a E2  E3 D       
 
Figure 6: Anna Karenina‘s biological and discursive life (approximate temporal scale). 
   
The question is: How can we reconcile the disparity between the two unequal periods 
of Anna‘s life—her life with Karenin, and her life with Vronsky—to accurately evaluate 
Anna‘s whole life? Again in very simple terms we can say that objectively Anna‘s life is 
predominantly meaningful as the larger temporal-frame of Anna‘s life, her disposition, 
her choices, actions, her becoming the wife of Karenin, and mother to Seryozha, is 
valued by the Other; thus the Other should deem Anna‘s life predominantly meaningful, 
despite the abject nature of her affair and her suicide. Indeed, her past life is objectively 
limiting the influence of her present life over the interpretation and evaluation of the 
whole of her life. Subjectively, however, Anna‘s life is predominantly meaningless as 
Anna does not value her temporally longer life with Karenin, instead finding meaning 
with Vronsky. Thus, if Anna‘s whole life is to be evaluated subjectively, then her life 
should be deemed predominantly meaningless.  
  However, we must of course remember that Anna is not a real person—she is a 
fictional character, and how she is evaluated as a fictional character differs greatly from The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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how we would (or should) evaluate her life if she were a real person. This disparity in 
evaluation can again be attributed to the corporeal conviction of the ―actual,‖ NOW-
story of the novel and  how  it relates  to the meaningfulness of a character. Anna‘s 
past—her life with Karenin—is not given sufficient, qualitative discourse—it is not NOW 
and it does not ―exist‖ within the pages of the book, except as ―incorporeal‖ memories. 
It  is  because  of  this  lack  of  qualitative  discourse  that  a  radical  shift  occurs  in  the 
evaluation of her life: Anna‘s subjective meaningful life with Vronsky suddenly becomes 
the predominant meaningful period of her ―whole‖ life, whereas objectively her life with 
Vronsky is predominantly meaningless. And yet irrespective of how we interpret Anna, 
we must understand that, rhetorically, Tolstoy is stating that this NOW-story is the story 
of Anna Karenina and, therefore, if Anna‘s discursive NOW-story is meaningful, then 
her whole life is meaningful. 
  This rhetorical  influence  of corporeal  conviction  over  evaluation  can  also  be 
illustrated  if  we  compare  another  ―meaningless  life‖  (again  a  result  of  a  loveless 
marriage), namely that of Dorothea and the reverend Mr. Casaubon in George Eliot‘s 
Middlemarch. Unlike Anna‘s unhappy marriage, which is essentially only alluded to in 
the discourse of Anna Karenina, a significant volume of the discourse of Middlemarch 
is given to detailing the story of the marriage of Dorothea and Casaubon, with their 
courtship being essentially the first major event of the plot. Of course, to the dismay of 
her friends and family, the idealistic, ascetic eighteen-year-old Dorothea accepts the 
proposal  of marriage from  the forty-five-year-old  Casaubon,  a  ―sallow-faced,‖ ―dried 
bookworm,‖  who  is  engaged  in  writing  his  great  life-work—a  treatise  concerning 
religious history. Dorothea sees in him the best kind of husband, who she believes 
should  be  ―a  sort  of father,  and  could  teach  you  even  Hebrew,  if  you  wished  it.‖
70 
Despite  having  her  own  projects  in  mind,  and a  strong-willed  disposition,  Dorothea 
weds Casaubon and takes upon herself the duties of an aid to his projects, even going 
so  far  as  to  learn  Greek,  Latin,  and  Hebrew  in  order  to  ―save‖  Casaubon‘s  eyes. 
However,  some  six  weeks  after  their  marriage,  on  a  trip  to  the  Vatican  to  further The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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Casaubon‘s research, Dorothea soon discovers that her marriage to Casaubon is not 
at all what she had expected, setting the tone for the brief period (approximately one 
year) of their marriage before Casaubon dies of a form of heart disease. However, 
Casaubon‘s death does not relinquish Dorothea of her sad marriage as Casaubon, on 
his  death-bed,  asks  Dorothea  to  complete  his  work.  What  is  more,  in  his  will, 
Casaubon, suspicious of his nephew Will Ladislaw, places a codicil which states that 
Dorothea‘s inherited fortune should be taken from her if she and Ladislaw were to wed. 
However, foregoing her inherited fortune, Dorothea and Ladislaw do wed, and a new 
life for the two of them begins.  
  What is significant about this brief summary is that the period of Dorothea‘s 
unhappy marriage to Casaubon dominates the greater part of the discursive volume of 
Middlemarch. The effect that this has is that it invokes a stronger sense of sympathy for 
Dorothea,  than  that  for  Anna  Karenina.  The  detail  given  to  Dorothea‘s  unhappy 
marriage creates a fuller representation, and, consequently, a ―fuller‖ response from 
the reader. Moreover, this greater volume of discourse also invokes a stronger sense 
of happiness for Dorothea when she herself is happy in her new life. In contrast, Anna‘s 
past, married life with Karenin, which is not NOW and is not qualitatively discoursed, is 
far less convincing and so we are not invoked with an overt, sympathetic feeling of 
happiness for Anna when she meets Vronsky. Indeed, the two stories represent the 
two  ―halves‖  of  a  whole  life:  Dorothea,  the  unhappy  marriage  before  a  new  happy 
beginning; Anna, the initial happiness of a new beginning after an unhappy marriage. 
However, in terms of evaluating Anna‘s life, her NOW-story—the short middle of her 
life—is  qualitatively  meaningful  and  supersedes  any  quantitative  evaluation  of  her 
whole  life.  Anna‘s  whole,  meaningful  life  can  be  found  within  the  pages  of  Anna 
Karenina. The rhetoric of corporeal conviction dismisses her quantitatively meaningless 
past, for the qualitatively meaningful ―present.‖ Indeed, Anna‘s undiscoursed life seems 
more meaningful than Dorothea‘s discoursed life simply because Dorothea does not 
redeem her meaningless life by marrying Ladislaw; in contrast, the meaninglessness of 
                                                                                                                                           
70 Eliot, Middlemarch, 10. The Middle as the Shaping of Meaning 
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Anna‘s  past  is  not  qualitatively  detailed  and  therefore  does  not  undermine  the 
meaningfulness of her discoursed life.  
  And yet it must be noted that, unlike the dead life of Anna, we cannot decide on 
the meaningfulness of Dorothea‘s life because she is essentially ahistorical. Her life is 
meaningless within the novel, but this meaninglessness is not determined as she is not 
yet dead. Unlike Anna, Dorothea theoretically has ―time on her side.‖ She can right her 
wrongs  and  lessen  the  impact  of  her  meaningless  past  less  on  her  whole  life‘s 
meaning. But what does it mean to say that Dorothea has ―time on her side‖ and that 
she  is  ―ahistorical.‖  This  is  clearly  a  strange  sentiment  for  a  fictional  character  as, 
although  she  is  not  dead,  her  discoursed  story  has  ended.  Here  we  find  a  clear 
discrepancy between the end of a character‘s personal narrative and the end of the 
novel‘s discourse, namely that they do not necessarily coincide. This discrepancy will 
be the subject of discussion in the following chapter in which we will also see how the 
relationship between the two disparate ends has a significant influence on how the 
meaning  of  a  character‘s  life  is  evaluated  by  the  shivering  reader,  but  also  on  the 
shivering reader‘s understanding of the meaning of his or her own life and their place in 
the world. 
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6 
The End as Death and Closure  
 
 
Men, like poets, rush ―into the middest,‖ in medius res, when they are born; they 
also  die  in  mediis  rebus,  and  to  make  sense  of  their  span  they  need  fictive 
concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to poems. The 
End they imagine will reflect the irreducibly intermediary preoccupations. They fear 
it, and as far as we can see have always done so; the End is a figure for their own 
deaths.  
           —Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending 
 
 
All plots tend to move deathward. This is the nature of plots. Political plots, terrorist 
plots, lovers‘ plots, narrative plots, plots that are part of children‘s games. We edge 
nearer death every time we plot. It is like a contract that all must sign, the plotters 
as well as those who are the targets of the plot. 
                             —Don DeLillo, White Noise 
 
 
he  end  of  our  personal  narratives  is  logically  our  biological  death.  And  as 
Heidegger suggests it is also the end of our existence where death is the ―end‖ of 
our Being-in-the-world.
1 However, the end of our personal narratives entails much more 
than just a biological or existential limit; it also marks the event of meaningful revelation 
and a denouement of our past, where the past is ―unknotted,‖ the mystery is solved, 
and the meaning of life revealed. Death reveals to us what has been for the most part 
of our lives concealed, as is exemplified by the revelations of the fictional characters of 
Ivan Ilyich, Mr. Kurtz, and Citizen Kane. But it is not only the revelations of death which 
make the event of death significant in our meaningful lives. Indeed, it is also the finitude 
of death and the inevitability of death which are essential for choosing our meaningful 
projects. This is to say that death is ―present‖ at our beginnings, when we are in the 
process of choosing our meaningful projects, as when we choose our projects we are 
T The End as Death and Closure 
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essentially choosing what meaning we intend to be revealed. This is the eschatological 
nature of our personal narratives: we begin our personal narratives with some form of 
an end in mind—we begin the tick of our lives with the expectation of tock. And it is this 
expectation of tock which also creates a necessary, meaningful limit to our projects. 
Indeed, as Winnie Richards states in a conversation between herself and Jack Gladney 
in Don DeLillo‘s White Noise:  
 
―I think it‘s a mistake to lose one‘s sense of death, even one‘s fear of death. Isn‘t death 
the boundary we need? Doesn‘t it give a precious texture to life, a sense of definition? 
You have to ask yourself whether anything you do in this life would have beauty and 
meaning without the knowledge you carry of a final line, a border or limit.‖
2  
 
This is very much the argument made by many existential philosophers: death is an 
essential  and  necessary  event  in  our  lives,  especially  for  our  understanding  of  the 
meaning of our lives. More specifically, the finitude of death gives special significance 
to the event of death as it is necessary for both our individual freedom and for giving 
individualised meaning and value to our lives. As Jean-Paul Sartre claims in Notebooks 
for an Ethics:   
 
Death is [freedom‘s] limit, but also a constitutive factor of freedom. . . . If a being were 
endowed with a temporal infinity, he could realise every possible, he would therefore be 
nothing more than the development in an infinite and necessary series of every possible, 
therefore he would disappear as an individuality (the realisation of these possibles to the 
exclusion of all the rest) and as freedom (the dangerous and irremediable choice of some 
possibles).
3 
 
Sartre suggests that if we were each immortal then we would each eventually achieve, 
or ―take-up,‖ every possible project, such that no choice or project would be peculiar or 
                                                                                                                                           
1 Heidegger, Being and Time, 234H. 
2 DeLillo, White Noise, 228–29. The End as Death and Closure 
  263 
special to our selves. We would no longer be individualised by the choices we make, or 
by the projects we undertake, which would remove all value and meaning from their 
achievement. The meaninglessness of life without death is also discussed by British 
philosopher Bernard Williams in his examination of the ―The Makropulos Case,‖ a play 
by Karel Čapek in which the protagonist Elina Makropulos takes an elixir purported to 
extend her life by three hundred years, thereby effectively giving her an immortal life. 
However, Elina discovers that her unending, immortal life has amounted to a ―state of 
boredom, indifference and coldness,‖
4 and at the age of 342 Elina dies having refused 
to take the elixir again. It is this description of the tragedy of Elina‘s immortal life which 
prompted  Williams  to  argue  that:  ―Immortality,  or  a  state  without  death,  would  be 
meaningless . . . ; so, in a sense, death gives the meaning to life.‖
5 For Williams, death 
is an event that should not be feared or regarded as an evil, but is an event that should 
be ―embraced‖ as it is necessary for human happiness and desire. Alphonso Lingis, 
drawing on Heidegger, makes a similar claim: 
 
My death advances toward me as the brink of the abyss, of utter impossibility. It outlines, 
in the outlying field of all that is possible in general, for anyone, an expanse of what is yet 
possible for me. It also reveals, under my feet, resources available to me. The acute 
sense of my mortality thus illuminates for me an expanse of possibilities possible for me. 
At the same time the anxiety that throws me back upon myself makes me feel what is 
unrealised  in  me,  the  potentialities  and  powers  that  are  in  me  and  have  remained  in 
suspense. Hence the sense of my vulnerability, contingency, mortality is also the sense 
of my being, my powers, my singularity.
6 
 
Death is therefore an important and meaningful event as it completes our subjective 
lives and gives them meaning and wholeness. Our lives are subjectively meaningful 
because death limits our possibilities and thereby individualises the meaning of our 
                                                                                                                                           
3 Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, 326. 
4 B. Williams, ―The Makropulos Case,‖ 82.   
5 Ibid.  
6 Lingis, ―To Die with Others,‖ 108. The End as Death and Closure 
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lives.  However,  for  the  anxious  living,  death  also  creates  a  boundary  for  objective 
interpretation and evaluation: death makes one whole and complete such that we are, 
as Sartre states, ―all done,‖ and necessarily become a historical dead life, which is to 
say we become ―interpretable.‖ This is also important for the shivering reader as the 
reader can interpret and evaluate the whole, dead life of the fictional character—the 
character that dies within the discourse of the novel—regardless of whether or not the 
dying character explicitly reveals the meaning of his or her life.   
 
Endings and Fiction 
 
However, when discussing the nature of the ends of fictional characters and how the 
character‘s death provides a necessary boundary for the reader‘s interpretation and 
evaluation of the character‘s life, we must recognise a disparity between the ends of 
real life and the ends of fiction—a disparity which is analogous to those discussed in 
the previous two chapters. In our own lives, we have one ―end‖ which is properly our 
biological death, and this end is both a revelation and a closure insofar as it reveals 
meaning and is an existential boundary which makes us complete and whole. In fiction, 
however, there are two ―ends‖: the biological death of the fictional character; and the 
end of the discourse—the end of the character‘s NOW-story—which can take the form 
of a resolution, a denouement, a climax or crescendo. These two endings allow for 
three distinct combinations of endings: the coinciding of the character‘s death with the 
end  of  the  novel‘s  NOW-story/discursive  end;  the  discursive  end  which  follows  a 
character‘s death; and the discursive end which comes before the character‘s death. 
As we will see, each of these combinations has a significant explicit or implicit influence 
on  how  a  character  is  interpreted  and  evaluated,  but  also  on  how  the  reader 
understands his or her own life particularly in terms of their in/authentic attitude towards 
their lives. 
 The End as Death and Closure 
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1. The Coinciding of  Discursive Endings  with  a 
Character’s Death  
 
The  end  of  the  novel‘s  discourse/NOW-story  (e  in  figure  7,  below)  and  the  exact 
moment of a character‘s biological end (D) very rarely coincide. Indeed, of the many 
novels discussed in this thesis none can be said to end at the exact moment of the 
protagonist‘s death. Actually, the one example which seems to end by coinciding these 
two ends is Tolstoy‘s The Death of Ivan Ilyich, in which the discourse of the NOW-story 
ends with the line: ―He drew in a breath, stopped in the midst of a sigh, stretched out 
and died.‖
7 Ivan‘s biological death is described on the very last line of the final page of 
the short story. However, we must remember that the very beginning of the discourse 
of the short story represents the narrative-NOW—the tense in which the narrator is 
telling the story—and then has a flashback to Ivan‘s NOW-story, such that his story is 
told in the preterite. It is also because of the narrative-NOW that the reader comes to 
know of Ivan‘s so–called friends‘ opinions of Ivan upon hearing of Ivan‘s death. This is 
significant as Ivan‘s death is not the boundary of the interpretation and evaluation of his 
life  within  the  discourse.  This  is  to  say  that  the  duration  of  the  story-time  of  the 
discourse does not end with Ivan‘s death but continues for some duration after his 
death, such that the other characters‘ opinions are included and may influence the 
reader‘s understanding of the meaning of the life of Ivan. The reader can see how 
Ivan‘s life was objectively evaluated before coming to know Ivan‘s subjective evaluation 
of his own life. This choice of Tolstoy‘s to tell the story in this way may be seen as a 
rhetorical device employed to further emphasise the meaninglessness of Ivan‘s life—a 
conclusion that is drawn by Ivan himself. 
 
                                                 
7 Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich, 161. The End as Death and Closure 
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                     a                           E                              D/e 
   
Figure 7: Coinciding of discursive end with character‘s death  
 
Of course, there are also many novels in which the main character dies in the final 
pages of the novel, such that it would seem that the character‘s death and the NOW-
story do coincide; however, even in these examples there is the possibility for some 
final word—a final value-judgment—to be spoken about the deceased character. This 
judgement may come from a third-person narrator or from another character within the 
novel left to confer meaning onto the dead life. It is these final judgements which can 
possibly  influence  the  reader‘s  own  evaluation  of  the  dead  character.  Indeed,  this 
combination of endings is far more common as is the combination where the NOW-
story ends before the protagonist‘s (undiscoursed) death. As will now be explained, of 
the two it is the former which is of the most value to the shivering reader.  
 
 
2. Discursive Endings that Follow a Character’s 
Death  
 
Typically  (and  necessarily)  autobiographical  first-person  narration  ends  before  the 
character‘s  death,  simply  because  the  autobiographer  cannot  write  his  or  her  own 
death or their dying revelations, rendering it impossible to end the NOW-story after 
their death. However, it is possible for an omniscient, third-person narrator to ―live on‖ 
after the protagonist has died such that the NOW-story ends after the character‘s death 
(see figure 8, below). Indeed, third-person narrators are the biographers left to finish The End as Death and Closure 
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the stories for those who can‘t. The obvious advantage of this ending to the shivering 
reader is that the story of the life of the character can be completed and becomes a 
historical dead life. This dead life can therefore be interpreted and evaluated by the 
reader with a sense of accuracy.  
 
 
                     a                           E                       D      e 
   
Figure 8: Character‘s death before novel‘s discursive/NOW-story end  
   
However, as was intimated above, the significance of this combination of endings is 
that, because the discourse continues for some duration after the character‘s death, 
there is also the possibility of rhetorical influence on the reader‘s evaluation of the 
deceased character, particularly if characters and narrators ―remain‖ to evaluate the 
deceased character‘s life and explicitly or implicitly communicate these evaluations to 
the reader. We see this combination of ending in  Hamlet  when,  following Hamlet‘s 
death, Horatio says: ―Now cracks a noble heart. Good night, sweet prince, / And flights 
of  angels  sing  thee  to  thy  rest.‖  Very  simply,  Horatio  imparts  to  the  viewer  his 
evaluation of the life of Hamlet and thereby influences the viewer‘s own evaluation of 
Hamlet. Two novels that exemplify this rhetorical influence by continuing the NOW-
story of the novel for some duration after the death of their respective protagonists are 
again Tolstoy‘s Anna Karenina (the story of Anna Karenina) and Conrad‘s Nostromo 
(the  story  of  Nostromo).  The  rhetorical  influence  of  the  respective  novelists  is 
particularly evidenced in how ―secondary‖ characters—characters that live on after the 
respective protagonists‘ deaths (specifically Levin and Kitty in Anna Karenina, and Mrs. 
Gould in Nostromo)—become the ―superior final arbiters‖ of the deceased character‘s 
lives. Indeed, these surviving characters are the ―moral compasses‖ for a meaningful The End as Death and Closure 
  268 
life,  and  implicitly  or  explicitly  determine  the  ―meaningfulness‖  of  the  deceased 
protagonists‘ lives.   
 
Anna Karenina 
 
Anna Karenina‘s final action of her life is her suicide, an action which is unwitnessed 
except by the omniscient narrator and the ―omniscient‖ reader via the narrator. Anna 
believes that she can redeem her tragic life and make herself a martyr by taking her 
own life. However, the novel and the NOW-story of Anna Karenina does not end with 
Anna‘s death: the final part of Anna Karenina takes the form of an epilogue, which 
takes place some two months after Anna‘s death. And it is here that the NOW-story 
returns to the story of Levin. The significance of including this final chapter is that it 
both explicitly and implicitly provides an objective evaluation of the meaning of Anna‘s 
dead  life.  The  former  is  evidenced  by  Tolstoy‘s  inclusion  of  a  comment  made  by 
Vronsky‘s mother: ―‗Yes, she ended as such a woman should have ended. Even the 
death she chose was mean and low.‘‖
8 The question we may ask is why does Tolstoy 
include Vronsky‘s mother‘s value judgment within the discourse? One possible reason 
is that it is a rhetorical device employed by Tolstoy to further illustrate the ills of society 
and its propensity for scandal, hypocrisy, and prejudice.
9 Indeed, it can be argued that 
the reader forgives Anna‘s action, and understands and sees her life as subjectively 
meaningful, whilst an ignorant society does not.
10   
  However, this comment made by Vronsky‘s mother pales in significance when 
compared to Tolstoy‘s ―implicit‖ commentary, which is demonstrated by the fact that 
                                                 
8 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, 778. 
9 Thorlby, Leo Tolstoy: Anna Karenina, 21. 
10 Interestingly, Moretti (The Way of the World, 188) describes how the theme of adultery is 
dealt with in the narrative traditions of France, Germany, America, and Russia, but is not dealt 
with in England, citing Jane Eyre as a prime example. The reason for this, Moretti claims, is that 
the ethical dichotomies of England did not tolerate ambiguous situations such as adultery, and, 
when the existence of Bertha Mason is revealed, Jane must therefore flee from the possibility of 
becoming an adulteress and begin her life again. In Anna Karenina‘s case, the ambiguity of the 
situation is brought to the foreground by illustrating various points of view and the Other‘s 
opinions of her adultery.    The End as Death and Closure 
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where the character Anna Karenina dies within the discourse of Anna Karenina, the 
character of Levin lives on at the ―end‖ of the discourse. It can be argued that this 
contrast enables Tolstoy to better illuminate his ―moral realism,‖
11 particularly in terms 
of  the  value  of  love  and  marriage  for  a  meaningful  life.  As  was  stated  above,  for 
Tolstoy,  married  life  is  tantamount  to  a  good  and  meaningful  life—marriage  which 
provides a unifying centre and a home to nourish the relationship. As Anthony Thorlby 
suggests: 
 
[Anna]  lacks  what  was  for  Tolstoy  the  ideal  and  necessary  centre  of  all  human 
relationships, including the relationship of self through memory to its own past: she lacks 
a home. The imaginative significance of this lack for Tolstoy was so great that Anna is felt 
to be in jeopardy not only as regards her position in society, but in her life altogether. 
There is nothing for her to become, her love exists in a kind of vacuum, and cannot grow. 
Here the contrast with Levin and Kitty is particularly telling; their relationship can and 
does grow, they have in their family life more to occupy and sustain them than just their 
feelings for one another. Anna has only her love for Vronsky, and she is utterly vulnerable 
to every kind of doubt about his love for her; her happiness is always fragile and at risk, 
until the struggle against unhappiness becomes unendurable and overwhelms her. In the 
context  of  Tolstoy‘s  moral  realism,  there  is  ultimately  no  place  for  the  passion  that 
consumes Anna.
12 
 
Anna‘s life ends because her project has ended—she cannot grow—and despite her 
actual death she is already a dead life. In contrast, Levin continues to become who he 
is to become, and his love for Kitty can grow. However, the fact that Levin lives on also 
suggests the superiority of Levin; indeed, it almost suggests that Levin‘s love for Kitty 
overcomes  death,  or  as  Henri  Troyat  suggests  conquers  life:  ―Anna  Karenina  and 
Vronsky are swept from the scene, leaving behind them the mighty conquerors in the 
battle of life: Kitty and Levin.‖
13 Levin survives, and he is left to categorise the dead—
                                                 
11 Ibid., 16. 
12 Ibid., 22. 
13 Troyat, Tolstoy, 512. The End as Death and Closure 
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he is superior to the dead and it is his voice which is the authoritative voice of Tolstoy‘s 
morality.  Levin  is  the  moral  compass  and  it  would  seem  that  Tolstoy  implies  that 
Levin‘s life is a life to which one should aspire; but also a life one should choose in 
order to overcome the negative categorisation of the Other.  
 
Nostromo 
 
A similar example to the contrasting stories of Anna and Levin—where the NOW-story 
ends  after  the  character‘s  death—is  the  contrasting  stories  of  Nostromo  and  Mrs. 
Gould in Conrad‘s Nostromo. However, the story of Nostromo is somewhat different in 
its structure to that  of Anna Karenina as the epilogue, which would normally follow 
Nostromo‘s death, comes before the event of his death as a ―flashforward‖ (prolepse) 
and breaks the linear story-flow.
14 The main action of this chapter surrounds what has 
become the common occurrence of Captain Mitchell retelling the historical  events of 
Sulaco‘s past to distinguished strangers visiting Sulaco. Not only does Captain Mitchell 
identify significant places and structures, and their relation to Sulaco‘s past, but also 
―remembers‖ Nostromo and his heroic actions: 
 
  ―The  equestrian  statue  that  used  to  stand  on  the  pedestal  over  there  has  been 
removed.  It  was  an  anachronism,‖  Captain  Mitchell  commented  obscurely.  ―There  is 
some talk of replacing it by a marble shaft commemorative of Separation, with angels of 
peace at the four corners, and a bronze Justice holding an even balance, all gilt, on the 
top. Cavaliere Parrochetti was asked to make a design, which you can see framed under 
glass in the Municipal Sala. Names are to be engraved all round the base. Well! They 
could do no better than begin with the name of Nostromo. He has done for Separation as 
much as anybody else, and,‖ added Captain Mitchell, ―has got less than many others by 
it—when  it  comes  to  that.‖  He  dropped  on  to  a  stone  seat  under  a  tree,  and  tapped 
invitingly at the place by his side. ―He carried to Barrios the letters from Sulaco which 
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decided the General to evacuate Catya for a time, and come to our help here by sea. . . . 
The history of that ride, sir, would make a most exciting book. He carried all our lives in 
his pocket. Devotion, courage, fidelity, intelligence were not enough. Of course, he was 
perfectly  fearless  and  incorruptible.  But  a  man  was  wanted  that  would  know  how  to 
succeed. He was that man, sir.‖
15   
 
What is significant about Captain Mitchell‘s praise is that Nostromo‘s incorruptibility is 
an  ironic  fallacy,  a  fallacy  which  is  known  only  by  Mrs.  Gould  and  the  omniscient 
reader. Nostromo is corruptible, as is evidenced by his attempt to keep the silver of the 
mine for himself, whilst allowing everyone to believe that it had been lost at sea. The 
omniscient  reader  knows  of  this  fallacy  before  Mrs.  Gould  who  only  learns  of 
Nostromo‘s secret when he confesses it to her on his death-bed. And it is just after 
Nostromo‘s death, whilst comforting the grieving Giselle, that Mrs. Gould discloses her 
feelings towards Nostromo‘s life:  
 
  ―Console yourself, child. Very soon he would have forgotten you for his treasure.‖  
  ―Señora, he loved me. He loved me,‖ Giselle whispered, despairingly. ―He loved me 
as no one had ever been loved before.‖ 
  ―I have been loved too,‖ Mrs. Gould said in a severe tone.
16 
 
Mrs Gould states very clearly the meaninglessness of ―material interests‖—interests 
which  have  haunted  both  Nostromo  and  her  husband.  Mrs.  Gould  is  the  moral 
compass of Nostromo and it is to her evaluation of Nostromo‘s life that the reader 
should acquiesce.  
  But as we have done in our analysis of Anna Karenina, the question we must 
again ask is: Why is the chapter on the period after Nostromo‘s death, and after Mrs. 
Gould‘s comments included? One of the possible answers to this question is that this 
epilogue  of  Nostromo‘s  life  somewhat  redeems  the  absurdity  of  his  life.  All  of 
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Nostromo‘s  projects  were  rendered  absurd  by  his  betrayal,  but  in  death  some 
reconciliation is made insofar as the action of Captain Mitchell remembering Nostromo 
―rewards‖ Nostromo with the Other‘s continued praise. This is the intended meaning of 
Nostromo‘s  project,  a  project  which  remained  incomplete  in  his  lived  life.  In  death, 
however, his project is in a sense complete, even if Nostromo himself did not see it 
come to pass. Nostromo seems to overcome absurdity as he achieves the meaning he 
initially intended to create. However, this overcoming is of course not solely Nostromo‘s 
doing.  It  is  Mrs.  Gould  who  keeps  his  confession  secret  and  it  is  Mrs.  Gould  that 
confers meaning onto Nostromo‘s dead life, a valued meaning but nevertheless a false 
meaning.  And  Nostromo‘s  life  is  absurd  as  it  is  Mrs.  Gould  who  is  responsible  for 
making Nostromo‘s life meaningful. What is more, Mrs. Gould‘s choice to withhold the 
truth of Nostromo‘s life has the secondary effect of converting Nostromo‘s life into a 
political and social tool—a tool which is necessary for maintaining the image and well-
being of Sulaco. As Edward W. Said writes in Beginnings:  
 
Only Mrs. Gould knows Sulaco for what it is, but she can never make her knowledge 
effective. Her moment of greatest understanding and illumination is also her moment of 
least practical influence. Yet she knows that it is possible for the integrity and courage of 
one person to sustain the life of a nation. So, as Nostromo once saved Sulaco with his 
daring ride (although he had already by then dishonoured himself), now she preserves 
Sulaco‘s record by withholding a secret certain to dishonour the country. Here, the refusal 
to be an author is a quality worthy of admiration.
17 
 
Mrs.  Gould  intentionally  or  unintentionally  equates  Nostromo‘s  life  with  that  of  an 
object, to be utilised by the Other. His subjective meaningful life has been completely 
alienated by the objective Other, which again reinforces his absurdity.   
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Stan Parker 
 
The discourse/NOW-stories of both  Anna Karenina  and  Nostromo  end by elevating 
what is often a secondary character into the position of superior final arbiter—the living 
character  is  left  to  confer  meaning  onto  the  deceased  character‘s  life,  effectively 
rendering the character‘s life absurd. However, there is also another form of absurdity 
which  is  rhetorically  implied  by  the  novelists‘  choices  to  continue  their  respective 
novel‘s  NOW-stories  for  some  duration  after  their  character‘s  death:  this  is  the 
absurdity of life in an unending, infinite, and indifferent world, or as Yugoslavian-born 
philosopher  Thomas  Nagel  states,  we  are  absurd  because  of  our  relation  to  the 
immeasurable dimensions of space and time of the universe: ―We are tiny specks in 
the infinite vastness of the universe; our lives are mere instants even on a geological 
time  scale,  let  alone  a  cosmic  one;  we  will  all  be  dead  any  minute.‖
18  American 
philosopher Richard Taylor makes a similar claim when he suggests that our lives are 
properly  Sisyphean  as  they  are  each  marked  by  the  element  of  ―repetitious,  cyclic 
activity that never comes to anything.‖
19 This interpretation of humankind‘s absurdity is 
exemplified by the story of Stan Parker from Patrick White‘s  The Tree of Man, the 
beginning of which we have already discussed. Stan dies in the penultimate chapter of 
the novel with his wife Amy by his side; the chapter ends with her words: ―Stan is dead. 
My husband. In the boundless garden.‖
20 This ending would seem satisfactory in the 
closure of a novel which begins with Stan‘s existential beginning and ends with his 
death, creating the necessary boundaries for the interpretation and evaluation of a full, 
meaningful life; however, the NOW-story does not end with Stan‘s death: there is a 
final chapter, no more than two pages, in which the main action focuses on Stan‘s 
grandson walking amongst the trees of the bush thinking of a poem he will write—―a 
poem of life, of all life, of what he did not know, but knew.‖
21 But it is the final paragraph 
                                                 
18 Nagel, "The Absurd," 151. 
19 Taylor, ―The Meaning of Life,‖ 142. 
20 White, The Tree of Man, 478. 
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of this last chapter which is of the most significance to the meaning of the novel and the 
meaning of Stan‘s life: 
 
So that in the end there were the trees. The boy walking through them with his head 
drooping as he increased in stature. Putting out shoots of green thought. So that, in the 
end, there was no end.
22  
 
In Patrick White's Fiction, Carolyn Bliss says of this passage: 
 
[Stan‘s] story and the novel begin and end with trees. When he first arrives in the virgin 
bushland he will settle, two trees form the gate which admits him. He makes his first mark 
on the wilderness by scarring a tree with his axe, and later fells many. Yet, even after his 
death, the trees remain. As Stan‘s young grandson walks among them, White says that 
the child ―could not believe in death,‖ and, as he thinks of the ―poem of life‖ he will write, 
he is described as ―Putting out shoots of green thought. So that, in the end, there was no 
end.‖  Like  the  trees,  the  boy  will  grow,  blossom,  and  propagate.  According  to  the 
Housman poem from which the novel‘s title is drawn, ―The tree of man was never quiet,‖ 
and its saplings are bent double by the gale of time. But man, for whom the tree stands 
as metaphor, will survive to reproduce himself, to ensure that there is no end.
23 
 
Bliss  suggests  that  this  metaphor  signifies  that  humankind  will  continue  by  its 
reproduction  such  that  it  will  not  end.  Humankind  keeps  itself  in  existence  by 
perpetuating existence. However, underlying this metaphor is a secondary metaphor 
which  signifies  the  perennial,  unending  nature  of  the  trees—of  the  world  and 
universe—a contrast to the individual‘s and, indeed, humankind‘s temporary, mortal 
existence. Humankind may reproduce itself, but the subjective, meaningful life of the 
individual must end and has no consequence on the world that continues to exist. Just 
as the discourse continued after Stan‘s death, so too did the world and time, thereby 
emphasising the absurdity of his life.    
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  But what is also significant about the story of Stan Parker, and also the stories 
of Anna Karenina and Nostromo, is not only are they each marked by absurdity but 
their stories (unintentionally or  not)  compel the reader to recognise his or  her own 
absurdity. Indeed, what we have previously described as the ―gift‖ of ironic fiction in the 
evaluation  of  the  meaningful  projects  of  the  Other—specifically,  the  gift  of  superior 
arbitration—also ―haunts‖ the authentic reader. The authentic reader—the reader who 
is ―aware‖ of his or her own ironic mode—is haunted by the same spectre of absurdity 
as the characters they themselves have read about and have evaluated. It is novels 
such as Anna Karenina, Nostromo, and The Tree of Man—in which the NOW-stories 
do not end with their respective characters‘ death—that intentionally or unintentionally 
reveal the absurdity of the reader. Indeed, if we again consider the story of Levin from 
Anna Karenina and his ―overcoming‖ of the absurdity of life, we must recognise that 
this is somewhat of a false ―overcoming‖ as Tolstoy‘s inclusion of Vronsky‘s mother‘s 
comments can be interpreted as an affirmation of the absurdity of Anna‘s death: the 
Other—Vronsky‘s mother—remains to evaluate the lives of the deceased—Anna—and 
confer meaning onto their lives. The deceased Anna cannot give the lie to Vronsky‘s 
mother‘s evaluation and conferral of meaning. Moreover, despite the illusion that Levin 
―lives on‖ and seems to overcome the same absurdity, in reality he and the ―superior‖ 
reader  will necessarily  become prey to the Other‘s categorisation just as Vronsky‘s 
mother and the reader categorise Anna. In this way, Tolstoy somewhat unintentionally 
promotes the attitude of inauthenticity towards the absurdity of life which comes from 
the conferral of meaning by the Other. The authentic reader, however, recognises, and 
is haunted by, this absurdity.   
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3.  Discursive  Endings  which  come  before  a 
Character’s Death 
 
The examples of the stories of Anna Karenina, Nostromo, and Stan Parker represent 
the combination of the two ―endings‖ of fiction where the discursive end comes after the 
character‘s biological death. However, just as common, if not more common, is the 
combination  of  endings  where  the  discursive  end  of  the  story  comes  before  the 
character‘s death. It would seem that this combination of endings would be of little 
value to the reader as the character is not completed within the novel‘s pages and 
therefore cannot be accurately interpreted or evaluated. However, in ―The Storyteller‖ 
Walter Benjamin claims that the shivering reader can warm him or herself with these 
incomplete characters as the characters experience ―figurative‖ death (FD in figure 9, 
below)—a discursive death which essentially completes the character and enables the 
reader to interpret and evaluate the character as a ―figuratively‖ dead life. As Benjamin 
claims, for  the  shivering  reader  to  be  warmed  by  the  novel‘s  representation  of  the 
fictional Other, the reader 
 
must, no matter what, know in advance that he will share  [the character in a novel‘s] 
experience  of  death:  if  need  be  their  figurative  death—the  end  of  the  novel—but 
preferably their actual one.
24  
 
Benjamin seems to suggest that the discursive/NOW-story end—the punctuated period 
which follows the final word on the final page—is essentially as valuable a boundary for 
interpreting the figurative dead life of the fictional Other as the event of biological death. 
Indeed, Benjamin says it is only preferable that the character biologically dies in the 
novel. 
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                     a                           E            FD/e            D   
   
Figure 9: Character‘s figurative death (coinciding with end of discourse)  
 
The concept of figurative death can be understood in at least two ways, both of which 
relate to the sense of closure in the novel. The first is that a character‘s figurative death 
is a reflection of the narrator‘s/novelist‘s ―attitude‖ towards his or her characters and 
how and when their story should be brought to a close, thereby completing the novel 
and giving the novel its structure. A second way of understanding the figurative death 
of a character specifically relates to the reader‘s reading process insofar as the reader 
does not anticipate that the realist character ―lives on‖ after the end of the novel and 
therefore does not speculate on the character‘s future. Similarly, Hochman states: ―If 
the characters in literature are like people at all, in the ordinary sense, they are like 
dead people. The characters in literature, once they are ‗written,‘ are finished like the 
dead.‖
25 The result is that, rather than anticipating the ―living‖ character‘s future, the 
reader looks back over the character‘s life in the same way that the dying look back 
over his or her life as a ―life review.‖ As will be explained, this reading process is very 
much a result of the ―geometry‖ of the novel and the ―retrospective patterning‖ of the 
novel which obviates the need for speculation on the future of a character, thereby 
rendering the character figuratively dead.  
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Closure and Social Death as Figurative Death: Jane Eyre and Emma 
Woodhouse 
 
The theory behind the concept of figurative death can primarily be understood by the 
manner  in  which  the  reader  reads  and the  expectation  of  an  end to the  novel.  As 
Forster writes it is natural for a reader to question what will come next in a story:  
 
We are all like Scheherazade‘s husband, in that we want to know what happens next. 
That is universal and that is why the backbone of a novel has to be a story. Some of us 
want  to  know  nothing  else—there  is  nothing  in  us  but  primeval  curiosity,  and 
consequently our other literary judgements are ludicrous.
26  
 
Forster touches upon a very human trait: a curiosity of what will happen next. But it is 
also a curiosity as to how a story will end and what will become of all this ―effort‖ of 
reading, which somewhat reflects our own curiosity of what will become of the effort of 
our own actions to achieve our intended projects. Marianna Torgovnick makes a similar 
claim in Closure in the Novel but also highlights the ―practicality‖ of endings for the 
reading process: 
 
In  any  narrative,  ―what  happens  next‖  ceases  to  be  a  pertinent  question  only  at  the 
conclusion, and the word ―end‖ in a novel consequently carries with it not just the notion 
of the turnable last page, but also that of the ―goal‖ of reading, the finish-line toward which 
our  bookmarks  aim.  In  long  works  of  fiction,  endings  are  important  for  another 
commonplace  but  true  reason:  it  is  difficult  to  recall  all  of  a  work  after  a  completed 
reading, but climactic moments, dramatic scenes, and beginnings and endings remain in 
the memory and decisively shape our sense of a novel as a whole.
27 
                                                 
26 Forster, Aspects of the Novel, 41–42. 
27 Torgovnick, Closure in the Novel, 3–4. Torgovnick makes a further interesting point with 
regards to the reader‘s desire to know what happens next in a novel: ―The process of reading 
without knowing endings is . . . rather like the process of day-to-day living: we make tentative 
guesses at direction and meaning by applying our experience of what the data we encounter 
usually lead to and mean. Since first readings involve the continuous making and revision of The End as Death and Closure 
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The story of the novel maintains the reader‘s interest and feeds the reader‘s need to 
know what will become of the novel‘s characters and their stories, and to see how their 
lives will come to an end, be it a biological or figurative end. This expectation for not 
only an end but closure and meaning is explained by a number of narrative theories, 
including Kermode‘s description of the sounds tick-tock being the model of the plot, 
where the tick (the beginning) creates the expectation of tock (an ending). However, a 
more pertinent theory for the present discussion is Roland Barthes‘ description of the 
readerly text. Barthes suggests that the readerly text (which is essentially the realist or 
―classic‖ novel) ends on a signified, giving a final meaning to the innumerable signifiers 
or words used to represent the past life of the fictional character. Further, the readerly 
text has a definite discursive beginning and ending. These discursive beginnings and 
endings  ―enclose‖—give  boundaries  to—the  words,  the  signifiers—the  raw  story 
material—used  by  the  narrator  to  describe  a  character  (or  by  which  the  character 
describes themselves), and from which meaning—a final signified—can be determined. 
The signified gives meaning to the expectations of the signifiers. This is very similar to 
one‘s own existence; but unlike death, which as Sartre states is unforeseeable, one 
can  see  the  end  of  the  novel—the  character‘s  death—regardless  of  whether  the 
character  actually  dies  or  only  figuratively  dies.  Death  becomes  determined  and 
foreseeable  as  pages which  impose  limitations  to the  character‘s  life  and  therefore 
determine the character‘s meaning. 
  However, this final determination of meaning can also be understood not only 
as  a  structural  trait  but  as  something  reflected  in  the  attitude  of  the  narrator—an 
attitude  which  reflects  closure  and  completes  the  character.  It  is  because  of  this 
                                                                                                                                           
guesses, first readings are like the process of living from moment to moment in the present. 
Second or subsequent readings—when the question of ‗what happens next‘ no longer pertains 
with urgency—differ fundamentally from first readings and resemble the ways in which we 
experience the past. Upon rereading, pattern and rhythm—connections between beginning, 
middle, and end—may be more easily discerned and more fully understood by the reader.‖ Ibid., 
8. This description of the reading process is significant if we consider that the anxious reader—
who is perplexed about his or her own life‘s meaning—is similarly perplexed during his or her 
first reading of a novel; however, unlike their own ―singular‖ life, the reader can reread and re-The End as Death and Closure 
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attitude that the ―living‖ character enters his or her figurative death. One of the most 
pertinent examples for illustrating this relation between the attitude of the narrator and 
the concept of figurative death is the story of Jane Eyre in Charlotte Bronte‘s Jane 
Eyre. The final chapter of Jane Eyre begins with her declaration that she married the 
blind and crippled Rochester and it is this choice which is essentially one of her final 
choices and actions within the NOW-story. But, of course, Jane does not die at the end 
of the novel and is, therefore, theoretically not complete and whole; theoretically she is 
an ahistorical being. However, the discourse and the NOW-story has ended such that 
Jane  can  be  said  to  enter  her  figurative  death.  But  it  is  not  simply  because  the 
discourse/NOW-story ends that makes Jane figuratively dead; it is understood by her 
attitude towards her ―present‖ life (the end of the discoursed NOW-story) which she 
discloses in one of the closing passages of the final chapter:  
 
My tale draws to its close: one word respecting my experience of married life, and one 
brief glance at the fortunes of those whose names have most frequently recurred in this 
narrative, and I have done. 
  I have now been married ten years. I know what it is to live entirely for and with what 
I love best on earth. I hold myself supremely blest—blest beyond what language can 
express; because I am my husband‘s life as fully as he is mine. No woman was ever 
nearer to her mate than I am: ever more absolutely bone of his bone, and flesh of his 
flesh. I know no weariness of my Edward‘s society: he knows none of mine, any more 
than  we  each  do  of  the  pulsation  of  the  heart  that  beats  in  our  separate  bosoms; 
consequently, we are ever together. To be together is for us to be at once as free as in 
solitude, as gay as in company. We talk, I believe, all day long: to talk to each other is but 
a more animated and an audible thinking. All my confidence is bestowed on him, all his 
confidence is devoted to me; we are precisely suited in character—perfect concord is the 
result.
28 
 
                                                                                                                                           
evaluate the fictional character, deriving a greater understanding of both the meaning of the 
character‘s life and of the connection between the intention and revelation of meaning. 
28 Brontë, Jane Eyre, 500. The End as Death and Closure 
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In themselves, the words Jane chooses to tell the end of her story suggest a sense of 
closure and harmony necessary for ending the story of a novel. Jane writes that her 
―tale draws to its close: . . . and one brief glance at the fortunes of those whose names 
have  most  frequently  recurred  in  this  narrative,  and  I  have  done.‖  This  sentence 
figuratively signifies the closure of her autobiographical story; however, it also signifies 
the  closure  of  her  life  and  her  (personal)  narrative.  Indeed,  consider  the  ominous 
similarity between Jane‘s phrase ―and I have done‖ and Sartre‘s claim that ―the dead 
life . . . is all done.‖ But, the sense of an ending of Jane‘s personal narrative is also 
exemplified by Jane‘s choice of words and phrases in relation to her thoughts and 
feelings towards her present life—the moment in which she began writing her history. 
Jane  uses  words  such  as:  ―entirely,‖  ―supremely,‖  ―fully,‖  ―absolutely‖;  and  phrases 
such as: ―know no weariness‖; ―we are ever together‖; ―all my confidence‖; and ―perfect 
concord is the result.‖
29 Jane talks of her life in absolute terms: the state of her life, at 
the  moment  of  writing,  is  eternal  and  complete.  Moreover,  her  life  is  essentially 
historical as, from this moment on, she (implicitly) expects her life to be unchanging 
and  static.  Jane  need  no  longer  choose  her  meaningful  projects  because  she  has 
become who she was to become. Here we are reminded of Ortega‘s claim that ―the 
most trivial and at the same time the most important note in human life is that man has 
no choice but to be always doing something to keep himself in existence.‖
30 Jane has 
no need to make any further choices to give meaning to her life and so her existence 
―ends.‖ Indeed, Jane‘s choosing to write her story at that particular moment in her life 
signifies  a  readiness  to  represent  a  complete  history  of  her  life.  Compare  this 
―readiness for completion‖ to the previously used example of Gin￩s de Pasamonte, 
from  Cervantes‘s  Don  Quixote,  who  explicitly  states  that  his  book  is  not  finished 
because his life has not finished: unlike Ginés de Pasamonte, Jane Eyre makes no 
such claim as her book and, indeed, her life are both ―finished.‖  
                                                 
29 All my emphasis. 
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  A  similar  example  to  the  figurative  death  of  Jane  Eyre  is  that  of  Emma 
Woodhouse  in  Jane  Austen‘s  Emma  (1815).  However,  the  significant  difference 
between Emma‘s figurative death and Jane Eyre‘s figurative death is that where Jane 
―determines‖ her own figurative death by her own words, Emma‘s end is determined by 
a third-person narrator. In the final chapter of Emma, Emma realises that she is in love 
with  Mr.  Knightley,  and  they  soon  wed—an  event  which  is  described  in  the  final 
paragraph of the final page of the novel: 
 
The wedding was very much like other weddings, where the parties have no taste for 
finery or parade; and Mrs. Elton, from the particulars detailed by her husband, thought it 
all extremely shabby, and very inferior to her own.—―Very little white satin, very few lace 
veils; a most pitiful business!—Selina would stare when she heard of it.‖—But, in spite of 
these deficiencies, the wishes, the hopes, the confidence, the predictions of the small 
band  of true friends who witnessed the ceremony,  were fully  answered in the perfect 
happiness of the union.
31 
 
Emma‘s NOW-story ends with her wedding and the ―perfect happiness of the union.‖ 
These  words,  spoken  by  the  third-person  narrator,  suggest ―perfection,‖  ―unity,‖  but 
also  ―wholeness,‖  and  ―completion.‖  And  it  is  these  words  that  determine  Emma‘s 
figurative  death  as  they  represent  the  narrator‘s  attitude  towards  Emma‘s  life—an 
attitude which suggests that Emma‘s life, which is said to proceed after the wedding, 
has  essentially  become  static  and  that  nothing  shall  disrupt  Emma‘s  perfect 
(meaningful) union with Mr. Knightley. Thus, Emma has entered her figurative death 
and has become a complete and historical being.
32 And she can be interpreted and 
                                                 
31 Austen, Emma, 453. 
32 Interestingly, E. M. Forster makes the somewhat humorous and, indeed, ominous observation 
that biological death and marriage have a special relationship insofar as they are the most 
common endings for the novel: ―If it was not for death and marriage I do not know how the 
average novelist would conclude. Death and marriage are almost his only connection between 
his characters and his plot, and the reader is more ready to meet him here, and take a bookish 
view of them, provided they occur later on in the book; the writer, poor fellow, must be allowed 
to finish up somehow, he has his living to get like any one else, so no wonder that nothing is 
heard but hammering and screwing.‖ Forster, Aspects of the Novel, 94.  The End as Death and Closure 
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evaluated  by  the  reader  as  if  she  were  biologically  dead.  The  reader  can  confer 
meaning onto the figuratively dead life of Emma. 
  But the attitudes of both Jane Eyre and the third-person narrator of Emma are 
not necessarily special to fiction (or to the ―function‖ of the end of fiction insofar as the 
end is to signify closure and stasis). There are two ways in which we can understand 
this type of ending: the first is that it is symbolic of socialisation in the Bildungsroman—
specifically the socialisation of marriage; the second is ―social death.‖ The former is 
described by Moretti and it again relates to the socialisation of the character and the 
synthesis of the individual with the expectations of normality in society. Moretti asks the 
question: ―How is it possible to convince the modern—‗free‘—individual to willingly limit 
his freedom?‖ The answer, Moretti suggests, is ―in marriage: when two people ascribe 
to one another such value as to accept being ‗bound‘ by it.‖ Moretti explains this in 
terms of marriage as a social contract: 
 
It has been observed that from the late eighteenth century on, marriage becomes the 
model for a new type of social contract: one no longer sealed by forces located outside of 
the individual (such as status), but founded on a sense of ―individual obligation.‖ A very 
plausible  thesis,  and  one  that  helps  us  understand  why  the  classical  Bildungsroman 
―must‖ always conclude with marriages. It is not only the foundation of the family that is at 
stake, but the ―pact‖ between the individual and the world, that reciprocal ―consent‖ which 
finds in the double ―I do‖ of the wedding ritual an unsurpassed symbolic condensation.
33 
 
Moretti adds that if the classical Bildungsroman does not end with a wedding then the 
protagonist  must  leave  social  life  altogether.  Again  the  dichotomies  of  the 
Bildungsroman, particularly the English Bildungsroman, are clearly evident: one either 
marries or flees society in disgrace.
34 However, it is this claim which is most interesting 
for our discussion on figurative death insofar as love and marriage, and the attitude that 
springs  from  this  union ,  has  a  rather  disturbing  relatio n  to  the  real  world  as  a 
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character‘s figurative death, brought about by marriage, can also be seen as a mode of 
―fleeing from society.‖ This is evident if we consider how the combination of marriage 
and  endings  in  the  novel  is  somewhat  similar  to  the  phenomenon  of  social  death. 
Social death is a psychological disengagement process whereby the dying individual 
has  accepted  that  the  dying  process  is  ―inevitable,  universal  and  triggered  by  an 
awareness of proximity to death.‖
35 It is because of this disengagement process that 
the dying individual is considered dead by him or herself as they lose interest in their 
usual activities; they desire to be left alone and avoid learning of news and problems of 
the outside world.
36 But the socially dead are also considered dead by society in terms 
of his or her role in society. This attitude of the living towards the dying is also reflected 
in the living‘s avoidance of the dying. Here we are reminded of Benjamin‘s claim that 
the modern world desires to hide the dying away in sanatoria and hospitals to avoid the 
sight of the dying. It is this attitude of the living which brings about the dying‘s social 
death.  
  A fictional example that best illustrates the sense of stasis and disengagement 
of social death can be found in William Faulkner‘s As I Lay Dying (1935). As I Lay 
Dying is the story of the Bundren family who have the grim task of transporting the 
deceased body of Addie Bundren—the matriarch of the family, wife of Anse Bundren, 
and mother to three sons and one daughter, Dewey Dell—to Jefferson, the town in 
which she asked to be buried, which is some forty miles away. The story takes place 
over approximately eleven days: the two days before Addie dies, and the nine days 
afterwards, which is the time it takes to get Addie‘s body to Jefferson. In the days 
before her death, Addie‘s eldest son Cash is preparing for her death by making her 
coffin. Though not-yet dead, Addie can hear her son Cash as he works on the coffin—
the ―Chuck   Chuck   Chuck of the adze,‖
37 which is described by Darl, Addie‘s second 
eldest son. Addie‘s third son, Jewel, also describes the morbid pride of Cash as he 
builds Addie‘s coffin: 
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It‘s because he stays out there, right under the window, hammering and sawing on that 
goddamn box. Where she‘s got to see him. Where every breath she draws is full of his 
knocking and sawing where she can see him saying See. See what a good one I am 
making for you. I told him to go somewhere else. I said Good God do you want to see her 
in it. . . .  
  And  now  them  others  sitting  there,  like  buzzards.  Waiting,  fanning  themselves. 
Because I said If you wouldn‘t keep on sawing and nailing at it until a man can‘t sleep 
even and her hands laying on the quilt like two of them roots dug up and tried to wash 
and you couldn‘t get them clean. I can see the fan and Dewey Dell‘s arm. I said if you‘d 
just let her alone. Sawing and knocking, and keeping the air always moving so fast on her 
face that when you‘re tired you can‘t breathe it, and that goddamn adze going One lick 
less. One lick less. One lick less until everybody that passes in the road will have to stop 
and see it and say what a fine carpenter he is.
38 
 
Addie‘s death is imminent and she is considered socially dead by her husband and her 
children: she is both an object and an objective observer of the living world, all but 
―physically‖ removed from subjective, meaningful life. Her life is in stasis insofar as she 
no longer chooses her action or acts; and she is closed and historical. However, it is 
not only the description of Addie‘s social death that makes Faulkner‘s As I Lay Dying a 
pertinent example but because of how Addie‘s story is told. Faulkner‘s narrative style in 
As  I  Lay  Dying  is  to  use  not  one  authoritative,  first-  or  third-person  narrator  but  a 
number  of  first-person  narrators,  specifically  fifteen  character-narrators  to  whom 
Faulkner allots one or more chapters of the story. What is significant about this choice 
is that the story is told almost exclusively from the point of view of everyone except 
Addie  who  has  only  one  chapter  dedicated  to  her.  In  this  one  chapter,  Addie 
summarises her past: her marriage, the birth of her children, and her illicit affair with 
Whitfield from which she has a son, Jewel. She also describes how her father once told 
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her:  ―The  reason  for  living  is  getting  ready  to  stay  dead.‖
39  For  Addie,  living  is  to 
prepare  for  death;  and  Addie  is  prepared  to  die—she  has  ―cleaned  her  house.‖
40 
However, the most telling words spoken by Addie do not appear within this one chapter 
but are spoken in the title of the novel—―As I Lay Dying‖—a statement which can be 
interpreted as meaning: ―As I lay dying, the world continues on around me.‖ It signifies 
Addie‘s lack of willingness to participate in the life that is being lead outside of her 
room—outside of her life. Addie is disengaged from the present but also her future. 
Moreover, Faulkner‘s choice to predominantly exclude Addie from the narration of As I 
Lay Dying implicitly suggests that she no longer has a voice of ―value‖ for the living. 
And Addie no longer has a ―living voice,‖ which is to say that she no longer has a voice 
to give lie to what the Other confers onto her life. She is no longer ―ahead‖ of the Other 
and can no longer contradict and undermine the meanings interpreted and conferred 
onto her life by the Other. She is a historical being-for-others—an object—despite her 
continued existence.  
  From this description of Addie‘s social death we can make a connection to the 
figurative deaths of Jane Eyre and Emma: both characters experience a metaphorical 
disengagement as both Jane Eyre and Emma become ―disengaged‖ from their future 
selves. Jane Eyre does not see a future for herself, nor does the narrator of Emma see 
a future for Emma: they do not entertain that they will act any differently or diverge from 
the course which has been determined by the final actions of their stories. What is 
more, just as in reality, their attitude towards their respective socially  dead lives  is 
imparted to the reader, such that, like both Jane and the narrator of Emma, the reader 
sees the respective characters‘ lives as socially dead—the reader sees them as static, 
closed, and historical. They no longer have an active role in any capacity of social life, 
or, indeed, in their own lives. Further, they appear to ―exist‖ but they are unchanging; 
and so they can be considered figuratively dead. Jane Eyre and Emma have entered 
into a mode of stasis and, indeed, the final words of their respective discourses are 
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very much stasis statements of their individual futures—the duration between the end 
of their discoursed NOW-stories and their future biological deaths.  
  What  is  more,  the  sense  of  stasis  of  Jane  Eyre  and  Emma  is  further 
emphasised if we consider that, in reality, a non-fictional narrator could not state with 
the same conviction as that of Jane Eyre that his or her life is complete and static, 
irrespective of what possibilities the future may hold. This is because one‘s future is 
inescapably  subject  to  contingency:  one  cannot  avoid  change  or  the  unforseen 
possibilities which may come in the future. However, unlike our own futures, the futures 
of Jane Eyre and Emma, as fictional characters, must be understood differently. Jane‘s 
and Emma‘s stories are each enclosed by a corporeal boundary which can be said 
undermine the appearance that Jane Eyre and Emma have any future existence—
existence, which in reality would be subject to contingency. This is to say that both 
Jane Eyre‘s and Emma‘s futures lack corporeal conviction as their future possibilities 
do  not  physically  exist  within  the  pages  of  the  novel—the  pages  which  essentially 
represent the complete meaningful story of Jane Eyre and Emma. What is within the 
pages of the novel is closed, complete and meaningful; the future, however, which lies 
beyond the pages of the novel, lacks conviction and would do little to undermine this 
closure. Indeed, it must be noted that, in reality, only the present ―exists‖—the past and 
future, however, do not; however, in fiction, only the future of a character does not 
exist; but the character‘s past does ―exist‖: the character‘s past can be seen and held in 
the  hand  as  a  complete  and  whole  corporeal  object.  It  has  what  Henry  James 
describes as a ―visibly-appointed stopping-place‖ (emphasis mine)—a visible, physical 
end  which signifies the ―end‖  of the  existence of the book but also the end of the 
existence of its characters.  
  But we can also understand the link between corporeality and the closure of 
figurative  death  in  another  way:  between  the  corporeal  end  of  the  novel  and  the 
character‘s  unforseen  future  death  is  a  void—a  void  which  is  ―unintelligible‖  to  the 
reader, much like Kermode‘s description of the silent, empty interval between tock-tick. 
To make the life of the character intelligible for the reader—to close the character and The End as Death and Closure 
  288 
the  novel  and  make  the  character  whole—the  character‘s  death  must  be  brought 
―forward‖ (as indicted by the arrow in figure 10, below) to the end of the discoursed 
NOW-story such that they coincide.  
 
 
                     a                           E            FD/e            D   
   
Figure 10: Character‘s biological death brought forward to become figurative death  
 
This is of course contrary to how we understand our own existence, especially if we 
consider Sartre‘s description of the relation between my future being and my present 
being.  
 
I am not the self which I will be. First I am not that self because time separates me from it. 
Secondly, I am not that self because what I am is not the foundation of what I will be. 
Finally I am not that self because no actual existent can determine strictly what I am 
going to be. Yet as I am already what I will be (otherwise I would not be interested in any 
one being more than another), I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it.
41  
 
Sartre  describes  how  one‘s  future  self  is  related  to  one‘s  present  self  as  they  are 
connected by the existence of the for-itself. But the future self has no bearing on who 
the present self is. However, fictional characters such as Jane Eyre and Emma do not 
have a future or a future self insofar as their existence has entered into a mode of 
stasis—nothing will change between the end of the discourse and their hypothetical 
biological  deaths:  their  stories  end  with  the  end  of  the  discourse,  and  they  have 
become the selves that they will become. Their future selves and their biological deaths 
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must  coincide  with  the  discursive  end  of  their  stories  to  make  them  whole  and 
complete.   
  What should be noted here is that this process of social death does not take 
place only at the end of the novel: it can also take place towards the beginning of the 
novel, especially in novels  where the main protagonist‘s story is not the  only  story 
being told. This process is exemplified in D. H. Lawrence‘s The Rainbow (1915). The 
temporal range of The Rainbow spans some four generations of the Brangwen family. 
More specifically, the temporal range encompasses three lives: Tom Brangwen, Anna 
Brangwen (Tom‘s step-daughter), and Ursula Brangwen (Anna‘s daughter). The three 
lives combine to form a sequence of three consecutive and interrelated Bildungsroman 
plots, or three consecutive tick-tock plots, within the one novel.   
  The first story centres on Tom—the fourth son of the unnamed Mr and Mrs 
Brangwen—but also includes the lives of Lydia—a Polish widow who he meets and 
weds in the first chapter—and Lydia‘s daughter, Anna, from her previous marriage. The 
story of Tom and Lydia dominates the early part of the novel with the first three of the 
sixteen chapters of The Rainbow dedicated to their courtship and marriage. The couple 
soon realise that they are ―strangers‖ to each other, such that their marriage is always 
engaged in a struggle for power of ―ownership‖ or it is one of distance and silence and 
fear. There is also the difficulties for Tom of embracing a child who is not his own. But, 
after two years of marriage, Tom finally begins to relinquish his fears and embraces 
their relationship—both his and Lydia‘s and his and Anna‘s. The turmoil of the past two 
years  ends  and  the  happy  stasis  of  marriage  begins,  which  is  recognised  by 
themselves, and by their daughter Anna:  
 
The days went on as before, Brangwen went out to his work, his wife nursed her child 
and attended in some measure to the farm. They did not think of each other—why should 
they? Only when she touched him, he knew her instantly, that she was with him, near 
him, that she was the gateway and the way out, that she was beyond, and that he was 
travelling  in  her  through  the  beyond.  Whither?—What  does  it  matter?  He  responded The End as Death and Closure 
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always. When she called, he answered, when he asked, her response came at once, or 
at length. 
  Anna‘s soul was put at peace between them. She looked from one to the other, and 
saw them established to her safety, and she was free. She played between the pillar of 
fire and the pillar of cloud in confidence, having the assurance on her right hand and the 
assurance on her left. She was no longer called upon to uphold with her childish might 
the  broken  end  of  the  arch.  Her  father  and  her  mother  now  met  to  the  span  of  the 
heavens, and she, the child, was free to play in the space beneath, between.
42 
 
This description in itself could be a fitting end to the tick-tock novel. Of course where 
the tock ends, the new tick of Anna‘s life begins or will begin. In Tom and Lydia‘s eyes, 
and in their daughter‘s eyes, they have become complete and whole. But they are also 
in a sense socially dead, not quite in the same way as Emma and Jane Eyre, where 
the end of the novel brings about their social death such that they become static and 
―determined,‖ but in the sense that, whilst they continue to live in the novel, their future 
choices and actions are less influential to the story and on the other characters. The 
action of the story  is overtaken by the story of Anna  and it is Anna‘s choices and 
actions  which  becomes  central  for  the  next  six  or  so  chapters.  In  effect,  it  is  her 
existential beginning which brings an end to the lives of her parents. Of course, Anna, 
in turn, enters into her own social death when Ursula‘s story—the third tick-tock of the 
novel—becomes central for the last seven chapters.   
  We may question whether the fate of social death is not only limited to the main 
or dare we say ―free‖ characters of the novel—those characters responsible for the 
movement of the story through their choices (kernels) and actions: social death is also 
applicable to ―unfree,‖ minor characters, or those that Forster may describe as ―flat‖ 
characters. These minor characters necessarily suffer social death but in an even more 
immediate sense because their story is not told in any significant detail and their lives 
are in many ways inessential to the main character‘s story. Within the world of the 
novel, the minor character proper is socially dead and does not participate in creating The End as Death and Closure 
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or choosing the world of the novel—their lives are more like satellites or fillers in the 
main character‘s story. The minor character‘s life lies elsewhere—an elsewhere that 
does not exist within the discursive framework of the novel. We may also say that they 
are  of  the  same  existential  status  as  props  or  objects—beings-in-themselves.  The 
minor character lives his or her (dead) life in the shadows of the living, free, ―round‖ 
characters.  
 
Speculation, Corporeality, and Retrospective Patterning: Konstantin Levin and 
the Vincys 
 
We know from the example of The Rainbow that the socially dead couple of Tom and 
Lydia do ―live on‖ because we are told so—the novel continues, and although they are 
no longer placed in the foreground of the story they still live and exist. However, at the 
end of the novel this ―living-on‖ prospect must be thought of differently, particularly in 
terms  of  possibilities.  Indeed,  the  above  description  of  the  relationship  between 
endings,  existence,  and  figurative  death  may  seem  to  contradict  the  general 
assumption that the discursive end of a ―living‖ character implies that the character has 
a future which is undetermined, such that the character should still be thought of as an 
ahistorical being; however, because of the corporeality of the novel it can be argued 
that  the  figurative,  dead  life  of  a  character  is  very  much  determined  because  it  is 
fixed—ossified—and cannot be altered. This is to say that, in theory, the novelist—the 
real  person,  poised  with  the  pen  or  the  finger  over  the  keyboard  of  the  PC—has 
nothing to add—not a single word more—to the story of his or her figuratively dead 
character‘s life. Indeed, the characters remain ―dead‖ until the pen or PC is again taken 
up by the novelist and the character‘s story is continued, which with the exception of a 
few examples, such as the character of Stephen Dedalus appearing in James Joyce‘s 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and again in Ulysses, or the figure of Marlow in 
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several of Joseph Conrad‘s novels, is a generally uncommon practice. As such, the 
character of the novel has little to no possibility of a discursive future such that the 
character enters into his or her figurative death and become an historical figuratively 
dead life which can be interpreted and evaluated by the shivering reader. 
  Of course there have been various attempts at endings which endeavour to 
overcome the sense of stasis of an ending—endings which seem to invite the reader to 
―speculate‖ on a character‘s future rather than accept closure. However, the argument 
can be made that regardless of the invitation for speculation the character of the realist 
novel  is  still  closed  as  the  reader  does  not  necessarily  engage  in  the  activity  of 
speculation (even when invited); instead, the reader becomes engaged in the activity of 
retrospective  analysis.  As  Torgovnick  describes,  this  mode  of  retrospection  can  be 
attributed to the novel‘s ―geometry‖: 
 
Endings enable an informed definition of a work‘s ―geometry‖ and set into motion the 
process  of  retrospective  rather  than  speculative  thinking  necessary  to  discern  it—the 
process  of  ―retrospective  patterning.‖  Moreover,  in  completing  the  ―circle‖  of  a  novel, 
endings create the illusion of life halted and poised for analysis. Like completed segments 
of human lives and as representations of them, completed stories illuminate and invite 
examination of human experiences. In part, we value endings because the retrospective 
patterning used to make sense of texts corresponds to one process used to make sense 
of life: the process of looking back over events and interpreting them in light of ―how 
things  turned  out.‖  Ordinary  readers  and  literary  critics  share  an  interest  in  endings 
because  appreciating  endings  is  one  way  of  evaluating  and  organising  personal 
experience.
43 
 
Torgovnick intimates that the reader retrospectively examines the life of the fictional 
character, whether the character is biologically or figuratively dead. This retrospective 
patterning of the figurative dead life brings the character to a ―determined‖ end and 
gives the character ―wholeness.‖  The End as Death and Closure 
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  This predisposition for the activity of retrospection rather than speculation of a 
figuratively dead character is exemplified by the end of the story of Levin in Tolstoy‘s 
Anna Karenina. Following Anna‘s suicide, the NOW-story shifts its focus to the story of 
Levin  where  the  main  action  is  his  authentic  revelation.  Levin  discovers  the 
meaningfulness of his two projects—his life with Kitty and a life lived in God‘s way. And 
it would seem that, like Jane Eyre and Emma, Levin‘s life has entered figurative death: 
he has found meaning, and his future is static and historical. However, on the final 
page  of  the  novel,  in  the  very  last  paragraphs,  this  sense  of  stasis  is  somewhat 
undermined:  
 
  ―This new feeling hasn‘t changed me. . . .  
  ―I‘ll get angry in the same way with the coachman Ivan, argue in the same way, 
speak my mind inappropriately, there will be the same wall between my soul‘s holy of 
holies and other people, even my wife, I‘ll accuse her in the same way of my own fear 
and then regret it, I‘ll fail in the same way to understand with my reason why I pray, and 
yet I will pray—but my life now, my whole life, regardless of all that may happen to me, 
every  minute  of  it,  is  not  only  not  meaningless,  as  it  was  before,  but  has  the 
unquestionable meaning of the good which is in my power to put into it!‖
44 
 
Torgovnick argues that this ending is more open than it is closed, claiming that despite 
the purpose of the epilogue ―it has no air of finality.‖
45 Torgovnick adds: 
 
The meaning of life has changed for Levin, but life—especially domestic life—continues 
to unroll with all its banality and tedium. . . . At the end of Anna Karenina, family life exists 
separately from, and even in conflict with, the characters‘ path of spiritual development.
46  
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Indeed,  life  does  have  the  illusion  of  ―unrolling‖  in  all  its  banality  and  tedium,  and 
separately  from  Levin‘s  spiritual  development;  however,  this  unrolling  does  not 
undermine the stasis of Levin‘s understanding of the meaning of his life. It may be 
implied  that  time  will  continue;  but  the  sense  of  historical  meaning,  from  Levin‘s 
figurative death, is maintained, and his figurative dead life is preserved, albeit as a 
banal, tedious, yet  spiritually meaningful life. Further, the meaning of life has been 
revealed to him—an authoritative revelation which we have hitherto associated only 
with imminent death. Indeed, the light that Levin sees is symbolic of the light that the 
authoritative  Ivan  Ilyich  and  Anna  Karenina  see  in  dying.  Levin  understands  the 
meaning of life and his life becomes complete and static, regardless of what the future 
may hold.    
  However, a more explicit example of a supposedly speculative ending can be 
found in George Eliot‘s Middlemarch in the last chapter entitled ―Finale.‖ Despite the 
reader‘s tacit understanding of what a ―Finale‖ is and what it signifies, Eliot somewhat 
explicitly states the problem of the after-history and justifies its inclusion:  
 
Every limit is a beginning as well as an ending. Who can quit young lives after being long 
in company with them, and not desire to know what befell them in their after-years? For 
the fragment of a life, however typical, is not the sample of an even web: promises may 
not be kept, and an ardent outset may be followed by declension; latent powers may find 
their long-waited opportunity; a past error may urge a grand retrieval.
47 
 
The first after-history described is that of Fred and Mary Vincy who are the subject of 
the preceding chapter; and it is from this preceding chapter that the reader can logically 
assume that Fred and Mary will eventually get married and live a happy life, as is 
illustrated by the playful dialogue between the pair: 
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  ―Oh, I could be a tremendously good fellow then, Mary, and we could be married 
directly.‖ 
  ―Not so fast, sir; how do you know that I would not rather defer our marriage for 
some years? That would leave you time to misbehave, and then if I liked someone else 
better, I should have an excuse for jilting you.‖ 
  ―Pray don‘t joke, Mary,‖ said Fred, with strong feeling. ―Tell me seriously that all this 
is true, and that you are happy because of it—because you love me best.‖ 
  ―It is all true, Fred, and I am happy because of it—because I love you best,‖ said 
Mary, in a tone of obedient recitation.
48 
 
Despite the ―tone‖ of Mary, the reader is easily lead to the assumption that the pair will 
wed  in  the  near  future.  This  assumption  is  affirmed  after  a  brief  description  of  the 
expectations of marriage:  
 
Marriage, which has been the bourne of so many narratives, is still a great beginning, as 
it was to Adam and Eve, who kept their honeymoon in Eden, but had their first little one 
among  the  thorns  and  thistles  of  the  wilderness.  It  is  still  the  beginning  of  the  home 
epic—the gradual conquest or irremediable loss of that complete union which makes the 
advancing years a climax, and age the harvest of sweet memories in common. 
  Some  set  out,  like  Crusaders  of  old,  with  a  glorious  equipment  of  hope  and 
enthusiasm, and get broken by the way, wanting patience with each other and the world.   
  All who have cared for Fred Vincy and Mary Garth will like to know that these two 
made no such failure, but achieved a solid mutual happiness.
49  
 
The narrator seems to suggest that this ending is also a beginning—it is the ending of 
an epoch and the beginning of a new one. But, this suggestion relates to segments of 
life, segments which can be described as static. Indeed,  Fred and Mary‘s stasis is 
further evidenced if we consider that their traits at the end of the story of Middlemarch 
are very similar to those in the ―Finale.‖ Although the narrator states that this is as 
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much a beginning as an ending, the discourse has ended and little to no detail need be 
supplemented  and  no  speculation  is  necessary.  Fred  and  Mary  are  complete  and 
historical.  
  However, when discussing the reader‘s possible role of speculation we must 
also consider Roland Barthes‘ suggestion that the reader of the readerly text is merely 
a consumer of the text and is not ―asked‖ to speculate on the text. The reader‘s task is 
not to speculate on the unwritten ―discursive future‖ of the readerly text, which is also to 
say  that  the  reader  is  not  expected  to  write  the  writerly  text.  Barthes  states,  in 
somewhat negative terms, that realist literature is characterised by the ―pitiless divorce 
. . . between the producer of the text and its user, between its owner and its customer, 
between its author and its reader,‖
50 where the reader is idle and ―left with no more 
than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text: reading is nothing more than a 
referendum.‖
51  The  reader‘s  task  is  to  merely  decide  whether  the  story  is  valid, 
believable, and nothing more.   
  This claim is also discussed in somewhat more ―positive‖ terms by Wolfgang 
Iser in The Implied Reader:  
 
While the eighteenth-century novel reader was cast by the author in a specific role, so 
that he could be guided—directly, or indirectly, through affirmation or through negation—
toward a conception of human nature and of reality, in the nineteenth century the reader 
was not told what part he was to play. Instead, he had to discover the fact that society 
had  imposed  a  part  on  him,  the  object  being  for  him  eventually  to  take  up  a  critical 
attitude toward this imposition. For him to perform this function, i.e., to accept the role of 
critic,  it  was  essential  that  the  novel  refrain  from  explicitly  telling  him  what  to  do,  for 
criticism must at least appear to be spontaneous if it is to have any value for the critic 
himself. In order for this complex process to be put into operation, the author had to use a 
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variety of cunning stratagems to nudge the reader unknowingly into making the ―right‖ 
discoveries.
52 
 
The reader is given the illusion that they are discovering the text; in reality, however, 
the reader is merely consuming the text, and is being lead to an ending which is well 
established and void of contingency. The reader is merely ―along for the predestined 
ride,‖ idly and patiently listening to the story of the storyteller. Indeed, the reader is the 
mute  listener  to  the  storyteller,  like  the  anonymous  narrator  of  Conrad‘s  Heart  of 
Darkness, listening to the story of Marlow, and only interrupts his story to describe 
Marlow‘s demeanour as he recounts his tale. And, of course, the story of the novel also 
comes  to  an  end  at  which  point  the  reader  is  left  to  digest  the  story  they  have 
consumed; to understand the story, but not to question what comes next—what comes 
after the conclusion.  
   Indeed, Kermode also argues that not only is the reader not free to speculate 
on the character‘s future because the figuratively dead character is determined and 
whole, but the novelist is similarly bound by the determinacy of an end: 
 
As  soon  as  it  speaks,  begins  to  be  a  novel,  it  imposes  causality  and  concordance, 
development,  character,  a  past  which  matters  and  a  future  within  certain  broad  limits 
determined by the project of the author rather than that of the characters. They have their 
choices, but the novel has its end. 
  It sounds good to say that the novelist is free; that, like the young man who asked 
Sartre whether he should join the Resistance or stay with his mother, he can be told ―You 
are free, therefore choose; that is to say, invent.‖ We may even agree that until he has 
chosen he will not know the reasons for his choice. But there is in practice this difference 
between the novelist and the young man as Sartre sees him: the young man will always 
be free in just this degree; whether he stays with his mother or not, his decision will not 
be relevant to his next decision. But the novelist is not like that; he is more Thomist than 
Sartrean, and every choice will limit the next. He has to collaborate with his novel; he 
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grows  in  bad  faith.  He  is  a  world  in  which  past,  present,  and  future  are  related 
inextricably.
53 
 
The novelist‘s freedom is limited just as he or she limits their character‘s freedom—the 
character‘s past will and must dominate them—the character must end and the novelist 
must  end  the  character.  This  end  is  related  to  the  novel‘s  and  the  character‘s 
beginnings—a claim which relates to the novel‘s geometry and reaffirms the inherent 
retrospective patterning of the realist novel. The reader may speculate and extrapolate 
on the character‘s story after his or her figurative death but it is an extrapolation on a 
determined individual, bound by historical, static traits and characteristics, which have 
been  well  established  by  the  character‘s  past.  This  is  of  course  one  of  the  most 
significant  disparities  between  fiction  and  reality:  as  Sartre  claims,  in  reality  the 
individual  is  always  free  to  choose,  irrespective  of  a  past  which  no  longer  exists. 
However, the characters of the novel do not have this freedom—they are not free to 
choose in the sense that they are expected to be related to, and dominated by, their 
past.  
 
Figurative Death and the Illusion of Outliving One’s Meaningful Projects 
 
However, underneath the closure of figurative death lies a sense of inauthenticity of the 
novelist and also the reader who is directed by the novelist. The novelist‘s attempt to 
bring meaningful closure to his or her characters through figurative death creates the 
appearance that the fictional character can escape the abject possibility of outliving his 
or  her  meaningful  projects—of  outliving  their  completed  projects.
54  To  outlive  one‘s 
projects is to be left without purpose and desire which is possibly what Bernard Shaw 
means by his remark that ―there are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart‘s 
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desire.  The  other  is  to  gain  it.‖
55  The  tragedy  of  the  possibility  of  outliving  one‘s 
meaningful projects is described by Roquentin in Sartre‘s Nausea when he reveals the 
―meaninglessness‖ of the Autodidact‘s meaningful project:  
 
One day, seven years ago (he told me once that he has been studying for seven years) 
he came ceremoniously into this reading room. He looked round at the countless books 
lining the walls, and he must have said, rather like Rastignac: ―It is between the two of us, 
Human Knowledge.‖ Then he went and took the first book from the first shelf on the far 
right; he opened it at the first page, with a feeling of respect and fear combined with 
unshakeable determination. Today he has reached ―L.‖ ―K‖ after ―J,‖ ―L‖ after ―K.‖ He has 
passed abruptly from the study of coleopterae to that of quantum theory, from a work on 
Tamerlane to a Catholic pamphlet against Darwinism: not for a moment has he been put 
off his stride. He has read everything; he has stored away in his head half of what is 
known about parthenogenesis, half the arguments against vivisection. Behind him, before 
him, there is a universe. And the day approaches when, closing the last book on the last 
shelf on the far left, he will say to himself: ―And now what?‖
56 
 
Roquentin leaves this question hanging, unanswered, and innocuously adds: ―It is time 
for [the Autodidact‘s] afternoon snack.‖
57 Indeed, Roquentin, a historian, faces a similar 
situation: Roquentin‘s project in Nausea is the writing of the biography of Monsieur de 
Rollebon—a  project  with  which  he  has  been  engaged  with  for  some  time;  but  his 
writing becomes stifled and eventually he stops with an admission: ―The great Rollebon 
affair has come to an end, like a great passion. I shall have to find something else.‖
58 
What follows is Roquentin‘s anxious coming to terms with his existence:  
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That is half past five striking. I get up, my cold shirt is sticking to my flesh. I go out. Why? 
Well, because I have no reason for not going out either. Even if I stay, even if I curl up 
quietly in a corner, I shan‘t forget myself. I shall be there, I shall weigh on the floor. I am.
59 
 
The  question  for  each  of  us  is:  What  happens  next  when  a  meaningful  project  is 
completed,  and  yet  we  continue  to  exist?  Does  our  existence  that  follows  the 
completion of our meaningful projects have meaning? Does it add meaning, or does it 
remove  meaning,  which  is  to  say,  does  the  existence  that  follows  our  projects 
completion alter the meaning we have intended by the completion of our meaningful 
projects? This is a significant problem faced by the realist novelist when he or she 
creates the meaningful story of their fictional characters. The novelist must create a 
whole  piece  of  art  work—it  must  be  complete.  And  it  is  because  of  this  that  the 
argument can be made that the realist novelist avoids Roquentin‘s question ―and now 
what?‖ by way of the technique of coinciding the end of the discourse of the novel with 
the end of the fictional character‘s meaningful project. This is because what comes 
after the novel‘s discursive end can only detract from not only the aesthetic wholeness 
of the novel, but also the meaningfulness of the project, and the completeness of the 
fictional character. The wholeness of the novel is both expected and desired by the 
realist reader. The novelist aims to have his characters‘ lives end with a ―bang and not 
a whimper.‖ The character‘s life lasts in the reader‘s mind in a seemingly contradictory 
fashion: the character‘s life appears open to a number of likely possibilities, whilst the 
character‘s  life  has  the  appearance  of  remaining  static  and  untainted  by  what  an 
unknown  future  may  hold—a  future  which  may  undo  the  meaning  so  painstakingly 
created by the novelist.  
  But the closure of figurative death also avoids another form of ―abjectness‖: the 
ever-present possibility of ―outliving‖ life itself by becoming socially dead. Again we can 
consider the ―outlived life‖ of Addie in Faulkner‘s As I Lay Dying, described above. 
Addie‘s  biological  death  is  preceded  with  her  social  death:  a  death  which  is 
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represented  as  a  meaningless,  morbid,  and  objectionable  finale  to  a  life.  It  is  this 
ending  which  is  wholly  disparate  from  the  more  ―romantic‖  endings  of  a  realist, 
figurative  death,  such  as  those  of  Jane  Eyre  and  Emma.  Addie‘s  social  death  is 
precisely the death that the realist novelists‘ avoided insofar as an abject after-history 
of  social  death  could  only  detract  from  the  reader‘s  interpretation  of  the  ―elevated‖ 
hero‘s meaning.  
  This escape of the character from outliving his or her projects and social death 
is also the escape of the reader into a form of inauthenticity—an escape from his or her 
own  undesirable  possibilities  of  outliving  their  own  projects  or  of  outliving  life.  The 
figurative death reflects a romantic assumption that the meaningfulness that comes 
from figurative death is also true of real, actual death thereby creating the reader‘s 
inauthentic belief that the questions ―And now what?‖ or ―What happens next?‖ are 
redundant questions.  
 
The Absurd Character of Anti-Closure: Holden Caulfield and Stephan Dedalus 
 
This description of figurative death has focused solely on realist novels which, despite 
effecting  the  illusion  that  a  character‘s  life  ―continues  on‖  beyond  the  end  of  the 
discourse, are very much closed narratives. However, the question we must now ask 
is: How do we interpret the endings of characters in novels that are considered ―anti-
closural‖?
60  These  types  of  endings  are  commonly  found  in  modernist  and 
postmodernist  fiction,  where  the  lives  of  the  characters  have  a  more  convincing 
―appearance‖  of  being  ―open-ended‖  and  undetermined,  or  are  absurd.  The 
significance of anti-closural novels and the interpretation of the meaning of their open-
ended  characters  is  that  their  relationship  represents  the  flipside  of  the  complete 
meaningfulness that a figurative death gives a realist novel‘s closed character: instead 
of  the  realist  novel‘s  interpretability  of ―complete  meaningfulness,‖  there  is  only  the 
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absurdity of interpreting incomplete, open-ended characters. They are absurd because 
of the futile activity of speculating on the lives of open-ended characters—an activity 
somewhat  ―superficially‖  encouraged  in  the  closed  realist  novel  but  ―overtly‖ 
encouraged in the anti-closural novel. The absurdity of the open-ended character and 
the absurdity of speculating on the future of the open-ended character can best be 
understood if we examine their similarities to Sartre‘s claims relating to the ―absurdity of 
premature death.‖ Sartre begins his discussion on the absurdity of premature death by 
stating that ―my death‖—my own individual death, that no-one can do for me—―can not 
be foreseen for any date. . . . (I can die at the age of a hundred or at thirty-seven, 
tomorrow).‖
61 Therefore, although death can be expected, it cannot be waited for in 
days, weeks, or years. For Sartre, this is one of the unique qualities of death: it is a 
―surprise‖ as death is the ―always possible nihlation of my possibles, a nihlation outside 
my possibilities. It is . . . the project which destroys all projects and which destroys 
itself.‖
62 Death can always come before the end,
63 where the ―end‖ does not simply 
mean the end of our lives—the temporal and biological boundary of our lives—but the 
completion of our meaningful project. As Sartre states, the harmony between death 
and  meaning  is rarely, if  ever,  like  that  of  a  resolved  chord—it  can ―cut  short‖  our 
meaningful  projects  and  render  the  project  incomplete  such  that  our  projects 
necessarily succumb to absurdity as they are directed toward an unattainable goal. 
Sartre uses a fictional example to illustrate his claims: 
 
[A] young man has lived for thirty years in the expectation of becoming a great writer, but 
this waiting itself is not enough; it becomes a vain and senseless obstinacy or a profound 
comprehension of his value according to the books which he writes. His first book has 
appeared, but by itself what does it mean? It is the book of a beginner. Let us admit that it 
is good; still it gets its meaning through the future. If it is unique, it is at once inauguration 
and testament. He had only one book to write; he is limited and cut off by his work; he will 
not be ―a great writer.‖ If the novel is one in a mediocre series, it is an ―accident.‖ If it is 
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followed by other better books, it can classify its author in the first rank. But exactly at this 
point  death  strikes  the  author—at  the  very  moment  when  he  was  anxiously  testing 
himself to find out ―whether he had the stuff‖ to write another work, at the moment when 
he was still expecting to become a great writer. This is enough to cause everything to fall 
into the undetermined: I can not say that the dead writer is the author of a single book (in 
the sense that he would have had only one book to write) nor that he would have written 
several (since in fact only one has appeared). I can say nothing. Suppose that Balzac 
had died before Les Chouans; he would remain the author of some execrable novels of 
intrigue. But suddenly the very expectation which this young man was, this expectation of 
being a great man, loses any kind of meaning; it is neither an obstinate and egotistical 
blindness nor the true sense of his own value since nothing shall ever decide it. It would 
be useless indeed to try to decide it by considering the sacrifices which he made to his 
art, the obscure and hard life which he was willing to lead; just as many mediocre figures 
have had the strength to make comparable sacrifices. On the contrary, the final value of 
this conduct remains forever in suspense; or if you prefer, the ensemble (particular kinds 
of conduct, expectations, values) falls suddenly into the absurd. Thus death is never that 
which gives life its meanings; it is, on the contrary, that which on principle removes all 
meaning from life. If we must die, then our life has no meaning because its problems 
receive  no  solution  and  because  the  very  meaning  of  the  problems  remains 
undetermined.
64 
 
The premature death of the writer throws his life into an indeterminable state. Instead 
of  stasis,  the  writer‘s  projected  life  prompts  only  questions  and  speculations; 
speculations which are in themselves absurd because of the inability to grasp the many 
contingencies that control one‘s future possibilities. And like the absurdity of premature 
death,  open-ended  fictional  characters  prompt  only  questions  that  relate  to  their 
undisclosed future. The open-ended character‘s life, like the writer‘s, is not closed and 
therefore  does  not  lend  itself  to  interpretability.  But  it  is  also  the  connection  of  the 
corporeality of existence which further binds these two examples: the dead writer—a 
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real existent—has ceased to exist, leaving a void of nothingness, such that it becomes 
uninterpretable;  similarly  the  character  of  the  novel  ceases  to  exist  beyond  the 
corporeal  boundary  of  the  book,  and  similarly  projects  into  a  void  of  nothingness 
thereby  becoming  uninterpretable.  This  void  of  nothingness  differs  from  the 
nothingness that lies outside of the realist novel simply because the realist novel does 
not project into this void with any conviction or purpose, whereas the anti-closural novel 
readily projects itself into the void. This is why the character of the anti-closural novel 
may be considered absurd and uninterpretable. More importantly, it can be said that 
these characters are of little value to the  shivering reader, especially the  reader of 
modern or postmodern fiction, as no answers to the reader‘s questions are found within 
the text. There is no closure and no synthesis of intention and revelation which are 
necessary for the accuracy and equanimity of interpretation and evaluation.  
  The sense of the absurdity of the open-ended character is exemplified by the 
closing paragraphs of the first-person narration of Holden Caulfield, in J. D. Salinger‘s 
The Catcher in the Rye (1945–46):  
 
That‘s all I‘m going to tell about. I could probably tell you what I did after I went home, and 
how I got sick and all, and what school I‘m supposed to go to next fall, after I get out of 
here, but I don‘t feel like it. I really don‘t. That stuff doesn‘t interest me too much right 
now. 
  A lot of people, especially this one psychoanalyst guy they have here, keeps asking 
me if I‘m going to apply myself when I go back to school next September. It‘s such a 
stupid question, in my opinion. I mean how do you know what you‘re going to do till you 
do it? The answer is, you don‘t. I think I am, but how do I know? I swear it‘s a stupid 
question.
65 
 
Holden tells the reader of a question he has been asked by his psychoanalyst: What is 
he going to do in the future? Ironically, this is a question that the reader could also ask 
of Holden. And Holden answers the question accordingly: he doesn‘t know—there are The End as Death and Closure 
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only possibilities spread out before him. And because it is a fictional story and because 
Holden‘s existence as raw story material ends on this final page, it would be absurd to 
speculate  on his future possibilities.  The reader cannot ask questions of what may 
become of Holden‘s life because nothing could come. This claim is further emphasised 
by Holden‘s lack of projection: it is not that there are too many possibilities from which 
the reader must choose (as even the binary of success or failure presents the reader 
with an absurdity), but because of Holden‘s lack of projection into the future. He does 
not know what the future may hold and he has no goal that the reader could begin to 
speculate on. The meaning of Holden‘s life is based purely on absurd speculation of 
the unknown. 
  The  indeterminacy  of  the  open-ended  character  is  also  exemplified  by  the 
character of Stephen Dedalus from James Joyce‘s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man—an  example  of  the  late  Bildungsroman.
66  A  Portrait  begins  with  Stephen‘s 
earliest memories as a child with his father reading him a bedtime story. However the 
NOW-story primarily focuses on his upbringing at an Irish catholic school. At the age of 
sixteen,  his  fear  of  God  prompts  Stephen  to  repent  a  sinful  past—his  childhood 
indiscretions. He confesses his sins and begins a pious life—a life of martyrdom and 
sacrifice. His piety leads to his being asked to join the order of the church; however, he 
quickly  realises,  upon  seeing  the  ―grave  and  ordered  and  passionless  life‖
67  of the 
priesthood, that it is not his calling. He proceeds to have what can be described as an 
existential beginning:   
 
His throat ached with a desire to cry aloud, the cry of a hawk or eagle on high, to cry 
piercingly of his deliverance to the winds. This was the call of life to his soul not the dull 
gross voice of the world of duties and despair, not the inhuman voice that had called him 
to the pale service of the altar. An instant of wild flight had delivered him and the cry of 
triumph which his lips withheld cleft his brain. 
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—Stephaneforos! 
  What were they now but cerements shaken from the body of death—the fear he had 
walked in night and day, the incertitude that had ringed him round, the shame that had 
abased him within and without—cerements, the linens of the grave? 
  His soul had arisen from the grave of boyhood, spurning her grave-clothes. Yes! 
Yes! Yes! He would create proudly out of the freedom and power of his soul, as the great 
artificer whose name he bore, a living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable, 
imperishable.
68 
 
Stephen‘s existential beginning signifies a new direction, a new possibility, which is a 
choice he has made for himself. Stephen chooses the meaningful project of ―artist‖—he 
writes poetry and, indeed, he is several times referred to as a poet. However, what 
becomes of this choice is not brought to a definitive conclusion. This indeterminism is 
illustrated by the final page of the novel, which comprises Stephen‘s last two diary 
entires: 
 
  April 26. Mother is putting my new secondhand clothes in order. She prays now, she 
says, that I may learn in my own life and away from home and friends what the heart is 
and what it feels. Amen. So be it. Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth time 
the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience 
of my race. 
  April 27. Old father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in good stead.
69 
 
The  novel  ends  with  Stephen‘s  journey  into  a  life  outside  of  the  novel‘s  pages,  a 
journey which marks the possibility of shaping Stephen‘s project of becoming an artist 
and  show  whether  Stephen  continues  on  this  chosen  path  or  whether  he  ―begins‖ 
again. And his ―success‖ as an artist is also called into question as the evidence of his 
potential  is  mixed  and  speculative  insofar  as  the  character  of  Stephen  is  partly 
identifiable with Joyce himself (who many would argue is not a ―mediocre‖ writer), but 
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also  because  of  the  many  similarities  and  differences  between  the  Stephen  of  A 
Portrait and the Stephen of Joyce‘s earlier work Stephen Hero which he revised to form 
A Portrait.
70 However, one can nevertheless speculate on Stephen‘s future. One such 
speculation is from William York Tindall who argues that within the text of A Portrait 
there is evidence that Stephen will not be a success: 
 
Aside from his weekly essay at school and the verses composed in bed with creator‘s 
ardour  to  an  accompaniment  more  seraphic  than  the  occasion  warrants,  Stephen‘s 
forgery  is  less  practical  than  theoretic:  ―he  was  striving  to  forge  out  an  esthetic 
philosophy.‖ From the evidence before us and whatever the title, Stephen is less artist 
than aesthetic philosopher—aesthete, in short, or man of letters. His interests, not only 
personal, are literary. Even in infancy he is fascinated by words (―belt‖ and ―suck,‖ for 
example);  and  his  adolescence  is  detained  by  the  words  ―detain‖  and  ―tundish.‖ 
Fascinated by rhythm, he esteems it  whether  in the supple periods  of Newman or in 
nonsense verses of his own composition. However internal his concerns and whatever 
the weakness of his eyes, each of his five senses is keen, a cause of trouble or delight. 
These are hopeful signs. The extent of his reading, displayed by quotation and allusion, is 
also impressive. If no artist yet, Stephen has some of the equipment. Potential or future 
artist  perhaps,  he  has  some  of  the  matter  from  which  an  artist  could  be  forged,  in 
whatever sense we take this pleasing and useful ambiguity. But, plainly, something is 
lacking there. 
  Since this ―artist‖ fails to become an artist or a complete forger, his portrait is not a 
story of success.
71 
 
Tindall argues that Stephen has the potential of becoming an artist; however, from 
Stephen‘s past choices and actions, which are described within the novel, this future 
possibility will not be successful—Stephen will not become an artist or at least not a 
successful artist. This argument is somewhat evidenced if we consider that Joyce‘s 
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intention  for  Stephen  was  not  to  be  a  particularly,  unique  individual  but  as  an 
―accumulation of identities. . . . For Joyce no individual is so unusual and no situation 
so distinct as not to echo other individuals and situations. Stephan Dedalus goes out to 
encounter reality for the millionth time.‖
72 Stephen was not meant to be portrayed as an 
outstanding individual, or as an outstanding artist, or as having ―supernatural power.‖
73 
And, yet, even if this intention of Joyce‘s does in some way support Tindall‘s claims, it 
does not negate the mistake made by Tindall (a mistake that we each inevitably make 
in most aspects of our lives) of predicting Stephen‘s future by looking to his past—a 
prediction that Sartre claims we cannot make. Indeed, the uncanny similarities between 
the  young  writer  of  which  Sartre  speaks  and  the  character  of  Stephen  Dedalus 
reaffirms the absurdity of predicting Stephen‘s future: in Tindall‘s opinion, Stephen‘s 
senses are keen and the extent of Stephen‘s reading is impressive and an artist could 
be forged from this matter; similarly, the writer‘s first book is good but it is that of a 
beginner.  However,  where  Sartre  proclaims  absurdity,  insofar  as  we  cannot merely 
guess whether this mediocre book is representative of those books that could follow or 
is merely a stepping-stone to a higher level of capability, Tindall proceeds to speculate 
and ossify Stephen‘s future.  
   
Anti-Closure and Intertextuality: Clarissa Dalloway and Antoinette Cosway 
 
Of course any attempt at the interpretation, evaluation and speculation of a character 
such as Stephen Dedalus is plagued with difficulty. This is because Stephen is not so 
open-ended and indeterminable in the way that Holden Caulfield appears to be. This is 
because  the  ―open-ended‖  Stephen  is  ―resurrected‖  by  Joyce  in  Ulysses,  albeit 
unceremoniously,  with  Buck  Mulligan‘s  exclamation  (having  borrowed  Stephan‘s 
handkerchief): ―The bard‘s noserag. A new art colour for our Irish poets: snotgreen.‖
74 
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Although the beginning of the story of Ulysses is set only a few months after the end of 
A Portrait the significance of the appellation of ―bard‖ is that Stephen is (in very general 
terms)  still  choosing  the  same  project  of  becoming  an  artist.  More  importantly,  the 
example of the open-ended character of Stephen illustrates how a character can be 
―added to‖ given a future where they once only had a past.  
  However, a character can be added to in two other ways. The first is where the 
future of an open-ended character is indirectly (yet purposefully) alluded to, either from 
within the text or from outside the text, thereby playing a major part in limiting the 
speculation of the open-ended character‘s future. This technique is exemplified by the 
character of Clarissa Dalloway in Virginia Woolf‘s Mrs. Dalloway in which there is an 
allusion to Clarissa committing suicide ―outside‖ of the story of  Mrs. Dalloway. This 
allusion is made explicitly by Woolf in her introduction to the Modern Library Edition of 
Mrs. Dalloway  where she states that she intended for Septimus Warren Smith, the 
shell-shocked World  War  One  soldier  who  takes  his  own  life,  to  be  the  double  of 
Clarissa.
75 Clarissa‘s possible suicide has a sense of imminence such that speculation 
of her death is somewhat justified, as is the claim that, because of the nearness of her 
death, Clarissa can be seen as somewhat of a complete, figuratively dead character 
and can be interpreted and evaluated by the reader as such. What was an open-ended 
character—open to speculation by the end of the text—is now a closed, whole and 
meaningful character, an implication made within the text itself. However, Clarissa‘s 
possible  suicide  is  somewhat  defused  from  outside  Mrs.  Dalloway  in  Michael 
Cunningham‘s  intertextual  novel  The  Hours  (1998).  Cunningham  represents  three 
stories of three women all of which somehow relate to the novel Mrs. Dalloway. The 
first character is Woolf herself. She is introduced in the ―Prologue,‖ the main action of 
which is Woolf‘s suicide, when she drowns herself near the family home in 1941. The 
story of Woolf then has a flashback to London in 1923, and become the main story. 
The second character is Clarissa Vaughan, a woman whose life mirrors the life of the 
character Mrs. Dalloway. The time and setting is the end of the twentieth century in The End as Death and Closure 
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New  York  City.  Like  Mrs.  Dalloway,  Clarissa  is  hosting  a  party  that  night  and  the 
duration  of  the  story-time  is  less  than  a  day.  There  is  also  a  connection  between 
Clarissa‘s friend Richard (whom the party is for) and Septimus as Richard also takes 
his own life by jumping out of a window only a few hours before the party is to begin. 
The third woman, Mrs. Brown, is reading Mrs. Dalloway. The time and setting is 1949 
in Los Angeles and the duration of her story is also less than one day. Mrs. Brown is a 
depressed woman, unable to understand how to be a mother to her son Richie and a 
wife to her husband Dan. She seeks immersion in a different reality—the reality of 
fiction—and she also contemplates taking her own life. Each of the three characters 
mirrors each other, and each is haunted by the act of suicide. Yet only Woolf actually 
takes her life within the story of the novel; the other two characters, however, do not. 
And, it would appear that they will not take their own lives in the near future, as is 
indicated in the story of Woolf who, when writing Mrs. Dalloway, explicitly states that 
Clarissa Dalloway ―will not die.‖
76 This essentially ―factual‖ statement may seem to be a 
contradiction to Woolf‘s claim that the suicidal Septimus is the double of Mrs. Dalloway. 
However, in The Hours, Woolf, it can be argued, does not say that Clarissa will never 
die or will not die soon or will never commit suicide, only that she will not die or die 
soon or commit suicide within the pages of Mrs. Dalloway. Indeed, Mrs. Brown, who 
does not take her own life within the story, could similarly commit suicide in the near 
future. This possibility is further strengthened when we discover that Mrs. Brown is 
Richard‘s  mother.  Richard‘s  suicide  could  easily  be  the  catalyst  for  the  haunting 
possibility of her suicide. Indeed, the stories of both Clarissa Vaughn and Mrs. Brown 
end at a very similar stage in life and both are affected by Richard‘s suicide. Again the 
reader is faced with the question of what will become of Clarissa Vaughn and Mrs. 
Brown. And again it would seem that suicide is a definite and imminent possibility for 
each  of  the  characters  as  each  of  the  characters  mirror  the  others  in  some  way: 
Septimus and Clarissa Dalloway; Clarissa Dalloway and Clarissa Vaughn; and Woolf 
                                                                                                                                           
75 See David Bradshaw‘s introduction to Mrs. Dalloway, by Virginia Woolf, xxi. 
76 M. Cunningham, The Hours, 211. The End as Death and Closure 
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and Mrs. Brown, both of whom suffer from bouts of depression and have an obsession 
with  death.
77  Mrs  Dalloway  is  a  very  special  case  of  a  fiction  where  the  reader‘s 
projection of the character‘s possibilities is viable.  However, this is not the case of 
―absurdist‖ postmodern fictions where there are little to no clues to  the possibilities 
which may lie ―outside‖ the discourse. Again we can consider the story of Oedipa Maas 
in Pynchon‘s The Crying of Lot 49 to illustrate this. As has been described, the plot of 
The  Crying  of  Lot  49  is  founded  on  suspended  meaning;  it  is  a  beginning  which 
disintegrates into indeterminacy, or as Thwaites writes, it is a beginning which ―is not 
resolved, but repeated, and even complicated in this repetition.‖
78 Here, words such as 
―ends,‖ ―revelations,‖ and ―answers‖ lose their poignancy. It should be noted that The 
Crying of Lot 49, like Mrs Dalloway and Anna Karenina has a discursive end—it has a 
final page with a full stop at the end of the final sentence; but, where Anna Karenina 
closes itself, and Mrs Dalloway, invites closure, The Crying of Lot 49 reveals the futility 
of projection. This is to say that to project beyond the text is to project an absurdity. 
Indeed,  where  Woolf  seemingly  invites  the  reader  to  draw  conclusions  and  infer 
possibilities, the reader of Pynchon‘s novel is reluctant to engage in such an activity, 
which is precisely the aim of the absurdist novelist: to uncover the futility of our serious 
endeavours to make meaning of our projects through their future ends—the futility of 
our attempts to understand our individual deaths and how they relate to the ends within 
a quiet, godless universe. The consequence of course is that the shivering reader is 
not warmed by closure; if anything, his or her anxiety is prolonged and intensified.  
  The second way in which a fictional character can be added to is when the life 
of a biologically dead, ―closed‖ character  is ―reopened‖ and added to such that the 
character becomes more rounded—more rounded by adding detail to the character‘s 
past. This form of ―resurrection‖ is exemplified in Jean Rhys‘s  Wide Sargasso Sea 
                                                 
77 Of course, what must also be acknowledged is that, unlike the relatively young characters of 
Holden Caulfield and Stephen Dedalus, Clarissa Dalloway is much older, and it can be said that 
the wholeness and shape of her life has become much more determined, despite the lack of 
discourse devoted to her past. Clarissa‘s future choices, intimated by the openness of her 
character, would have little bearing on the interpretation and evaluation of the whole of her life, 
such that, once again, she is essentially a closed and interpretable character.    
78 Thwaites, ―Miracles,‖ 270. The End as Death and Closure 
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(1966). Rhys reworks the character of Antoinette Cosway/Bertha Mason from Charlotte 
Brontë‘s Jane Eyre and in doing so gives the flat character of Bertha—hitherto known 
only as the mad woman locked away in the ―attic‖ of Thornfield—a fuller history and 
distances her from Jane Eyre‘s description of Bertha as a ―clothed hyena‖ with ―purple 
face‖ and ―bloated features.‖
79 Indeed, from Jane Eyre‘s description it would seem that 
Bertha  is  unrecognisable  as  a  human  being,  let  alone  as  an  individual  with  a 
meaningful life and meaningful projects. She is without voice except for her animalistic 
growling,  her  fierce  cries  and  maniacal  bellowing.
80  Her purpose is that of a plot 
function, and is of little to no value to the  shivering reader. However, in Rhys‘s Wide 
Sargasso Sea, the events of Antoinette‘s life—prior to those described in Jane Eyre—
are  recounted  from  Antoinette‘s  first-person  point  of  view.  Rhys  gives  Antoinette  a 
voice and gives her purpose: she chooses and acts and she has a personal narrative 
with  meaningful  projects.  And  Antoinette  is  given  roundness—she  is  no  longer 
marginalised,  but  becomes  the  centre  of  the  story.  It  is  around  her  life  that  the 
meaningful story takes place. What is also interesting is that Bertha dies within the 
discourse of Jane Eyre which would theoretically make her complete and interpretable; 
and yet she is far from being a round character and cannot be interpreted with any 
accuracy. However, when the two texts are ―conflated,‖ Antoinette/Bertha becomes a 
properly  round  and  interpretable  character.  And  for  the  shivering  reader, 
Antoinette‘s/Bertha‘s life becomes ―valuable.‖
81   
    
Vicarious Endings, Closure, and the Inauthentic Reader 
 
I  have  suggested  that  open-ended  characters  are  of  lesser  value  to  the  shivering 
reader than both figuratively and biologically dead characters, because they represent 
                                                 
79 Brontë, Jane Eyre, 328. 
80 Ibid. 
81 The example of Antoinette/Bertha also prompts questions relating to the ownership of a 
character‘s life and the rights over the meaning of a character‘s life: Does the life and the The End as Death and Closure 
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the absurdity of incompleteness. Indeed, they may be seen as less valuable as they 
reflect the reader‘s own lack of wholeness and completion. It is this lack of wholeness 
and completion which brings us to one final way in which the novel, particularly the 
realist novel, can warm the shivering reader: the closed realist novel can warm the 
shivering  reader  vicariously  as  the  reader  can  experience  that  which  cannot  be 
experienced in his or her own life, namely death and the closure of death. Indeed, 
throughout this thesis, it has been argued that the shivering reader cannot experience 
death until he or she is dying; therefore, shivering the reader looks to others—other 
people—but  also  fictional  characters  to  experience  the  unknowable  experience  of 
death. However, the shivering reader also desires meaning and closure in an absurd, 
infinite world which will continue to exist with or without his or her individual life. The 
shivering reader cannot experience death and thus cannot experience wholeness and 
closure nor meaning within an infinite world. As Heidegger describes: 
 
As long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its ―wholeness.‖ But if it gains 
such ―wholeness,‖ this gain becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-world. In such a case, 
it can never again be experienced as an entity.
82 
 
The  shivering  reader  desires  an  ending  which  confers  completion,  closure,  and 
wholeness. The novel satisfies this desire as it escapes the absurdity that haunts the 
reality of human existence: the world of the realist novel does end—it is a finite world, 
with a beginning and an end—and the novel‘s characters‘ existence within this fictional 
world  also  ends.  The  characters‘  lives  and  the  closed  discourse  of  the  novel  are 
inextricably  linked:  one perpetuates the  existence  of  the  other.  And  the  characters‘ 
existence ends regardless of whether they are biologically dead or figuratively dead—
they are closed and whole and they have meaning within their fragmented fictional 
                                                                                                                                           
meaning of a character‘s life belongs to the character‘s creator or is the character an open-
ended ―text,‖ vulnerable to appropriation, reinterpretation, and re-evaluation? 
82 Heidegger, Being and Time, 236H. The End as Death and Closure 
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worlds. This is why the shivering reader looks to the novel for vicarious warmth. As 
Torgovnick states:  
 
Individuals interrupt the flow of their own lives for immersion in the life of fiction to achieve 
the satisfaction of an ending. Our sense that fictions will end in part nurtures our desire to 
read them.
83 
 
The authentic shivering reader immerses him or  herself in the inauthentic mode of 
vicarious  satisfaction—the  inauthentic  warmth of  vicarious  wholeness  and  meaning. 
Where earlier  it was suggested that the shivering reader is warmed by the novel‘s 
representation of the fictional character‘s dying revelations—warmth derived from his or 
her  dying  wisdom—now  the  shivering  reader  desires  the  warmth  of  ignorance  and 
inauthenticity, as he or she immerses themselves in the pages of the finite novel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Torgovnick, Closure in the Novel, 4. Conclusion 
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Conclusion 
 
We began this thesis with two questions, one far more serious than the other: the first 
was the question, why does the novel reader read; the second, the question of the 
meaning of life. And we saw how both these questions were very much related: the 
reader reads to understand better the meaning of his or her life. More specifically, in 
the modern world, the novel reader is, as Benjamin claims, a shivering reader—an 
existentially anxious reader—having been thrown into the world without instruction or 
guidance. As has been argued, this is very much the case for the contemporary reader, 
where the secularisation and privatisation of death continues to be of cause for anxiety. 
Indeed, in a world of human and species finitude—a world of ecological crises and 
extinction prophesises—anxiety about meaning and purpose is not only justifiable but 
maintains its critical and theoretical poignancy. The shivering reader is faced with the 
perplexity of the abyss of unknown meaning; and because of this perplexity, the reader 
looks to the novel and its characters to warm his or her life—warm themselves with 
wisdom and insights into the creation and revelation of individual meaning. A reader 
finds  this  warmth  primarily  in  the  realist  novel,  especially  in  novels  such  as  Anna 
Karenina, Nostromo, The Tree of Man, and Jane Eyre. Indeed, the realist novel shows 
itself to be the most valuable form because its attributes and conventions provide the 
warmth sought by the reader. These attributes and conventions relate to the structure 
of the narrative which, being linear, has an identifiable beginning, middle, and end. 
Further, characters choose meaningful projects—projects which create the meaningful 
structure of the story. These stories begin with the characters‘ primary or secondary 
meaningful choices and come to an end with their actual or figurative death. It is only in 
the  end  that  the  meanings  of  the  characters‘  choices  are  revealed;  it  gives  the 
characters a sense of wholeness, but also gives the reader a sense of closure. The 
realist novel is also valuable because readers can readily identify with its characters Conclusion 
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and can immerse themselves in the characters‘ stories. These valuable attributes and 
conventions of the realist novel are further emphasised when contrasted with novels 
that  intentionally  or  unintentionally  defy  such  conventions,  particularly  those  novels 
which fall into the category of the postmodern novel. We have considered examples 
such as Pynchon‘s The Crying of Lot 49 and Gravity’s Rainbow, and Sterne‘s Tristram 
Shandy  and  Rushdie‘s  Midnight’s  Children.  Each  of  these  novels  purposefully 
undermines the shivering reader‘s sense of an ending, and his or her vicarious closure. 
The shivering reader‘s need for the meaningfulness of tick-tock so as to make sense of 
his or her own life is frustrated by the tick-tock-tick of the modern novel or the tock-tick 
or tick-… of the postmodern novel. Moreover, metafictional novels such as Tristram 
Shandy and Midnight’s Children continually remind the reader that he or she is reading 
fiction, denying the ―reality‖ of the texts and thereby undermining their value to the 
shivering reader.   
  However,  in  the  postmodern  world—the  world  of  printed  text  as  well  as 
hypertext (electronic text) and electronic books (e-books)—it is not only the content of 
the postmodern novel which can undermine its value to the shivering reader, but the 
presented discourse, or the form of representation, itself. Indeed, in the world of the 
computer and virtual images, the ―corporeal‖ book appears obsolete:  
 
So long as the text was married to a physical media, readers and writers took for granted 
three  crucial  attributes:  that  the  text  was  linear,  bounded,  and  fixed.  Generations  of 
scholars and authors internalised these qualities as the rules of thought, and they had 
pervasive social consequences. We can define Hypertext as the use of the computer to 
transcend  the  linear,  bounded,  and  fixed  qualities  of  the  traditional  written  text.  .  .  . 
Instead of facing a stable object—the book—enclosing an entire text and held between 
two hands, the hypertext reader sees only the image of a single block of text on the 
computer  screen.  Behind  that  image  lies  a  variable  textual  structure  that  can  be Conclusion 
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represented on the screen in different ways, according to the reader‘s choice of links to 
follow.
1 
 
A pertinent example of a novel which would benefit the reader if recast as hypertext is 
Joyce‘s Ulysses—a novel in which an editor‘s explanatory endnotes often supplement 
the main text. Instead of the reader physically flipping through the pages to see these 
endnotes,  a  hypertext  version  would  enable  this  information  to  be  more  readily 
accessible—a  hyperlink  would  retrieve  this  information  immediately  without  losing 
one‘s  page. Take, for  example,  the many  Dublin  slang terms,  such  as  scutter  and 
bowsy,
2 which riddle Ulysses: instead of the reader having to search for the meaning of 
the words at the back of the book, disrupting the reading process, the meanings can be 
accessed  immediately.  Further,  a  hypertext  version  of  Ulysses  could  also  be 
interspersed  with  hyperlinks  to  supplementary  information  ―outside‖  or  ―behind‖  the 
novel‘s text, such as various introductions to the text, histories and maps of Dublin, but 
also to other works, including Homer‘s Odyssey, and Shakespeare‘s Hamlet—both of 
which  have  a  significant  connection  to  Ulysses.  The  same  benefits  of  hypertextual 
representation could assist the reading of Pynchon‘s The Crying of Lot 49. Indeed, on 
the first page alone of Pynchon‘s chaotic novel, hyperlinks could connect the reader to 
a history of the Tupperware brand, maps of both Mazatlán and Cornell University, a 
rendition of Bart￳k‘s Concerto for Orchestra, and an auto/biography of Jay Gould.
3  
  However, for the shivering reader there is an unwanted side-effect to this wealth 
of supplementary information, namely that these connecting hyperlinks may also lead 
to further hyperlinks, such that the discourse of the novel, and the meaning of the 
novel,  is  ever-expanding  and  cannot  be  closed;  and  as  such  meaning  cannot  be 
localised, a centre found or pinned down. Indeed, Tristram Shandy‘s and Midnight’s 
Children‘s Saleem Sinai‘s stories affirm the difficulty of grasping a whole text as they 
are  essentially  ―hypertextual‖  representations;  what  is  more    they  reflect  the 
                                                 
1 Delany and Landow, eds., Hypermedia and Literary Studies, 3. 
2 In Dublin slang, scutter is a dismissive term and means a watery stool; whereas Bowsy is 
Dublin slang for a worthless fellow. See Declan Kiberd‘s notes to Ulysses, by Joyce.  Conclusion 
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possibilities of the new, virtual medium of the computer age. Within the world of the 
hypertextual novel there is an  absence of definitive meaning, reflecting postmodern 
culture‘s  resistance  to  such  definitive  meaning.  As  a  book  or  as  hypertextual 
representation,  these  postmodern  fictions  lack  the  warmth  sought  by  the  shivering 
reader. Indeed, the solution to the problem of textual limitation by enabling access to 
more information—more than can be written—only exacerbates the problem for the 
shivering reader. 
  Of  course,  realist  novels  can  also  be  ―hypertextualised‖—represented  as  e-
books—where hyperlinks may guide the reader to further information about the author 
and the novel‘s historical context; however, for the benefit of the shivering reader, this 
supplementary information does not necessarily compromise the ―closedness‖ of the 
realist  novel‘s  characters  because  the  realist  novel  is  essentially  a  self-sufficient 
―system‖. The novel begins and ends within the novel‘s pages, such that the novel and 
its characters remain complete and whole. The medium by which the realist novel is 
represented does not compromise its closed meaningful narrative. There is, however, a 
drawback to the hypertextual version of the realist novel, namely its lack of corporeal 
boundaries—boundaries which reflect the closed structure of the realist narrative but 
are also important for the reader‘s interpretation and evaluation of the realist novel‘s 
characters.  When  reading  a  book,  the  reader  can  see  a  character‘s  past  and  a 
character‘s future as pages existing in space and time. The reader can physically see, 
at a glance, the whole, complete world of the realist novel and the whole meaningful life 
of the character within this world.  
  Thus, we can say that it is not only the closed, interpretable world of the realist 
novel that best warms the shivering reader, and is of value to the shivering reader, it is 
also  the  closed,  corporeality  of  the  print  medium—the  book—which  symbolises  the 
closed, interpretable world of the realist novel. The shivering reader looks to the realist 
representation of the fictional Other, printed on the pages of the book before them, 
because  it  lends  itself  to  closedness  and  interpretability.  And  from  this  closed 
                                                                                                                                           
3 All of which have a reference in the free online encyclopaedia Wikipedia. Conclusion 
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interpretation, the reader gains some form of wisdom and insight into both the creation 
and revelation of meaning, and some understanding of the true meaning of his or her 
own life before the revelation of meaning in death. By looking to fictional characters 
such as Levin, Anna Karenina, Ivan Ilyich, Nostromo and Jane Eyre, the reader can 
better understand what it is that makes life meaningful and what death reveals of that 
meaning; the reader can see how these characters achieve their desired outcomes of 
their meaningful choices by looking to the representation of what is essentially their 
whole lives. But the reader can also gather some understanding of what it means to 
have a whole meaningful life—an understanding that the living reader can only know of 
vicariously, as only in death does the reader gain wholeness. The warmth of fiction for 
the shivering reader is therefore both the warmth of knowledge and warmth of vicarious 
endings, both of which are derived from the dead lives of the realist novel‘s characters. 
  In closing, it must be noted that this desire is not particular to the Victorian 
reader  or  the  pre-postmodern,  twentieth  century  reader.  It  a  desire  also  for 
contemporary (postmodern) readers—a desire which is being met  by  contemporary 
realism. As Julie Scanlon writes in ―Why do we still want to believe? The Case of Annie 
Proulx‖:   
 
Contemporary realism stands as an uncanny shadowing of the supposedly more avant-
garde forms that developed correlative to such shifts. Its very persistence intimates reality 
is biting back in other ways,  an undercurrent to the mainstay of contemporary critical 
perceptions, an undercurrent that exhibits desire for the possibility of a reality and the 
potential for its representation.
4 
 
The contemporary reader still wants to believe, or chooses to believe, in fictional worlds 
even if the reader knows these worlds are fictional. Further, the contemporary reader 
chooses to believe in fictional worlds even if the fictionality of these worlds is clearly 
acknowledged  by  their  contemporary  authors.  Scanlon  cites  Annie  Proulx  as  an 
                                                 
4 Scanlon, ―Why do we still want to believe? The Case of Annie Proulx,‖ 89.   Conclusion 
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example  of  an  author who  acknowledges  the fictionality  of  a  work  and  yet  desires 
realism as she ―consciously presents herself as a storyteller who bases her fictions on 
facts.‖
5 And it is in Proulx‘s The Shipping News that we see this desire in practice as 
she employs classical realist techniques such as faith in mimesis, and the placing of 
the story in a real location: Newfoundland. But the desire for realism is also found in 
Proulx‘s  novel‘s  reception  as  The  Shipping  News  was  ―critiqued  for  providing  an 
inaccurate picture of Newfoundland.‖
6 What is implied by this comment is that both the 
reader and writer  desire realism—the fictional representation of reality. But, as  has 
been argued in this thesis, it is not only a reaction against postmodern theory which 
has sparked the desire for fictional realism: it is also the ever-present desire of the 
shivering reader. Indeed, the shivering reader has not disappeared—the questions of 
the meaning of life have not been answered. The shivering reader is, today, still looking 
to others—real people—for answers to the questions of meaning; and if the reader 
cannot find these answers in the real Other, then he or she can look to the fictional 
Other. Clearly this need has a unique connection to the reader‘s desire for realism: the 
reader is looking to realistic representations of the lives and deaths of characters within 
the realist novel‘s closed revelatory structure. Indeed, in a quiet, godless world, where 
no  instruction  is  given,  it  is  these  closed,  realist  characters,  found  in  past  and 
contemporary fiction, that best warm the shivering reader with the wisdom and insight 
to choose and create a meaningful life.  
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